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CHINA AWAKENED

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(*Photo by Yung Kwong, Peking*)

His Excellency Hsu Shih-ch'ang, President of the Chinese Republic.

CHINA AWAKENED

BY

MIN-CH'IEN T. Z. TYAU, LL.D. (London)

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With Special Honorific Endorsement by His Excellency Hsu Shih-ch'ang, President of the Chinese Republic, as well as Introductions by Right Honorable Sir John Newell Jordan, K.C.B., K.C.M.G., G.C.I.E., etc., and the Honorable Charles R. Crane, United States Minister to China.

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PREFACE

MY friend, Mr. M. T. Z. Tyau, has written to me from Peking and asked me to furnish him with a Preface to a new book which he proposes to publish.

Judging from the summary of the contents which accompanies Mr. Tyau's letter, the work will cover a very wide and formidable array of subjects, some of which give room for difference of opinion. Although I have every confidence in the author's judgment and discretion, it is possible that I may not be in entire agreement with some of the views to which he gives expression.

With this reservation, I heartily recommend Mr. Tyau's book to the notice of the reading public. I do so for two reasons. In the first place, Mr. Tyau is an experienced publicist whose previous writings have met with a favorable reception, and secondly, I welcome every honest attempt to elucidate the problems of the Far East and to secure, if possible, for that part of the world some slight portion of the attention which is now exclusively devoted to clearing up the aftermath of the Great War.

Our knowledge of China has hitherto been mainly drawn from books written by foreigners, and it is only within the last few years that the Chinese have themselves recognized the necessity of making their country better known to the outside world. This is a distinct gain, for China has suffered much from misrepresentation in the past and deserves a fair hearing.

"China Awakened" will give a full account of the great intellectual, moral and material transformation which the country is undergoing and of the new forces which are at work in every department of the national life.

People at a distance are apt to regard the unrest which, in recent years, has been almost chronic in China, as an indication of the country's hopeless condition. To those who recall the political apathy of the past and have the advantage of

studying the present situation close at hand, the discontent which now prevails appears to be a hopeful augury of a better order of things.

Public opinion, which was formerly nonexistent or inarticulate, is now a growing and powerful influence, and even the Students' Movement, much as it has been criticized, is a factor which no Government can afford to ignore. Pseudo-militarism is still the bane of China and until the *Tuchunate* is abolished, there can be little hope of any improvement in the Administration.

But sooner or later the pacific instincts of the people will reassert themselves and sweep away this noxious excrescence. And then China will gradually win its way to the place in the family of nations to which it is entitled by the extent of its territory, the innate worth of its people, and its great historical past.

J. N. Jordan.

Harrogate, England.
August 7, 1920.

INTRODUCTION

THOSE who would understand the problems of Far Eastern countries and the perplexing features of their international relations need to realize and constantly remember that until recently Western Europe and Eastern Asia had almost no contact. They stood back to back, with insulating and isolating mountain ranges, deserts and seas between them. The cultures of the two regions developed quite independently each of the other. Moreover, the civilizations of the East were old before those of the West were new. It is not easy, but it is important, to grasp the full significance of the fact that the foundation and framework of Chinese life, even to-day, is a system of social, political and economic norms which was already mature when Athens and Sparta were in the making.

When in the course of time the Westerner brought his religion, his aggressive determination to trade, and his superior fighting equipment to the Far East, he came without invitation. Where he found himself opposed, he forced his way in. For the most part, he was as ignorant of the men of the East as were they of him; he was more intolerant of their manners and customs than they were of his; but he was above all utterly impatient of their calm confidence in the immutable superiority of their ancient institutions and methods.

Predictions of futility and folly notwithstanding, the West *has* tried to "hustle" the East—and, after periods of resistance, the nations of the East have one after another yielded to the pressure of Occidental influence and have quickened their steps.

China, the oldest, the largest, the most numerously populated, possessed of the most firmly rooted indigenous institutions, has naturally been one of the slowest among Far Eastern states in accepting the logic of the Occidental impact. It took a long time and hard knocks to persuade the Chinese that there was anything useful for them to learn from the

West; it took further time to bring them to the conclusion that some at least of these things they *must* learn; and it took yet more time for them to realize that there was any hurry about the matter. And because of her size and her antiquity and the substantial character of her civilization, China cannot—and it should not be expected of her—change otherwise than slowly.

China is, however, certainly awake. A goodly number of her sons, both young men and old, and a surprising number of her daughters are cognizant of the dangers which menace her and are alive to the necessity of bringing to the nation modern education, improved instruments, new methods, to the end that their country may survive and prosper in the competition of modern international existence. They know that a vast handicap of ignorance must be overcome, both among their own people and among those of other countries. They are, as were their ancestors when first the West came to the East, more tolerant of the Occident than the Occident is of them—yet none too tolerant at that. And they are at last impatient—which is not to be wondered at; but in their impatience together with that of other countries toward them there lie both the good and the evil potentialities of high explosives. The family of nations desires the presence of a united, independent Chinese Commonwealth, strong politically, economically and morally. The realization can be achieved only by patient, constructive effort on the one side and patient, sympathetic assistance on the other. In the process, China should be so treated by the other nations that she may follow her natural inclination and habit to develop peacefully; she should not be so menaced and harassed as to feel obliged to add the modern military establishment, burdens and practices to the rest of her Western acquisitions.

That China's achievements and problems are all too little understood is due in part to lack of adequate surveys and interpretations of the country and its people by the Chinese people *themselves*. Like a proud family of long line, the Chinese, with their forty centuries of honorable achievement have been indifferent to, in fact oblivious of, any call for self-explanation or advertisement. They have left it to the inquisitive foreigner to find out what he may and tell what he pleases about them.

It is therefore interesting and gratifying to find Chinese publicists now taking up the task of telling the world what China is, what she is doing, and what she is hoping to do. China is indeed becoming articulate—and this is a most encouraging sign.

China has been asking the help of other nations. "Is the Republic worth helping?" Dr. Tyau asks this question, and in the chapters which precede it in this book he sets forth a comprehensive array of facts on the basis of which he ventures to suggest the reply. He shows, among other things, how China is traveling the same road that has been traveled by some other nations, and how China needs, as others have needed, time, sympathy, and generous encouragement. Dr. Tyau is one of the foremost of China's contemporary publicists. Educated in England, he has taught for several years in the well-known Chinese-American College, Tsing Hua, popularly known as the "Indemnity College." He has written authoritatively upon questions of International Law, especially those which are most closely related to China's foreign relations. During recent years he has lived the life, thought the thoughts, and expressed the ideas of Young China at the nation's capital. Within the past year he has published a most substantial volume in which are to be found an Oriental student's impressions of life in London. As the present volume goes to press he will be on his way to join the Delegation which his Government has sent to represent China's interests in the councils of the League of Nations.

It is a pleasure to wish both the book and its author "Godspeed" in the service of "China Awakened."

CHARLES R. CRANE.

American Legation.
Peking, November 8, 1920.

FOREWORD

THANKS to the Shantung Question the world has come to know more about China and the Chinese. Just because the Republic is so far away, the average Westerner little cares to know about it. But when its delegates refused to sign the Versailles Treaty, thus throwing the distinguished assembly gathered at the historic ceremony into "great commotion and perturbation," the man in the street began to stop and think. No one dreamed that China, the amiable old man, would dare pluck up so much courage as to assert his undeniable dignity. But even a worm would turn, and so he has stoutly declined to submit to further spoliation.

Consequently, China and Shantung are ever on the lips of men and women to-day. Added to this is the remarkable awakening of four hundred million people—an awakening impelled by all and sundry attempts to throttle and strangle. Here is a theme fit for the bards: who is there with a spark of patriotism and independence, be he politician or scholar, merchant or farmer, journalist or student, that will not pause and reflect?

In the past China has been much misunderstood. The "Big Four" at Paris are said to have awarded Shantung to Japan because of the secret agreements of February-March, 1917; but it is at least open to doubt if these agreements would be given any weight if the Allies, for example, had jointly invested $100,000,000 in Shantung province.

To-day the situation is almost reversed. If the Middle Kingdom could be despoiled twenty or forty years ago, he will be a brave man who dares now breathe the word. And if the old, decrepit Empire of the Manchus was looked down upon, the Republic of China is to-day very much respected. Thanks to the Chinese people's determined crusade against opium, thanks to their bloodless Revolution and overthrow of absolutism, and thanks to their courage to live or die with the Shantung question, "China stands higher at this moment in

the estimation and confidence of the world than ever before in her history."

Here is indeed food for furious thought: the hows and whys for this complete reversal in the world's estimate of a hoary civilization. An answer to these hows and whys will be found in the following pages. If the reader is to do justice to his or her inquisitive mind, the appendices at the end of this volume can in no wise be neglected. They are not separate from but a continuation of the main narrative.

The story of China's awakening is indeed an ambitious one. Within the covers of one volume, however, we have tried our best to present a picture that will explain the situation clearly as well as comprehensively—from educational reforms, intellectual rebirth, social transformation, improved communications and industrial progress to judicial reforms, self-respecting international attitude, rupture with the Central Powers, entry into the War and finally participation in the Peace Conference.

Politics and finance being difficult to unravel, we have purposely omitted them from our survey. The politics of any one country is baffling to a foreigner, and in China's case the complexities of the situation are multiplied at least tenfold. For example, there are to-day two parliaments sitting at Peking and Canton, respectively, and each calls the other illegal. As regards finance, the outlook is equally uninviting. The central exchequer is never filled to overflowing and the country is burdened with a heavy foreign debt, although this works out at only £1 per head in comparison with Great Britain's £200 per head. Then there are the operations of foreign banks in China and their issue of paper currency, to complement those of Chinese banks. Imports are still in excess of exports, and the situation is complicated by the existence of various kinds of taels, although the popular unit of exchange is the dollar and its subsidiaries. Finally under a weak central government, the provincial authorities are pretty well their own masters; hence the plethora of spurious coinage and hence the fluctuating exchange in different districts for the same tael or dollar.

But however disappointing the political or financial conditions may be, the outlook is bright enough if the people themselves and all that really matters are sound at the core. As the following pages will show, the people are sound and virile;

they only await an opportunity to resume their normal life and well-being. Given the time and opportunity for natural development, both political and financial stabilization will soon come to pass.

Even omitting politics and finance, our task is big enough. We have thrown our nets over an extensive area: if so, it is inevitable that a few fishes could not be caught. For example, owing to pressure of time we have not been able to carry out our original intention of adding to the Appendices a select bibliography on China. So the reader will have to rest content with the principal share of the catch.

We have to express our indebtedness to the numerous friends and public institutions or departments that have rendered assistance in the completion of this volume. But an especial debt of gratitude is due to His Excellency Hsu Shih-ch'ang, President of the Chinese Republic, for the courtesy of an honorific Endorsement as well as portrait; to Right Honorable Sir John Jordan—until recently His Britannic Majesty's Minister in China, where he has spent the greater part of his life and the government of which, in recognition of his numerous tokens of friendship for the Chinese people, has conferred upon him the highest possible decoration (First Class Order of Ta-shou Pao-kuang Chia-ho)—for the courtesy of an Introduction; to Honorable Charles R. Crane, the retiring United States Minister to China, for a similar courtesy; to Messrs. John E. Baker and F. T. Cheng for special assistance in the chapters on improved communications and judicial reforms; to the publishers of the *North China Daily News*, *China Press*, *Trans-Pacific*, *North China Commerce* and *Far Eastern Review*, for permission to use portions of articles which have already appeared in their columns; to those journals as well as friends who have kindly lent or supplied illustrations, and finally to my devoted wife who has inspired the writing of this volume as well as helped to read the proofs and compile the Index.

M. T. Z. T.

Peking, November, 1920.

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CHINA AWAKENED

CHAPTER I

EDUCATIONAL REFORMS

RESPECT for learning has always been proverbial in China: hence in the system of stratification known to this land of hoary civilization, the *literatus* or scholar comes before the farmer, the artisan, and the merchant. In our survey of the latest progress and development of the Far Eastern Republic, we can therefore do no better than commence with educational reforms.

In Western countries China has always been regarded as a land of inconsistencies. Whilst the forefathers of modern Europe ran wild in their primeval forests and painted their skins, the Middle Kingdom (as the Chinese denominate their country) was already a civilized state: yet to-day she is accounted only semi-civilized by Europe. Similarly, China was the land of first inventions—gunpowder, mariner's compass, the art of writing, etc.—yet to-day she is rated by military experts as but a second-class Power.

This inconsistency is also reflected in her educational system. Partly owing to the aristocratic nature of her system and partly due to the formidable difficulties of the written language, education is only for the few, not for the many. Consequently, side by side with the general respect for learning is the fact that there is a greater percentage of illiteracy in China than in perhaps any other country—one estimate contrasting one per cent. of illiteracy in Germany with ninety-five per cent. of that in the Middle Kingdom.

Such a state of affairs, of course, is intolerable; the Chinese, however, are a long-suffering race, and they will put up with many things from which the Westerner unmistakably shrinks

with horror. The people have been long kept under subjection, and it was to the interests of the ruling classes that the masses should continually remain in ignorance. Or as one conservative official put it:—"If you educate the people, you educate them at your peril: they will be enlightened, and then they will overthrow you."

But man can no more stem the onrushing tide of knowledge than King Canute could attempt to drive back the ocean. Hence the era of emancipation is bound to come, sooner or later. To the advocates of universal education, the dawning of that new era may have been painfully slow; but China is a land of prodigious dimensions, and one or two decades count like nothing to her four or five thousand years of existence.

The old educational system was conceived as a means to an end, not as a positive end in itself. Handed down from time immemorial, its aim was to build up talent and produce men of ability for the service of the country. This in itself is admirable, since the practice of selecting men for the civil service by special examinations is being copied in Great Britain and other countries. However, with the passage of time the wheels of such system got deplorably clogged, and education was sought principally as an avenue to entering official life.

Schools in the Western sense, therefore, did not exist: education was based largely on self-help or private help. The aspirant after knowledge is first taught or assisted by his parents and then sent to a private school—generally one established and supported by the family or clan. The textbooks placed before him are anything but easy; he does not understand what he reads; but all he has to do is to memorize the books and be able to recite them by rote. He plods on and wades through the classics as best he can, being gradually initiated into the priceless mysteries of the "Eight-Legged Essay" that will one day mean all the treasure to him. At the age of fourteen or upwards he starts on his worldly experience —namely, to try his luck at the first of the literary examinations. If he is successful he goes to the next higher examination, and so on each time until at last he appears before the emperor as the premier scholar of the realm.

All this seems to be innocent enough; unfortunately the system of examinations tends to encourage "the manufacture

of mental typewriters, where the stereotyped forms of antiquity are reproduced with but scant variety." The "Eight-Legged Essay," for example, was designed to keep alive classical learning through all generations; nevertheless, "it has been the liveliest factor in suppressing the desire for such knowledge." In fact, its only recommendation was according to an eminent Chinese statesman, that "it has repressed rebellion by keeping the minds of ambitious men cramped up by the pursuit of useless knowledge."

With the introduction of Western civilization and Western learning since the middle of the last century, serious doubts began to be entertained as to the advisability of continuing such a system, and the defeat of China in 1894-1895 by her island neighbor, Japan, opened people's eyes to the futility of the old. The regulations of the examinations were modified and candidates thenceforth were to qualify likewise in mathematics and other sciences. Then came the Boxer outbreak of 1900 and the severe punishment by foreign Powers. China was humiliated as it never had been before, and the ruling dynasty bowed to the inevitable. Almost simultaneously with the attempts to introduce the beginning of a constitutional form of government, the Manchus turned their backs on the old dispensation. In the memorable edict of September, 1905, the former system was abolished and a liberal system of modern education inaugurated. Then for the first time a proper government department was established for the supervision of the new system, and since then the Ministry of Education has discharged its arduous duties courageously.

Strange to relate, higher education was at first encouraged to the inexplicable neglect of elementary education, but shortly afterwards the oversight was remedied and attention paid to the establishment of kindergartens, elementary schools, and so on in the gradation upwards. The scholars of the old type were not fitted to tackle the new educational problem, and there was a dearth of teachers capable of giving the necessary instruction. Hence what are called Normal schools sprang up everywhere to train the required teachers as well as administrators.

As is only to be expected, the results have more than justified the innovation. While statistics are not always available, it is yet possible to tabulate the returns as follows:—

	1910	1914	1917	1919
Number of Schools	42,444	59,796	128,048	134,000
Number of Teachers	185,566	200,000	326,417	326,000
Number of Students	1,625,534	3,849,554	4,269,197	4,500,000

That is to say, there has been a steady increase all along the line. These figures do not include missionary or private institutions; if, however, the latter were included, then the total number of students registered for 1919 would be five million.

Considering the size of the Republic and the density of its population—namely, 4,278,352 square miles and 400,000,000 respectively—a paltry five millions is insignificant. Nevertheless, it is a sign of progress that whereas only one out of four hundred persons received any education in 1910, that proportion has in the space of nine years been reduced to one in eighty.

Besides, there are many other agencies which provide facilities of education to those unable to attend the ordinary schools. According to the latest comprehensive statistics, there are at present in the country no fewer than 175 libraries; 287 elementary libraries; 257 circulating libraries; 2,129 elementary lecture halls; 659 open air lecture booths; 1,727 newspaper reading rooms; 10 museums; 81 schools for backward students; 1,242 half-day schools for the poor and destitute; 37 open air schools; and 4,593 elementary reading schools.

These supplementary aids are for the less educated classes. If we include such also, then the number of pupils would be at least eight million, or one out of every fifty of China's population.

To the foreign public it may seem puzzling that the returns, satisfactory as they are, have not been higher. This is because the country has even now not yet settled down to serious reconstruction work: the political disturbances of the past nine years are enough to upset any well-meaning plans. As the present President of the Republic had it in one of his mandates promulgated immediately after his assumption of office in September, 1918:—"In recent years there has been chaos and confusion in the political life of China, and troubles have come from without and from within. As a result, education has made no decisive advance. In the provinces where

military operations have taken place, education has been neglected. School houses have been taken by force; books and apparatus destroyed; while funds allotted to education have been used for other purposes. . . . As soon as peace is fully restored, no delay should be made in the promotion of education."

Another equally effective reason is the lack of funds—notably to establish more schools than what actually exist to-day. For example, at the end of 1917 there were 119,007 lower primary schools; 7,862 higher primary schools; 437 middle schools; 181 normal primary schools; 7 higher normal schools; 477 technical schools (of all kinds); and 77 colleges and universities—a total of 128,048. Two years later the increase only netted an extra six thousand.

This is proved by the fact that whereas the appropriation for education in 1910 was $33,000,000, the expenditure for 1919 amounted to $40,000,000—an increase of only seven million dollars for an increase of three times the number of students. This is because during the last nine years the powers that be were military autocrats who administered the country in their own sweet way. Hence in the central government's budget for July, 1919—June, 1920, the appropriation for military purposes was $198,000,000, whereas that for education was one-thirtieth or $6,500,000!

Such an anomaly, of course, will soon pass away, just as it will not be long before the present militarists will soon make way for a real democratic government. But until then national education will continue to be handicapped, and the results will never be so satisfactory as one might have hoped.

Some idea of educational progress in the country may be gleaned from the following comparative statistics of four provinces—namely, Chihli, in which the national capital, Peking, is situated; Kiangsu, in which the premier port of the Republic, Shanghai, is situated; Chekiang, which is celebrated for its silks, tea, and romantic lake district; and Shantung, the birthplace of Confucius, China's greatest sage:—

	Chihli	*Kiangsu*	*Chekiang*	*Shantung*
Higher Normal College	1	1	.....	.....
Universities	3	2	.....	.....
Normal Schools	7	19	18	4
Commercial Schools	2	22	.....	13
Middle Schools	23	15	19	11

	Chihli	*Kiangsu*	*Chekiang*	*Shantung*
Industrial Schools	26	83	33	90
Higher Primary Schools	404	467	781	450
Primary Schools	15,152	6,508	8,014	16,400
Girls' Schools	582	?	?	200
Mission Schools	117	?	211	?
Private Middle Schools	4	9	4	3

The above figures are taken from "The Educational Directory and Year Book of China for 1920," an annual published at Shanghai under foreign auspices. The statistics concern chiefly government schools, whilst those of mission schools are not always given. A statement contained elsewhere in the same publication declares that there are now established in China by the Protestant missionary societies alone 581 higher primary schools, 256 middle schools, and 27 colleges and universities—a total enrollment of almost 196,000 students.

Kiangsu and Chekiang are two of the most advanced provinces, but are smaller than Chihli or Shantung in both density of population and extent of territory—the figures being as follows:—

	Population	*Area in Square Miles*
Kiangsu	26,920,000	38,600
Chekiang	22,690,000	36,670
Chihli	29,400,000	115,800
Shantung	38,000,000	55,970

This explains the apparent backwardness in some provinces which are known to be enlightened as well as the apparent progress in others not so generally credited. But the aforementioned statistics may be taken as typical of the gradual spread of modern learning.

In the conception of the Western public, a Chinese scholar is a veritable Buddha: serene and sedate, never gets excited or flurried, and speaks but seldom unless to utter words of Oriental wisdom. This is because of his old academic training. Education, according to the old system, is devoid of joy or pleasure except that perhaps of experts and professionals. "To study is beneficial: to play is useless," says the injunction handed down from time immemorial. So he takes life as well as his studies seriously.

To-day it is all changed, and education becomes both interesting and pleasurable. The tiny tots who attend a kindergarten no longer have to commence with such controversial philosophy as "Man's nature is radically good," but they

begin as children in Western countries do. They understand what they are taught and they are eager to display their new acquisition. Consequently, anywhere in the Republic children may be seen chalking or writing on unoffending walls, and if they have also been taught singing, they may be heard singing away, happy as skylarks, on their way to or from the school. This certainly is a decided asset of the new educational régime.

Besides, given the proper encouragement, boys and girls will always be boys and girls everywhere in the world. In the beginning their parents may be shocked at their new ways and manners—tricks and pranks dear to the hearts of true school children all over the universe—but the elders are quick to discern the change. For instead of being quiet, foolish-looking and half-alive, the children are now the embodiment of promising youth—happy and cheerful, strong and good-looking, the forerunners of a New China. Modern education not only instills healthy knowledge in a scientific manner, but also produces happy faces and promises a most hopeful future.

The quality of Chinese intellect is well-known, and Westerners never cease to wonder at the Chinese powers of memorizing books and volumes. But in the old system, the training of the intellect was overemphasized at the expense perhaps of the body: "to study is beneficial, to play is useless." This is now no longer true, and a sound mind is postulated in a sound body. The old decrepit scholar is universally tabooed and round shoulders are looked upon as anachronisms. Physical exercises, military drill, physical drill and athletics are becoming increasingly popular, and exhibitions of physical skill always draw vast crowds of interested spectators. In interior cities where the innovation is also gradually being introduced, the enthusiasm for *mens sana in sano corpore* is most keen, and a foreign onlooker testified to the fact that school girls were in one instance doing calisthenics in the direct line of fire of a school squad! And in one of these athletic meets there was an actual printing press on the field to publish the results of the events every hour!

As usual, the mission schools are the pioneers in this reform, and the example shown by their students is being emulated everywhere. Like other things athletics have come to stay, and the holding of the biennial Far Eastern Olympic Games

only serves to spur the enthusiasts forward. Success is the best of incentives; so the fact that Chinese athletes captured the first place at the Olympic Games in Shanghai, in 1915, has awakened healthy ambitions in every manly heart.

The following comparative tables of records will show the caliber of Chinese athletes. The results in China are collected from the best records made by schools, missionary as well as government, in different centers, between 1913 and 1920. The second column gives the records of the Far Eastern Olympic Games: the first of these was as already stated, held at Shanghai in 1915; the second, at Tokyo, Japan, 1917; and the third, at Manila, Philippine Islands, 1919. Each of the three countries—China, Japan and the Philippines—has in turn won the championship, and the next series will commence in Shanghai again, in June, 1921.

A COMPARISON OF ATHLETIC RECORDS

(A) OPEN CLASS

Events	*China*	*Far East*	*U. S. A.*	*World*
100-Yard dash	10 2/5"	10"	9 3/5"	9 3/5"
220-Yard dash	23 2/5"	23"	21 1/5"	21 1/5"
440-Yard dash	54"	51 1/2"	47"	47"
½-Mile run	2' 6 2/5"	2' 5"	1' 52 1/5"	1' 52 1/5"
1-Mile run	4' 50 4/5"	4' 50 4/5"	4' 12 3/5"	4' 12 3/5"
2-Mile run	11' 45"	.....	.....	.....
3-Mile run	17' 30 3/5"	.....	.....	.....
5-Mile run	30' 1 3/5"	29' 25 1/5"	24' 36 4/5"	.....
8-Mile run	49' 30 4/5"	47' 16"	.....	.....
10-Mile run	.....	55' 17 1/5"	51' 3 2/5"	.....
120-Yard hurdles	17 1/5"	16 1/5"	14 3/5"	14 3/5"
220-Yard hurdles	26 3/5"	26 2/5"	23 3/5"	23 3/5"
½-Mile relay	1' 40 4/5"	1' 33 1/5"	.....	1' 29"
1-Mile relay	3' 53 2/5"	3' 36"	.....	3' 18"
Running high jump	5' 9"	5' 7 3/4"	6' 7 5/16"	6' 7 5/16"
Running broad jump	21' 7"	21' 9 3/8"	24' 7 1/4"	24' 11 3/4"
Hop, step and jump	41' 11"	.....	50' 11"	50' 11"
Standing high jump	4' ½"	.....	5' 5 3/4"	.....
Standing broad jump	9' 2 1/2"	.....	11' 4 7/8"	.....
Pole vault	10' 9"	10' 10 3/4"	13' 2 1/4"	13' 2 1/4"
12 lb. shot put	42' 5 1/2"	.....	57' 3"	57' 3"
16 lb. shot put	29' 11 1/2"	37' 4 1/4"	51'	.....
Discus throw	104' 10"	109' 5 3/4"	145' 9 1/2"	156' 1 3/8"
Javelin throw	132' 1"	152' 4 1/2"	190' 6"	204' 5 5/8"
Pentathlon	345	359	.....	500
Decathlon	720	753	.....	1,000

(B) MIDDLE SCHOOL CLASS

	China	*U. S. A.*
100-Yard dash	10 4/5"	10 2/5"
220-Yard dash	24 4/5"	22 1/5"

(B) MIDDLE SCHOOL CLASS

440-Yard dash	58⅕″	53⅜″
½-Mile run	2′ 10⅗″	2′ 5″
1-Mile run	5′ 40⅖″	4′ 46⅘″
3-Mile run	18′ 29″	.....
½-Mile relay	1′ 46⅗″	1′ 32⅖″
1-Mile relay	4′ 6⅘″	3′ 27⅕″
120-Yard hurdles	17″	15⅖″
220-Yard hurdles	27⅘″	24⅖″
Running high jump	5′ 5″	6′ 3⅝″
Running broad jump	19′ 4″	23′ 1½″
Pole vault	9′ 8″	12′ 6½″
12 lb. shot put	38′ 11½″	55′ 9″
Discus throw	97′ 7″	139′ 5½″
Javelin throw	132′ 1½″	134′ 10″

Athletics in China are only one or two decades old, so the above records are highly gratifying. And the path having once been blazed, we may be sure that the trail will be eagerly followed up. Already foreign games are popular, and intercollegiate matches in football, basketball, tennis and athletic events are frequently held. Man to man, the Chinese athlete is no mean rival; hence in both North China and South China the lawn tennis champion is in each case a Chinese. This success is all the more noteworthy, since the contest was open to foreigners as well; and in South China the champion, a young Cantonese just out of his teens, is in 1920 the proud holder of the silver cup, having wrested it from his British opponents in Hongkong for three successive years.

Side by side with the popularity of athletics must be coupled the fact that physical education as a part of the regular curriculum is now taught in many institutions. In a few higher normal colleges, classes of future physical directors are being trained, and in at least one prominent college candidates for graduation must also have satisfied the examiners in various physical and agility tests. If nothing else will persuade a student to take care of his body, this regulation will certainly accomplish the desired result.

We have said that to-day one at least out of every fifty Chinese receives some sort of education. This is far from the ideal, so the Ministry of Education has prepared an ambitious program of compulsory universal education which merely awaits the magic touch of adequate funds to translate it into reality. This being most difficult to accomplish, meanwhile the initiative of pushing the scheme forward is left to the provincial governments. Already the province of Shansi,

under the enlightened administration of Governor Yen Hsi-shan, is known as the "Model Province" in this and other respects. The next best is the province of Kirin, where compulsory universal education is enforced notably in the provincial capital of the same name. As further illustrations of educational progress in the country, we append statistics of these two remarkable provinces:—

	Shansi	*Kirin*
University	1	..
Normal Schools	10	15
Commercial Schools	25	2
Middle Schools	19	6
Industrial Schools	27	6
Higher Primary Schools	300	109
Primary Schools	13,215	1,051
Girls' Schools	865	70
Mission Schools	86	18
Private Middle Schools	1	4
Law School	..	1
	14,549	1,283

By way of parenthesis it should be explained that Kirin is one of the northeastern provinces which, together with Fengtien and Heilungkiang, constitute Manchuria. It is not reputed to be one of the advanced districts, and there are only fifteen million persons to 363,700 square miles of the entire "Three Eastern Provinces," as Manchuria is denominated in Chinese. Shansi, on the other hand, is a historic center, over twelve million people occupying 82,000 square miles of territory.

All good things may, indeed, come by waiting; meanwhile Heaven helps those who help themselves. Pending the future provision of adequate funds which will make compulsory education universal in the Republic, there is now the encouraging movement in favor of adopting a new system of Chinese phonetics. As the resolution of the fifth annual conference of provincial educational associations, held in October, 1919, at the provincial capital of Shansi province, put it:—"The great obstruction to educational progress in China has been that of the bewildering variety of dialects and styles used in the provinces. Moderate reformers recommend the use of the simplified classical (*Wen-li*) style, while the more ardent ones advocate the exclusive use of the phonetic system. It is not unlikely that the ideal course would be the combination of both

systems, especially in view of the publication of a dictionary of phonetics."

This is an interesting departure from well-beaten paths. Because China is a land of huge dimensions and the facilities of communication are antiquated, there are at least a hundred different dialects spoken by the 400,000,000 people. Of these the most universally spoken is the Mandarin or official language, which is understood in two-thirds of the country. This language barrier being at times quite formidable, it was found desirable to bring about some sort of consolidation. Early in 1913, therefore, a sound unification conference was held in Peking, under the auspices of the Ministry of Education, to devise means to reduce the sounds of these numerous dialects to uniformity. After a session of over three months, a phonetic alphabet was invented. Forthwith it was taught in the Peking Phonetic Training School and tried for five years in a number of the higher normal colleges. The results were satisfactory, and the system has since been officially adopted as well as promulgated.

This new alphabet consists of thirty-nine symbols or letters, divided into three classes—24 initials, 3 medials, and 12 finals. The symbols or letters are chosen from archaic Chinese ideographs or characters, with somewhat newer sounds given to them. To denote the different tones of the words so as to express the required meanings—the Chinese language is monosyllabic—a little dot is placed by the side of the new letter, its position depending upon the tone desired. In this way the proper pronunciation of a word is also indicated—a great improvement over the old system—and so helps to increase the reading vocabulary of the less educated people.

That the phonetic alphabet is an undoubted reform is shown by the fact that the present Chinese language is really without an alphabet; it has over two hundred radicals or roots, by a combination of two or more of which ideographs or characters are formed. This, of course, makes the language so much the more difficult to learn. Hence a man may be accounted scholarly if he knows five thousand words of Shakespeare's tongue, but five thousand characters in China are regarded as only the ordinary working minimum of every-day life. Anything which helps to simplify the language is therefore to be welcomed, and the Mandarin dialect (*Kuan-hua*)

being understood most widely, is adopted as the national spoken language. A course in Mandarin is now compulsory in most schools, and the pronunciation transcribed in the "National Phonetic Dictionary" is to be followed.

As is to be expected, foreign languages are also taught in conjunction with Western sciences and other modern subjects. American and British missionary societies have done perhaps the most in planting the seeds of modern education, ever since the treaty of 1858 expressly permitted the propagation of Christianity in China; hence English is the most popular foreign language. To many it is the stepping stone to higher education, while to others it is the avenue to earning a decent livelihood in foreign business houses in the various treaty ports. English is the commercial *lingua franca* in the East, and it is really surprising how few people do *not* know it! Once a British traveler entered a Chinese shop in Hongkong to make some purchases, but opened the conversation with "Pidgin English"—a corrupt form of English employed especially by the uneducated servant class or small business men. Imagine his astonishment when he found himself face to face with an Oxford graduate who asked in perfect English what it was he exactly wanted!

Of course, such an experience is unusual; at the same time, it is much the safest policy to begin with proper business English, until the shop-keeper replies in less Shakesperean forms. At one time foreign employers were accustomed to receiving letters of application from Chinese, which were superb screamers; nowadays such Babu English as the following would each year be harder to find:—(A Chinese manager to a foreign customer) "We are much sorrowful to announcement you the butter you have order have expired, and the Cheese more three days gone before is finish. Next week we expecting catch new lots this cargos fresh butter and powerful cheese from Hongkong which is to be fit for you and we determining must execute them as per your esteem order."

Out of the mouths of babes words of wisdom shall be spoken; certainly, the innocent manager above quoted has hit the nail squarely on the head when he refers to the cheese from abroad as "powerful."

As may have already been noticed, great emphasis is also laid on female education. To the Western mind such a thing

need occasion no remark at all; but in the old Chinese system the benefits of education were denied to women. Such prohibition is unnatural; therefore, the mistakes of the past are being remedied, as will be seen in the chapter on the New Woman.

The question immediately arises: How about co-education? The reply is: It is yet to come. However much the radicals may wish to expedite the progress of their country, the fact remains uncontroverted that the conservatism of forty centuries can never be discarded in the space of one or two generations. It is only recently that the seclusion of the sexes has been somewhat relaxed; consequently most educators will think perhaps thirty times thrice before they adopt co-education. Thanks, however, to the new spirit which is abroad in the land, the pros and cons of the proposal are being keenly debated among Chinese intellectuals. And just as the British House of Commons has requited the nation's debt of gratitude for the war services of England's loyal womanhood by enfranchising six million women voters, so it seems intellectual China will now repay its debt. In a subsequent chapter will be discussed the remarkable Student Movement which has stirred the lethargic nation to its innermost depths; here suffice it to say that the girl students of the country have valiantly championed their brothers' cause and stuck to it through thick and thin—in order that democracy might soon prevail over the present régime of lawlessness and militarism. This splendid manifestation of patriotism contributed in no small measure to the success of the achievement; and in gratitude two prominent government institutions are now espousers of co-education.

It is noteworthy that even the mission schools—admirable guides for Chinese institutions—are hesitant about adopting this innovation, so cautious are they to refrain from anything which will antagonize the best Chinese opinion. The foreign missionary societies may establish girl schools attached to their schools and colleges for Chinese boys, but it was the Canton Christian College which boldly led in this notable direction. Canton being one of the earliest cities to come into contact with the outside world and therefore one of the most progressive, the experiment was considered warrantable. The other mission institutions, however, are content to bide their time.

Of Chinese schools Peking Government University is the first to lead in this respect. Commencing from the autumn of 1919 a handful of young ladies were admitted into the classes of male students. The innovation caused a great deal of comment, but it seems to have been justified. It is now announced that the experiment will be repeated during the next academic year (1920-1921). Similarly the Government Teachers' College at Nanking is emulating the University and plans to go a step further. Whereas the girls were admitted into Peking Government University merely as auditors, the Nanking institution has decided to admit them as regular students, beginning with the summer school of 1920. The students of the Teachers' College are the future school masters and school mistresses; so their comparative maturity in age and experience has much to recommend the feasibility of the scheme.[1]

One destructive criticism leveled against the old system was that classical learning alone was insufficient to start a man in life. If the aspirant after official honors were brilliant, his future was assured, whereas the unsuccessful candidates would not know how to shift for themselves. This is why men as old as fifty or sixty often rubbed shoulders with mere striplings in the quest for official preferment—the veterans had failed many times before and preferred to court Dame Fortune once more rather than face unemployment and perhaps starvation! Such indomitable ambition surely deserves a better fate than is vouchsafed by a system which "manufactures mental typewriters."

Consequently, the tendency now is to make education as practicable as possible, especially for students who have no hopes of prosecuting higher studies and whose studies at any moment may be cut short for family or economic reasons. Hence some form of vocational education is being given in most institutions. Under the auspices of the National Association of Vocational Education, organized in 1917, an experimental Chung Hua Vocational School was established at Shanghai in October, 1918, where courses in machine shop work, carpentry, button and enamel manufacturing are taught.

[1] Since the above was written a dozen young ladies have attended the special library science class of eighty odd, held at the 1920 summer school of Peking Higher Normal or Government Teachers' College.

The greater number of students inevitably will have to prepare for a useful life without entering a professional institution; so the National Association of Vocational Education has mapped out the following program which is supported by most educators in the country, to provide them with the requisite facilities:—

a. To introduce vocational courses in the higher primary schools, such as manual training for boys, and cooking and sewing for girls; book-keeping and shop-keeping for city schools and gardening for country schools.
b. To establish commercial, industrial, or agricultural departments in the middle schools.
c. To introduce commercial, industrial, or agricultural courses in the lower normal schools to train vocational teachers for higher primary schools.
d. To establish commercial, industrial and agricultural departments in the higher normal colleges to train teachers for vocational courses in middle schools.
e. To establish more vocational schools of elementary grades, such as elementary commercial, industrial or agricultural schools.
f. To establish more vocational schools of middle grades, such as middle commercial, industrial or agricultural schools.

The plan is admirable, as the need is an urgent one. Not only does vocational education teach the boys and girls to apply the theories they have learned to actual practice—for example, the Government Teachers' College at Peking has on its campus a good-sized building, built by the students themselves—but it equips them with something wherewith to become independent whenever they should be suddenly thrust into the world to shift for themselves. As the secretary of the National Association of Vocational Education remarks:—"The majority of students who graduate from the primary schools have no suitable institutions to enter in order to prepare themselves to earn a living. Their rudimentary training in languages, arithmetic, geography and manual work is not sufficient to meet the demands of life after leaving school. Moreover, less than one-third of the graduates of the middle schools ever enter the higher institutions. Many even had left be-

fore they reached the senior year of the middle schools." Under the old system they would be dependent upon other people's charity; now they will learn to be independent and value their own self-respect, thus developing good citizenship.

The question of modern text-books is gradually being solved. Under the old system, the ancient classics were all-sufficient; to-day, however, the young student has to know something about every conceivable thing under the sun. In the beginning, the text-books were simply translations from foreign originals —a task faithfully performed by learned missionary sinologues. Gradually the work was taken over by Chinese educators, and then men with foreign education began to write elementary text-books on different scientific subjects. At present good text-books for use in the colleges and universities are still few and inadequate.

Classical Chinese literature, while rich in philosophical and literary vocabulary, is very deficient in scientific and legal vocabulary. For instance, the legal vocabulary now in use in the Republic is mainly borrowed from the Japanese, though Japan was once China's pupil. As to Chinese scientific terminology, it is only in recent years that attempts were made to arrive at some uniformity in the task of compiling scientific text-books. Nevertheless, notable progress has been made, and already there are published dictionaries of medical, mathematical and engineering terms. Much, of course, remains yet to be done, but it is worthy of note that the Law School of Peking Government University has published over forty volumes of its text-books, covering many of the courses given in the school. Some of these are original works, whilst others are either reprints or translations.

With unscrupulous publishers the production of modern text-books may lend itself to grave abuse; the demand for new text-books is continuous and the temptation to make money out of spurious books is not easy to resist. Hence as a precaution against the introduction of poisonous ideas, text-books for use in the elementary and secondary schools especially must first be approved by the Ministry of Education. Those for the higher schools are left to the school authorities or the students themselves, as the latter are advanced enough to use perhaps the foreign originals and also discriminate the good from the bad doctrines in any translations. Here is a typical illustration of the transition period in China; the old

being continued in the paternal care of the Ministry of Education—for instance, the present form of government being a republic, any book containing propaganda in favor of restoring the discredited monarchy will at once be condemned as a poison-injector—and the new being symbolized by the discretion left to those capable of taking care of themselves.

We have said that compulsory education will become universal when there is sufficient money to carry out the comprehensive program. This lack of funds is the greatest of problems confronting Chinese educators. There is no dearth of eager pupils and the number of qualified teachers is not difficult to procure. But funds are necessary to equip existing schools or put up ever so many more. Patriotic men of wealth are doing what they can to encourage education by establishing private institutions or endowing public schools, but millionaires are rare in a country which is essentially agricultural. Nor is the central government situated in a better position, since it can set aside only six and a half million dollars for education against nearly two hundred million for the army. The present political confusion can never last long, and then the money which the central government will borrow from willing lenders will be devoted to real reconstruction work—disbandment of superfluous soldiery, reorganization of the national finances, improvement of facilities of communication, promotion of industries, etc. The promotion of education, indeed, is equally important; but the indications are that the topics above mentioned will be assisted financially before the question of education can be taken up.

What then is the remedy? There may be other possible remedies, but the simplest is undoubtedly that of utilizing the balance of the so-called Boxer indemnity. In consequence of the "midsummer madness" of 1900 when the Boxers, with the connivance of the Manchu rulers, tried to drive all foreigners into the sea and laid siege to the foreign legations in Peking, thus committing a serious breach of international law, China was made to pay as indemnity to fourteen Powers the sum of 450,000,000 Haikwan taels or £67,500,000. This amount, however, was to spread over thirty-nine years and bear annual interest at four per cent.; so by 1940 the total would reach the huge figure of 982,238,150 taels or £147,335,722!

In August, 1917, the Republic declared war on the Central Powers, whereupon the Entente Allies consented to postpone

for five years the receipt of their annual shares—Russia, alone, stipulating that her share so waived was to be only one-third, the other two-thirds being reserved for the maintenance of her diplomatic and consular officers. In round numbers the amount already paid up to the date of postponement—viz., January 1, 1918—was one-third of the grand total, leaving an unexpired balance of roughly ninety millions sterling. From this, of course, must be deducted the shares originally alloted to Germany and Austria-Hungary—namely, ninety million taels and four million taels respectively—which have been cancelled since the declaration of war between China and those countries. Consequently, the remainder is approximately seventy millions sterling.

Of this total the unexpired quota of the different Powers is roughly as follows:—

Belgium	5,500,000	taels
France	46,000,000	"
Great Britain	34,000,000	"
Italy	20,000,000	"
Japan	23,000,000	"
Holland	261,000	"
Russia	86,500,000	"
Spain	90,000	"
United States	22,000,000	"
Portugal	61,000	"
Denmark and Sweden	141,000	"
	237,553,000	taels

Ever since 1908 one-half of America's share has been returned to China and its proceeds devoted to the education of Chinese students in the United States. If the small shares of Holland, Denmark and Sweden—neutrals during the Great War—be also left out of consideration, then the Allied shares would amount to 205,000,000 taels or less than £35,000,000. The Entente Allies have agreed that this indemnity might be postponed for five years; why can they not go a step further and forego the entire remainder altogether? Considering that millions and billions of pounds had been expended in the late war, this paltry thirty-five millions is not worth even bothering about. But to China, £35,000,000 at pre-war rate is equal to 350,000,000 silver dollars—a sum which can do incalculable good to the cause of education and general enlightenment. And lest the money should be frittered away in unproductive con-

sumption, the Allies can effectively stipulate that such returned indemnity shall only be appropriated for educational purposes.

According to latest indications it seems that France, Great Britain and Japan are prepared to assist the Republic in this direction, but the exact form of their assistance will not be the same as that shown by the United States. Instead of returning the money direct to China, each will probably spend the money on education for the Chinese. Great Britain, for example, will supplement the endowment for the present Hongkong University and also strengthen the finances of existing British schools in China. On the other hand, France will encourage Chinese students to study in her country; hence an Institute for Higher Chinese Studies is being established as a branch of Paris University. The precise method of Japan's assistance is not yet known, but at the moment of writing (June, 1920), a representative of the Ministry of Education is already in Japan to discuss the necessary details and arrangements.

All this is encouraging and will do much to help forward the cause of education in China. For this reason it is earnestly hoped that the other Allies will also soon fall into line. Education produces good citizenship, and education thus assisted by foreign Powers will indubitably redound to the ultimate benefit of these countries. Besides—a fact which is apt to be overlooked—the insensate Boxer outbreak was the work of Manchu lunatics, not the result of deliberation on the part of the Chinese people. Now that the Manchus have gone, never to return—gone with their anti-foreign spirit and other anachronisms—the Allies as well as other beneficiaries owe it to the infant Republic and liberty-striving Chinese to lose no time in burying the hatchet of that awful summer. Otherwise the foreign Powers concerned will appear to the Chinese as so many Shylocks. It is unfair to saddle upon the shoulders of the present generation the reproach of their former rulers, and common sense enjoins the judicious exercise of discretion as well as discrimination. A friend in need is a friend indeed. China, the young republic struggling for true democracy, needs encouragement and assistance. Will the Powers not respond?

CHAPTER II

FOREIGN-EDUCATED STUDENTS

ONE outstanding educational reform that will have far-reaching consequences is that of sending students to study in foreign countries. Already hundreds have returned and already they have contributed their share to the awakening of the nation. Therefore, we need to know more about them.

In point of number as well as prestige the earliest Chinese students to be sent abroad were those who arrived in America in 1872. In those days the great outside world was as distant to the Chinese as the planet Mars itself; so when boys were selected to form this first contingent of government students, many parents hesitated to acept the offer. As the cook of a foreign-educated student put it:—"We had the chance of a lifetime, then, but we were afraid to take the risks. We heard that the Great Mei Kuo (Great America) was a land of cannibals, and we did not like the idea of being sent over and having our skins scalped." (!) Half a century later, the village children of an interior district, on being accosted by a foreign diplomat who spoke their language, told him with a splendid air of self-assurance, that they hoped to go abroad to study and become great men!

In these two pictures we see the remarkable change which has occurred in the country—a change certainly full of hope and promise for the future. We will do well to keep this note ever before our eyes.

To Chang Chih-tung, formerly grand councilor and viceroy, a noted Chinese scholar and one of the foremost statesmen in the last days of the Manchu régime, must be given the credit of stirring the nation to action in this direction. In 1898, he wrote a famous book—*Ch'uen Hsueh P'ien*—the title of which has been variously rendered as "Learn" or "China's Only Hope." It was sanctioned by the emperor, who com-

manded it to be distributed broadcast throughout the empire. In these words he advised the sending of students to study abroad:—

"In order to render China powerful, and at the same time preserve our own institutions, it is absolutely necessary that we should utilize Western knowledge. But unless Chinese learning is made the basis of education, and a Chinese direction given to thought, the strong will become anarchists, and the weak slaves. Thus the latter end will be worse than the former. . . . Travel abroad for one year is more profitable than study at home for five years. It has been well said that seeing is a hundred times better than hearing. One year's study in a foreign institution is better than three years in a Chinese. Mencius remarks that a man can learn foreign things best abroad; but much more benefit can be derived from travel by older and experienced men than by the young, and high mandarins can learn more than petty officials. . . . Cannot China follow the *viam mediam* and learn a lesson from Japan? As the case stands to-day, study by travel can better be done in that country than in Europe for the following reasons. . . . If it were deemed advisable, some students could afterwards be sent to Europe for a fuller course."

Respect for learning being universal, this book at once created a tremendous impression, and coming as it did from the celebrated scholar, backed by the sanction of the highest authority in the land, its opinion carried unprecedented weight. Its effects are felt even to-day, and the treatise is therefore as epoch-making as "Uncle Tom's Cabin," "The Origin of Species," and "*Contrat Social*," etc.

In the exodus of students from China there are three streams of migration. The first goes to Japan, the second to Europe and the third to the United States. Each stream is composed of (a) students receiving government scholarships, (b) students supported by their own parents or guardians, and (c) students assisted by foreign missionary societies or other philanthropists.

The first batch of students to Japan was sent over after the war between China and Japan, when the former was defeated. As political events during the next ten years moved with kaleidoscopic speed, the flow of the stream was greatly accelerated. The *coup d'état* took place in 1898, the wrath

of the "Old Buddha" Empress Dowager was upon the land, and the reformers fled to Dai Nippon. The writings of the latter, especially those of Liang Ch'i-ch'ao—who acted as finance minister in 1917, when China declared war against the Central Powers—fired their countrymen with the spirit of nationalism and drew more students to the island empire. The Boxer uprising broke out in 1900, the imperial court fled to Si-an-fu, the western capital, and the Allied armies occupied Peking. At the "sacking" of Peking's holiest of holies—the Forbidden City—the Japanese troops comported themselves with restraint, and the Chinese were favorably impressed. Finally, the Russo-Japanese war was fought, and Japan emerged in 1905 a victorious first-class Power. The Chinese were elated with their neighbors' success and students swarmed into the Land of the Rising Sun in hundreds and thousands, until at one time the figure stood at 15,000.

There being then an increasing demand for modern schoolmasters, many old-time scholars rushed to Japan in their eagerness to get through the special "short-cut" courses. "Sheep-skins" as well as other testimonials of "proficiency" were freely bought and sold, and Japanese educationists reaped a rich harvest. The "graduates," however, proved mere smatterers and public confidence was rudely shaken. Moreover, the suspicion was steadily gaining ground that those returned from Japan were more or less anti-monarchists, and the fear-stricken Manchu government thereupon resolved to send youths to Europe and America instead. That was at least ten years ago; since then those studying in Japan have applied themselves more thoroughly to their task. At present they number nearly four thousand.

With reference to the second stream, it surely comes as a pleasant surprise that even as early as the eighties of the eighteenth century two Chinese students had made their appearance in Paris; the celebrated French economist and statesman, Turgot, befriended them and wrote his well-known *Essai sur la Formation et la Distribution des Richesses* expressly for them. In 1876 the Foochow arsenal sent out forty-eight students to study navigation and shipbuilding. Some went to France, two to Germany, and the rest to England. Of this group one later became the Chinese minister in London; another is the present Acting Premier and Minister of Navy,

Admiral Sir Sah Chen-ping; and a third is a prominent translator, Dr. Yen Fuh. About this time there was also a handful of self-supporting students who studied in the British Isles, notably Dr. Wu T'ing-fang, who later became Chinese minister in Washington for three terms and subsequently acting premier, May, 1917.

Since then the stream has flowed fairly steadily, especially after 1900. Up to that time the students sent out by the government generally specialized in naval studies; but beginning with that year, when the scholar-viceroy Chang Chih-tung, already referred to, despatched simultaneously over eighty students to Europe, emphasis also began to be laid upon law, medicine, languages, railways, military science, mining, agriculture, engineering and the art of making guns as well as explosives. In response to an invitation from the French government, Viceroy Yuan Shih-k'ai—afterwards the first president of the Chinese Republic, who died in 1916, after an unsuccessful attempt to put himself on the throne—sent over a few students from Tientsin Peiyang University as well as some surgeons from the Chinese army. Before the Great War broke out there were about 350 students in Great Britain, 100 in France, 60 in Germany, 60 in Belgium, 20 in Austria, 15 in Russia and 20 in Holland. Of course this number has been greatly reduced during the last five years, with the exception of those in France and Great Britain.

As regards the third stream to the United States, those who arrived before 1872 were mainly assisted by American missionaries. They were men who did not figure perhaps as prominently in the public eye but who did no less to uplift the moral and spiritual conditions of their countrymen. Then came the first Chinese educational mission of 1872 fathered by Dr. Yung Wing, a graduate of Yale University, when thirty of the contingent of 120 boys arrived in New England. With the change of commissioners ill luck befell these lads. The new superintendent was an ultra-conservative; he reprobated the "Americanization" of his protégés and, acting upon his exaggerated reports, the Peking government "determined to exterminate the embryo rebels before their full development." (!) Thereupon the mission was disbanded, and only six out of the hundred odd were allowed to finish their studies. The most conspicuous of this unfortunate group are Mr.

T'ang Shao-yi, premier of the first Republican cabinet; the late Sir Chentung Liang Ch'eng, Chinese minister to Washington and Berlin, and Jeme Tien-yu, "Father of Railways in China."

Between 1881 and 1896 the first foreign-educated Chinese lady doctors arrived in America. Dr. King Ya-mei obtained her M.D. degree from Cornell in 1885, while Doctors Mary Stone and Ida Kahn graduated from Michigan eleven years later; the latter being preceded by Dr. Hü King-eng, who received her degree from Philadelphia Woman's Medical College in 1894. All four were assisted by American missionaries and have since distinguished themselves in medical work in their native cities. In addition Dr. King is at present conducting special investigations on the soya bean for the United States government.

In response to the popular clamor for the grant of a constitution the Manchu government despatched, in 1905, a commission of five high officials to study the constitutional systems of Western countries. During their visit to America, scholarships were promised to Chinese students by Yale, Harvard and Wellesley universities. Thereupon began the holding of competitive examinations for men and women desirous of going to the United States to study under government auspices—1907 in Nanking, and the following year in Hangchow. These examinations were a distinct departure from the old procedure, as until then the selection of scholars had been governed by no fixed rules.

As already stated, in 1908 the American government waived its claim to one-half of its share of the Boxer indemnity—a total of nearly twelve million gold dollars. This fund having been set aside for the education of Chinese students in the United States, a special institution—Tsing Hua College, situated twelve miles northwest of Peking—was established to prepare boys to go to America. Up to date over six hundred students have been sent over, some of whom being admitted into the sophomore or junior class in American universities. And since 1914 about ten girls and ten special fellowship students have been similarly financed every two years. Including these so-called "Indemnity" scholars, there are now over two thousand students in the United States, one-tenth being girls.

Here is in brief the story of Chinese boys and girls going

to study in foreign universities. These streams of migration will continue to flow for another decade or two, when China will have sufficient facilities for higher education to train and develop her children. And until then the competition for the privilege of going abroad will always be keenly contested.

The question next arises: Are these returned students making good? And what is their influence on the life of the nation? During recent years, especially since the ambitious Yuan Shih-k'ai attempted to make himself the emperor of a new dynasty, the country has been drifting from quasi-republicanism to military autocracy: the military governors who rule the country pay lip service to the constitution of the Republic, the people have been denied their inherent rights and prerogatives, and returned students appear signally to have failed.

In 1908, when returned students commanded a premium, one of them was asked by a school principal to get him a foreign-educated teacher. "Suppose I get you one who is not a returned student but who is better than the average returned student?" "Then, very sorry, we must decline the offer; what we want is a returned student."(!) To-day, there is a plethora of returned students, for example, in Peking. They are unemployed, simply because the reactionary authorities have no use for them. Those that are employed are in the majority of cases not taken seriously. In the keen struggle for existence diplomas and degrees are often forgotten, and an incumbent for a certain position might as well have always stayed at home, instead of returning with a foreign academic or professional training. Consequently, the spectacle is often one of undignified incongruities and, in some cases, even of round objects being put into square holes.

This, of course, is as it should never be and indubitably will be ameliorated as soon as the liberal elements come to administer the government. Until then, therefore, there are bound to be failures among this privileged class. One of these is a famous mathematician, who graduated from a university in the eastern states of the United States. Early in 1917 he was publicly disgraced, and the charge preferred against him before a court of law was one of accepting bribery while in charge of an important government department. At that time an all-powerful militarist whose influence is to-day still

paramount, is said to have remarked to his advisers:—"After all, we cannot depend upon the returned students." In justice, however, to the accused it must be said that he had never been given a proper trial; his arrest and imprisonment were the intrigues of his political opponents, and the public was never furnished with the data necessary to form an impartial judgment as to his guilt or innocence.

Up to date this seems to be the most quoted instance of a returned student's failure, and until justice is finally done, one way or the other, the victim will always be handicapped and the community deprived of an expert's services. Otherwise the record of these privileged men and women will only be as expected, since like the Chinese people at large, they are only biding their time and have yet to come into their own. Water cannot rise higher than its source, and defenseless citizens are impotent when confronted by a ring of steel and barbed wires.

Nevertheless, the good they have already done to their country is by no means inconsiderable. For example, "it has been entirely due to their efforts and influence that the country is being modernized. To be specific, the early returned students from America, and a few from Great Britain, toiled hard to clear the ground, break the soil, and sow the seed. Those coming after them, though in larger numbers, had naturally a much easier task to perform. To them as a class must be credited, in spite of the very decided and far-reaching contributions by other parties, the introduction of Western ideas and ideals, the institution of fundamental reforms and the gradual transformation of the social and political order of the country along modern lines. More than anything else that will stand out as a monument to their achievement and influence is the change of the country from a monarchy to a republic, from an absolute despotism to a popular democracy, from an antiquated conservatism to a modern liberalism."

At the mention of the republic, the carping critic may chuckle in his sleeves:—"Did not a Yale graduate of the early eighties act as foreign minister in the cabinet of the 'Peking Government' when, for a brief fortnight in July, 1917, the Manchus were restored to power by a *coup d'état* of one of the almighty militarists? And did not also an Edinburgh graduate act as vice-minister in the same department in the same short-lived restoration?" This indeed may be admitted, and so also may be conceded much which is calculated to de-

tract from the value of the returned students' work. But such incidents pale into insignificance when placed side by side with the larger emblazoned fact that under their leadership the vast country is being modernized. If conditions political, economic, educational and commercial, etc., were only normal, the majority of foreign-educated students would have been given a chance to demonstrate their training and knowledge.

Despite adverse circumstances, to the credit of this *élite* class of China's population it may be said that their record as a whole is one that no one ever need be ashamed of. The wonder is not that the returned students have done so little for their country, but that they have done so much in face of uphill opposition. For example, some originally trained for other professions have, on account of unfavorable circumstances, entered the commercial field, and the present tendency among Chinese studying abroad is to specialize along wealth-producing lines. Wealth-producing industries especially will bring prosperity to the country, and given a stable as well as prosperous economic foundation, the work of well-meaning legislators and diplomats ought to be much easier. So while party politicians quarrel over their respective "spoils," the returned students are content to occupy a minor rôle and make themselves good therein.

It is not easy to estimate the total number of students who have returned with foreign education; whereas those from Europe and America are counted by the hundreds, those from Japan are counted by thousands—just because the latter is nearest to China and expenses there are cheapest. A recent estimate put the figures for America and Great Britain respectively at 1,700 and 400 holding degrees. Details of these graduates are difficult to obtain, but "Who's Who of American Returned Students," published by Tsing Hua College, Peking, already referred to, contains particulars of some six hundred alumnae of American institutions who are in actual employment. These may be classified according to their professions and occupations as follows:—

1.	Education:—	
	a. Administrators	38
	b. Teachers	197
2.	Government Service:—	
	a. Executive officers (including diplomatic and consular officers)	129
	b. Legislators	3
	c. Judicial officers	4

3. Technical and Professional Work:—	
a. Architects	4
b. Engineers	95
c. Legal practitioners	6
d. Medical practitioners (including dentists)	35
4. Miscellaneous Vocations:—	
a. Directors and employees in banks	22
b. Managers and employees in manufacturing and commercial houses	38
c. Editors and correspondents	2
d. Librarians	2
e. Social and religious workers	21
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The above is brought down to the end of 1919: it is, nevertheless, incomplete, as numerous old students especially are reluctant to have their records advertised. Anyway, it gives us some idea of the possibilities of the returned students. Similar details about graduates from Great Britain are, unfortunately, not available, although the nature of their studies can be known with some certainty. For example, at the end of 1916, the three hundred students who were studying in Great Britain were classified according to faculties as follows:—

Agriculture	3	Metallurgy	6
Architecture	1	Military science	2
Arts	7	Mining	22
Chemistry	10	Natural science	8
Commerce	8	Naval architecture	5
Engineering	42	Nursing	4
Flying	4	Preparatory	67
Geology	1	Sociology	2
Law and Economics	47	Wireless telegraphy	2
Leather industry	1		292[1]
Medicine	50		

To give a better idea of possibilities of returned students it should be mentioned that aviation is no longer new to this land of lotus-eaters. The number of licensed Chinese airmen is increasing, and there are some thirty students in the Army Flying School at Nanyuan, Peking. More than this, recently one of these pilots in the Naval School of Foochow invented a kind of hydroplane which is now being tested by the proper authorities. Hence the extension of the above aviation school,

[1] At the end of 1919 there were 245 students in the United Kingdom. Of these 11 studied wireless telegraphy, 9 industry and textile, and 15 economics, political science and sociology. The rest were distributed among the other faculties in almost the same proportion as in 1916.

and hence the purchase of over 100 new Vickers-Vimy machines from England.

As regards architects and engineers, it is noteworthy that many returned students have organized themselves into partnerships or limited companies for doing independent architectural and engineering work. And as regards railway engineers, it is on record that the unification of accounts over China's 7,000 miles of railways at present in operation, which was first effected in 1915 by foreign-educated students under the supervision of an American adviser, has been pronounced excellent. An English railway expert in London refers to it as the "Chinese system" and recommends the South African government to adopt it wholesale. Can there be better testimony?

In the course of our survey we have already mentioned the names of a few prominent returned students—Admiral Sir Sah Chen-ping, Dr. Wu T'ing-fang, Mr. T'ang Shao-yi, and the four pioneer lady doctors, etc. The following are no less outstanding names:—

1. General Li Yuan-hung.—Hero of the 1911 Revolution, he learned his art in Japan and succeeded President Yuan Shih-k'ai after his death in June, 1916. Compelled by the militarists to dissolve the parliament unconstitutionally twelve months later, he resigned and has since lived in retirement.
2. Dr. Sun Yat-sen.—Soul of the anti-monarchist movement which fructified in the Revolution of 1911, he lived half his lifetime in foreign countries, there being a price of $100,000 set by the Manchus upon his head. He was provisional president of the Republic until parliament formally elected Yuan Shih-k'ai in October, 1912.
3. Dr. C. T. Wang.—A graduate of Yale, he was successively Y. M. C. A. leader, vice-speaker of the senate, and one of China's peace delegates at the Paris Conference—being co-signatory with Minister Lou Tseng-tsiang of the Austrian peace treaty on behalf of the Republic.
4. Dr. V. K. Wellington Koo.—A graduate of Columbia, he is the representative of China in Washington. One

of the peace delegates at Paris, he signed the Bulgarian and Hungarian peace treaties on China's behalf.

5. Dr. Sao-ke Alfred Sze.—Master of Arts from Cornell, he is the Chinese Minister in London and was also one of the peace delegates at Paris.
6. Dr. W. W. Yen.—Bachelor of Arts from Virginia, he is the present Chinese Minister to Denmark (and Berlin, before the war).
7. Dr. Wang Ch'ung-hui.—Doctor of Civil Law from Yale, he was at one time minister of justice and is now the Chairman of the Law Codification Commission.
8. Dr. C. C. Wang.—A graduate of Illinois, he is the railway expert and Chinese member on the Inter-Allied Railway Technical Commission in charge of Siberian railways.
9. Chancellor Ts'ai Yuan-p'ei.—A research student in France and Germany, he was formerly minister of education and now head of Peking Government University.
10. Dr. Chang Po-ling.—A research student in America and Principal of Tientsin Nankai College, he is described as "the most brilliant school principal" by Dr. George E. Vincent, President of the Rockefeller Foundation.
11. Dr. Z. T. K. Woo.—A graduate from Sheffield University, he is the Superintendent of the Hanyang Iron Works, Hanyang (Hupeh).
12. Mr. David Z. T. Yui.—Master of Arts from Harvard, he is a leading social worker and head of the National Committee of Y. M. C. A.'s in China.
13. Mr. K. P. Ch'en.—A graduate of Pennsylvania, he is General Manager of the Shanghai Commercial and Savings Bank, the Ladies' Savings Department of which is under the charge of a returned student's widow.
14. Dr. P. W. Kuo.—A graduate also of Columbia, he is head of the Government Teachers' College, Nanking, which may subsequently become the Nanking Government University.
15. Mr. H. Y. Moh.—A graduate from Illinois, he is known as "China's Cotton King."

16. Dr. Wu Lien-teh.—A graduate from Cambridge, he was chairman of the international plague conference at Mukden, 1910-1911, and is now head of the North Manchurian Plague Prevention Service.
17. Dr. Hu Suh.—A graduate also from Columbia and Professor of Comparative English Literature at Peking Government University, he is the moving spirit in the present "Literary Revolution."[1]

Recently the *London Times* drew attention to the importance of recognizing the commercial value of providing educational facilities to foreign students. It said that the United States was doing its utmost to attract students and emphasized that the Chinese student who had been educated in England was the greatest commercial asset Britain possessed in China.

To those countries where Chinese students are yet unknown, this is a timely suggestion, since such returned students will naturally place orders for commercial goods and industrial machinery, etc., with firms and people whom they know. For example, witness the popularity of the United States in this respect. Partly because the distance from China to America is shorter than that to Europe, and partly also because of the greater number of earlier students to the United States, the stream of migration to Uncle Sam's land is unceasing. By far, however, the chief reason for such popularity is America's return of its unexpired Boxer indemnity. Hence the number of self-supporting students in the United States is equal to if not in excess of that of those supported by the government.

With this object in view the French government is now attracting Chinese students—by establishing an Institute for Higher Chinese Studies at Paris, and providing other facilities. The college has the cordial support of the Chinese government, which has already donated 100,000 manuscripts. In America, a student can work his way through college, but in Great Britain this could not be done. Perhaps after the

[1] Since the above was written Dr. Yen has become Minister for Foreign Affairs, Dr. Sze has been transferred to Washington, Dr. Koo appointed Senior Chinese Delegate to the League of Nations Assembly as well as Minister to London, Dr. C. H. Wang, Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and Admiral Sah has resigned from both the acting premiership and ministry of navy.

recent war the dignity of labor will be recognized and some form of assistance held out to Chinese students. In France there is also the system, introduced only after the signing of the Armistice, of student laborers—men who study half day and work half day. The scheme is said to be practicable, and already there are over one thousand students in that country. It is the intention of the promoters to send over five or six thousand a year for two years, so that by 1922 there will be ten thousand Chinese students.

The keynote sounded by the *London Times* is one of "commercial asset." But there is something more permanent in the extending of such assistance to Chinese students—namely, the promotion of better international friendship through the intellectual exchange of ideas, and therefore the best guarantee of harmony and concord for all time to come. There is everything to gain by such coöperation and it is sincerely hoped that other Powers will not lag behind in this worthy cause.

CHAPTER III

INTELLECTUAL REBIRTH

HALF a century of contact with Western nations might not have produced much impression on a proud autocrat like China of the Manchu régime, and the Peking government was never penitent until the Boxer outrages of 1900 compelled the imperial court to flee westward for safety; yet it has transformed the intellectual life of the nation. The Middle Kingdom could look with indifference upon the incursions of the outer "barbarians"—had she not been invaded and even conquered by alien hordes several times before but always absorbed them in the end? She could likewise regard with nonchalance the diminution of her vast territory—had she not each time wrested back the straggling portions from her intruders? In the present case, however, she has caught a Tartar. The Western trespassers could not be driven away, nor could they be absorbed. This is because they have brought with them the intellectual weapon, and the pen is always mightier than the sword.

It is idle at this date to discuss whether or not it was proper for the Powers to impose in their treaties with China the stipulation that Christian missionaries should be permitted to propagate their religion in a land where there were already four religions—Confucianism, Buddhism, Taoism, and Mohammedanism. Nor will perhaps the Chinese people themselves discuss any further whether such missionaries have done more harm than good to China. After all is said and done, the presence of foreign missionaries has come to be recognized as a blessing in disguise. The former popular outburst of anger against the missionaries, which resulted in destruction of property and sometimes likewise the shedding of unnecessary blood, has cost the country dearly, since the inevitable retribution meant indemnity, the creation of bad blood, and in the notorious case of Kiaochow, the loss also of territory. But

such ugly incidents are now happily obsolete; the motives of the missionaries are better understood, and the missionaries themselves have taken greater care to respect the feelings as well as susceptibilities of the local population.

On the other hand, it is admitted, the missionaries are inspired by noble motives: "the principles of the Christian religion," to quote from the treaty provision, "as professed by the Protestant and Roman Catholic churches, are recognized as teaching men to do good, and to do to others as they would have others do to them." They do not come to trade or to make money; in fact, they come at their own expense and have to finance their own enterprise. Like the champions of other religions, they come to teach men to do good, and "to do to others as they would have others do to them" is nothing more than the Confucian precept but worded in the positive form. They may not have succeeded in converting a great proportion of China's teeming millions, but they have certainly won the esteem and gratitude of thinking Chinese—by their schools and colleges all over the country, by their hospitals and dispensaries, by their self-sacrificing social work, and by their translations of Western literature. All this is done for the Chinese, and their only reward is the glory of having done their duty.

Thus through the fruits of applied Christianity as well as personal example of foreign missionaries have the Chinese been persuaded to accept the best that Western nations have to offer. And, as already explained, the devoted labors of missionaries are now bearing good fruit—in the establishment of schools by the Chinese themselves, in the modernization of their hoary civilization, and in the substitution of an effete despotism by a democratic form of representative government.

Rome is not built in a day: nor can the Republic be truly established in a year. Superficially the body politic has been changed, but inwardly the minds of the people remain yet to be changed. The intellectual awakening is now on, but the moral revolution has yet to come. The spread of universal education, of course, will be the panacea to all present evils; meanwhile, we have to be patient and rely upon the gradual infiltration of the new learning.

Respect for learning, as we have said, is proverbial in China; so any modernization of the country must need invoke

that medium. To the credit of the early missionaries, therefore, it should be pointed out that they were not slow to recognize or act upon this fact. Therefore long before Chinese intellectuals themselves ever influenced their countrymen, the missionaries had prepared the ground for them.

Chinese classics being deficient in scientific literature, that was the missionaries' first point of attack, although as early as 1864 Dr. W. A. P. Martin had translated Wheaton's "Elements of International Law" with the assistance of a commission appointed by the Peking government. Between 1872 and 1902, it is estimated that upwards of sixty books on physics, chemistry, metallurgy, mathematics, etc., were rendered into Chinese by Doctors John Fryer, Young J. Allen and others, with the help of Chinese Christians.

After the defeat of China by Japan in 1895, Chinese thinkers began to open their eyes—they had imagined that the Middle Kingdom was invulnerable—and certainly humiliation at the hands of little Japan was the least thinkable. Consequently Dr. Timothy Richard's translation of "Modern History of Europe" and other works on political science, etc., about this period were favorably received. It was symptomatic of the times that freeing themselves from the shackles of the past, they seized eagerly everything which gave promise of a brighter future—modern science, modern history, modern mathematics, etc.

The *coup d'état* of "Old Buddha" Empress Dowager in 1898, which forced the reformers to flee to Japan, gave the vigorous Chinese intellectuals their opportunity. From the vantage ground of alien protection Liang Ch'i-ch'ao especially preached reform, and his brilliant writings were devoured with avidity. About this time the revolutionary party also began their propaganda, but owing to the rigorous government censorship their radical journal printed in Japan was inaccessible beyond the treaty ports.

Then commenced the notable translation of Western books by Chinese scholars. One after another the philosophical works of Spencer, Darwin, Huxley, Rousseau, Montesquieu, Adam Smith, etc., were translated by Dr. Yen Fuh, and then the novels of Scott, Dickens, Dumas and Hugo, etc., by Lin Shu. This field, of course, has since been extensively explored until to-day the works of President Wilson, Lord Bryce, Bage-

hot, Burgess, Hobhouse, Maupassant, Conan Doyle, Daudet, Strindberg, Ibsen and Bernard Shaw, etc., are also accessible in Chinese.

The contribution of these Chinese scholars to the intellectual awakening cannot be over-estimated. Liang Ch'i-ch'ao and Lin Shu, two of China's most prolific contemporary writers, speak no foreign languages but wrote through an interpreter; yet the former is perhaps the foremost political writer and the latter, like the great H. G. Wells, writes quicker than any person can read and quicker than any publisher can produce! As has been remarked by an authority on Far Eastern politics, in all political movements in China scholarship and literary appeal have always played an extraordinary rôle. The voice of men of recognized erudition is always listened to with respect; hence the propagation of political theories attains through them a remarkable amount of success.

Here we must not forget to mention the share borne by Chinese publishers in the moving of such intellectual waters. The Commercial Press, Limited, of Shanghai, is especially noteworthy in this respect. Started in 1896 by a few Chinese Christians, this purely Chinese concern is now the largest printing plant in the Orient, with a capital of over two million silver dollars. It employs over 3,000 men and women, has 50 branch offices and more than 1,000 agencies all over the Republic. It aims to supply every requisite of the schoolroom in China, and hence is a great educational force. It has more business than it can possibly handle, and early in 1920 it declared a dividend of fifty per cent. Alone of Chinese publishers, the Commercial Press can boast of several complete series of text-books, with teacher's manuals, for the primary, the middle and the normal schools, which have been approved by the Ministry of Education. "These have been so experimented upon, criticized, and improved year by year that they are now quite well adapted to the needs of Chinese students."

In addition, this enterprising firm has an efficient translation department, the editor-in-chief of the English section being a returned student from the United States. Among its latest translated works is a Chinese life of the American negro leader, Booker T. Washington. And apart from text-books it also publishes regular periodicals—some of at least fifteen years' standing—for the general public, including the *Chinese Ladies' Journal.*

We have said that the Chinese have been induced to accept the introduction of Western civilization only through the endeavors of applied Christianity. Another medium of applied Christianity which has contributed no less to the moving of intellectual waters is the Chinese Young Men's Christian Association. A few months ago (April, 1920) it celebrated the twenty-fifth anniversary of its foundation, when His Excellency the President of the Republic gave them a reception and addressed one thousand of its delegates. At the end of 1919 it had 170 student associations in various government and mission schools throughout the country with 14,200 members; 30 city associations in the principal cities, with 32,330 members; and 383 employed secretaries—279 Chinese and 104 foreign. It has thirteen modern buildings and its finances are remarkably sound—the cash receipts from all sources for 1919 totalling $575,197. Since 1912 it is a distinctly Chinese movement—Chinese financed and Chinese directed. The foreign secretaries, mostly from America but a few also from Canada, Great Britain, Denmark, Norway and Sweden, are honorary workers. The association is under the control of a national committee, at the head of which is Mr. David Z. T. Yui, a graduate from Harvard.

Some idea of its ever-spreading influence may be gleaned from the following statistics:—

	1918	*1919*
Religious meetings	1,918	2,389
Attendance at religious meetings	235,298	288,977
Bible study enrollment, City Associations	9,548	12,755
Enrollment in day and night schools	8,074	10,411
Attendance at all Physical Department activities	224,197	558,163
Attendance at Socials	209,027	360,094
Roomers in dormitories	2,627	3,017
Engaged in social service	2,469	3,110
Associations reporting Boys' Work	12	16
Members serving on committees, City Associations	1,971	2,681

Between January, 1915, and June, 1919, it trained twenty-six physical directors, and since 1916 twenty Chinese secretaries have been further trained in the United States under a special fellowship plan. During 1919 its publication department produced nearly four million pages of constructive literature, and by the end of the year 221 different publications—on Bible study, devotional life, personal work, social service, character building, physical work, biographies, maps, hymnals, charts, etc.—had been issued. Finally, fifty-two Chinese and

foreign secretaries worked with the Chinese Labor Battalions in France during the war, and four with the Chinese troops in Siberia.

Here is an institution which is bound to wield a tremendous influence for good. Hence in recognition as well as encouragement of its admirable work performed for the rising generation, His Excellency the President of the Republic accorded its delegates a special reception and delivered an address, of which the following is an English translation:—"It is indeed a great event that on the occasion of the twenty-fifth anniversary of the founding of the association movement in China in April of this year, the Y. M. C. A. has held a national convention in Tientsin attended by the delegates of the association from the different provinces for discussing further extension of its activities.

"I am very glad to see this brilliant gathering in this hall. I consider that a man can achieve success and also contribute to the society solely because he devotes himself to study in his youth. Our sage Mencius commented on the cultivation of barley in the following sense. Let the barley be sown and covered up: the ground being the same, and the time of sowing likewise the same, there may finally be inequality of produce. This is due to the unequal nourishment afforded by the rains and dews and to the different ways in which man has undertaken the work in reference to it. So it is with the young man. Were his foundation properly laid and consolidated and his progress towards the right path encouraged, it is seldom that he would not live a successful and prosperous life.

"You gentlemen, impelled by the trend of world affairs, have assumed responsibilities as pioneers of civilization, and inspired with the Christian spirit have propagated the principles of humanity and justice. You have made remarkable progress in your work and have trained innumerable able men. You do not aim at immediate results and have therefore achieved great success. The 'Book of Changes' says—'The virtuous man gradually inculcates morality among the masses.' This is exactly what you are doing. A society to be perfect must be composed of men of perfect knowledge on whom depends also the prosperity or otherwise of a nation. Great indeed have been your contributions to the young Chinese and the Chinese Republic. Judging by what you have done in the past, I am

confident that you will continue to make remarkable progress in the future."

This address as well as the reception within the beautiful grounds of the President's Mansion—formerly the innermost palace of the Manchu rulers—is an unprecedented honor, but the association is well worthy of it.

Here we have in brief a survey of China's intellectual awakening, but the end is not yet. As already stated, the Republic exists superficially; actually the powerful militarists have it all their own way. The political confusion of the past nine years has opened men's eyes to the necessity for greater constructive work, and with the authorities that be adopting an air of apathy such social or moral revolution must needs be done by the people themselves. The progress of the recent war in Europe furnished the serious thinkers with a clew to the solution of the problem—namely, how to make the greatest number of people more educated and hence more articulate. The national treasury is empty, so the program of compulsory universal education will be indefinitely delayed. The new phonetic system will assist a greater percentage to obtain some education, but it is also a slow process. What then is the remedy?

As has been explained in a previous chapter, the Chinese language is most rich but tediously difficult to master. Five thousand words of Shakespeare's tongue may constitute a good storehouse for any average English scholar, whereas five thousand characters in the Chinese language are barely sufficient for everyday use. One Chinese word may mean several things, but the present script contains no clew whatsoever to its pronunciation. Sometimes the radical may indicate something of its meaning: for example the words for river, lake, ocean, ice, etc., will all have the same root or radical meaning "water." But more often one has to be an expert in order to recognize the ideographs. The chief difficulty, however, lies in the very conciseness of the language, and a Chinese sentence of just a few words will in English occupy at least two or three sentences. This is because of the classical background; hence Chinese literature is full of classical allusions which are generally not intelligible to the readers.

Take for example, the four characters composed as well as written by His Excellency the President of the Republic, on

the front cover of this book. The first two—Chinese characters are always read from the right to the left and, column by column, from top to bottom—*Erh Hsin* mean literally "(every) day new," and the other two *Hung Yi*, "grand discussion." The first refer to a passage in one of the classics, and the second to another passage in another book. In English one would paraphrase His Excellency's endorsement somewhat as follows—"A grand discourse on (China's) latest progress." But in Chinese the sentences are usually elliptical and the exact purport of "Day New Grand Discussion" is understood by all scholars.

Such being the case, one remedy that at once suggests itself is to simplify the written language which is universal in China, despite the bewildering number of district or provincial dialects. This is now being attempted by employing the spoken language also as a medium of writing. Early in 1917, Dr. Hu Suh, a graduate of Columbia, wrote an article in a periodical, published by the faculty and students of Peking Government University, called *La Jeunesse*, which advocates liberal thought in politics, ethics and religion, etc.—entitled "Suggestions for the Reform of Chinese Literature." He advocated the abolition of classical allusions, literary conventions, and the strict parallel structures beloved by Chinese pedants. He condemned the practice of slavishly imitating ancient writers and argued that modern China ought to create a living literature of its own. Finally he discussed the historical significance of the spoken language and championed its adoption as the fitting medium for literary expression.

This first shot having been boldly fired, the battle royal began in dead earnest. A gallant band of writers rallied round Dr. Hu and *La Jeunesse* forthwith began to publish all its articles in the spoken language. The scholars of the old school, of course, arose in bitter opposition—including Lin Shu, the prolific novelist and translator, already referred to. The rising generation took up the cudgels of the "literary revolutionists" with enthusiasm, since any simplification of the existing language would lighten their burden. Periodicals began first to adopt a half-way reform: instead of commencing in the ordinary way from the right and reading from top to bottom, column by column, the articles were published as in a

foreign language—from left to right, in horizontal lines, and with also the English marks of punctuation, an aid practically unknown to devotees of the old school! The movement rapidly gained momentum and soon editors of many leading newspapers in Peking and Shanghai were writing their editorials in this popular medium of communication. Several scientific and philosophical works began also to be published in the spoken language, and even the influential Liang Ch'i-ch'ao commenced to write his Sunday lay sermons in it.

The "revolution" has therefore succeeded and come to stay. But as an instance of the struggle between the champions of the old and the new, the following incident may be related. A year ago a senior student in a prominent institution wrote a letter to his principal in the spoken language. The latter replied and cautioned the lad to show his superior due respect by using the orthodox classical style. The "literary revolutionist" showed a fighting spirit and demanded to know in what way the new spoken language was a mark of discourtesy, whereupon his superior administered a final disciplinary rebuke. The incident ended there, but it led indirectly some months afterwards to the principal's resignation over the violent opposition of the entire student body on some other grounds. The affair is unfortunate, because though a poor disciplinarian and administrator, the principal concerned is in other respects a fine character.

Historically speaking, this is not the first time that the spoken language has been used as a literary medium. Between the twelfth and fifteenth centuries A. D., almost every branch of Chinese literature was written in the spoken language—from philosophical discourses to the popular novel and drama—and two masterpieces of fiction written at this period are even to-day popular favorites. "Unfortunately," as Dr. Hu points out, "this development was stunted during the Ming dynasty—A. D. 1368-1644—when, on the one hand, a very strict form of literary composition, both in prose and poetry, was fixed by imperial decree as the standard form for all civil examinations and, on the other hand, a wave of reactionism was sweeping over the *literati* themselves, who deplored the degeneration of literary style and proposed to go back to the pre-Han period—A. D. 25—for literary models. From that

time to this day Chinese literature, with the exception of a few novels, has never been able to free itself from the shackles of classical imitation and contentless formalism."

Inveterate imitation of the past is responsible for the innate conservativeness of the Chinese people as well as the backwardness of the country. "It is to free ourselves from these shackles," concludes Dr. Hu, "that we are now proposing the adoption of spoken Chinese as our literary medium. Doubtless one of the most important causes for this deplorable retrogression of Chinese literature has been the anachronous employment of a dead language which is no longer adequate for the expression of the ideas and sentiments of the nation. In these days of intense living and modernized thinking, this linguistic inadequacy becomes more apparent than it ever was before. In order to express an enriched content, it is necessary first to secure the emancipation of the literary form. The old bottles can no longer hold the new wine. If we truly wish to give China a literature which shall not only be expressive of the real life and thoughts of our own time, but also an effective force in the intellectual and social reforms, we must first emancipate ourselves from the fetters of a dead language which may have once been the literary instrument for our forefathers, but which certainly is not adequate for the creation of a living literature of our own times."

The old scholars regard the "revolution" as sheer, unfeeling iconoclasm, whereas the reformers espouse it as a form of emancipation from the soft-cushioned past. And most assuredly it is this keynote of resolutely breaking away from the insufficient past to reach out for something which gives promise of a better future which is mainly responsible for the remarkable success of the movement. The gods of yore have been found to be mere idols of clay; wherefore the people must help themselves. The new reform is founded on emancipation but thrives on the determination to be independent and original. More than this, the "revolution" considerably simplifies the written language and thereby assists the less educated masses likewise to derive education and enlightenment.

Here then is the intellectual rebirth, one in which the people may be said to have rediscovered their true capabilities. The working of the leaven introduced by foreign missionaries was the beginning of the renaissance, if by such is meant

"an attitude of dissatisfaction towards the imperfection of the present order of things, in order to realize better things in the future." It has culminated in the present "revolution." One can imagine the extent of its influence for good, but one can hardly foresee all its possibilities. Already it is a power in the land, as there are now no less than two hundred and sixty different kinds of periodicals published in this spoken language or vulgate tongue, in the market. It constitutes with the Student Movement, which will be discussed in a subsequent chapter, an almost irresistible driving force the end of which it is impossible to predict.

Perhaps the element of time in some measure accounts for its success. Nine years of republicanism, as held up by the powerful militarists, has been a sorry failure, and people yearn for something really constructive in nature and scope. The progress of the war only saddened Chinese hearts: for had the Republic been better situated—had the situation been normal, with a well-ordered government, patriotic legislature, and well-developed industry, etc., China would have taken a more creditable part in the struggle for democracy. As it was, China was a negligible quantity—politically, industrially, as well as internationally. Hence the Shantung award by the Paris Conference was the last straw that broke the camel's back. And since then the slogan of the thinking classes—in the press, on the platform, in the school, in the church, on the stage, etc.—has been emancipation and reconstruction. Emancipation from the fetters of the past which has been tried and found wanting; reconstruction of a new democratic order on the solid foundations of the old which has been tested and found serviceable.

The Chinese body is being developed, and its mind is rediscovering itself. How about its spiritual condition? We have discussed intellectual rebirth: is there also a religious rebirth in China?

Such a question is easier to ask than to answer. But taking it as a whole, it seems that there is likewise a spiritual rebirth, although it may not be so pronounced as that of the intellect. This is not to be wondered at, considering how religion has fared in the belligerent countries during the war. There is heart-searching among the churches all over the world, and China is no exception to the rule.

As already stated, in addition to Christianity there are the following religions in China:—Confucianism, named after Confucius, China's greatest sage, whose direct lineal descendant retains to-day the title of a duke of the land; Taoism, so-called from the doctrine of the Way, or *Tao*, of Lao-tze, a celebrated Chinese philosopher and contemporary of Confucius; Buddhism, introduced from India about the beginning of the Christian era; and Mohammedanism, also introduced from abroad. Whilst the literary men are believers of Confucianism, because the Confucian precepts contained in his writings are moral teachings rather than religious injunctions, the converts to Buddhism and Taoism are generally recruited from the general masses—for the simple reason that these religions as practised to-day encourage superstition and subservience. Mohammedanism perhaps has the least adherents, though among all classes, high and low.

Measured by the keen struggle for existence, national as well as individualistic, neither of the four has been found satisfactory by the clearest-headed of China's thinkers. Confucianism is summed up in its negative exposition of the Golden Rule, but offers no solution of the after-life problem. As the great master himself has said—"Since we do not know all about the present life, how can we know about the future?" (Here is a typical example of the richness of the Chinese language: the original of this quotation has only six characters, whereas the English translation must perforce have a minimum of twice that number. A literal translation of the original Chinese would be—"Know not life, how know death?")

We are here describing Confucianism as well as other religions only in a general way; but admirable as is Confucianism as a system of ethics, as a religion and dynamic driving force it seems to have failed. This is best illustrated by the present backward condition of the country, since China was civilized when Rome was nothing more than a city of seven hills. Nevertheless, the ground has been well prepared for the reception of Christianity. As ethical systems and guides of human conduct, Confucianism, Buddhism, and in some respects also Taoism, compare favorably with Christianity. The latter, however, also has in addition to offer that which is unobtainable in other religions. Hence the place of Christianity in the larger life of modern China.

Up to date the latter may be said to have been experimented upon for already a hundred years. In actual converts the number is probably in the neighborhood of 1,500,000, one-third being Protestants. But in the fruitful fields of applied Christianity, as already explained, the whole nation is indebted to the missionaries. In the beginning the Christian churches had to be financed as well as directed by the missionary societies; but in recent years the movement for a Chinese national church has been steadily growing. Gradually the native churches are learning to be independent, and slowly the missionaries are coming to occupy the position of honorary advisers. Among Chinese Christians the "China for Christ" movement—assisted also by the Y. M. C. A.'s of the country—is spreading rapidly; and while the missionaries will remain for some time to help and guide their Chinese brothers and sisters, it is the latter who are directing the movement and working out their own peculiar problems.

This is a healthy sign—the desire to be independent and work out one's own problems. Without intending in any way to disparage the work of other patriotic Chinese, it is nevertheless noteworthy that Chinese Christians are conspicuous leaders in every walk of life. For example, at least one-half of our list of prominent returned students, contained in Chapter II, are Christians. Then there is the remarkable case of Brigadier General Feng Yü-hsiang, who is known as the "Christian General." Commander of nearly 10,000 men, by sheer force of personal example he has shown what a conscientious leader could do, even in the midst of admittedly adverse circumstances: his is the model brigade and 5,000 of his men are Christians. Finally, true to their religion, hundreds of Chinese Christians were martyred during the 1900 Boxer troubles rather than turned renegades to save themselves and their families. If Christianity could lead men calmly to death, it certainly could work wonders among the living.

Example is contagious, and like the Christians the Confucianists are doing much heart-searching among themselves. K'ang Yu-wei, known as "China's Modern Sage" and teacher of Liang Ch'i-ch'ao—the counselor who advised the unhappy Manchu emperor in 1898 to inaugurate wholesale reforms which frightened the Manchu reactionaries and precipitated the famous *coup d'état* by the latter's aunt, "Old Buddha"

Empress Dowager—attempted to revive Confucianism by his numerous writings, but with indifferent success. There is an active Confucian Society in Peking under the leadership of Dr. Ch'en Huan-chang, a graduate of Columbia and pupil of K'ang Yu-wei, but the revival movement does not seem to be taken seriously by the people at large. At one time, however, it looked as if Confucianism would be established as the state religion of the Republic; in the end, after prolonged debates and heated discussions, the hope of Confucianists was shattered, and China's constitution—the one at present in force is still the 1912 Provisional Constitution drawn up at Nanking, as the past years' civil war and political quarrels have precluded the completion of a permanent compact—ordains that "citizens of the Chinese Republic . . . shall have the freedom of religion."

An instance of the healthy rivalry existing between two religions is afforded by the students of Tsing Hua College, Peking. Out of an enrollment of over 600 students, only one-sixth are Christians and members of the college Y. M. C. A. At least one-half of the rest join the Confucian Society of the college. The former led the way in holding weekly meetings, canvassing for membership, holding classes on Saturdays and Sundays for the poor children of the neighborhood and teaching them the rudiments of the Three R's. The latter followed, and out of this emulation the village children are the greatest gainers. The spirit of narrow-minded jealousy is absent, and the members of each association attend the social and other public functions of the other—a large-minded sympathy which is reflected in the larger nation-wide activities of the two religions.

Philosophy and religion in China generally go hand in hand, since Confucianism and Taoism are founded on the moral teachings of two of the nation's greatest philosophers. As is inevitable, the ancient Chinese philosophy has lost much of its charm to students of the new learning—the first impulse being to discard everything that savors of the old. In recent years, however, there has been a resuscitation of interest in China's ancient philosophers. Many of them have been restudied and their teachings reinterpreted by some of the greatest contemporary writers. Dr. Hu, the "literary revolutionist," for example, professes himself a disciple of Mo-tze

—the apostle of universal love, who is contrasted with his contemporary, Yang Chu, the egoist—and two at least of Chinese graduates from Berlin University offered as theses for the doctor's degree learned disquisitions on the teachings of Lao-tze. Similarly, there has been a number of new commentaries on Buddhist sacred books, one of the latest and perhaps the best, it is stated, being Liang Su-ming's "Introduction to Indian Philosophy."

We have said that Dr. Yen Fuh is the first to introduce Huxley, Spencer, Darwin, Mill, etc., to Chinese readers. The experts declare that to Chancellor Ts'ai Yuan-p'ei, of Peking Government University, belongs the credit of presenting the European systems of philosophy in a more systematic and comprehensive form. Consequently, his "Outlines of European Philosophy" and translation of Paulsen's "Principles of Moral Philosophy," etc., have been widely read. Translations of Bergson's "Creative Evolution" and of other psychologists like Wundt and Le Bon are the latest to appear on the market.

Besides a restudy of China's ancient philosophers and moral teachers, there is also the attempt to construct something new out of the wisdom of the past. The most conspicuous in this respect are Chang Ping-lin's "Collected Works" and T'an T'zu-t'ung's *Jen Hsueh*, or "Benevolence." Chang is a noted revolutionary, who is as profound as Liang Ch'i-ch'ao is brilliant. He is an enthusiast of the mystic Chuang-tze, disciple of Lao-tze, and Chang's philosophy shows traces also of the influence of Buddhism. In the latter religion he sees "those elements which are most in harmony with the aspirations of Oriental democracy. He admires especially its social ideals, its belief in absolute equality among men based upon the essential being of human nature, the exalted spirit of independence which it imparts, as well as its teachings on service and sacrifice." Tired of the apparent failure of the Republic which he had helped to establish, this profound scholar has since retired to an ascetic life in one of China's sacred mountains in the far west, but his "Collected Works," in the opinion of all who are qualified to speak, "will be a permanent contribution to Chinese literature."

T'an took a prominent part in the ill-fated reforms of 1898; but he was not so fortunate as either K'ang Yu-wei or

Liang Ch'i-ch'ao, and so perished as a martyr for the cause of a new China. According to this fervent patriot, love or benevolence "is the well-spring of all virtues, and the highest act of love is self-sacrifice. In its practical application, benevolence calls for the abolition of all inequalities and artificial restrictions which stand in the way of mutual service and helpfulness among nations and men." He, too, prefers Buddhism in its purest form.

Such philosophy has undoubtedly its place of usefulness, and the author having died a martyr as well as a true exponent of his own system, the influence it has exerted is by no means inconsiderable. Dr. Paul S. Reinsch, until recently the United States minister at Peking, thus commented on T'an's book twenty years ago:—"The thought of this man, truly Oriental in elements and form, nevertheless yields a result which, together with his action during his life and the temper of his martyrdom, gives us an insight into the complexity of the present Chinese intellectual temper and indicates the many points which, with all differences, it has in common with our own ideas. T'an Tz'u-t'ung is an energist like Wang Yang-ming, but his desire for strength and efficiency is moderated by a deep sense of justice and the belief in sympathy and benevolence. These men, who are trying to build up and rejuvenate the forces of the most ancient empire, are not animated by the unbridled ambition of a Napoleon; they would not follow Nietzsche in his extreme views; but their thought, with all its longing for energy and strength, carries in it the feeling of a deep human sympathy."

This then is the imperfect answer to the inquiry whether or not there is a spiritual awakening in the land. The latest manifestation in this direction is a movement among especially the official class and those associated with them, towards meditation and self-introspection. That is to say, a man would sit for an hour or more every day in quiet meditation—rather in perfect mental quiescence. He must let his mind dwell in absolute blank, and no thought whatsoever must obtrude itself upon his quiescent mind. Such action practised regularly, it is claimed, will not only afford the brain genuine rest, but in course of time the subconscious self will be able to see into the future. When a person is capable of the latter frame of mind, it is said that his body will actually rock from side to

side as his quiescent mind either rests or goes in quest of its affinity.

This is a remarkable manifestation, although not being a psychologist or metaphysician, we may not have given it the precise description. In a way it savors of occultism or spiritualism, and in another of the hermit or ascetic's meditation. But whatever is its real description, its reason is not far to seek. The explanation apparently lies in a distinct reaction against the present confusion and militaristic régime. The growth of republicanism being repressed and everything constructive being suppressed by the iron hand of militarists, there is a spirit of despondency among a certain class of people. Unable or unwilling to strive for the improvement of the country because of disheartening odds, they prefer to retire to the privacy of their seclusion. Far from the madding crowd, they hope to secure peace of mind and spirit during some portion of each day. The respite may be short, but it is better than nothing—otherwise their minds will constantly fret over the general turmoil and unhappiness.

Such attitude, of course, is unedifying, since it is the duty of every right-thinking individual always to strive for the best and seek to overcome the obstacles: while there is life, there is hope. The votaries of the movement which, although only two or three years old, is already fairly widespread, however, seem to believe in the *laissez faire* policy of Taoism—namely, leave well alone, and all's well that ends well. In the end the nation will right itself; meanwhile, let each person rest his jaded spirit and seek reinvigoration from within.

There is also another aspect to this interesting manifestation. Among its members who are now numbered by the thousands, there seems to be likewise a sort of freemasonry. Those who desire to enter the brotherhood must undergo certain tests—length of meditative period and amount of quiescent concentration, etc.—and promise to observe its mystic rules and regulations. The adherents being mostly present or former officials, the fraternity appears to be well financed, and new recruits who are said to have been cured, Christian Science like, by faith and prolonged meditation during the greater part of the day, contribute handsomely to its coffers.

Here is altogether an interesting complex situation. The intellectual waters have been moved, and the Chinese mind is

rediscovering itself. In a less accentuated form the spiritual waters have also been stirred, and the resultant manifestations are many. Some are hopeful, others are promising, while still others baffle description. This much, however, is certain: whatever be the nature of these manifestations, the new Chinese soul is not the same old counterpart. It, too, is endeavoring to rediscover itself, although for the present some parts of it are cautiously groping their way. Time alone will be the best physician here as elsewhere.

Employees of the Printing Department of the Commercial Press, Shanghai.



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(*Courtesy of* The Trans-Pacific)

WOMEN GRADUATES OF PEKING CHRISTIAN UNIVERSITY, WITH AMERICAN TEACHER.

CHAPTER IV

THE NEW WOMAN

THE hand that rocks the cradle rules the world"—in China no less than in any other country. If the West could produce women rulers famous in history, so could China; it is but twelve years since the forceful "Old Buddha" Empress Dowager was laid to her rest. Likewise women in both hemispheres have become celebrated in other fields of activity, with the possible exception of a lack of women scientists in the East, although last year a Chinese lady graduate in America qualified for the Doctor of Science degree by her researches into two of China's epicurean delicacies—namely, the preserved egg and the birds' nest soup—and the same maternal instinct beats true and nurtures alike the plastic material for the future well-being of the country.

"Votes for Women!" cries the woman in the West in this twentieth century; and in more than a dozen countries, including Great Britain, that great stronghold of traditional conservatism, women have now been enfranchised. "Votes for Women!" also cried a section of Chinese women in 1912—the first year of the Republic—and a band of suffragettes delighted their militant English sisters when they invaded the sanctuary of the provincial legislature in Canton, that beacon light in China of all progress, and similarly clamored for enfranchisement. That agitation, however, proved a nine days' wonder, and the women of to-day are committed to a more laudable ambition than that of political emancipation.[1] To be sure, that coveted grant will not be refused if freely voted

[1] Recently, on March 30, 1921, 700 women rushed into the provincial assembly building at Canton, as that body was discussing a bill for the election of district magistrates, demanding the addition of a clause granting women the right to vote. It is reported that "disorderly scenes ensued, in which several of the suffragettes were injured and a number of them knocked down unconscious."

by the national parliament, but the time is not yet ripe for a republic-wide campaign in its favor. The time is, however, ripe for a nation-wide agitation for the emancipation of China's womanhood in order that the hands which "rock the cradle" shall truly rule the world, not so much in the legislatures as lawmakers, but in other equally important spheres of usefulness. And this is now being vigorously pushed forward through the instrumentality of education—education in the broadest sense of the word.

Here we get the key to the difference between the Chinese women of to-day and those of almost yesterday. In the good old days "a woman without talent is virtuous," whereas modern educators are doing their best to promote compulsory universal education so that there will be no unlettered man or woman in the land. Therefore, the ancient classics lay down the duties of womanhood as obedience to parents and submission to husbands. Hence followed all the customary presumptions in favor of man's superiority, and hence a wife might be put away for any of the following seven reasons—barrenness, lasciviousness, disregard of husband's parents. talkativeness, thievish propensities, envious and suspicious temper, and inveterate infirmity. Perhaps those in the West who are championing the cause of easy divorce legislation may take a leaf out of China's past history.

Notwithstanding this comparative inferiority, the woman of China is highly respected. In the opinion of many outsiders, "China is a country that respects and values her women exceedingly"; hence in addition to the great Empress Dowager whom we have already mentioned, history also records the remarkable case of Mu-lan, who "won undying reputation as a great general when she fought for her father," and whose "filial piety and soldierly qualities have been themes for poets and scholars through after ages." Besides, in the Chinese bibliographical dictionary of 1,628 volumes, no fewer than 376 were devoted to the lives of celebrated Chinese women.

According to the great Confucian interpreter, Dr. Ch'en Huan-chang who qualified for the Doctor of Philosophy degree at Columbia by his thesis on "The Economic Principles of Confucius and his School" (two volumes), the position of woman is far from being unenviable. He says that "according to the teachings of Confucius, the position of woman is equal

to that of man. From the emperor to the common people, the wife of each is his equal. Therefore the word wife means equal. And the *Canon of Changes* (or Book of Changes) even says that with the repression of the one for the satisfaction of the other, the man is placed below woman in relative position. Hence, the relation of husband and wife is called 'brothers' by Confucius. And the *Canon of Poetry* (or Book of Odes) also says—'Love your bride as your brothers.'

"For the equality of man and woman, Confucius prescribes the rite of 'personal receiving' as a necessary ceremony of marriage—that is, the bridegroom must go to the bride's home to receive her personally. This rite is necessary for all classes, not excepting even the emperor. In the *Canon of Poetry* and the *Spring and Autumn* (one of the great sage's most famous works), there are many condemnations of those who do not observe this rite. Confucius was asked by Duke Ai of Lu if to wear a crown for the exercise of 'personal receiving' would be too ceremonious. Confucius answered him by saying that an emperor must pay respect to his wife. Indeed, the rite of 'personal receiving' is to indicate the principle of respect for woman. Mo-tze (the apostle of universal love, already referred to) attacked Confucius on this point by saying that one is as respectful and humble as a servant to his wife; that the ceremony of taking her to the carriage is like the service due to one's parents; and that all the ceremonies of marriage are as solemn as those of sacrifices. From the argument of Mo-tze we know clearly that Confucius raised the position of woman very high."

This exposition is illuminating, but it is not all. According to the same author, "another example illustrating the equality of man and woman is that the married woman preserves her own name after marriage. . . . Europeans and Americans are proud of the high position of their women, but the married woman must give up her own name, and adopt the name of her husband, being known as Mrs. So-and-So. This means that she cannot keep her individuality and is merely a dependent of her husband; whereas, among the Chinese, the married woman has her individual name." (Vol. I, pp. 64-65.)

Whatever the shortcomings of the Chinese as a race, and however much they may have deviated from the precepts of their sages and philosophers, they have consistently obeyed

the Fifth Commandment. This explains in great measure the longevity of a nation which has seen Egypt, Babylon, Greece and Rome rise, thrive and decline—a longevity which can only be interpreted as the working out of the Divine promise "that thy days may be long upon the land which the Lord thy God giveth thee." Filial piety represents in China the embodiment of all virtues, and all over the country are memorial archways immortalizing this virtue of son or daughter. Whoever is unconvinced of the extent of the love of Chinese for their mothers has only to witness an elaborate funeral procession where the deceased is mother of the chief mourner.

That is one form in which the nation shows respect for its womanhood. Another consists in the protection of women's rights. In the West, widows frequently remarry; but in China such remarriages were practically unknown until very recent years. No prohibition, social or legal, exists against such new relationship, but a Chinese wife is in more cases true to the memory of her deceased husband than is her Western sister; and if a wife elects to share her husband's grave rather than survive him, she is considered a model wife, whose act of devotion should be commemorated by a memorial tablet or arch.

A Chinese husband may legally divorce his wife on any of the seven grounds above mentioned, but in practice divorces are virtually unknown. The sense of social dignity and consideration for womanhood serve to deter dissatisfied husbands from creating scandal. The philosophic East regards the materialistic West as an irresponsible urchin playing fast and loose with holy matrimony in a way which can only end in lowering the general moral tone.

With the introduction of Western religion, trade, learning and civilization, as already stated, the Chinese mind has broadened, and schools for girls have been established in increasing numbers. In a previous chapter on Educational Reforms we gave statistics of girl schools in several provinces, and five years ago out of a total enrollment of over four million students quite two hundred thousand were girls in Chinese government and private schools. If we add to this the number of those studying in mission schools, there is good reason to believe that out of five million students attending schools in China at the end of 1919, at least one-twentieth are girls.

That is to say, female education is becoming more and more popular, and the example set by patriotic women educators has done not a little towards enlisting public support. A decade ago the viceroy of Hupeh province requested the Manchu throne to decorate one Mrs. Hu, "who has contributed the sum of fifty thousand taels (say over £8,000) towards the educational expenses of the Hupeh Provincial Government, thus giving relief to the financial strain in the management of the various government schools which would have closed down but for this munificent contribution." About the same time another lady, Mrs. Wei, who had traveled a great deal in Japan, gave twenty thousand silver dollars for the establishment of a special bureau to translate books for the enlightenment of her fellow-provincials in Honan.

The two ladies having distinguished themselves for their provinces, it is relevant here to survey the educational progress in both Hupeh and Honan. The former has an area of 71,410 square miles and a population of 35,280,685 and the latter 67,940 square miles and population of 35,316,800. As in the case of the other provinces, the statistics are taken from the "Educational Directory for 1920":—

	Hupeh	*Honan*
University (mission)	1	..
Higher Normal School	1	..
Normal Schools	3	6
Commercial Schools	10	2
Middle Schools	16	13
Industrial Schools	33	10
Higher Primary Schools	178	236
Primary Schools	3,847	7,363
Girls' Schools	202	143
Private Middle Schools	4	4
Mission Schools	?	?
College of Law	..	1
College of Agriculture	..	1

The next step in the advancement of female education consists in the sending of girl students abroad for completion of their studies. This was first officially inaugurated thirteen years ago. In a previous chapter we referred to the five high commissioners sent out by the Manchu government, in 1905, to study the constitutional systems of the West, as well as the promise of special scholarships by such American institutions as Yale, Harvard and Wellesley, etc. One of these commissioners was the enlightened Manchu, Tuan Fang, who

subsequently perished in the Revolution of 1911—his son later studied in the United States and lived the life of a gentleman of means. During his tenure of office as viceroy at Nanking—the Southern Capital, which is eight hours' train journey from Shanghai—he held an examination, in 1907, of candidates who desired to go to America. The competition being open to all comers, there were over 600 contestants, including fifty ladies. Of these twelve men and three women were selected. Since then, as already noted, about ten girls are being sent every two years by Tsing Hua College, Peking.

There are now about two hundred girl students in the United States alone. The greater portion of these are private students, supported by their own parents or guardians. In addition to the institutions above named, a private endowment in Michigan University is also instrumental in assisting Oriental and especially Chinese girls to study for the medical profession. The number of girls in other countries is necessarily smaller, with the possible exception of Japan; but as a rule the proportion of girls to boys ranges from one-tenth to one-thirtieth. Naturally the courses they take up are those which will equip them for their future life work—such as arts, music, and medicine or nursing, while a few prepare for teaching or the ministry. Wherever they go, they seem to enter whole-heartedly into their new environment and justify the high expectations entertained of them. Many contribute to the various college periodicals, especially in America; and one Dr. Tseo Pang-yuen, hailing from an interior province which is famous for its porcelain, is the first Chinese lady ambulance surgeon at Bellevue Hospital, New York, having studied at Northwestern University, Michigan, and Chicago for ten years.

Now that the nation's womanhood is becoming educated, naturally they are impatient at the old restraints. They are daily becoming more and more self-reliant, and no longer have they to depend upon their brothers for expression or ventilation of their grievances and desires. The education which they are deriving from modern schools fits them to take a larger part in community activities; they can no longer be confined within the four walls of their homes. Into the relief of distress as well as other philanthropic work they are already entering heart and soul. The honorary chairman and the

president of the Chinese Ladies' Red Cross Society, established eighteen months ago in Peking, are Madame Hsu Shih-ch'ang, wife of the President of the Republic, and Madame Hsiung Hsi-ling, wife of an ex-premier. The example of service given by these distinguished ladies is being followed eagerly by admiring fellow-women.

Probably the most popular profession among the modern educated women is nursing and medicine, apart from teaching. "When the Chinese Revolution broke out in 1911," writes Dr. Ida Kahn, already referred to in the chapter on Foreign-educated Students, "companies of women wanted to join the Amazon corps of 'Dare to die' soldiers, and I had to sit here (Nan-ch'ang, capital of Dr. Tseo's province) and answer mother after mother who came to seek their daughters because they thought that, as I was a leader of modern thought, I had urged them to leave their homes. They could not be convinced that I abhorred such rashness. Bevies of women wanted to join the Red Cross as nurses, and I had to point out to them that only trained helpers could be useful."

A school of law and politics for women was established in Peking, in 1912, by women lawyers returned from Paris, but it soon went out of existence. A Miss Cheng, recently graduated in law, also from Paris, and who is a native of Canton, attended the Peace Conference in 1919 as correspondent for various native newspapers in her own province. Other women are entering business and the manufacturing industries. A young widow is in charge of the Ladies' Savings Department of the Shanghai Commercial and Savings Bank, a thriving Chinese institution; and women are becoming expert manufacturers, especially in Canton, where no less than forty factories, making socks, shirts and the like, are owned and operated entirely by women, while in others women and girls furnish all the labor.[1] Nine or ten factories employ from forty to fifty women and girls each, while the rest have from eight to ten. The Yu Hung Knitting Company, of Canton, employs

[1] A new women's savings bank, with a capital of two million dollars, is being promoted by the women of Peking, and in Canton the following appointments have recently been made: a Miss Kan to be clerk of the "Extraordinary Parliament" in charge of the publication of the "Parliamentarian Record"; another lady as one of the five election supervisors; and over forty women as secretaries, ticket collectors and inspectors of the Canton-Samshui railway, as well as telephone exchange operators.

more than fifty persons. It does a business of more than $50,000 a year and the manager is one Mrs. Shen Tsao-see.

The "Votes for Women" movement in 1912 died quickly, and even to-day most educated women express great doubt on the subject. One who speaks English as well as French fluently, her husband being a Chinese diplomat, remarks:—"The less I say about the question of woman suffrage the better, but I feel that to respond to the needs of the present general situation, Chinese women must have the proper new knowledge; the object should be to produce virtuous wives and good mothers, who can really assume the duties of teaching their children and helping their husbands." On the other hand, the editress of the *Chinese Ladies' Journal* is in favor of woman suffrage, as are a few other women intellectuals; but the bulk of the nation is not yet prepared for its advocacy.

The question of emancipating Chinese women forms now one of the live topics in the press, especially in the liberal periodicals. A semi-monthly, for instance, was started scarcely a year ago, entitled *Emancipation and Reconstruction*, in almost every issue of which some phase of woman's emancipation was discussed. Monthlies, like the *Renaissance* and the *Journal of the Young China Association*, also give prominence to this popular subject. The latter issued at one time a special woman's Number, containing many articles written by Chinese ladies themselves. The *Chinese Ladies' Journal*, the pioneer publication of its kind and published by the Commercial Press, Ltd. (Shanghai), is doing splendid work in enlightening the womenfolk of the country in ways of household management, care of children, etc. It began publication a few years ago and its first editress was a Wellesley graduate. In our next chapter on Marriage Reforms we shall have occasion again to refer to this enterprising *Ladies' Journal*.

We have said that the medical profession is perhaps the new women's most popular lifework, but as an instance of feminine possibilities it is noteworthy that a few of them have also taken up flying—one sustaining serious injuries in the course of a flight in Peking. During the war a British officer, who had joined up from China, was invalided from the front. At the hospital in England he desired to be attended by a Chinese nurse who, he said, always made the best of nurses. As his request could not be acceded to, he is reported to have

shown signs of intense disappointment. This opinion may be further corroborated by the following testimony of Dr. Mary H. Fulton, who established the Hackett Medical College for Women at Canton in 1901—an institution which is doing splendid work in South China and has an enrollment of fifty boarders:—

"After many years' experience I can testify that the Chinese girls become almost ideal doctors. They learn quickly and have good memories. They are calm, dignified and self-possessed, clean in their personal habits, and dainty in their dress. Their small hands are finely adapted for delicate surgical work. They are seldom elated or cast down. They seem steadily year by year to grow in grace and knowledge. They bear heavy and important responsibilities readily and cheerfully. I do not remember in all these years to have heard one murmur or complaint, although they are busy all day and often all night in homes anything but sanitary. They are instant in season and out of season."

Similar golden opinions may be multiplied; and no less an authority than Sir John Jordan, until recently British minister to China, who had lived thirty-six years in the country, has said that in his experience the best surgeon in Peking is a foreign-educated Chinese, although there are at least a dozen foreign doctors in the Capital. These testimonies will, however, suffice for our purpose.

Here it is interesting to know what the new women think about themselves, their new life of greater service, and the ultimate destination of their new freedom. As is natural, the very first reform which the emancipated woman will demand is one which vitally concerns herself—namely, the matter of betrothals and marriages. On this subject she has very distinct opinions, which will be set forth in the next chapter. Meanwhile the following editorial translated from the maiden issue of a women's newspaper in Canton, started a year ago, may be quoted:—

"To oversee the government and to lead society into an enlightened path is the duty of journalists. A few words from their pen constitute a criticism which in effect will criticize the actions of the society and reform their misdemeanors in

the course of time. . . . As to human beings in the world, it is impossible to neglect entirely the welfare of the female sex; yet our parents have adopted such an idea as to despise the female sex, and ignorant citizens have echoed with the ancients the saying that 'Virtue lies within a girl who possesses no education or ability.' Hence at the mercy of the male sex our two hundred million sisters have been condemned to the hall of darkness. Why? Are females not also human beings? Why then should they receive such cruel treatment in society? On this point the writer is inclined to think that we, the female sex, are partly responsible for such consequences, since we did not assert our rights and never struggled for our own welfare. . . . In order to preserve our own position in society, we must have a definite plan—namely, through journalism and newspaper propaganda to attain the necessary result. . . . To educate the ignorant and strengthen the weaker ones will be the duty of this paper. Therefore we, the publishers of the *Girls' Daily*, propose to support and carry out the following points as our aims:—

"1. All things which will preserve the dignity and virtues of a woman, we will advocate in our columns.

"2. All things which are beneficial to womanhood, we will agitate.

"3. All those who are in sympathy with our cause, we will manifest.

"4. All those who are working contrary to our cause we will fight to the last."

The note of determination underlying the above cannot be mistaken. If similar sentiments have not been expressed in other parts of the country, there are not wanting signs which show that the same chord beats true in other hearts. A significant manifestation of this is the attitude among well-educated ladies in Tientsin, North China (three hours' train journey from Peking) to declare war against the custom of concubinage. Because of the new spirit of nationalism in the land, modern women in most cities are organizing themselves into patriotic associations. One of these is the Women's Patriotic Association of Tientsin, whose members include several hundred educated ladies and wives of the most intellectual families in the city. The question at issue was whether or not

to admit concubines into the association. Their answer was a deliberate No, although the association was fully aware of the fact that these women were usually wealthy and could contribute handsomely to the society's funds. The declaration issued last year in this connection is notable for the straightforward way in which the problem was stated and tackled:—

"One of the most painful and horrible sufferings which women have been experiencing during the last several thousand years is the system of concubinage. Once women become concubines, their fate is sealed. Formerly in China the family system was in vogue. In accordance with it, it would be unfilial if a man did not have a son to succeed him or to burn incense for his deceased parents. If his wife failed to give birth to a son he was obliged to take unto himself a concubine. Concubinage soon afterwards became popular, and numberless women have in consequence been degraded. The status of Chinese women as a result has been lowered. Contempt and cruelty are showered upon them until their death. If they are maltreated, they have no redress. One man, if he is wealthy enough, may take from three to ten concubines. Many corrupt officials, merchants and national traitors, usually keep a host of them in their homes.

"Unless concubinage is abolished, our family system and finally our nation will be destroyed. We modern women cannot refrain from paying attention to this question. The result of our deliberation is the passing of a resolution excluding concubines from the membership of the association. We herewith give the detailed reasons why we have adopted this strong attitude:—

"1. Although the promoters of the association are teachers and students of girl schools, they are more than pleased to have wives and members of reputable families join them so that they may be able to render greater service to the country. Why not take in concubines, who are also Chinese women and are none the less patriotic? We have been asked to answer this question. Now to take in concubines as our members would go against our first principle. Our object in organizing the association was to arouse our sisters to do something for their country. Our future plan is to reform the family, to reform society and to abolish any social system which is

detrimental to Chinese women. Those concubines who desire to join us will probably fail to understand these ultimate objects of the association. They would be offended should we in future discuss the question of the abolition of concubinage. Such a disagreement of views will result in hindrance to the progress of the association.

"2. Such being our principle, we cannot admit the right of concubines to exist as part of the society and consequently cannot allow them to become members; otherwise our task of uprooting the evil will be increased tenfold. However, we are not looking down upon them or considering them not as our equals. On the contrary, we are devising means for their salvation from their present deplorable state.

"3. There are three classes of concubines in China. Some are ambitious women belonging to good families. Some are sold into slavery as a result of calamity or misfortune, some are women without principle, not knowing the sin they have committed, and are satisfied with worldly comforts and luxuries. Still others are prostitutes, who are impudent and proud of their degraded position. If we take in as our members any concubines at all, the good name of the association will surely be compromised. Furthermore, this is the first time that Chinese women have tried to do something for their country, and we are consequently passing a trying period.

"4. Ninety-nine out of every hundred women in China are not free. We are now sending out eighty or ninety women to speak on public questions. These lecturers include teachers, students, matrons and young women. We have now completed our patriotic work inside the city and will continue our campaign outside it. We are grateful to our parents for their support and sympathy, which will be withdrawn if they discover that we are not living up to our principles. Our parents will dislike our association with degraded women. These are the four reasons why we exclude concubines from the association."

The courage of these ladies is admirable, because the social evil they seek to eradicate is not only widespread but also strongly entrenched. There are no laws forbidding concubinage, simply because it is not regarded as a second marriage. A Chinese marriage is accompanied by elaborate ceremonies,

but scarcely any ritual at all is required in the case of taking in a concubine. Hence one may keep as many concubines as his means will allow and yet is no bigamist at law. So the fair crusaders will have plenty of spadework to do. They have, however, started in the right direction by taking the public into their confidence and awakening the nation to the enormity of the social crime. In course of time the public conscience will be aroused sufficiently to warrant the enactment of a much-needed legislation.

From impatience at being bound by the old restraints and the desire to take a larger part in the activities of the community, it is a logical step for the modern women to participate also in political discussions. Two thousand years before the Christian era a law was passed forbidding public assemblies of the fair sex especially in the temples, lest they congregated to talk politics; yet almost four thousand years later China's womanhood, thanks to the action of the Paris Conference over the Shantung question, is as active as its rising manhood in discussing publicly the burning politics of the day. Like the male students whose activities are now a power in the land, the women students have also organized themselves into unions and affiliated their associations with the former's National Union of Students. At an inaugural meeting in Tientsin, one Miss Wang, of that city's First Girls' Normal School, took the chair by popular acclamation. In the course of her speech she is reported to have said:—"Conditions are very dark. Some lay all the blame on our unenlightened government. I, little sister, say that the most unenlightened of all are our Chinese women. First, we bind our feet; secondly, our minds are bound; thirdly, we are inferiors and servants of our husbands. To-day, in the amalgamation of our women's society with the Students' Union, we are unbinding ancient restrictions."

Here we have the voice of China's rising women, no longer leading lives of seclusion but coming out to discharge their duties towards the public. As a woman orator has finely put it:—"We are taught by our sages to obey our fathers and mothers, but our Republic is the father and mother of our four hundred millions. Therefore, we should place the interests of our greater father and mother before those of our own fathers and mothers." Such public-spirited sentiments are

echoed and re-echoed from one end of the country to the other, and there is indeed a new spirit in the land.

In a future chapter we will discuss the remarkable Student Movement which is stirring the nation to its very depths. The trials and tribulations of the male students are gladly shared by the girls, and the traditional segregation of sexes is no longer an effective barrier to prevent the nation's rising generation from coöperating with one another for the ultimate benefit of the Republic. This is how the girls of St. Mary's Hall, a leading mission school in Shanghai, spoke out their minds last year on the problems of the day:—

"Our first object is to help to build a greater China for the future. It is a big task and it is not a thing we can accomplish in a day or two, but it is something that we have to try to do through all our lifetime. We must therefore be patient in our effort. It would be splendid to succeed in our demonstration about Tsingtau (Shantung), but that alone would not be enough, for we want to do our part in building a strong China. This requires time, but if we, the people of the land, have true patriotism and develop it in the right way, a future righteous China is bound to come. In carrying out this aim we do not want to be too violent in our actions at one time and then let our patriotic feelings fade away as time goes on. If we are too excited now and try to do things which are beyond our capability, we are harming China rather than helping China, for such actions, unless they are wisely planned, may lead to lifelong regret afterwards and that will not be true patriotism. Even though we lose Tsingtau temporarily, we can surely get it and all our lands back if our country is strong in time to come. So let us strive not only for the demonstration, but also for a strong China.

"Secondly, we want to explain the reason for the 'boycott.' It is not because we have ill feelings against any particular country, but it is one of the necessary policies for us to adopt in order to strengthen our country. This 'boycott' comes from the Chinese people and not from the government. We are against the insults, 'demands' and predatory ambitions of Japan towards our country, but not against the Japanese people. We sincerely hope our neighboring folks will understand that every one has the right to strengthen his or her

own country in any legal way. What we are doing now is due to our desire to help to found a strong and righteous China. We are trying to do our part to encourage our national industries. A developed China will more readily enter into trade relations with Japan and other countries than an undeveloped China, and our progress will enable us to contribute our share in international commerce to the benefit of all."

This sums up preëminently the strivings of the present generation—a strong and righteous China. It may be a long, long trail, but the nation's new womanhood has here held out the buoyant hope of optimism. Those who are pessimistic may sit in sackcloth and bemoan the present state of chaos and anarchy, but the optimists—and the students of to-day are contagious optimists—will strive upward for a better future. When the leaders of the future are rationally confident of a happier day for the Republic, who is there to say them nay?

The new woman is, therefore, abroad in the land. She is patriotic and public-spirited. In her leisure hours she does all she can to assist her less fortunate sisters—by teaching them when they are not otherwise employed, by giving them talks on useful subjects, and by helping them to establish a better future for themselves as well as their community.

Here a tribute must be paid to the admirable work of the Young Women's Christian Association in this direction. Like the Young Men's Christian Association already described, this organization in China is also in charge of a national committee. For the first time, a Chinese woman, Mrs. T. C. Chu, a graduate of Wellesley, was this year elected chairman of this committee. Altogether there are seven city associations with a standing ranging from ten years to two months, and seventy-one student associations, the majority being in mission schools. The first city association was organized in Shanghai among the hundreds and thousands of female mill workers, and the first student association among some students in Hangchow (capital of Chekiang province). More and more is the leadership in the national committee and local boards becoming Chinese, and at present the association has a staff of sixty-eight foreign secretaries and thirty-one Chinese secretaries. The opportunities for developing leadership among China's modern women are appreciated; hence thirty students

from fifteen provinces have graduated from the association's Normal School of Physical Training and are now teaching in twenty-eight schools.

The new woman in China is a social worker; nay she is withal an international worker. As already stated, a few women intellectuals are champions of woman suffrage. This year, for the first time in the nation's history, Chinese women are also represented in an international assembly—namely, at the Quinquennial Congress of the International Council of Women in Christiania (September, 1920). Originally the National Union of Chinese Women, with headquarters at Shanghai, decided to send Miss Cheng, who attended the Peace Conference in Paris as newspaper correspondent and since returned to Canton, and another lady studying in America, but at the last minute they could not go. Finally the unique invitation was extended by the Chinese government to Madame Lo Ch'ang, the talented wife of the Chinese Consul-General in London and daughter of Mr. K'ang Yu-wei, already referred to. In appreciation of China's participation, the congress unanimously elected Madame Lo as the honorary vice-president of the council for the next quinquennial period of 1921-1925.

This is an epochal departure from the seclusion of the past —one which all will welcome with the best of wishes. Therefore, the new woman in China is likewise rediscovering herself—in her new home, in her new society, in the new Republic, in the new family of nations. If so, in more senses than one is it true that "the hand that rocks the cradle rules the world."

CHAPTER V

MARRIAGE REFORMS

IT is a common saying among foreign observers that love and romance in the Western sense are unknown in China, because Chinese marriages are not supposed to be founded on love and consent. In a general way the observation seems to be true, but most people are apt to forget another aspect of the question. A Western marriage is reputed to be established on love, after Cupid has discharged his darts, because matrimony is an affair of individuals. Then why is the tale of separations and divorces so painfully frequent in foreign countries?

In China, however, marriage is not regarded as an affair of the individuals, but as a vital concern of the family. The unit is the family, not the individual. The interests of the family come first, not those of the members composing it, nor of the state itself. These paramount interests demand that the parental stock should be continued, and there can be no more heinous offense than to let the family perish altogether. Hence in A.D. 189 a law subjected unmarried women between the ages of fifteen and thirty to a poll tax of five times the ordinary amount!

It is, therefore, the business of the parents to see that early provision should be made against such eventuality. When two young people enter upon matrimony, they may be unknown to each other, and perhaps their first meeting is at the nuptial ceremony itself. But having been yoked together for life, what are they to do? Social customs enjoin that they should obey their parents, and family interests demand that the name of the family should be perpetuated. If they feel discontented, they will only make life most miserable for themselves. They are powerless to change the customs: so they have to resign themselves to the situation and make the best of it. Do we wonder if love should then begin to grow between the two, especially after the arrival of an heir?

Now all this may sound intolerable to the Western lover, accustomed as he is to his *billets doux*, moonlight walks and sweet meetings; but bad as the system is, it has its virtues in being one of the chief factors contributory to the longevity of the Chinese race. If the maxim "Take care of the pence and the pounds will take care of themselves" is sound, then "Take care of the family and the nation will take care of itself" ought to be equally unimpeachable. It may be hard for the romantic Westerner to conceive of conjugal love existing where it never had a chance to grow or develop, but in view of the fact that separations and divorces are practically unknown in the unemotional East, it is not so impossible as is generally imagined. Has not somebody suggested that if we put two people of the opposite sex together alone, however unattractive they both may be, in the end they will be mutually attracted to each other? The late Sir Robert Hart, or "Chinese Hart," as he is better known for his fifty years' service with the Chinese government as the inspector-general of the maritime customs, has thus illustrated the contrast between Western and Chinese love: The former is like putting a kettle of boiling water on the stove and then letting it cool, whereas in the latter the water is cold but you apply fire to the kettle and then it gradually gets hotter and hotter.

Moreover, all parents are reasonable and wish their children joy. So while some may arrange their children's matches with an eye to the prospective bride or groom's position or wealth, despite the utter incompatibility of the two young people, such cannot be predicated in the preponderating majority of cases. In their own light, therefore, the parents will arrange the most suitable alliances; then the children will live happily and the parents, though deceased, will be reverenced as in actual life. This is both human nature and parental love, the latter being reciprocal of the children's filial piety.

On the other hand, Chinese husbands and wives are not given to emotional ostentation. Superficially, one may think them cold and unaffectionate: this is because of the rigid rules of social custom. But peep into the privacy of their conjugal surroundings, and one will be soon disillusioned. The following excerpt from Mr. Wagel's translations will give some idea of Chinese conjugal love. The composition of a poet in the Han dynasty, first century B.C., it tells of a man resolving

to go out into the world to make his fortune but is kept back by his wife:—

"There was not a peck of rice in the bin:
There was not a coat hanging on the pegs.
So I took my sword, and went towards the gate.
My wife and child clutched at my coat and wept—
'Some people want to be rich and grand,
I only want to share my porridge with you.
Above we have the blue wave of the sky,
Below, the dear face of our little child.'"

With the introduction of Western learning, an awakened people began to feel the disadvantages of a system which subordinated everything pertaining to the individual to the interests of the family, especially the uneviable lot of a daughter-in-law where the husband's mother was still living. The philosophic wedding of the past might suit their forefathers, but for half a decade "free love" became the battle cry of young China. Just as the caged bird, when released, will soar far and high, so the rising generation would go to extremes after breaking loose from the old restraints and restrictions. Intoxicated with the new wine of freedom, many tragedies and complications resulted; consequently modern girls in Canton have more than once thrown themselves into the river rather than be married in the old, conventional way. The following incident produced at the time a profound impression.

Mr. Tsu Da-fah, an Anhui man, was educated at a missionary college at Shanghai, where he graduated in 1904. The next year he married Miss Wang Shang-lan, of Chinkiang (Kiangsu). Early in 1907 Mrs. Tsu contracted diphtheria. She recovered, but her husband died from the infection. Mrs. Tsu was a remarkable woman. Her parents had been hoping for a son; so when she was born, they christened her "Shang-lan," phonetically meaning "like a boy," although literally "Sweet Orchid." When only five years of age she learned the exact signification of her name, so she determined to act up to it. Being a precocious child, she plagued her father to give her books and teach her, and at eleven she was sent to a private school. At fifteen she studied English. Her father was a progressive man, and instead of engaging his daughter to a rich mandarin decided that she should wed a foreign-

educated Chinese. The usual go-betweens' services were enlisted and the Tsu couple were happily married.

When the husband succumbed to her disease, Mrs. Tsu took poison and then sat down to write to her parents. When help arrived, she was beyond rescue. Her letter reads as follows (in translation):—

"Dear Parents:

I know something of my duty. I know I ought to discharge my obligation towards you and help you to teach my younger brothers. But fate is hard. My husband is dead: why should I linger in this world? I have told him to wait for me, for I will follow wherever he goes, so that our two years' love will not be in vain. But what I cannot bear is to think that I cannot serve you or teach my younger brothers. I know I am full of crimes not to be pardoned, but when I prefer to be perfect in conjugal devotion, it is impossible to leave my filial piety blameless. . . . The last favor I beg of you is that you will kindly hold our funeral services on the same day and inter the coffins in the same grave. No superstitious ceremony need be observed. The six hundred dollars, together with my gold ornaments, should be contributed to schools. I have many things to tell you, but now my heart is rending. I do not know what to say. Good-by, my dearest parents.

Your loving daughter,

SHANG-LAN."

The tragedy created a sensation but met with silent approval everywhere, because it harmonized with the general conviction that one could enter wedlock only once. Tsu's friends held a memorial service for the devoted couple, and honorable mention was made of the heroine's generosity even at the approach of death to leave instructions about donating her property to educational uses.

The stage of tragedies and complications was inevitable in the process of evolution but, fortunately, did not last long. To-day the picture is one of happy blending between the old and the new. In the more enlightened families the young people are allowed to choose for themselves, so long as the parents are consulted in the matter. In the less progressive families the parents still exercise the initiative in the matter

but the young people are consulted in the final decision. Among foreign-educated students the customary go-between or match-maker is still an important functionary, but he is getting to be more and more an ornamental figure once the necessary introduction is made.

The marriage ceremony is becoming less elaborate: in fact, the new ritual is simplicity itself when compared with the old cumbersome procedure, which sometimes requires several days to complete! If the parties are Christians, the ceremony may be held in a place of worship, which may be a church or Y. M. C. A. hall. Otherwise the rites may be celebrated at a private house or public institution. The following is typical of the ceremony observed at a modern Chinese marriage. It was prescribed for a fashionable wedding between the daughter of a cabinet minister and the son of an ex-governor, which took place in Peking at noon on New Year's Day, 1918, at the former's residence:—

1. Music.
2. Guests enter.
3. The go-betweens enter.
4. The heads of the two families enter.
5. The bride and bridegroom bow twice to each other.
6. The bride and bridegroom exchange tokens and testimonials.
7. The bride and bridegroom face northward and thank the go-betweens. Two bows.
8. The bride and bridegroom thank the male guests. One bow.
9. The bride and bridegroom thank the female guests. One bow.
10. The bride and bridegroom face northward and honor the family ancestors. They burn incense, offer wines, kneel, make three prostrations, and then rise.
11. The bride and bridegroom tender respects to their parents.
12. The parents acknowledge the presents already received. Three bows.
13. The family elders *ditto*. Three bows.
14. Other relatives *ditto*. One bow.
15. The ceremony is concluded.

An example of a modern wedding where the contracting parties were returned students is the following. The groom is a graduate of an English university and professor at a government university. The bride was a pupil of a missionary institution in her native city and has also studied in Japan. The ceremony took place in the Returned Students' Club, Peking, in the early afternoon:—

1. Music.
2. The guests take their seats.
3. The witness (to the solemnization) takes his place (stand).
4. The go-betweens take their place (stand).
5. The best man conducts the groom before the witness.
6. The bridesmaids conduct the bride before the witness.
7. Music.
8. The witness reads the marriage certificate.
9. The groom puts the ring on the bride's finger.
10. The bride and bridegroom bow to each other. Then another bow.
11. The bride and bridegroom bow to the witness.
12. The bride and bridegroom bow to the go-betweens.
13. The bride and bridegroom bow to the guests. (The guests stand and return the bow.)
14. The bride and bridegroom bow to their relatives. Altogether three bows.
15. Music.

Here we have the essence of marriage reforms in China, namely, the judicious blending of the East and the West. The groom, as well as the best man, was arrayed in the orthodox European evening dress. The organist played the usual wedding marches from "Lohengrin" and Mendelssohn, but when it came to the indispensable rite of placing the ring on the bride's finger, the symbol slipped from the groom's nervous fingers to the floor! Instead of a priest the ceremony was solemnized by a witness, who was the chancellor of the groom's university and ex-minister of education. The marriage certificate, in Chinese, reads somewhat as follows:—

"T. L. K. of Chihli Province, and S. J. S. of Chekiang Province, having agreed to be married to each other, are to-day, the 28th day of June, 1918, united in wedlock before

the Witness T. Y. P. The affections of the two are overflowing and will continue though their hairs turn gray. (Signed) T. Y. P., T. L. K., S. J. S., S. C."

The whole thing lasted only ten minutes. The company then adjourned to the adjoining rooms for light refreshments, and finally the happy couple drove away in an automobile for their honeymoon. All this instead of the old-fashioned formidable dinner party, to be followed by the nerve-racking ordeal of being teased in the "new" bedroom by the guests until the early hours of the morning—a practice often characterized by much vulgarity, immemorial custom giving the teasers on this rare occasion every license to devise ways and means for the unlucky couple's embarrassment!

Still another example of modern Chinese wedding took place about the same time in a southern provincial capital. The parties were Christians and the groom was a graduate of an American university. The rites were celebrated in a church, and the hero, as well as his best man, wore the European morning coat, the bride being attended by four bridesmaids. The religious ceremony over, the couple however turned round and bowed to the congregation which the latter reciprocated. A friend of the groom then mounted the platform and read aloud three congratulatory telegrams received a few hours previously, after which the procession filed out of the church, photographs were taken, and all adjourned to the "new" house for dinner.

Can there be a better method of combining the old and the new, the East and the West? We have spoken of the best man; but it seems that in only one or two cases did the groom's friend ever avail himself of his customary Western privilege. One of these confessed that he made bold enough to claim the privilege simply because he had known both the bride and groom long before they were married; otherwise he would never have felt justified in the existing circumstances.

Evidence positive of the direction in which the matrimonial wind is blowing is given in the following remarkable article on "Choosing a Husband," translated from the *Chinese Ladies' Journal* referred to in a previous chapter:—

"According to modern Chinese custom a son or daughter has the right to make his or her own choice in matrimony

without interference from the parents. Chinese, for thousands of years, have followed the custom of having such choice made by the parents instead of by the couples themselves. This bad custom often caused unhappiness, because the parents cared very little for the element of love between the young people. Since Western civilization came eastward this custom has gradually changed. Young lovers have often misused the term 'free marriage,' and considerable immorality has resulted.

"Since love should be lifelong, and as there is nothing so fine as love, the marriage of young people should not be decided upon in a short time. It is necessary to investigate habits and character with great care, so as to avoid future regrets on the part of the contracting parties. The following are the important points for Chinese women to consider in making their choice, and I should like to bring them forth and discuss them with young girls who are looking for husbands:—

"1. Appearance and knowledge.—A beauty should match a husband of good education and appearance, and a stout woman should marry a giant husband. Such couples will live together peacefully; but if an unusually beautiful and well educated woman marries a stupid husband, or an ugly and uneducated woman marries a well-educated and well-appearing man, they will never live together happily. It is necessary to judge the man intellectually as well as morally in order that the couple may be well balanced.

"2. Age.—The best time for marriage is between the ages of twenty and twenty-eight. Look for a husband who is neither too old nor too young. Generally husbands should be older by two or three years.

"3. Occupation.—Has your prospective husband an independent occupation? What kind of work is he doing? Is his income sufficient for his living without depending on his father's property?

"4. Property.—How big is your fiancé's house? Is it rented or is it his own property? Has he saved any money? Has he any other property? His wealth should be well balanced with that of your own family. If your husband is poor, you can never hope to live with him peacefully.

"5. Relations.—Are his parents still living? Has he any brothers or sisters? How many servants? Do his parents love him? Do they interfere in everything he does? How about his affection for his brothers and sisters or other members of his family?

"6. Health.—Is he in good health? Has he any hereditary disease?

"7. Living.—Does he live extravagantly or economically? Does he smoke, drink or gamble? What is his income and how does he spend it? Is there any balance left after he has paid his expenses?

"8. Temper.—How does he treat his friends or servants? This will enable you to know his temper.

"9. Character.—What is his opinion towards public affairs? Has he done anything to cause him to lose public respect?

"10. Purpose.—What is his aim regarding marriage? Does he believe in the rule of one wife or does he expect to have more than one?

"11. Other investigations.—Is he clean in living and eating? How about his friends, etc.?

"The other points may be learned by interview or by correspondence, or by getting information from his neighbors. If his morals are satisfactory, an engagement may be entered into. In this way you will never regret your action. If you marry a husband with whom you are not acquainted, how can you love each other? This is a very important matter, which every young woman should consider. Don't be too shy to investigate. This is a matter of great importance for your lifelong happiness."

It is difficult to say how far the above will be faithfully followed, but the principles enunciated are being adopted more and more. About the same time that the above article was published, the following incident was reported from an interior district, showing how an offer of marriage was met with flogging. A young woman of good but poor family attended a mission school for a short time and there developed strong ideas about her rights. Her father and brothers having died, she was left alone to care for her mother. Being good looking, she received repeated offers of marriage; but she scornfully rejected one and all. She said that as long as she lived she

would take care of her mother and also the property of the family, namely, about an acre of land.

One of her persistent suitors was an old-fashioned scholar who had obtained a degree at one of the former literary examinations. He called the local minor official and a likely friend together, wrote out a marriage certificate, got them to sign as witnesses, and then tossed it into the girl's yard when the mother was not at home. Reading the paper, she flew into great indignation. Straightway she went to the suitor's house, and finding him at his door called him by his infant name, "Wang Hsiao-kou!" (which phonetically also means "Puppy Wang"). "You were once my grandfather's servant; to-day we are poor and you a degree man. But this does not excuse you; your insolence is insufferable," she said. With that she seized a heavy three-pronged fork and whacked and drubbed him soundly. When he had been brought to his knees, she turned to the middle men, who were still in the house, but they quickly got the table between her and themselves. She returned home and, finding her mother, started with her to the magistracy to bring suit against Wang for his insulting proposal. In the end the suitor agreed to go daily to the girl's house and knock his head on the floor before her mother as a sign of apology!

A distinct change has, therefore, come over the mentality of the new woman. Widows to-day remarry, as in the West, especially if they are under thirty years of age, although the practice is not yet common. Love letters are not unknown, but they are not of the effusive, inconsequential sort familiar to the West. Thoughts and affections are expressed, but one must read between the lines to get at the gems. How many wives, for example, in any country can excel the Chinese lady who uses the following sentence in her first letter to her husband: "Kwei-li sends with each stroke of her brush a part of her heart"? The line of cleavage between the old and the new is clearly discernible, but the fire of the new Romeo is tempered by the conventions of the old lover. Moreover, the modern woman is courageous enough to assert her rights and, if necessary, seek redress before a divorce court. In 1912, a suit for bigamy was instituted in Shanghai against a returned student by his Chinese wife, as he had married an American girl during his sojourn in the United States. The court found him guilty and sentenced him to ninety days' imprisonment.

Marriages between Chinese and foreign women are usually contracted while the former reside as students in foreign countries. Some of these are known to be successful, while others appear to be failures. Not a few foreign women are especially devoted to their Chinese husbands. In the above cited bigamy case the Chinese wife offered to compromise, if the American girl would listen to her husband's father and return to the United States on a handsome allowance, but the latter refused. In another case when the bride landed in China, she was told by her consul that her husband already had a Chinese wife before he went abroad, and if she wished to return, the consul would be glad to secure passage for her. The offer was declined. When she arrived at an interior treaty port, another consul advised her to turn back before it was too late, but again she refused. The couple journeyed to their destination, apparently happy.

Recently the following advertisements appeared in two dailies in Tokyo and Shanghai:—"Japanese young lady, aged twenty, of best Samurai family, wishes to break off old customs and wed a foreigner. Willing to learn English customs and wear Western clothes." (!) "A young Japanese girl, aged twenty-three, wishes to meet a foreigner with a view to matrimony, speaks a little English. Kindly apply to Box No. 7274, care of Office of this paper." These are signs of the times for the women of the Land of Cherry Blossoms, as is also the proposal to be placed before the next Japanese Diet that a law should be passed requiring a prospective groom to be provided with a medical certificate, declaring him to be free from lunacy, infectious disease or sexual disease. So far, however, no similar predilections on the part of Chinese girls for foreign spouses have been reported, and we doubt if such advertisements will be inserted by Chinese women.[1] A few Chinese educated women are married to foreign educated men, but the advertisement method has in none of them been adopted. The friendly matchmaker is always procurable; so there is no place for matrimonial agencies in China, as in the West.

Evidence of the popularity of modern weddings is shown by

[1] One of these advertisements has since appeared in a Chinese vernacular daily in north China, but the authenticity of the enterprising "Miss Yao" who advertised has been doubted. It is suspected that a male wag has been masquerading as such.

the fact that an enterprising individual in Peking has invested his savings in the construction of a special modern building for the celebration of modern marriages! A resourceful finance minister has suggested that every marriage certificate should contain a revenue stamp. As a start the amount of tax will be ten cents, and the annual revenue from this source is estimated at $800,000, or eight million marriages, a year. Here is certainly an abundant reserve fund for the national treasury.

On the other hand, the tendency towards easy divorce is not very reassuring. In a previous chapter we noted the seven grounds for divorce permitted by ancient law. But no decree was to be granted if any of the following three reasons existed:—

(1) The wife had mourned three years for her husband's parents.
(2) The family had become rich since she joined it.
(3) The wife had no parents to receive her back.

As already stated, the combined operation of the above statutes has deterred many husbands from putting away their wives, and divorces were virtually unheard of. During the last days, however, of the Manchu régime a provisional civil code was enacted, under which the following eight causes would justify a divorce:—

1. When one of the parties has committed bigamy.
2. When the wife has committed adultery.
3. When the husband has been convicted of adultery.
4. When one party has intended to kill the other.
5. When one party has ill-treated the other, thereby making it impossible for them to live together.
6. When the wife has insulted or ill-treated the relatives of the husband's parents.
7. When the husband has been insulted or ill-treated by his wife's parents or relatives.
8. When either party does not know the other's whereabouts or that the other is living for a period of over three years.

This provisional code is to-day partially enforced, since the permanent code is still under draft. Meanwhile, the number of applications for divorce among the poorer classes is increasing day by day. Consequently the Ministry of Justice has issued instructions to the various judicial departments not to entertain any application at all unless it be expressed as the unanimous desire of both parties, each application to be accompanied by a fee of four dollars.

Now how far this is a good symptom it is not easy to say, but Chinese legislators will need to take stock of the whole situation. It is desirable that the ancient marriage ceremonial should be modernized, and it is also equitable that ill-assorted couples should not be forever yoked together. On the other hand, the danger of going to the undesirable extremes should be guarded against. It is greatly to be hoped that the common sense of the race which has stood the nation in good stead in the past will in the end assert itself and restore the institution of holy matrimony to its rightful place in the modern life of the country.

CHAPTER VI

SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION

THE tremendous changes which have come over the social life of the nation reflect faithfully the nature and scope of China's awakening. Often has it been said that the Middle Kingdom of to-day is not that of yesterday, and often has it been repeated that we are on the eve of great social upheavals among one-fourth of the world's entire population. Now let us examine the evidence.

The ancient world boasted of seven wonders, and among them was the Great Wall of China separating, on the north, the eighteen provinces of China Proper from its outer dependencies. The number of world wonders has increased if not multiplied since then, and as usual China has contributed its quota. For example, the Chinese Revolution of 1911-1912 will always be remembered to the credit of this nation. Whereas the revolutions in France, Turkey, and Russia, etc., were marked by an orgy of bloodshed and almost fiendish cruelty, the Chinese Revolution was practically as bloodless as the English Revolution of 1688. And far from confiscating the property of the dethroned Manchus, the government of the Republic allowed them every consideration and sanctioned the articles of favorable treatment granting China's erstwhile rulers an annual pension of four million dollars.

That is one of the marvels of the twentieth century, and in a quarter least expected by Westerners. Another marvel is the success of the Chinese in ridding themselves of the opium habit. It is still a moot point among modern historians whether this drug was indigenous to China or imported from abroad, but all are agreed that after the "Opium War" of 1840 between Great Britain and the Middle Kingdom, the trade in Indian opium was legalized by the Anglo-Chinese treaty of 1858. The ravages of the drug spread far and wide and the number of its victims at the beginning of the

twentieth century was estimated at twenty-five million men and women. The evils of the poison having been brought home to the nation, a vigorous campaign was started in which such returned students as Messrs. T'ang Shao-yi, already referred to, and Tong Kai-son—first president of Tsing Hua College —played a conspicuous part. Great Britain agreed, in December, 1907, that the importation of Indian opium could be stopped in ten years, provided that the diminution of poppy growth in China itself was proportional to the annual one-tenth diminution of Indian import. The Chinese people entered wholeheartedly into the bargain and succeeded beyond the most sanguine expectations. The agreement was made revisable after three years; so at the end of the period, Great Britain restated that the Indian export could cease "in less than seven years if clear proof is given of the complete absence of production of native opium in China," in view of the fact that the Chinese government had "adopted a most rigorous policy for prohibiting the production, the transport and the smoking of native opium." The anti-opium crusade was thereupon prosecuted with greater vigor, with the result that Great Britain consented from April 1, 1913, to discontinue the Indian trade altogether.

Here is an accomplishment which is most spectacular. Not only did it belie the misgivings of China's critics, but it has filled the Chinese with the desired encouragement to do greater things. The incentive bore signal fruit in the bloodless Revolution, and is bearing fresh fruits to-day in the social, intellectual and moral awakening of four hundred million people. Unfortunately the past years' political disturbances have deranged the body politic and there has been a recrudescence of poppy growth in many parts of the country. The relapse is, however, temporary and appears to be encouraged by short-sighted militarists. The moral awakening of the nation being an irrevocable fact, the stain of such recrudescence will soon be wiped away.

Social transformation connotes many things, and pertinent examples of such transformation are surely the above noted Revolution and opium suppression as well as the new mentality of the rising generation described in previous chapters. Let us descend from generalities to particulars.

As further exemplification of inconsistencies in China it

should be noted that the country has always been more democratic than autocratic. An emperor calling himself the "Son of Heaven" may sit on the throne and rule the land, but the people's right of self-government in the villages, in the smaller towns, etc., has never been denied. A governor or magistrate appointed by the central government may administer the province or district, but he is never an absolute autocrat. The people will, whenever necessary, always make themselves heard, and even the throne has sometimes to bow to the popular will. This phenomenon explains the bloodless substitution of the former monarchy by a republican form of government, since democracy can only thrive on congenial soil.

Hence the rigid caste system is unknown to China. Popularly speaking, the system of stratification resolves itself into the literatus, the farmer, the artisan and the merchant, but such stratification is horizontal, not vertical as in India. Therefore nothing prevents a merchant from climbing up to the social pinnacle nor a scholar from dropping to the bottom of the ladder. The royal road to fame or success is open to everybody who has ability and character. Consequently, the poorest man's son may rise to become the prime minister and like the founder of the Ming dynasty (A. D. 1368-1644), a beggar may also become an emperor.

The advent of the Republic having been effected in a natural peaceful way, the old system of stratification has been left untouched. The division is professional, rather than social; and as such there is no place for caste or class prejudice. In the days of emperors and empresses China was a nominal autocracy but really a formless democracy. To-day she is a formal democracy, in name as well as in fact, and the traditional democratic inclinations of the people have received fresh impetus. Under a monarchy there were peers and commoners; now everybody is a plain "Shen-sheng" or "Mister." A special exception is, however, made in the case of Manchus and Mongols who are permitted to retain their hereditary titles of nobility, and also of Confucius' direct lineal descendant who is known as Duke K'ung. Otherwise a premier is likewise plain "Mister," although for courtesy sake the President of the Republic is referred to as the "Great President" and cabinet ministers by their rank and position. Recognition of merit is shown by the conferring of orders and

decorations, but the recipient is nevertheless a "Mister" and no more.

Hence there is no limit to the power of voting, except that of having attained majority and fulfilling certain educational or property tests. A prospective member of parliament need be only twenty-five years old, a senator thirty years old and a president forty years old—an age limit which compares favorably with that in any other democracy.

Much the best proof of democratization is the accessibility of the President of the Republic to foreign visitors. For example, although the treaties of 1858 between China and Great Britain, France, America and Russia respectively stipulated for the right of legation in Peking, no foreign ministers were actually permitted so to reside until two years after, and no imperial audience was granted until 1873. The policy of the ruling house was one of arrogance and concessions were made inch by inch. Hence the wives of foreign ministers were not received by the "Old Buddha" Empress Dowager until 1899—a condescension granted after China's southern outlying dependencies had been lost to France and Great Britain and after the Celestial Empire had been worsted by little Japan.

To-day the premier citizen of the Republic is easily accessible to foreigners. Not only does the chief magistrate hold regular garden parties for foreign diplomats and their families, but invitations are also extended to foreign advisers, bankers, newspapermen, and their wives, etc. At these delightful functions the visitors roam freely about the beautiful grounds of what was once the inviolable preserve of Manchu emperors and empresses, shake hands with the President of the Republic and Madame President, partake of lavish refreshments and enjoy Chinese theatricals performed by the "star" cast of the entire metropolis. During these pleasurable occasions the chief magistrate sometimes also walks about with his guests and engages in animated conversation with those who speak Chinese. At any time, however, any foreign visitor to Peking may obtain an interview with the President or other important functionary upon introduction by his legation—a privilege usually withheld from the ordinary Chinese.

The Westerner is therefore no longer held at arm's length but is welcomed to share the amenities of Chinese hospitality.

The energizing influence of alien workers in the land is not unappreciated; and not a few foreigners have been awarded orders and decorations by the Chinese government for meritorious services. Hence twenty-one years after a Chinese sovereign's first audience with the wives of foreign diplomats, China's representative conferred a special Order of Merit on a retiring minister's wife in recognition of her charitable activities. The Countess Ahlefeldt-Laurvig, wife of the Danish minister, toiled hard to help establish the Old Women's Home in Peking and showed by her example the path of service to China's educated women. The honor is given for the first time, but is well deserved by one who has spent a good number of years of self-sacrifice for the poor.

Although the breach with the old is in theory more nominal than actual in the advent of the Republic, yet it represents a determined departure from ancient modes and manners. The substitution of a formal democracy for an amorphous prototype may not have been attended by violent changes, yet the break from the old is in most respects unmistakable. Thanks to the impetus given to modern learning by the abolition of old-fashioned literary examinations, discarded temples and examination halls were even before the Revolution converted into schools; now city walls are pulled down and converted into macadamized roads for modern vehicles of transportation. The walls of Peking have been breached and the modern railway brings one up to the quarter occupied by foreign legations as well as within a stone's throw of the Forbidden City. Other cities may progress at a slower rate, but the Capital is certainly leading in this direction. The horse-drawn carriages and pneumatic-tyred rickshaws are replacing the old mule-carts, and the automobile has come to stay. In September, 1917, a friend of the writer bought a car and took out a license, Number 255. To-day in less than three years, the highest number on the road is 900. This notwithstanding the fact that Peking is not a treaty port where, like Shanghai, the automobile-driving community is mainly European and the number of cars on the road is over three thousand.

For speed and comfort a motor car is excellent, but this alone does not account for its popularity. If ancient records were looked up, the Western importation would also be traced

to Chinese origin, since no less eminent a strategist than K'ung Ming (or Chu Ko-liang) had occasion to invent a crude counterpart at the stirring time of the "Three Kingdoms" (3rd century A. D.). A considerable share of such popularity should rather be ascribed to the general fondness for foreign things and foreign fashions. The West admires Chinese redwood furniture; by way of reciprocity the Chinese are gradually coming to like the comfortable foreign furniture and decorations. Therefore, residences as well as public buildings are being built in the latest European style, together with modern fittings and fixtures for the interior. Foreign cooking, foreign wines, foreign games, foreign clothes, foreign customs—almost everything foreign is becoming fashionable. The walking-stick habit is no longer the national emblem of the Englishman, but a Chinese member of parliament may be identified by his stick and attaché case or small valise. The military salute and the doffing of hats are also in vogue as forms of salutation, and the picturesque bowing of former days is being replaced by the European handshake.

Foreign clothes are popular with the educated male population, not the female population. And the approved uniform to be worn now by civil officials on ceremonial occasions is the European frock coat, evening dress, or morning coat, according to the solemnity of the function. This is because of the absence of the former "pig-tail"—a hirsute appendage imposed by the Manchus as a sign of subjection. Here and there one may still see a few queues about; but the wearers keep them because they are too poor to buy the wherewithal to protect their exposed heads, especially in the broiling heat of summer. European dress is, however, not all-conquering, as Chinese clothes are still preferred in extremes of weather and foreign clothes are worn generally in spring and autumn.

Chinese ladies, none the less, will always keep to their national dress, since it is more becoming and more comfortable when contrasted with European corsets and high heels. On the other hand, European civilization is not without its influence here as elsewhere. The fur overcoat especially is worn in winter on top of the Chinese jacket, and modern fashions in the size of sleeves, matching of colors, as well as trimming of borders with foreign laces and ribbons, etc., are becoming more dainty. A few women radicals, it is related, wore Euro-

pean dress immediately after the Revolution but, not knowing any better, put the wrong garments on the outside! Such freaks are now unknown, and even among women returned students the semi-foreign dress is preferred to the complete foreign outfit. The Japanese lady's pompadour style of coiffure was quite fashionable after Dai Nippon's victory over Russia. Ten years later, in 1915, Japan bullied the Republic with its famous Twenty-One Demands, and China's patriotic womanhood at once banned the Japanese coiffure. Nowadays the vogue is a compromise between the severe old-fashioned headgear and Western coiffure, although a few girls may be seen adopting the latest "Bob-hair" fashion.

The modern Chinese do not take life so seriously as their forefathers. In large, progressive cities there are public gardens and moving picture shows for the recuperation of jaded minds, and tea parties take the place of the former heavy dinners. The weekly day of rest is practically in force everywhere, and lectures by famous speakers, Chinese as well as foreign, and athletic meets, graduation exercises, inaugural ceremonies, etc., are always well attended. Poker and bridge parties are getting to be immensely popular, and five million packs of foreign cards are said to have been imported during 1919. The proceedings at public functions are enlivened by a foreign band—properly trained, Chinese make good musicians as well as soldiers—and foreign music is also displacing the orthodox, Chinese funeral dirge. Thus at a funeral procession in Peking the band struck up a popular foreign song, and at another in Shanghai the tune played was in sentiment at least appropriately enough, "Over there."

There is less formality and more sincerity in social intercourse. The ancient ceremonial was most elaborate, and the "Book of Rites" mentions, for example, no less than thirty-three shades of relationship for which mourning should be worn. The grades of precedence are strictly regulated, and a master of ceremonies is indispensable at weddings, funerals, and other public functions. To-day the cake of ancient custom is crumbling, and "the bow of greeting is mutual; the handclasp is friendly; the round table for feasts lessens the problem of places of honor." Since everybody is a plain "Mister," precedence is recognized only on formal occasions.

At home the elders are still paid respect to, but the rigidity of old customs is being relaxed.

The barrier of sex seclusion is being slowly broken down, and within reasonable limits intercourse between the sexes is approved. According to the author of "The Economic Principles of Confucius and His School," already quoted, the separation of the two sexes was not the original plan in China. In the "Book of Poetry" there are many poems describing a social life quite like that of the West to-day. One poem reads as follows:—

"The Tsin and the Wei
Now present their broad sheets of water.
Ladies and gentlemen
Are carrying flowers of valerian.
A lady says, 'Shall we go to see?'
A gentleman replies, 'I have already been.'
'But let us go again to see.
Beyond the Wei
The ground is large and fit for pleasure.'
So the gentlemen and ladies
Make sport together,
Presenting one another with small peonies."

Another reads as follows:—

"(The girl) goes out on a fine morning:
Then (the boy and girl) proceed together.
'I look on you as the flower of the thorny mallows:
You give me a stalk of the pepper plant!' "

With the passage of time, however, the mixing of the sexes came to be proscribed. Therefore the "Book of Rites" prescribes:—

"Man and woman should not sit together in the same apartment, . . . nor let their hands touch in giving and receiving. A sister-in-law and brother-in-law do not interchange compliments about each other. . . . When a young lady has been engaged, no man should enter the door of her apartment, unless there be some grave cause (such as great sickness, or death, or other great calamity). When a married aunt, or sister, or daughter, returns home on a visit, no brother of

the family should sit with her on the same mat or eat with her from the same dish. Even father and daughter should not occupy the same mat. Man and woman, without the intervention of the matchmaker, do not know each other's name. Unless the engagement has been accepted, there should be no communication or affection between them."

Nowadays the mentality of the nation has undergone a transformation, and social intercourse between the sexes is encouraged within well defined limits. The wife of a Chinese official once remarked to a missionary lady: "When I am born again into the world, I want to be born a dog. A dog can come and go as it pleases. I must stay right within these doors!" To-day the girls can go almost anywhere—to the restaurants, to the theaters, to the parks, to do shopping or calling, etc.—themselves. One modern lady who has traveled far and wide as a lecturer recently testified: "A girl may travel anywhere now. Her own self-respect and dignity will protect her."

In the interior districts the progress in this direction is naturally slower than in treaty ports where the people daily come into contact with Westerners. Even then, the sex barrier is gradually falling away and among Christians, for example, men and women will meet in the same place for worship, although the ladies will sit by themselves and the gentlemen by themselves. On the whole, the judicious commingling of the sexes to help establish a better society and happier country is already exerting a wholesome influence, and the most eloquent proof is the moral awakening of the nation by the patriotic activities of both boy and girl students in the present crisis.

The quondam popular prejudice against foreign medicine is no more, and increasing attention is paid to sanitation and hygiene. Medical education is emphasized and effective measures are being adopted against the recurrence of the terrible plague in North Manchuria, 1910-1911. There is a National Medical Association of China composed of foreign-educated doctors, and also a China Medical Missionary Association composed of missionary doctors. The combined influence of the two is elevating sanitation and hygiene to their proper status, and in further encouragement the Minister of Educa-

tion outlined the following policy a few months ago at the joint biennial conference of the above associations held in Peking:—

"It has ever been the policy of the Ministry to give medical education its rightful place in the educational system of China. It hopes likewise that better ideas regarding living and sanitation will be spread through its extension, resulting in a healthier and stronger nation. But impediments it has had in its way, such as the great war in Europe and conditions of affairs in China, each of which had its share of responsibility —the former interfered with the supply of materials, while the latter curtailed the supply of funds. Now as the great world struggle is over, and there are also signs of peace and reunion in China, the Ministry of Education will certainly fall back on its cherished policy to provide the country with a medical education that will be sufficient as well as efficient in meeting the demands made upon it. In outline, the policy is as follows:—

"1. To establish new medical schools as soon as conditions will allow, on the basis of one medical school for each province.

"2. To improve and extend such schools as are already established.

"3. To encourage the study of medicine and to maintain for the scientifically trained doctors a high social status.

"4. To organize in proper localities such institutions or facilities of investigation as will aid specialists in their research work.

"5. To regulate the practice of doctors trained in the old-fashioned way with a view to unifying the standards required of medical practitioners."

Here a word of tribute must be paid to the splendid work in this direction done by foreign missionaries and the Rockefeller Foundation, the latest of philanthropists in the field. A time there was when ignorant Chinese had a genuine dread for foreign hospitals—the charitable purpose was misunderstood and the hospital was regarded as a place where Chinese children were made into foreign medicines by devilish foreign doctors! To-day all such hospitals are well patronized, and thousands most willingly pay the nominal fee to get the necessary treatment. In 1918 the China Medical Board, which

is a subsidiary of the Rockefeller Foundation, spent over two million gold dollars in China, according to a report issued last year. Nineteen hospitals, three medical schools, sixty-five fellowship scholars were maintained under this endowment, and the new imposing Union Medical College in Peking, now nearing completion, will cost five million dollars. The pre-medical school of this institution includes two Chinese girls among its score of students, thus paving the way for co-education in foreign schools in China.

Old customs are dying, and the former custom of "sweeping the graves" in Tsing Ming—equivalent in approximate date and remote significance to the Christian Eastertide—when pieces of paper are put on the graves of the departed, is being replaced by the Arbor Day and planting of new trees. At first the innovation was confined to mission schools: now Arbor Day is also a Chinese institution especially with the rising generation. At one time infanticide was not unusual, because the public sympathized with the parents who had more daughters than sons. To-day, infanticide as well as suicide are reprobated, and modern mothers, aided by missionaries, Y. W. C. A.'s and the *Chinese Ladies' Journal*, etc., are caring for their children in approved modern methods. Just as ladies' names in English can be identified by their spellings, so could Chinese feminine names be recognized by their expressed affinity with flowers, precious stones, and other objects of beauty—e.g. "Shang-lan" (Sweet Orchid) of the heroine noted in our last chapter. To-day, as additional indication of the gradual commingling of the sexes, many girls adopt the names of boys.

The actor's profession used to be looked down upon: to-day both the players and their profession are held in greater esteem. The best female impersonator, Mei Lan-fang, has an international as well as nation-wide reputation, and during his tour in Japan last year the theater-goers there went into ecstasies over him and treasured his autographed post card photographs like so many talismans. He draws full houses in Peking nightly, and his superb acting has been compared to the reversed rôle of Sarah Bernhardt, the great septuagenarian French actress, in "*L'Aiglon.*" The plain, inartistic theater of former days is being replaced by more attractive-looking structures, and in Shanghai, for example, a few

modern theaters compare not unfavorably with those in the West. Instead of the old historical plays which, to the inexplicable astonishment of foreign observers, used to last several days and nights, just because each performance was a continuation of one complete novel, modern plays are being staged. These ridicule the foibles of existing society and emphasize the need of reform—in officialdom, in the home, in the family. Chinese versions of foreign plays like "Uncle Tom's Cabin" and "*La Dame aux Camelias*" are popular, and dramatizations of famous historical characters like Napoleon and Cæsar are well received.

Modern Chinese actors are also playwrights, and those educated in Japan have founded new theatrical schools. Perhaps the greatest help towards ennobling the profession in the eyes of the public is the participation of boy students as well as girl students, since the scholarly class does not deem it unworthy to act the part of those who were regarded as outcasts in the former order of social hierarchy. Generally at the end of a school year the students in advanced institutions will stage a play written by themselves for the entertainment of the visitors: or it may be a story from Shakespeare's plays. Oftentimes the object of the entertainment is to raise a public subscription for the benefit of a charity, in which case the play so written will portray some evils of Chinese society. Among girl students the plays so staged are usually stories from Shakespeare or the Arabian Nights, although a few modern plays are also becoming popular. These modern dramas constitute contemporary Chinese literature, and the extent of their influence may be gauged by the following examples:—(1) *P'an Lieh Shih T'ou Hai*—concerning a patriot P'an who drowned himself while returning from Japan, because he thought China's condition was hopeless. (2) *Hei Ch'i Yuen Fen*—describing the pitiable life of opium smokers. (3) *Fu Tze P'iao Yuan*—a Chinese parallel to the Londoners' "Girl in the Taxi" and the Parisians' "*La Chaste Suzanne.*" (4) *Ch'i Tang T'ung Ê Pao*—a searchlight study into the banefulness of the old family system.

The greatest break with the old is perhaps the campaign against the crying evils of traditional family system. Early marriages are now unpopular, and boy and girl marriages are looked upon as a social shame. The barbarous practice of

binding the girls' feet so as to make them look like "three-inch golden lilies" is now frowned upon, and bound feet are being rapidly unbound. The ancient sages taught that the physical body nurtured by one's parents should never be mutilated or destroyed, yet the perversity of human nature created an atmosphere that bound feet were becoming to well-bred ladies. Thanks to the infiltration of Western civilization, people's eyes have been opened, and over a decade ago the arduous labors of such self-sacrificing missionary ladies as Mrs. Archibald Little and her associates were rewarded by the organization of Chinese anti-foot-binding societies. To-day unnatural feet may still be found here and there, but among educated classes the parents love their daughters better than to worship old idols.

In a previous chapter we noted the Tientsin ladies' war against concubinage. Another social institution which remains to be swept away is that of domestic slavery. In 1912 when the provisional constitution under which the Republic to-day is still being administered, was drawn up, a provision tabooing domestic slavery almost succeeded in getting inserted: as it is, one has to wait for the awakening of the public conscience in this and other respects. In theory the custom is no more than buying a girl from her poor parents and bringing her up like an ordinary servant, until it is time to marry her off to a suitable husband. In practice, however, it is a sort of serfdom, since the girl has become the property of the mistress for anywhere between five and ten years, and in the hands of an unfeeling mistress the poor girl's lot is unenviable. If she is intelligent and good-looking, she may win the favor of her master and succeed in becoming his concubine; otherwise a spiteful mistress may resell her to a life of shame and ill-repute. Comparatively speaking, the existing situation is an improvement over the old, as numerous convictions of mistresses for cruelty to such unfortunates have brought home a healthy lesson. Nevertheless, the blot should be washed away.

From an awakened social consciousness it is a near cry to patriotic consciousness. Hence the national flag is in evidence everywhere on national holidays as well as at public functions. Boys and girls in schools are taught to sing the national songs, and athletic meets especially are opened with the play-

ing of the national anthem and saluting of the national flag. The indignation at present surging in Chinese breasts being one against the high-handed actions of Japan, patriotic reminders are printed on stationery paper and chinaware—"Forget not the national disgrace" (of the Japanese 21 Demands of 1915), "Develop home industries," etc. In addition, envelopes are sometimes inlined with a miniature colored map of the Republic.

In other words, the motto of the rising generation is "Be prepared," like that of the boy scouts. These are now numbered by the thousands. Founded in 1913 at Shanghai, the Boy Scouts' Association of China is to-day a fine stripling, with branches in most leading cities—Peking, Tientsin, Canton, Nanking, Foochow, Hankow and Wuchang, etc. It is a potent power for good and the Ministry of Education gave it a deserved benediction in a recent circular to the provinces, as follows:—"Boy scouts organizations exist in Europe and America. Their object is to cultivate morality among the young. Many schools (in China) have adopted this system and organized like associations. The Kiangsu Educational Association has a boy scouts' union. Other schools might have similar organizations. Reports from schools having boy scouts organizations are now called for." Nor is the public slow to appreciate its benefits, as exhibitions of scoutcraft are always witnessed by large crowds. In a few mission schools especially there are also girl scouts organizations, but the movement among the girls appears to be just beginning.

Here we have some aspects of the social transformation. The question at once arises: Is the breach with the old complete and irrevocable? And has the centuries old conservatism of four hundred million people been entirely discarded in the process of metamorphosis? The reply is a decided NO. The break from the old is more pronounced in some cases and less in others, but in very few has the past been torn up entirely by the root, leaving nothing except the débris of the fallen idol.

After all, China is a land of prodigious dimensions—over four million square miles of territory and four hundred million inhabitants with a civilization of forty to fifty centuries, but a railway mileage of only seven thousand miles. Rome was not built in a day: nor can the traditions of four thousand

years be renovated overnight. Those who live at the treaty ports or come into constant contact with Westerners are easily susceptible to modern influences, whereas those who live far in the interior, untouched by the welding railway and telegraph, etc., have yet to wait for the light of the world. Of course, those who first received the light will lead and the others will follow. Until the late comers, so to speak, do fall into line, it is futile to expect a transformation which can be complete and irrevocable.

Hence the separation between the sexes is but slowly relaxed, and hence the traditional faith in the skill of the native-trained physician remains unshaken among the masses. Even among some educated people, in times of emergency both Chinese and foreign trained doctors will be requisitioned—the theory being that what one cannot accomplish the other can supplement! Foreign clothes are handy at times, but Chinese clothes are both cooler in summer and warmer in winter. Modern athletics are splendid aids in developing a sound mind in a sound body; so are Chinese archery and Chinese boxing, which are taught side by side with Western calisthenics in many an institution.

On the other hand, there are elements in China's civilization which should be preserved in conformity to the rule of survival of the fittest. One of these is filial piety: hence the continued respect paid to parents and elders among the rising generation, although such respect is now more rational than traditional. Another is the sanctity of the family: hence in the latest draft criminal code, completed last year, the penalty for offenses against the best family ethics, according to Chinese conceptions, is more rigorous than that for those in other Western codes, just because there appears to be a greater need for repressive measures as deterrents in the present state of Chinese society than is perhaps necessary in foreign communities where the institutions are better established.

A further illustration may be cited. A girl in a northern city was at an early age engaged to a boy who appeared to be a desirable companion. Subsequently she studied in a mission school and grew to be a promising type of womanhood. He, on the other hand, was good for nothing and grew to be a simpleton. The girl sought to have her engagement annulled, but the other family stood on its customary rights. A

lawsuit ensued, and the undeserving party is reported to have won. The position taken up by the judges was that under existing circumstances the girl was helpless. As the permanent civil code remains to be drafted, the law administered is still the provisional code enacted at the close of the Manchu régime. Wherefore the customary law must prevail. On the other hand, the law could not compel the girl to marry the boy if she would not consent; so the girl's family must compensate the other side with a sum of money as damages, as in a Western breach of promise case. Of course, the ideal solution is for the boy to release the girl voluntarily; but until that is done, the old customary law must be upheld if the sanctity of the family institution is not to be unlawfully encroached upon.

One naturally sympathizes with the above young lady, but it seems that the existing dispensation affords her no solace. As a woman returned student suggests, the girl could have sportingly stipulated that her fiancé should go abroad for a number of years and return with a foreign education—a condition which, if complied with, would serve to amend matters but failure to observe which would put the simpleton in the position of a defendant. Probably the boy's family would thereupon retire in good grace. Apparently the heroine in question did not put up a stiff fight but bowed to the inevitable.

Standing midway between customs which may be discarded and those which may be preserved is perhaps the patriotic veneration of the past, if one accepts Tennyson's definition of patriotism in this sense. At one time the iconoclastic spirit of the rising generation was to do away with everything which savored of the old, irrespective of its merits, and adopt the methods of the West wholesale and unassimilated, regardless of their workability or otherwise. Fortunately, that state of mind soon evaporated in the heat of greater understanding and general enlightenment. To-day the nation exercises strict discrimination, and the majority waits while the minority experiments with the Western importation. If the latter is superior to old-fashioned Chinese ways, well and good; otherwise, the national tradition should be maintained.

Manifestations of this attitude occurred twice at times of greatest national crisis during the last nine years. In Feb-

ruary, 1912, when the Revolution had succeeded, a Republican government established at Nanking—the Southern Capital—and Dr. Sun Yat-sen, the provisional president, had resigned in favor of Yuan Shih-k'ai, he repaired with 15,000 troops to the tomb of the founder of the Ming dynasty (A. D. 1368-1644) situated outside the city. Surrounded by military and naval officers, the Chinese Cincinnatus "at high noon stood reverently before the ancient altar at the tomb, whilst the master of ceremonies announced to the spirits of the departed monarch that China had been recovered by the Chinese people, that the power and prestige of the Manchus had been annihilated, and that a free republic had been established." The ceremony was historic and unique, picturesque and impressive. As an eye-witness had it:—

"Over the battlefield of two months ago and stretching like a dragon over the hills and hollows to the huge embattled walls of Nanking, the troops in multi-colored uniforms stood in splendid array, whilst the light played strangely tremulous upon the heaving lines of bayonets. . . . The sun had by this time broken through the clouds, and the scene was never to be forgotten. . . . The red walls (of the mausoleum) were falling, and decay had set its hand irrevocably to work. At the end furthest from the entrance where the old altar stood was now placed a table, above it flags of the Republic were crossed, and between these was suspended an ancient and valuable life-sized painting of the emperor, Hung Wu. On the table a sumptuous array of food, tasty and satiating, was spread for the spirits, and two huge red candles blazed in the daylight and poured streams of red wax to the boards as they gutted in the breeze. The wind soughed in the trees covering the hill forming the grave mound of the emperor, and high above the white fog shrouded the top of the Purple Mountain. There was not a sound but that of the soughing wind moaning as Doctor Sun and his party stood with bare heads and profoundly bowed before the altar and the picture of the long-dead monarch. Three times they bent their heads and whilst the master of ceremonies, in frock coat, read out to the spirits the reason for the gathering, the spectators could not but marvel at the significance of the ceremony and the strangeness of the group, dressed as they were in European military

uniform, paying this homage to the spirits of an emperor who was laid to rest some five hundred years ago."

The second occasion was no less historic and occurred a few months ago. At this date the name of Shantung, China's sacred province, is famous all over the world, and how the Chinese delegation in Paris refused to sign the German peace treaty is also popular history. On their return from Europe, members of the delegation visited the tomb of Confucius at Ch'ü-fou, in the heart of Shantung, and offered formal sacrifices to the departed spirits. Dr. Sun at Nanking announced the recovery of the nation's patrimony from alien hands; here the act of worship was an expression of gratitude that the Republic had not been deprived of its holy land. Combine the two and we get modern China's veneration of the past—a veneration which bids fair to live through all ages.

This aspect of the metamorphosis was very recently given expression to when the new American minister to China, Honorable Charles R. Crane, presented his letter of credence to the President of the Republic and made a graceful speech. In reply President Hsu observed at one part as follows:—

"You are good enough to say, Mr. Minister, that, in the intervals which have elapsed between your successive visits to our country, you have noted that change has been constantly accompanied by progress, and that there is justification for our belief that we shall fully succeed in remodeling the structure of our administration while leaving untouched the ancient bases of our democracy, which are love of family and love of soil. The transformation which is even now taking place is necessarily gradual and step by step, since it must be primarily the diffusion of modern ideas and their free acceptance by one and all which will complete the reform of which the declaration of the Republic was the design."

As already stated, the political revolution and the intellectual revolution are here. The spiritual waters have been moved, but the moral revolution has yet to come. Bribery and corruption are still rampant to-day; hence many honest men keep away from political life. The militarists have it all their own way, and defenseless citizens are ground down ruthlessly. As we write (July 12, 1920) an insensate clash of

arms is threatened between two rival militarist factions, just because each has so many illiterate soldiers to offer as fodder for the other's cannons. And because of this guerilla warfare during the past nine years, when neither side would come to death grips for a decisive victory but each would prolong the meaningless struggle in the hope that the other would first call off the fight, everything constructive had to stand still—commerce, industry, education, etc. The outlay is gloomy and men are despondent. No ray of hope seems to be vouchsafed to a struggling nation, and the Republic is termed a fiasco.

That is only one side of the picture, although admittedly the more prominent. There is, however, another less spectacular side—one which is full of promise for the future. The numerous educational reforms, the intellectual rebirth of the nation, the emancipation of China's womanhood and the increasing momentum of social transformation, etc., are sufficient to inspire optimism in any but doubting Thomases who decline to believe unless they see with their own eyes. To those who possess the faith of things unseen the evidence is nevertheless cumulative: the speck of cloud of future promise which is now no bigger than a man's hand will soon overshadow the whole sky, and then the downpour will spread destruction to whatever is at present pushing back the clock of progress.

Signs of future promise occur in by-paths and out-of-the-way places, not on the high roads for him who runs to see. Thus 100 miles from Shanghai, located on the north bank of the great Yangtze River, which practically divides the country into north and south, is Nan-tung-chow, which has already earned for itself the name of "China's Model City." With a population of 150,000 in the city and ten times this number in the surrounding district of the same name, the following are some of its outstanding features:—

"1. Center of the great 'Tungchow' cotton district, the best grade of cotton in China. Production more than 1,000,000 bales annually.
"2. More than fifty miles of modern roads, much of which is now being rock-surfaced.
"3. Cotton and sericulture experimental stations and schools of instruction.

"4. Modern agricultural college with 126 students who do practical work under supervision of foreign-trained teachers.
"5. 334 separate schools with more than 20,000 students.
"6. Two modern cotton mills with 60,000 spindles, 500 looms and 3,000 operators.
"7. Modern cotton-seed oil mill which provides a surplus for export.
"8. Five modern banks and eight native style banks.
"9. One match factory, one flour mill, one silk filature, one iron foundry, one electric light plant, and a direct steamer line to Shanghai and other ports.
"10. Maintains the 'Nantoon' Chinese embroidery, lace and needlework shop in Fifth Avenue, New York City."

Here is a showing that reflects the greatest credit on Mr. Chang Ch'ien, eminent scholar, China's foremost industrial reformer and ex-minister of agriculture and commerce, who resides in the city. Among projected enterprises for the whole district are hundreds of miles of new roads costing over $300,000, seven new cotton mills, one new electric light and power plant, coal mine development to supply the industries of the district, and an extensive reclamation scheme to reclaim thousands of acres of land from the overflow of the Yangtze River.

Where there is a will, there is a way. This is remarkably exemplified in Shansi, which is known as the "Model Province of China." In a previous chapter we gave the size and population of the province as 81,830 square miles and 12,200,456 inhabitants. Under the enlightened administration of Governor Yen Hsi-shan, a military man, the province is now the best governed, happiest and most peaceful. As it is proverbially rich in coal deposits, the reforms which General Yen has introduced therefore deserve more than cursory notice.

Commencing with civil reorganization, the candidates for official posts are given a course in intensive training under the personal supervision of the Governor and then selected by a system of competitive examination. The objective of the Governor's endeavors is grouped under "Three sources of prosperity" and "Three evils to be removed." In the first are afforestation, sericulture and irrigation; in the second are opium-smoking, foot-binding and the queue. As a foreign

eyewitness has testified:—"While, of course, there is a considerable variation in the zeal with which local magistrates and village presidents push forward these reforms, one can at least say that a beginning has been made—and that the three great evils have been dealt some mighty blows, such as even we who have been a long while in Shansi scarcely hoped to see coming from official sources."

One of the most notable reforms is along the line of popular education. The governor has written three books and copies of them are distributed broadcast throughout the province. The first is entitled "What a Citizen ought to know;" the second, "What Village Presidents and Vice-Presidents ought to know;" and the third, "Laws and Punishments." The first of these has eight chapters—namely, The Citizen's Virtue, The Citizen's Knowledge, The Citizen's Wealth, The Family, Society, The Government, The World (i.e. of human relationships), and Explanation of Accompanying Maps. Said the above-quoted witness:—"I have given these books a somewhat careful examination, especially the first, and would say that, on the whole, the Governor has done an admirable piece of work, although, of course, there are many evidences that his training and his point of view are those of the military man. Shansi is probably at present the best-governed and most peaceful province in China, and it is safe to say that it would remain permanently so if the people were faithfully to live up to the instructions their governor has given them."

More than once has General Yen's work been commended in the President's mandates, and his name is one of the few which are constantly on the lips of foreign observers. In the following testimony dated March, 1918, recorded by another foreign resident, we get a still better insight into the beneficence of the governor's administration:—

"Since the cultivation of the poppy ceased in Shansi, business has prospered greatly, land values have increased, and the people are better clothed and better fed. The officials are energetic in looking after the welfare of the people, giving attention even to minor details. The people in the cities are queueless now, and in most districts the women have unbound their feet. Girls discovered with bound feet are heavily fined. Each spring fresh orders are given for the planting of trees

and this year the aim is to plant one tree for each member of every family. . . . In Ping-yang-fu orders have been given that vacant plots of ground are to be cleared of rubbish and brickbats and to be leveled. If this is neglected, the government will do the work and appropriate the land. In that city also, on one pillar of each shop front a space of 10 by 36 inches has been painted brown, and on this mottoes from the Governor's 'What a Citizen ought to know' have been written, and then the whole has been oiled over so as to make the writing permanent. Also on the front of almost every house a similar space has been plastered with white lime, and a similar use made, the writing being in black.

"Compulsory education is being introduced throughout the province, all boys over seven and under fifteen have been registered, and the parents will be fined if their boys do not attend school. Special half-day schools are also being opened for the very poor who cannot afford to keep their children at school all day. A beginning of this scheme is being made in the cities and larger towns, and it will be gradually extended to smaller villages, and where one village cannot support a school several villages will combine in the support of one. Later it is hoped to apply the scheme to the education of girls also."

There may be bribery and corruption in high places, but there is also self-denying patriotism in other places. Some who ride the horse of power to-day may have to be eventually hounded out of office, but there are others who are shining examples of personal integrity. Names of patriots like Dr. C. T. Wang and Dr. Chang Po-ling—Christian leaders who have proved their worth—are familiar to most people, but there are others who deserve to be equally well known. One of these is Mr. S. T. Wen, a Christian, who recently resigned the comfortable position of foreign adviser to an influential military governor, General Li Shun, to take up a Y. M. C. A. secretaryship. Another is General Chao Yu-chin, of Shansi, aide-de-camp to Governor Yen Hsi-shan.

The latter became a Christian about the time of the 1911 Revolution when, fighting against Mongol robbers on the northern frontiers, his sick wife recovered through the prayers of a Chinese evangelist. Since then he has been a power for

good, and among the foreign residents in Shansi province he is held in great esteem. According to a foreign observer, "his faith in prayer is very simple, his dependence on God is quite childlike, his enthusiasm for the Gospel most contagious. Unlike high officials, military or civil, who are fat, puffy-faced gentlemen, whose high office relieves them of most duties except those concerned with social amenities, calls, dinners, etc., and who go about with a great trail of servants behind them, General Chao is of great military bearing, sprightly and independent, not above shining his own foreign shoes and carrying his own baggage. He wears foreign clothes entirely, and wears them well. And wherever he goes he proclaims the Gospel, on the train giving away tracts, in private conversation bearing His testimony, and wherever opportunity offers speaking in church or assembly for his Master."

In the present frame of national mind, the mention of military men is a popular anathema. Happily the names of General Chao and his distinguished superior do not come under this category. In addition there are two who must be counted among those who are genuinely laboring for a new and happier China. We refer to General Li Shun, military governor of Kiangsu province, with headquarters at Nanking, whose quondam foreign adviser is Mr. S. T. Wen, cited above, and General Feng Yü-hsiang, who is known as the "Christian General."

Whilst other military men are unworthy of the confidence reposed in them—their lack of education, for example, should have disqualified them from occupying positions of responsibility—General Li is eminently fitted for his post, which has a strategic value in the existing political disturbances between two opposing military camps and dividing the country into the so-called North and South. Two years ago we had occasion to call on him, and the impression he left on us is to-day still favorable. In plain clothes, he looks in good trim, being neither puffy-faced nor bladder-like. Rather his physique is that of a well-built officer. His face is intelligent and his eyes are keen. He is very well-read for a military man and could cite parallels from American and Mexican history. He has the mouth of determination and the polished manners of a scholar. He knows his mission and means to stick to it. At the end of an hour's most interesting discussion he wound up by this unexpected remark:—"China to-day is like the Thirteen

Colonies at the time of Washington: the situation is gloomy and the outlook is black. But Washington at Valley Forge had what we Chinese patriots do not possess—namely, the whole-hearted support of a united nation behind his back."

The story of the "Christian General" reads almost like a fairy tale in modern China. As already stated, he is a brigadier commander, five thousand of his ten thousand men being also Christians. The following estimate by "Rover" in the *Central China Post* of Hankow, is the most comprehensive of all foreign testimonies yet available:—

"General Feng Yü-hsiang is decidedly one of the strongest characters in the official life of China at the present time (November, 1918). He is as much against graft, corruption, vice, gambling, ostentation and extravagance as many of his contemporary military colleagues are indifferent thereto. He is a Christian who practises what he teaches and a humanitarian, who goes out of his way to protect the humble. He is open to the good parts of foreign influence, so far as they bring good to his fellow-countrymen, and as closed as an oyster to any influence which aims at making him a catspaw or of overawing his personality.

"In Wusueh (Hupeh), where his troops were the objects of such regard that General Feng's name will ever be remembered with gratitude, the people lost no opportunity in lauding him to the skies in press and conversation, but many foreigners and myriads of Chinese took these reports with a grain of salt and I was amongst the number. I thought this general was posing in the limelight with some ulterior object in view. Now I must confess myself to have been completely mistaken. I am convinced that General Feng is what he is, because his conscience tells him what is right and moreover he has the courage to carry out his opinions with the forces at his command. 'Hats off' to General Feng, and if China and the world had more staunch and good-living men like him, the earth at large would be a happier one to live in.

"General Feng brought his army division to Changteh (Hunan) some months ago, and being lately in that city I went out of my way to try and ascertain from all kinds of men what sort of a personality this General Feng really is. Born of humble parentage less than forty years ago, General

Feng entered the Chinese army as a private. In those days he was completely illiterate, but by pure merit he rose above his surroundings. By hook and crook he learned how to read and write until now he is a very fine Chinese student and knows some English. From early life he trained himself to habits of economy and plainness, so the general of to-day lives and dresses in practically the same manner as the private of old.

"At the present time General Feng is at the zenith of his bodily strength. A veritable giant in size, he towers over all comers. His black eyes look at you over his serious mouth and appear like gimlets penetrating to your inmost soul. He delights to walk about the streets dressed in a shabby uniform and the same kind of oil cloth and straw hat as his soldiers wear, and he wears invariably straw sandals in lieu of boots. He fears no one but penetrates everywhere, and has no imposing retinue to herald his approach. His ear is ever open to grievances, as his hand is heavy on evildoers; his daily receptions are open to all, without the show and exclusiveness common to his rank.

"He is a total abstainer and a non-smoker, and so convinced is he that wine and tobacco are evils to be combated that he has forbidden his officers and men to smoke and drink. Changteh, when he reached it, was as all large Chinese cities—no better, no worse. General Feng made up his mind it should be better, and he carried his reforms through, despite vested interests, with unflinching purpose. In a very few days after his army division arrived, he closed all the brothels in Changteh and deported the inmates. He closed the theaters and forbade gambling under heavy penalties.

"General Feng resolved that his soldiers should not impose on the people, so his officers and men are confined to barracks all the time when not on duty. No one is allowed on the streets without a wooden pass conspicuously displayed on their uniform, and the reason of their getting leave is clearly stated thereon. Any merchant can complain if any soldier pays less than the proper price of goods and, on the other hand, any merchant who charges the soldiers more than the standard is heavily fined for his meanness.

"The general, in closing the resorts of vice, which are bad for the soldiers, as an alternative has established Y. M. C. A. rooms, a gymnasium, and further allowed the soldiers to have

their own theatricals among themselves as he knows the value of recreation. He allows none of his officers to bring their families with them when on campaign, and hence each month the soldiers are in a position to remit the greater part of their salaries to their dependents in the north.

"The general's great weakness is hate of fine clothes. No one under his command, be he colonel or soldier, dares to wear silken clothes or satin shoes. Many a good story is told of the sandal shod general surprising his soldiers with satin shoes on their feet. He says nothing but stands rigidly at attention. One of the colonels once had the temerity to remonstrate because the general had saluted him, when he remarked, 'I do not salute you. I salute your shoes.'

"General Feng rarely executes. The only cases where he uses the extreme penalty of the law are those in which the culprits are hardened criminals or red-handed brigands. Tales are told of how the general has spared the lives of many Southern spies who waited his verdict with fear and trembling. Instead of the order for the firing squad, the general took the men by the hand and led them through the city. He showed them the strength of his regiments, his horses, his guns, his grenade corps and then, handing them sums of money, sent them back to tell his enemies what they saw.

"He is as impartial as he is strict. He gives an order and expects it to be obeyed. No one may leave or enter the city without his boxes being overhauled, and no foreigner is exempt, nor Chinese, no matter of what rank. At night the streets are closed to pedestrian traffic, and there are no special passes or favoritism in General Feng's domain. As to his politics I am not in a position to speak, but we may rest assured that whatever they are, the welfare of his fellow-men is the guiding motive."

In further corroboration of the above the following may be added. As already remarked, during his stay of over three months in Wusueh he took care that his men should behave themselves. The inhabitants were sincerely sorry when the time came for their departure to Changteh and therefore gave them a hearty send-off at the water-front—this in remarkable contrast to the feelings of a population usually outraged by irresponsible soldiery. Nine months after his departure the

people of Wusueh erected a large stone tablet to commemorate his good deeds. Four of these virtues were engraved on the stone—viz.:

"1. His kindness to the populace, especially to the poor.
"2. When his soldiers were compelled through lack of space to pitch their tents on wheat fields, the farmers were justly recompensed for damage done to crops.
"3. In the course of a big fire which occurred during General Feng's stay, his soldiers rendered valuable assistance in quenching the flames, and in keeping order among an excited crowd. General Feng also rewarded those who carried water, and recompensed the poor whose homes were gutted.
"4. When a poor farmer lost a few cash notes, afterwards found by an officer, the notes were handed to General Feng who did all in his power to discover the rightful owner."

Five hundred copies of the above were traced from the tablet on paper and distributed among the military in the neighboring province where General Feng was campaigning. Can there be more signal proof of an appreciative people's gratitude?

Here are assuredly rich portents of a brighter future. Of the remarkable military men above noted, Governor Yen is the best situated for real constructive work—twelve million inhabitants on eighty-one thousand square miles of territory. Ever since the establishment of the Republic, he has not even once left the province; so his program of reform has been carried out continuously without a single break. General Li, however, is not so advantageously placed, since he was appointed to his present position only in 1917 and may be transferred to another post. Nevertheless, his influence is being felt over 38,600 square miles of territory, including Shanghai, and among 13,980,235 inhabitants.[1] The "Christian General" is the smallest in rank of the three; yet ten thousand well-disciplined soldiers constitute a reconstructive agency which can in no wise be neglected.

[1] Since the above was written General Li has committed suicide, ashamed that he could not improve the general situation of the country. He bequeathed two million dollars for educational purposes.

Little drops of water make an ocean, little grains of sand make a continent. If so, there is no need to despair of the new China when she has already Doctors C. T. Wang and Chang Po-ling, Generals Yen, Li, Feng and Chao, and ex-minister Chang Ch'ien, not to mention the hundreds and thousands who, though nameless, are doing no less patriotic work and contributing their share to the building of a stronger and happier republic.[1]

[1] On March 24, 1921, Dr. Yü Shu-fen, a brilliant young doctor who had been educated in Japan, sacrificed his life while comoating the epidemic of pneumonic plague in Shantung. He left the following message:—"In my enthusiasm for plague prevention I overstepped the bounds of caution, and in my constant contact with plague patients I accidentally contracted the disease. I am dying for the people; I have no complaint. At home I leave my wife a widow and childless. See that she receives the assistance she will need. . . . I wish that those engaged in plague prevention might receive more adequate compensation." Surely, "so long as China has such sons, she has hope."

CHAPTER VII

GROWTH OF PUBLIC OPINION

AMONG the characteristic phenomena of China's social transformation must be placed the growth of public opinion through the growth of newspapers. Here, as elsewhere, the Press stands in the forefront of supporters of reform and progress. It exercises an educational influence by spreading a knowledge of European institutions and China's well-nigh limitless possibilities; it arouses the literate classes from their traditional attitude of indifference to political questions and awakens in them an interest in national politics as well as the problems involved in the advance of civilization. The newspapers criticize the evils and arbitrary conduct of the official class, and in so doing they make the weight of public opinion felt as well as respected. They champion all genuine reforms and so exert an inspirational influence on the transition from conservatism to a spirit of progress.

As already stated, China's contributions to the world have not been inconsiderable; and in addition to the mariner's compass, gunpowder, etc., modern civilization is also indebted to the Chinese for their invention of paper and printing. Ts'ai Lun, a native of South China, invented paper in A. D. 75. As one foreign writer put it:—"We think the Chinese pretty slow. But here is one of the most valuable inventions ever conceived by the human brain; and yet more than a thousand years elapsed between Ts'ai Lun's invention and the first paper mill in Europe. Three hundred years went by before paper was made in Germany and France. The French carried the industry to England, and not until 1690 had a paper mill been established in America." Similarly, as regards printing, which was an invention of later date, the Chinese preceded Gutenberg by at least ten centuries.

Consequently, China is the most literary nation in its universal veneration for learning and unique esteem for the

scholarly class. But as already pointed out, the written language is inaccessible to the bulk of the population; hence promising attempts are being launched to simplify it. An almost similar situation is reflected in the tardy growth of newspapers. By right of theory, these should have made their appearance centuries ago in the land that first invented paper and printing; but in point of fact the scheme was impracticable owing to various inherent difficulties. For example, a Chinese typesetter has to walk three miles in order to set up one Chinese page of newspaper! And even to-day Chinese business houses are backward in advertising their own goods. As a result, the modern newspaper in China is a recent development.

The first newspaper which appeared in the world was the *Peking Gazette* (*Kung Men Ch'ao* or Imperial Court Gazette), published in Peking during the days of the Ming dynasty (A. D. 1368-1644). But unlike modern newspapers, it contained only imperial decrees, reports of high officials, petitions and memorials presented to the throne, promotions and sentences, etc., without any editorial opinions or explanations. Issued daily, it numbered among its subscribers only officials and *literati*. "It is very generally read and discussed by educated people in the cities, and tends to keep them more acquainted with the character and proceedings of their rulers than ever the Romans were of their sovereigns and senate. In the provinces, thousands of persons find employment by copying and abridging the 'Gazette' for readers who cannot afford to purchase the complete edition."

Some idea of the world's oldest newspaper is afforded by the following description given in "Things Chinese," p. 480:—

"The printing is effected by means of wooden movable types, which, to judge from some specimens examined, are cut in willow or poplar wood, a cheap if not highly durable material. . . . An average 'Gazette' consists of ten or twelve leaves of thin, brownish paper, measuring 7½ by 3¾ inches, and enclosed between leaves, front and back, of bright yellow paper, to form a species of binding. The whole is roughly attached or 'stitched' by means of two short pieces of paper rolled into a substitute for twine, the ends of which, passing through holes, punched in the rear margin of the sheets, are loosely

twisted together. (This being the usual manner of 'stitching' small pamphlets in China.) . . . The inside leaves, being folded double in the usual Chinese fashion, give some twenty or more small pages of matter, each page divided by red lines into seven columns. Each column contains fourteen characters from top to bottom, with a blank space equal to four characters in height at the top. . . . As everything which the emperor says takes precedence of everything else, his replies to memorials appear in advance of the documents to which they relate, and this produces an effect much like that of a Puzzle Department, where all the answers should be printed one week, and the original conundrums the next."

Then came the "Provincial Ya-men Gazette" (*Yuen Men Ch'ao*) published in each provincial capital, containing the proceedings of that particular *ya-men* or administrative office, the names of officials visiting the governor, proclamations and some local news. The subscribers to the gazettes of each provincial capital were likewise officials and would-be officials.

The first modern Chinese newspaper, however, appeared only in 1872, in Shanghai, a year before foreign ministers in Peking were received in audience by the Manchu emperor—namely, the *Shun Pao* or "Chinese Daily News." It is to-day probably the only Chinese journal which can boast of a modern five-story concrete building, with a library, photo-engraving rooms, artists' quarters, a staff club, a complete up-to-date printing machine and the largest circulation. Since then, coincident with the gradual spread of modern learning, the number of modern newspapers has increased rapidly, until now there are over one thousand dailies, weeklies and monthlies in all the principal cities.

Pending the elimination of omnipotent militarists, the development of the Chinese press is handicapped. In Shanghai and Tientsin, etc., where are situated the foreign settlements, Chinese editors are protected so long as they keep within the bounds of the libel law as understood in the West and administered by the foreign municipalities, whereas their confrères dwelling outside of foreign protection have to toe the line very gingerly. Hence we find the most outspoken comments as well as greatest progress in newspapers published in treaty ports and under the ægis of alien extraterritoriality.

(*Courtesy of* The Shun Pao)

Shanghai "Fleet Street"—The Five-storied Concrete Building on the Right is the "Shun Pao" Office, and further on the "Eastern Times."



Launching of the United States 10,000 Tonner "Mandarin" at the Kiangnan Dockyard, Shanghai.

(*Courtesy of* The Eastern Times)

A Scene in Shanghai during the Patriotic Commercial Strike against the National "Traitors."

The value of advertising is still little known to Chinese traders, so the main income of newspapers is thus cut off. This accounts for the prosperity of vernacular papers established in treaty ports and the unsatisfactory financial conditions of those published in non-treaty ports. Many merely subsist on the subsidies of different political parties. For example, in Peking alone there are no less than forty dailies in the Chinese language, but only two or three can be called independent or non-party papers.

Nevertheless despite these adverse circumstances, the most enterprising among Chinese journalists are endeavoring to live up to the ideals of their noble profession. Consequently, apart from taking sides where they are expected or constrained so to do, they have a considerable field to explore in the way of enlightening public opinion. This is especially true of their non-political news pages—the literary, educational, industrial and magazine sections, etc. One or two have in addition either a daily English edition or a weekly English sheet, while many issue also special supplements in colloquial style for less educated readers.

A decade ago a favorite "stunt" with the native newspapers in the treaty ports was to heap coals of satire and ridicule upon the heads of Chinese officialdom. The following appeared in one of the most influential dailies which to-day is "still going strong," under its Notes and Comments:

"The eight thoughts of a Chinese official are—(1) When he hears of the construction of a railway, he thinks of its being vested in government control; (2) when he hears of the development of a new industry, he thinks of the appointment of officials to foster it; (3) when he sees commercial commodities, he thinks of the *Li-kin* tariff; (4) when he meets a Western returned student, he regards him as a revolutionary; (5) when he meets a Chinese merchant from Singapore, Java, San Francisco, etc., he thinks of charitable endowments; (6) when he meets a superior, he thinks of cultivating his good graces; (7) when he meets an inferior, he expects to be treated with due respect; and (8) when he hears of a local uprising, he calculates upon his chances or otherwise of earning a Red Button."

Such language sounds rather archaic after the lapse of twelve weary years. Not only have sixty-eight hundred miles

of railways been constructed and numerous industries developed, but the Manchus have gone, never to return, and the people are living under a republican régime, even though it is more in name than in fact. Moreover, Red Buttons and Peacock Feathers—the pride of former officials—are no longer *à la mode;* their successors are now the Order of Merit, the Order of the Excellent Crop, and the Order of the Striped Tiger, etc. Nevertheless, the patriots of the country have still to do incessant spadework before the Augean stable of official corruption can be cleansed. And until the hearts of Chinese officials are purged of all forms of uncleanliness, democracy cannot be enthroned on the pedestal of China's body politic.

However, it is encouraging to find that even in China today "the pen is mightier than the sword," and the Chinese editor knows how to wield his pen and make the wrongdoer look stupid. But the predominant note which is being struck in the majority of journals is one of reconstruction. Nine years of mock republicanism and three years of insensate civil strife between the so-called North and South have nauseated men's minds, and the clarion call proclaimed through the press is "Reconstruct!" The unabashed hypocrisy of those who perform lip service to the ideals of constitutionalism is worn almost threadbare and none but the absolutely blind will wish to see them continue, much less multiply. Politics, finance, etc.—all these are so much rottenness, and their tottering structures will soon collapse like a pack of cards. There is no time to be lost if the calamity is to be averted, and hence the imperative need of immediate reconstruction from top to bottom.

Yes, but how to reconstruct? The change from absolute monarchy to a republic, as already noted, does not appear to have helped the people much, except perhaps in their being minus the Manchu-imposed hirsute appendage, and the word politics is being almost tabooed from patriotic, respectable society. In fact, the professional politician is regarded as a parasite of the first water, and the wider the berth he is given the better for all concerned. On the one hand he lends no help to the production of wealth, and on the other he is daily eating into the vitals of the nation, if not actually selling the people's birthright for a few miserable shining shekels. If so,

all the energies of the nation should be concentrated on the problem of increasing the national wealth, not however by ill-gotten means but by honest labor.

The most effective method for this purpose is therefore to bestir the wealth-producing elements and assist them in all possible directions. Those who can read the ordinary newspapers do not need much persuasion, and already they have done more than their level best to make their country prosperous. But the vast majority who are unable to wade through the journals written in classical Chinese style deserve all possible encouragement, since their quota of contribution to the sum total of the nation's wealth is by no means negligible. Hence they should be given the means of enlightenment most easily accessible to them, and hence, as already stated, facilities are being provided through the medium of the simplified colloquial as well as new phonetic alphabet.

"The pen is mightier than the sword." The militarists know it and dread it. Consequently papers are either subsidized or suppressed altogether. But no amount of money or repression will avail to stifle the rising spirit of democracy, even though such pressure should be abetted if not instigated by external influence. The following incidents exemplify the psychology of those who desire to strangle public opinion as well as the tribulations of Chinese editors.

In September, 1918, the militarists in Peking negotiated two loans with Japanese capitalists nominally to construct two railways in Shantung and four lines in Manchuria and Inner Mongolia, but the proceeds were, as expected, sidetracked to military uses. For disclosing this information six vernacular dailies in the Capital were simultaneously suppressed. In the ordinary course of events the journal published in English which we then edited would have also published the news, but that day happened to be the Chinese harvest moon festival, a national holiday, and our office was closed. When we resumed publication the next day we reproduced details of the loans from our foreign contemporaries which took no holiday, and so were not suppressed! Who dares to say then that a holiday is a humbug?

Towards the end of January, 1919, there occurred in Paris the first difference of opinion between the peace delegates from China and Japan over the now famous Shantung question.

Whereupon the Japanese minister in Peking made astonishing representations to the Chinese Foreign Office that the Chinese delegates in Paris should be instructed to desist from further embarrassing the Japanese delegates! The publicity of the Chinese papers being too uncomfortable for the Japanese diplomat, he waited until the Chinese New Year when the vernacular papers, following the customary rule, would have five days holidays, before sending in his official communication to the Chinese government. For then the papers would suspend publication and there would be no opportunity for them to inform the nation! Can there be a better proof of the power of the Chinese press?

Conscientious editors have nowadays not only to fight against their own unscrupulous officials but also to resist the machinations and aggressions of Japan. In so doing they are often caught between the devil and the deep sea. The militarists are notorious for their pro-Japanese proclivities, and many Japanese are known to be hand in glove with the militarists. Under the circumstances most uneasy lies the head that wears the editorial crown, as may be seen from our own personal experience.

Encouraged by their Japanese friends, the almighty militarist gang has been bartering away the nation's assets for a mess of pottage, until to-day there is perhaps only one other national security which has not been hypothecated to foreign capitalists. Reciprocally, heartened by the repressive measures of the militarists, the unscrupulous lenders in Dai Nippon have been most reckless in advancing loans to those who have no business to administer the government. With both it is a flagrant case of "After me the deluge." What patriotic citizen in any country can remain indifferent to the outlook? And when the country is drifting to inevitable bankruptcy just because the lenders do not bother even to question the ultimate purpose of the money or the legality of the transaction, who can conscientiously maintain silence?

Like many others we chose to speak out and run the gauntlet of pro-Japanese militarism and pro-militarist Nipponism. But mindful of the numerous dangers besetting our way, we exercised every caution to keep within the law and especially to leave no loophole for attack or suppression by our ill-wishers. (The brilliant editor of another liberal daily in the

English language in Peking had, twelve months previously, been imprisoned for personal attacks on the Japanese and Chinese authorities, and his paper has since been suppressed entirely.) The Chinese people have no quarrel whatsoever with the Japanese people, but they have every justification to criticize the unfriendly acts of Japanese militarists and easy-going money lenders. Since the combined operation of their activities has been to reduce China almost to the status of a political dependent as well as insolvent debtor, it is to the interests of the Japanese people themselves that the warning should be uttered, lest the resultant ill-feeling should become unabatable. What will it avail the Tokyo government if China is a second Korea but with four hundred million people vowing vengeance at the first opportunity? Is it not the best policy to live and let live, since each dog will have his day?

Unfortunately, one can never please everybody. And while we were on cordial terms with representatives of official Japan resident in China, other Japanese could not be so persuaded. Consequently, the expected thing happened. We received anonymous letters threatening us, first, with dire consequences, lawsuits and what not, unless we desisted from our so-called anti-Japanese articles, and then with danger to life and limb upon our publishing the first threat together with our reply and taking no notice whatever of the proffered "friendly advice." Six months elapsed, and the anonymous correspondents swung round completely. From an attitude of bullying they descended to one of ingratiation. Namely, that Japan was after all China's best friend; wherefore intelligent Chinese should be careful not to listen to the instigations of Americans and Britishers, etc. Needless to say, we disagreed with our kind correspondents and continued in the course we judged best. Subsequently even official Japan whispered a compliment against us, but—a truly significant sign of the turning of the tide—official China likewise took no heed.

We have said there are now over one thousand dailies, weeklies and monthlies published in the principal cities. Greater enlightenment induces greater articulation, and it is noteworthy that the classes which were regarded as so many meek sheep are now very articulate. It is impossible here to enumerate the formidable list of publications which to-day are influencing public opinion; here it will suffice to remark that

almost every class of people has its own organ. For example, there is a paper for beggars in Canton, another for sing-song girls of the same city, and among the latest in the field are *The Chinese Druggist* (monthly) of Shanghai, and *The Labour Weekly* of Canton. By the time this volume appears in print, there will also have been published a *Chinese Aviation Journal, Chinese Builder and Contractor* and *Chinese Hardware Journal*, etc.[1]

A few of the powerful periodicals are *La Jeunesse, Emancipation and Reconstruction*, already referred to in previous chapters, *Construction, The Renaissance, The Educational Tide*, and *The New China*, etc. As evidence of the intellectual rebirth, the popularity of periodicals is a remarkable phenomenon. The explanation seems to lie in the new scientific spirit: "The question 'WHY?' is heard everywhere. Why should we believe in this or that idea? Why should this or that institution still exist to-day? Doubt rarely is purely negative. It leads to inquiries which in most cases lead in turn to positive reconstructions. We find, for example, many Confucian doctrines severely criticized, but we also find that Confucianism was never so intelligently studied as it is to-day. We find filial piety seriously questioned, but we again find that the relation between parents and children has never before been so rationally discussed as it is now."

There is, therefore, a critical spirit abroad. Men no longer take statements at their face value, but will ask questions and also try to answer them. During this period of transition, they are willing to study all theories relevant to an understanding of their problems—social, intellectual, religious, political, economic and educational, etc. For this purpose translations from foreign authors appear in almost every publication—e.g. Carpenter's "Love's Coming of Age," Marx's "*Das Kapital*," the doctrines of Robert Owen, Louis Blanc, Saint Simon, etc.—and many also publish special numbers exclusively —e.g. The Dewey Number, the Ibsen Number, the Marx Number, and the New Thought Number, etc. The Dewey Number, for example, was devoted to a consideration of the doctrines of Professor John Dewey, of Columbia University, who is

[1] The *Soldiers' Weekly*—the first newspaper ever printed by and for Chinese soldiers—has made its appearance. It is said to be published by General Feng Yü-hsiang.

now in China and influencing the educational world to no small extent.

As may have been noticed, there is a distinct socialist tendency in the current periodical literature. It seems that sickened by the overweening ambition of militarists and their gang, men are turning to something new—something which will not be so disastrous as the Bolshevist reaction from the Czarist oppression. There is a general feeling of disintegration, and the old dispensation is found unsuited to present needs. Hence the phenomenal outburst of interest in all forms of socialism and socialist theories—an attitude which, it is reported, is also reflected among the masses in Japan, a prominent daily in Osaka only two or three months ago publishing serially "The Eternal Life" of Maurice Maeterlinck.

Further illustrations of the growing articulateness among various classes are the number of technical and professional periodicals, the number of government publications, and the willingness of the Chinese government to take the people into its confidence. Of the first there are for example the following: *Science, Wissen und Wissenschaft, The National History, The Journal of Mathematics and Science, The Bankers' Weekly, The Railway Association Magazine, The Mining Magazine,* and *The National Medical Journal of China*, etc. Assuredly an interesting phenomenon of some of these periodicals is their fondness for names in foreign languages—e.g. *La Jeunesse, Science, Wissen und Wissenschaft, The Renaissance*, etc.—side by side with Chinese originals.

Formerly the government preferred to keep the people in the dark, whereas the policy now is to encourage them to know the exact conditions of the country—in matters educational, economic, political, commercial, financial, etc. This is done by means of publications issued by various government departments and also asking parliament to vote on the national budget. Examples of such are *The Chinese Astronomical and Meteorological Magazine, The Finance Journal, The Journal of Agriculture and Commerce,* and those of the Board of Audit, the Ministries of Education, of Justice, of Interior, etc. In addition, the Ministries of Education and Agriculture and Commerce also issue annual compilations. All contain documents and statistics valuable for reference. *The Chinese Astronomical and Meteorological Magazine* is published by the Central

Observatory in Peking—an institution which is now of more than usual interest, since the German government, in execution of the Versailles treaty, is beginning to return the astronomical instruments installed in the thirteenth century which its troops removed twenty years ago.

Here is an important advance in the development of public opinion. Prior to the establishment of the Republic, the only government publications accessible to the people were perhaps the annual trade reports of the Chinese Maritime Customs and the annual reports of the Chinese Post Office, both administered under foreign supervision. To-day most official reports and statistics are available to the public, with the result that one can ascertain the balance of foreign trade, the progress of education, the net result of railway operations, the development of industries, the amount of revenue and expenditure, etc. The innovation being comparatively new, not all the desired information can be kept up to date, especially as the country has been so much disturbed during the past few years. To cite an example: the last national census for China Proper —i.e., the old eighteen provinces, excluding the Three Eastern Provinces of Manchuria, Mongolia (Outer and Inner), Sinkiang and Tibet—was taken in 1910 by the Ministry of Interior and the total was estimated at 331,000,000. Since then the popularly accepted figure for the whole of China has been taken as four hundred millions, although foreign estimates vary from 342 to 448 millions. The trade returns for 1919 issued by the Chinese Maritime Customs a month ago, however, reckon the total population of the country minus Mongolia, Sinkiang and Tibet at 439,405,000. Given time and facilities for steady development, it will not be long before official publications can be kept up to date as in other countries.

Undoubtedly the most eloquent testimony of the weight of public opinion is the fact that the Chinese government has begun to take the people and the world into its confidence. In the past, the public never had an opportunity to know whether China was right or wrong in her controversies with foreign nations—the archives were locked up in the government offices, and very few ever knew the ins and outs of the complicated questions. Silence is said to be tantamount to consent: hence China's silence has frequently been regarded as a confession of guilt or culpability. But there are always two

sides to a question, and it is inconceivable that China should consistently be in the wrong. Since she spake not, however, what else was the world to do except to believe in the version of the other side?

In the memorable year of 1915 the ice of sphinx-like silence was broken in face of the famous Twenty-one Demands presented by Japan—but only after the Peking government had accepted Tokyo's ultimatum and concluded the treaties of May 25th of that year. China had every right on her side but neither fortune nor military strength. The other Powers interested in China were engaged in a life and death struggle in Europe, and Japan was free to browbeat her big neighbor. On the one hand, she warned Peking on no account to divulge the nature of her exorbitant demands and, on the other, she declared solemnly in Europe and America that her demands numbered only eleven instead of twenty-one, whilst those disclosed by her were the least offensive of the lot! Such "duplicity and tergiversation" are almost unparalleled in history, yet the Republic was helpless. That being the case, China had no alternative but in self-defense to publish the history of the whole sordid affair to the country and the impartial world. The disclosure constitutes a remarkable story, one which every student of modern history should know and take to heart. Full details will be found in one of the appendices at the end of this volume.

Eighteen months later there occurred another Sino-Japanese clash over the Cheng-chia-tun incident, and when the incident had been finally settled its history was similarly published in both Chinese and English. This departure from the foolish silence of the past has since been repeatedly followed, until now China has also a White Book, relating to the Great War and covering the entire year of 1917. We shall have occasion to refer again to this White Book when we discuss the Republic's new international attitude. Here it will suffice to remark that the documents included in the unique publication relate to the events leading up to the declaration of war between the Republic and the Central Powers, the recall of Chinese ministers from Germany and Austria-Hungary, the departure of German and Austrian diplomatic officials, rules and regulations relating to the war, and the treatment of enemy persons as well as property.

Among the latest official publications which have likewise an

international interest may be included the following:—Chinese High Prize Court Judgments, Chinese Supreme Court Regulations, Chinese Supreme Court Decisions, and the Second Revised Draft of the Chinese Criminal Code. Each of these has also an English edition, whilst the last has in addition a French translation.

As already stated, even the devil-may-care militarists are conscious of the weight of public opinion, and if they cannot suppress it, they will endeavor to win it by hook or crook. This is best exemplified in the present hostilities between two rival factions in north China (July 16, 1920). Each side proclaims to the world the crimes of the other and each thereby hopes to win the support of the people. What a contrast between the former attitude of supercilious arrogance and the present bid for public support! As a foreign critic on the spot puts it:—

"To the superficial observer who looks only at outward forms and conventional signs, China is a Republic only in name. But as a matter of fact public opinion in China, democratic after its own fashion, is making itself felt in a slow, clumsy, but nevertheless positive manner. On the part of many this recognition of the great power of public opinion may be almost subconscious, but the feeling is there even though ill-defined. How the troops feel, what the people think, the opinion of foreign residents and even the judgment of the outside world, all is weighed in the minds of the military leaders, and how to influence public opinion in their favor seems to preoccupy their thoughts far more than questions of strategy or tactics."

Another indication of the power of public opinion is the number of foreign newspapers published in China. Even in Peking, which is not a treaty port, there are at least three foreign papers, besides two Chinese journals published in the English language, for an alien population of two thousand, one-half of whom are Japanese. The first European journal in the field was the *Canton Register*, published in 1827. Being generally commercial ventures, these have done good work not only in educating Chinese public opinion, as trans-

lations from foreign papers appear daily in their native contemporaries, but also in encouraging the Chinese journals to develop by showing them the way. For 350,000 aliens to dwell in China, it is proper they should be on the friendliest terms with the local inhabitants. Foreign journals are read by an increasing number of English-speaking population, but the vast masses require also to be informed of the foreign point of view. Hence, a few foreign dailies have also begun to publish Chinese editions, notably two in Peking and Tientsin, and several native papers are now foreign owned.

A remarkable feature in this connection is the number of Japanese papers which masquerade as native journals whilst many Chinese papers are also Japanese subsidized. Published in Chinese, the former boldly employ "we Chinese" and "our country" to lead the unwary astray. As a matter of fact, however, the ruse is unsuccessful, and few people take their preachings seriously. Whereupon within recent months professedly Japanese organs have been started in the English language—in Peking, Tientsin, and Shanghai, etc.—so that Dai Nippon's aims and policies *vis-à-vis* the Chinese might not be misunderstood by the English-reading public.

The potency of public opinion is therefore acknowledged, and in subsequent chapters we will discuss some of the methods utilized to enforce it. This does not mean to imply that the Chinese newspapers do not need further development; on the contrary, the journalists themselves will be the first to confess their shortcomings. A few months ago the national press association held its second conference at Canton and passed several important resolutions. It was attended by over two hundred delegates from fifty newspapers in eight provinces and twenty-two cities, as well as five foreign countries where there are Chinese journals for the Chinese residents—namely, the United States, Siam, the Straits Settlements, Cuba and Canada. These resolutions indicate the necessary lines of development.

In the first place, the journalistic profession in China likewise requires regular training. For this purpose a school of journalism is to be established at one of the universities in Shanghai, with an initial capital of three hundred thousand dollars, two-thirds of which having already been donated by the Nanyang Brothers and Company, tobacco manufacturers.

Secondly, there should be established an efficient foreign news service, with correspondents in all foreign capitals. As a beginning correspondents will be sent to the United States, Great Britain and also the headquarters of the League of Nations. Thirdly, newspapers should also have one holiday in a week, instead of the present seven days a week and no rest except on national as well as customary holidays. Fourthly, there should be periodic visits to foreign lands by members of the Chinese press. Hence as a start, the conference accepted the invitation of the Japanese Press Association to visit their country in April, 1921.

These are proper lines of development, especially as in regard to the first resolution the Government University in Peking is the only institution which offers a tentative course in journalism, although there are about one or two dozen returned students who have been trained for the profession mainly in Japan and the United States. But the need of an efficient school of journalism is an urgent one, since the majority of Chinese editors are more dabblers than experts. With the introduction of up-to-date commercial methods, the mercantile classes will appreciate the value of newspapers as an advertising medium, and then the disseminators of public information will be placed on a sound financial basis. The profession will become independent and all outside assistance or subsidies will be eliminated. And with the return of the country to normal well-ordered conditions, the bane of militarism will disappear and the leaders of public opinion will occupy their proper place in the life of the community. The pen is mightier than the sword, and public opinion will control yet more completely the destinies of the Republic.

CHAPTER VIII

NEW PATRIOTISM

AMONG students of Chinese history it is often said that patriotism is unknown in this land of four hundred million souls. And the favorite evidence adduced is the apathy of the people when the Boxers of 1900 ran amok in the northern provinces, as a result of which China engaged to pay an indemnity which by 1940 would have totalled £147,335,722. But surely it was a blessing in disguise that that was the actual situation; that Yuan Shih-k'ai, then governor of Shantung province, did protect foreign lives and property; and that the viceroys of the Yangtze provinces were courageous enough to alter the word "destroy" in the imperial edict into "protect." Otherwise, the story of that "midsummer madness" would have to be entirely rewritten.

Whatever may have been the motives which prompted such apathy or indifference, it is nevertheless true that, regarded from the Western point of view, the Chinese were on the whole lacking in that quality which is called the love of country, although individual patriots are numerous in Chinese history. The explanation, however, is not far to seek. As already stated, the unit in Chinese society is the family, not the individual. The interests of the family come first, and all a man has to live for is to perpetuate the parental stock and by dint of individual virtue to add glory to it. The officials, the emperor and his ministers, not to mention the tax-gatherers, will look after the state, and even if the country should go wrong those who rule and administer will find means to improve it. Therefore the state is no concern of the individual: his interests dwell nearer home, namely, in his parents, his family, and invariably his relatives also.

Such philosophy suited China when she was splendid in isolation, since even her conquerors were in the end absorbed by her. But the world is getting closer and closer together,

thanks to the railroad, steamship, telegraph, wireless and aeroplanes as well as airships. The Middle Kingdom can no more hold aloof from intercourse with the rest of the world than can the rest of the world exclude it from such intercourse, but each is interdependent on the other just because each has its quota to contribute to the progress of humanity. Hence with the opening of the country to foreign trade and introduction of Western civilization, men's minds have broadened to the perception of a larger vision—one which showed that the "Middle Kingdom" was by no means in the center of the civilized world and that the Celestial Empire itself was fast becoming semi-civilized unless it set about immediately to reform its institutions in accord with those of the West. Hence the old order passeth, yielding place to the new.

With the assimilation of modern learning, with the establishment of improved facilities of communication, and especially with the pricking of the bubble that the Celestial Empire, headed by the "Son of Heaven," was invincible as well as invulnerable, the people have begun to realize what it is to be the citizen of a free and independent sovereign state, respected and honored by all and sundry. If love of the soil that gave a person his birth had been lying dormant all these centuries, it is now rapidly asserting itself. One's family interests no longer are supreme, because the state, not the family, is to-day paramount. As the woman orator, already cited, has put it: "Our Republic is the father and mother of our four hundred millions. Therefore, we should place the interests of our greater father and mother before those of our own fathers and mothers."

Hence, in order of chronology, the clamor for the cancellation of all railroad, mining and other concessions granted to aliens; hence the determination to get rid of the opium habit; hence the advent of the Republic; hence China's non-signature of the German peace treaty; and hence the present adamant resolution to prosecute the boycott of Japanese goods until the Japanese government will restore Kiaochow unconditionally and make other amends to the outraged feelings of a friendly neighbor as well as quondam teacher.

All this is collective action; there are also individual acts of patriotism which deserve to be recorded in our survey of

the transition from dormant patriotism to intense nationalism. In the last days of the Manchu régime, when the people disbelieved the fine promises of their alien rulers, there was a heavy feeling of despondency. All talk of constitutionalism and reform, they said, was idle vaporing, and the country was to be condemned to another decade of oppression and retrogression. Impotent to ameliorate its conditions, what else could they do except to resort to patriotic suicide? If in their lifetime they could not attain their cherished desires, their death might fire the imagination of their compatriots and rouse them to vigorous action.

Thus in 1909, a year after the "Old Buddha" Empress Dowager's death, a Manchu metropolitan official Yung Lin "sacrificed his life," to quote from the imperial edict conferring upon him posthumous honors, "in order to display his patriotism." Before his death he sent to the press a remarkable open petition addressed to the prince regent, who was administering the government during the minority of the new boy emperor. He called attention to the dangers besetting the administration and suggested remedies. Then he concluded as follows:

"I am a member of the Imperial household, and my family has been a recipient of the imperial bounty for generations. The contemplation of the dangers of the time made me sick at heart. Full of grief at what I cannot alter, I have braved death in making my remonstrance. Lacking literary ability or grace of style, and knowing that the law punishes him who speaks of what concerns him not, I have decided on self-slaughter after sending in this document in fear of punishment, because my constitution is not strong enough to endure the cruel tortures of my gaolers, so I beseech your Highness to pity and forgive. . . . My original intention was to ask my superior official to present my memorial, but I fear that your Highness's anger might extend to him for presenting it. Then I thought of stopping your Highness's chariot and presenting it personally, but your suite is too large to render approach an easy matter. And a call to you on my part would result in my being rebuked. So I decided to send it by post to the newspapers, where your Highness will be able to peruse it and act accordingly. Then I shall live though I die. Weep-

ing bitterly, I prostrate myself and reverently hand in my memorial."

As in the tragedy of Mr. and Mrs. Tsu Da-fah, already cited, the incident created a profound impression and indirectly it had its influence in accelerating the constitutional reforms already granted to the people. Two years after a Chinese student in England similarly dedicated his life. He was a Confucian scholar and remembered how the patriots of yore made the supreme sacrifice. Thinking likewise there was no hope for his country and impatient at the delay in constitutional reform, he jumped overboard in the harbor of Liverpool just shortly before the outbreak of the Revolution which dethroned the Manchus. In recent years similar cases have occurred, and the latest is that of a promising student in North China some three months ago. He drowned himself and left the following message, according to newspaper reports, on his clothing:—

"With troubles both internal and external, China will soon be a defunct country. No one can tell how the Shantung question will end, and when there will be peace between the North and South. What a pitiful sight to see the students rise up empty-handed, risking their lives for the national salvation! Without the least selfishness or conceit, and free from any guilty motive, they are nevertheless suppressed and treated as criminals. With the thought of seeing a passing nation and her people enslaved, I would rather be a free ghost than a living slave. My fellow citizens, be brave and struggle for your country! I have finished my life."

Now Westerners may not quite comprehend the significance of this extreme sacrifice, since suicide in whatever form is reprobated by their law. To the Orientals the act is regarded with the greatest of respect, because unlike ordinary suicides in the West, it is not due to sentimental or financial reasons. It is rather the result of deliberate thought, and the person resorting to it puts himself in the position of a martyr for a noble cause. The Japanese have also their *hara-kiri*, and a celebrated case is that of Count Nogi, the conqueror of Port Arthur, and his wife who committed suicide in 1912 as an act

of loyalty when their imperial sovereign "ascended unto heaven." The motives actuating the Chinese and Japanese patriotic suicides are not the same, but they resemble each other in their ardent fervor for a cause, be it loyalty to a departed monarch or loyalty to a country that shall be erected on the sacrifice of the martyrs. If so, as Sir Charles Bruce then pointed out in the *London Times*, in a general discussion of the merits and motives of Nogi's immolation, the question may be put to the Christian world—"whether the bodily fulfillment of the spiritual law of self-sacrifice was not consecrated by Divine authority in the central fact of Christianity of which the Cross is the symbol?"

Proof positive of the changed mentality of the Chinese people is the fact that the tendency nowadays is to discourage all patriotic suicides. If a man is willing to die for his country, the greater patriotism will be for him to live for it, work for it and fight for it. The nation is in need of good men, men who have the patriotism to sacrifice their personal comforts for the welfare of the Republic; so it can ill spare such patriots. There are times, indeed, when one will have to die as a martyr, but in the cases noted, the heroes are not required to choose at the hands of a persecutor between loyalty to a cause or complete renunciation. Hence the students who are spurring the nation to greater action are willing to be imprisoned by the militarists rather than commit suicide, and hence the aged father of one of the incarcerated boys would rather have his son remain true to his ideal than have him bailed out and abjure his patriotic creed.

This then is the new patriotism which is animating the nation to-day throughout its length and breadth. It is attested in the display of the Rainbow Flag on every legitimate occasion to remind the spectators of the union of the five races in the quin-colored stripes of their corporate emblem. It is symbolized in the new spirit of self-abnegation for the good of the greatest number, in the new spirit of social service for the benefit of poor and destitute. It is exemplified in the despatch of telegrams to the total of over one thousand in the short space of four or five months to the Peace Conference in Paris and the Chinese delegates—pleading, on the one hand, for fair play for the nation of four hundred million souls and implor-

ing, on the other, their own spokesmen not to sign the Versailles treaty unless justice were accorded to the Republic in the Shantung question. It is manifested to-day in the resolute stand to boycott Japanese goods and develop native industries.

The amount of money spent on the telegrams must have cost a small fortune, but the fate of the country being at stake, money was literally of no consequence so long as China's case could be heard by those who were to reëstablish a new world order which would be safe for democracy. For example, one of the telegrams appealed for tariff autonomy in place of the existing treaty-established tariff, which levies a nominal five per cent. *ad valorem* duty on all imported goods entering Chinese ports. We were asked to draft it as if we were writing an editorial for our English newspaper; it must be clear and comprehensive; and the editorial as published was textually cabled to the Peace Conference—namely a total of two thousand words!

In the generous contributions of Mrs. Hu and Mrs. Wei to educational funds referred to in an earlier chapter, we have examples of individual patriotic endeavors. Other patriotic benefactors include Messrs. Ch'en Chia-keng and Ch'en Ching-hsien, two brothers, who recently donated fourteen million dollars to promote higher education in Amoy (Fukien), one of the earliest ports to be opened to foreign trade; Mr. H. Y. Moh, "China's Cotton King," who contributed to the Peking Government University fifty thousand taels two months ago as a permanent fund for the support of special scholars in Europe and America; and the Nanyang Brothers, tobacco manufacturers, who in addition to endowing twenty thousand dollars for a school of journalism in Shanghai, are also supporting forty-five scholars in European and American universities. As recent as a fortnight ago (July 1, 1920) the Chinese merchants in Shanghai offered the big sum of two million dollars to relieve the rice shortage in that port. The cotton mill owners' association pledged one-half of the amount, and the bankers' association one-half of the rest. Their plan was to import rice from Hongkong and Saigon, etc., and sell it at $8.50 per picul (100 catties or 133 and one-third pounds) instead of the inflated price of $15 per picul. The loss in the transaction would amount to one hundred thousand dollars,

but the merchants were willing to shoulder it in order to keep the city free from labor unrest. Finally the contribution became unnecessary, as their threat to import foreign rice immediately brought the profiteers' price down to reasonable limits. Can there be a more telling effect of brave show of patriotism?

President Wilson has said that "a nation boycotted is a nation in sight of surrender." This is the battle cry of patriotic Chinese to-day. As the Chinese girls whom we have already quoted, remarked truly:—"The boycott (of Japanese goods) comes from the Chinese people and not from the government. We are against the insults, 'demands' and predatory ambitions of Japan towards our country, but not against the Japanese people. . . . What we are doing now is due to our desire to help to found a strong and righteous China. We are trying to do our part to encourage our national industries. A developed China will more readily enter into trade relations with Japan and other countries than an undeveloped China, and our progress will enable us to contribute our share in international commerce to the benefit of all."

Historically speaking, this is by no means the first boycott of its kind. Fifteen years ago when there was a popular outcry against the harsh execution of the United States Chinese exclusion laws, an American boycott was similarly declared—and with equal disastrous consequences to American trade. Ten years later, when China had to swallow the indignity of Japan's infamous Twenty-one Demands, a like boycott against Japanese goods was instituted. In both, however, the determination was never nation-wide. It required the humiliation of Shantung clauses in the Versailles treaty to break the camel's back. Moreover, the resolution to make Japan surrender is supplemented by the patriotic resolve to develop home industries so that the Republic will in the end be an exporting rather than an importing country.

The following exchange of correspondence reported in the *North China Star*, Tientsin (January 15, 1920), will best illustrate the numerous phases of the present boycott:—

(1) Protest from the Japanese consul-general in Tientsin to the Chinese commissioner of the foreign affairs:—

"By the action of the Chinese Yarn, Piece-goods and Silk

Guild, the fire of the boycott has been again lighted. The students prevent the Chinese merchants from accepting delivery of goods already ordered from Japanese merchants. Japanese merchants will allow thirty days for all contracts to be fulfilled and payments made in full. The approach of the Chinese New Year makes it the more necessary that Chinese merchants should hold to their contracts. Our country has suffered incalculable injury from the Chinese boycott of our goods. Chinese merchants have also been impoverished, whilst some have had to close their doors because of the students' prevention of the sale of goods.

"For these reasons I beg of you to use severe measures to remove the interference of the students so that undesirable results may be obviated. Such action on your part would be most desirable. Chinese officials are too loose in the control of affairs. For this reason Chinese merchants are unable to hold to their contracts. When the merchants of our country suffer, our Office must request sufficient and proper indemnity from the Chinese Government. We cannot guarantee that such complications will not arise. I hope for a reply."

(2) Letter from the Chinese guild to the commissioner of foreign affairs, replying to the Japanese consul-general's protest:—

"Our neighbor in the east constantly reminds us of his prosperity. First he steals our Tsingtau; then he constantly wants to control our internal administration and the administration of our commercial and citizen organizations. Last month at Foochow (capital of Fukien province) students and police were killed by Japanese rowdies. This is in contravention of international law and ignores our sovereignty. As a result, our people have been roused to anger and hatred. The entire nation is involved. There is no way to change this condition. Moreover, the Japanese Government does not endeavor to save the situation but remains extremely unyielding—repeatedly pressing us, sending its ships of war to inspire fear, and making the resolve of our people ever more determined, as well as forcing them into associations unitedly to boycott Japanese goods. The Japanese Government does not wish to save the situation, but to cast the responsibility entirely upon the Chinese.

"As to our guild, the majority of goods we handled were Japanese. The love of country among the people is very strong. No one orders Japanese goods from us. Such as we have on hand it is impossible to sell. The goods we have ordered we cannot therefore free our money to purchase. The harm suffered by our various interests it is useless to set forth. It originates, we are convinced, in the trust in militarism of the Japanese Government. Thus things have come to this pass. It is a universal principle that orders contracted for must be accepted. As to the loss by merchants, according to justice, the Japanese Government, being the primary cause, should bear it. If Japan does not awaken in regard to Tsingtau and Foochow, but continues to go on its own way, Chinese business will suffer incalculable injury and should properly ask Japan for indemnity."

(3) Letter from the Japanese yarn, silk and piece-goods dealers to the Chinese guild:—

"Our relations should not be considered broken in the least, but closer every day. Because of Tsingtau and Foochow the students boycott Japanese goods, and the merchants have suffered greatly from their acts. As to the Tsingtau and Foochow affairs, they belong to our two governments which are even now in the process of settling them. An entirely satisfactory solution will be reached presently. You should not be exercised over them. The students should not have the power of interference in such matters.

"May we respectfully request your honorable society to press your officials to remove immediately such unwarranted interference of the students and clear the road for the merchants? We believe your honorable guild will approve. As to contracts already contracted for, we must find means to protect them, whether by partial or full payment. If you do not faithfully carry them out, we will hold you to your agreements by law and international treaty. Think this over!"

(4) Reply from the Chinese guild:—

"Your letter received. Sino-Japanese commercial relations have gradually increased and occupy a large place in our business, but our object in severing these relations at present is positively on account of Tsingtau and Foochow. If you

wish to lay matters at rest, it is absolutely necessary for you to recognize the necessity of giving in a step. Your letter states that Tsingtau and Foochow are government affairs and that merchants should not interfere. Your statement is too categorical. We beg your honorable association to press your government to give in on these matters.

"As to the international relationships of our countries the students have no power of interference. Still less have they the power of interfering in regard to contracts between ourselves, which cannot come under the disposition of students. But if we receive your goods, no Chinese will buy them. We have no way to change this condition. This feeling prevails not only among the student class but among all classes. This is an extraordinary condition with which we are dealing. You must not bring forward ordinary precedents to deal with it. We are not breaking our faith or our contracts. We are temporarily holding up the execution of the latter. This is the furthest degree to which we can bend. You must pardon the situation."

The spirit shown by the above merchants is admirably courteous and firm, and the whole incident mirrors the new mentality of the nation. A time there was when a foreign official's hint at indemnity would strike terror into Chinese hearts; to-day there is no more fear. In one or two cases official pressure was unfortunately exerted on the commercial and student classes by reactionary henchmen of pro-Japanese militarists; nevertheless, the people remain unshakable in their determination to win out by the only effective weapon left them. That Japan is within sight of surrender is evident, for on an average it has lost forty per cent. of its former trade with China. But until the goal is attained, the boycott will be maintained, no matter how much some sections will suffer or how menacingly the Japanese government will brandish its big stick.

About the same time that the aforementioned exchange of correspondence took place the union of industrial guilds was inaugurated in Tientsin. The meeting was opened by a girl orator—a significant tribute to China's new womanhood—who complimented the local merchants on their firm stand in the boycott, since from her observations in many ports she found

the merchants most systematic and exemplary in this respect. The enthusiastic proceedings closed with the following instructive dialogue, foreshadowing the independent plans of trading classes:

Q.—"If we get back Tsingtau and the Foochow affair is settled, shall we not call off the boycott?"

A.—"Suppose Japan perpetrates further aggressions. I think we will forever boycott Japanese goods."

Q.—"If we continue to boycott Japan, our business will suffer from lack of material and goods."

A.—"Formerly we traded more with Western countries than with Japan. It was only through the war in Europe that Japan obtained her present preponderating position. We will hereafter go again to America and Europe."

Q.—"But Western goods are too expensive."

A.—"Take, for instance, this hat. The Japanese make it for $1.00, whereas Americans would charge $8.00. This is because American hats are made for the American market. Have you ever taken this hat to an American manufacturer and asked if he could duplicate it in quantities of 100,000 for $1.00 each? I believe that Americans can manufacture goods, if made especially for the market in China, with their machinery output, as cheaply as anybody else's."

Q.—"But how can we get in touch with Western manufacturers and wholesalers?"

A.—"Foreign manufacturers issue catalogues which are supplied free of charge. Then we can advertise our wants in the foreign newspapers. Best of all, however, is to establish a market introducing bureau on the model of a bank, to finance quantity ordering from the manufacturers in Europe and the United States, and at the same time send market investigators as well as buyers to every country in the world. Every guild should contribute to the funds of the bureau."

The suggestions outlined above are being followed, and Japan is indeed a boycotted nation. For example, the bank-notes of a certain Japanese bank were at one time very popular: during the last twelve months they have rarely been seen, for the boycott of Japanese goods has extended also to their bank-notes. To the uninitiated Western reader, it should be explained that owing to the unsatisfactory conditions of

China's finances, consequent upon especially its numerous loans from foreign creditors to pay off indemnities, to construct railroads and to finance other public utilities, many foreign banks established at the treaty ports and Peking have likewise been suffered to issue bank-notes which are accepted with confidence by the Chinese people. The bank in question is a semi-official institution and one of China's creditors.

The movement to develop native or national industries appears to be making steady headway. The determination to do it is there, and so is part of the necessary capital. But the political confusion still prevailing in the country and the delay in arrival of machinery ordered from abroad are factors not easy to overcome at once. Nevertheless, it is instructive to note that at a big bazaar in Peking, the building housing it having been burnt down and now reconstructed of concrete, the two hundred shops have pledged to sell only national goods—namely, those manufactured at home. And in the authoritative "Trade Returns" for last year, just issued by the Maritime Customs, we find the following eloquent testimony:—"There are few foreign type articles of domestic use that are not now manufactured in China by factories on modern lines, the majority of them without foreign assistance. Out of a long list the following may be mentioned—enameled-ware, silk and cotton clothing and underwear, toilet articles, umbrellas, woolen yarn, mother-of-pearl, bone, and horn buttons, chemicals, needles, electric lamps, telephone appliances, asbestos manufacture, wine, beer, beet sugar, glassware, and window glass."

That the people are filled with a new spirit of nationalism is no longer to be questioned. A pertinent query at once arises: How about the Chinese soldiers? Foreign experts who had trained these men have declared that they would make fine soldiers if properly officered and properly led, and the splendid behavior of General Feng Yü-hsiang's troops, one-half of whom are Christians, is certainly corroborative of such testimony. In the general awakening of the country, have these soldiers likewise become more patriotic? And can they be relied upon in the hour of need?

The consensus of opinion would be an outspoken NO. This is because of the peculiar environment in which Chinese sol-

diers are brought up. Very rarely are they required to fight for their country, and seldom are they properly trained for real campaigning. The central government being impotent to check the provincial governors, the latter have been left to look after their own defense as best they could. Hence the present inflated soldiery all over the country. At the end of August, 1913, the size of China's army was estimated at half a million; five years later an official statement put it at approximately one million and three hundred thousand, of which 540,344 were under the direct control of the Peking government. Hence the cost of maintenance for the army alone in 1918 totalled two hundred and nine million dollars, whereas sound finance dictated that this expenditure should not have exceeded one hundred and twenty million dollars. And hence the appropriation of one hundred and ninety-eight millions for the army as compared with that of six and a half millions for education in the central government's budget for July, 1919—June, 1920.

Under the circumstances, the soldiery is a veritable thorn in the side of the body politic. In the hands of ambitious military leaders the ill-trained army has constituted a menace to public safety, and more than once has the solidarity of the Republic been jeopardized thereby. Even now no one will speak a good word for the public parasites, and the country's supposed protectors will always be given the widest berth. If their pay, as is unfortunately often the case, is in arrears, they are liable to get out of hand and help themselves to the defenseless people's property and belongings, and in the strife between the so-called North and South the conditions in many districts are truly deplorable. As soon as the country is reunited and funds are available, the superfluous troops will be immediately disbanded; but until then the uneducated men will always be a source of danger to the public.

Nevertheless, in recent years and as we write, a change for the better is perceptible among even this class of population. If it were asked how could the civil war of the last three years be indefinitely prolonged, the explanation is no other than the fact that none wished to prosecute the hostilities to a decisive victory. After all, the combatants are fellow-countrymen, if not actual fellow-provincials. As usual, time is relied upon as

the best of healers, and with the national penchant for compromise even at the thirteenth hour, it was hoped on both sides that matters somehow would right themselves and so there was no necessity for much bloodshed. In some places, according to eye-witnesses, the fighting was all make-believe: one side would retire before the advance of the other, and then after a period agreed upon the reverse would occur! This may look suspiciously disloyal; but after all, reasoned the rank and file, especially the intelligent minor officers, why on earth all this bad blood? No rational answer could be supplied, except that the leaders on both sides were intriguing for power and the spoils of war as long as there were armed men on the field to put up a brave show. If so, let the leaders themselves do their own fighting, while the recruits return to their former occupations and help increase the prosperity of the country.

Now how widespread is this feeling, it is difficult to say; but all evidence goes to confirm its existence among the men on both sides. As we write (July 20, 1920) two rival militarist camps have started to fight among themselves, and the sound of their cannonading is audible here in Peking. The men of the first camp were intended for frontier defense, but because their commanders desire the heads of the "enemy" leaders they must now be rushed into battle. A regiment of these refused to go to the front because they were never recruited to fight anybody except the Russian Bolsheviks threatening the north-western frontiers, but yielded only to the personal entreaty of their commander-in-chief. Arrived at the front, the men on both sides fraternized with one another just because one had a cousin on the other side and the other a relative on this side! At the moment of writing the factional leaders have opened the gates of Janus and hostilities have commenced. But the promising change seems to occur in the streams of men who are returning to the Capital, apparently wounded and defeated, but probably willing cowards. The cause declared by their leaders is one reprobated by the nation, whereas that of their opponents is endorsed by the public opinion of both Chinese and foreigners. If so, why put up a hard fight when public opinion decrees that their side is unrighteous and must fail in the end?

The exact situation is as follows. The side entrenched in the Capital is led by men who belong to the Anfu party, which not only controls the bogus parliament in Peking and dominates the central government, but also is in league with Japanese militarists. For the past three years these politicians have not only bartered away the nation's assets for a few shining shekels but almost contrived to sign China's death warrant at Versailles thirteen months ago. Public opinion, however, saved the day, and the same public opinion is tolling the death-knell of the renegades. The people have long yearned to be delivered from the party that suppressed liberal newspapers on the pretext of preaching Bolshevism, that imprisoned patriotic students and merchants at the virtual behest of their Japanese paymasters, and fiddled on high like Nero, while the whole of China was literally burning with anger and indignation; but no savior appeared until General Wu P'ei-fu, commander of the third division, dramatically dashed back from the south, where he and his men had for two years been quartered to resist the "Constitutionalists," and became the one driving force which welded the anti-Anfu public together. Under his inspiration the soldiers and officers of the whole metropolitan province proclaimed the crimes of the traitors in a bold manifesto and demanded that General Hsu Shu-tseng, the arch conspirator and evil genius of the Anfu party, should be ejected from his high pedestal. Ex-Premier Tuan Ch'i-jui, the protector of the individual thus held up to public execration, took offense and retorted with a declaration of war. Hence the present conflagration the upshot of which, though undecided at the moment, can mean only the extinction of a clique which will go down in the nation's history "unwept, unsung and unhonored."

Now what is this remarkable General Wu like? The following picture is supplied by the Peking correspondent of the *North China Daily News* (Shanghai) who wrote from the headquarters of the redoubtable officer:—

"The writer arrived there (Pao-ting-fu, capital of Chihli province) on the morning of June 27, 1920, and had no difficulty in gaining access to the Commander of the Third Division. Wu himself is not inclined to discuss the intricacies of

Chinese politics. He does not indulge in prophecies or probabilities: he simply states what he wants to do and how he wants to do it. To any one who is accustomed to interviewing Chinese officials, a talk with him is disappointing. He does not deal in the usual general persiflage. He gives you the impression of a man who has a great deal on his mind, but does not want to talk if you have nothing to say. In his telegrams, with which all are familiar, he is in the habit of describing himself as a plain military man, giving the world the impression that he is an uncouth but honest swordsman, only semi-literate and guided rather by his emotions than by his intellect. It is, therefore, something of a surprise to find in him a slender, dapper, little man, with noticeably small white hands and all the dignity and punctiliousness of a Chinese scholar.

"He has a high, close cropped head and bright intelligent eyes, and on occasions he can smile very sweetly, but he does not waste any smiles. Although there is nothing pompous about him, no strut and no self-assertion, it is evident at the first glance that Wu is one who takes himself seriously and who believes in his mission. In the management of his troops he is said to be something of a martinet, and in the execution of what he considers to be his duty it is easy to see that he is something of a fanatic. The ordinary Chinese military official is a bluff, easy-going person with a keen sense of humor. It may be doing him an injustice, but after meeting Wu P'ei-fu and talking with him it is very difficult to imagine him indulging in any sort of frivolity. Perhaps the seriousness of his present situation weighs heavily upon him, but one is given the impression that he takes everything very seriously and that his smiles are only a compromise with social amenities. He tells you directly that he is after Hsu Shu-tseng's scalp; and if Hsu does not get out, he will be put out, and that the Anfu club must go. He believes that he has things so thoroughly organized and so well arranged that this will be accomplished without any serious disturbances. . . . He disclaims all credit for the accomplishments and good behavior of his men. He says that they are patriotic Chinese soldiers and that they are supported by public opinion."

This then is the patriotic soldier who is determined to hound the traitors out of office. While others talked, he prepared his plans for the final blow that should strike unerringly. As division commander he has ten or twelve thousand men; but down in the south he has been watching the Anfu club cutting capers at the nation's expense and quietly recruiting more men until his well-seasoned troops now number something like twenty thousand. And when he was about to strike he made sure that there should be no miscarriage; hence the federation of commanders of eight provinces and hence the present hostilities. Assisted by Japanese money and Japanese arms, however much such responsibility may be piously denied by the parties concerned, his opponents may yet win the day; but he and his cause, endorsed wholeheartedly as it is by public opinion, will triumph eventually. If so, General Wu will be one of the nation's greatest modern benefactors.

We have said that the Quincolor of the Republic is much in evidence everywhere—on national holidays, at meetings or other ceremonies, on housetops and on flag poles, etc. But the habit of singing national anthems remains to be cultivated. At patriotic gatherings the audience will shout "*Min Kuo Wan Sui!*" (May the Republic live ten thousand years!) and at indignation meetings a fanatic may bite off his finger and inscribe a patriotic pledge with the blood as an earnest of perhaps a greater sacrifice. But except in the modern schools the national anthems are not heard. This is because the practice is one which is not yet universal, although the students are enthusiastically leading the way.

Another reason seems to be the fact that until very recent years an officially promulgated national song was unknown and many therefore composed their own music and words. Four or five years ago the Ministry of Education asked the public to send in suggestions so that the best composition could be selected. How well that scheme has worked it is difficult to say, but the national anthem now being sung is one not easy for the average person to attempt. While quite martial in its way, it goes very high at one place and then very low at the next—much higher or lower than persons accustomed to singing only one octave can reach. It is not im-

probable that it may have to be replaced at some future date by one easier for everybody to sing.

Here we may throw out a suggestion to our Western friends. In many song books the patriotic songs of most countries are given, including the Japanese. But the national anthem of one-fourth of the world's population is conspicuous by its absence. Its inclusion will do much to make the Chinese Republic a reality in the West, especially as since the war in Europe the Chinese Quincolor will also be exhibited at all international gatherings. As long as the Manchus were on the throne, few Chinese might comment on the absence of the old dragon flag at such functions; now the oversight will be adversely interpreted if not actually resented. If so, the Chinese national anthem should likewise be made known to Western music lovers, just as "God save the King," "Marseillaise," and the anthems of other countries are known to and appreciated by Chinese audiences. One good turn deserves another, and most assuredly the democracies of the Entente and Associated Powers in the Great War will not begrudge this meed of tribute to their recent ally and co-partner in the Orient.

CHAPTER IX

THE STUDENT MOVEMENT

FIVE years ago the month of May was one of national humiliation: for on May 9th, 1915, the Republic had to accept Japan's ultimatum over the infamous Twenty-one Demands, and sixteen days later the new treaties embodying the negotiations were signed and sealed by the respective plenipotentiaries. China's consent had been extorted at the point of the bayonet; yet the treaties were regarded as binding four years afterwards at the Peace Conference in Paris. The memory of those Twenty-one Demands will be hard to efface: hence the imprint of "Forget not the national disgrace" on all stationery, etc.

May, 1919, however, will always be surrounded with lustre in the annals of the country: it was the month that the long-suffering nation, led by the self-sacrificing students, rose in one solid mass and proclaimed their independence from the oppression of their officials. October 10th is a public holiday, because on that day nine years ago the Chinese Revolution broke out and sounded the death-knell of the Manchus. But May 4th, 1919, may be justly observed as the real "Independence Day"—since then there has been a new spirit in the land at the breath of which the old enervation is being replaced by a new vitalizing force. Even if the Republic fared no better at the Paris Conference and Japan remained in unlawful possession of Tsingtau, this fact alone is sufficient to emblazon 1919 with all the brightness which is its due. To the eternal glory of China's students it will be remembered that the phenomenal achievement was theirs, and as a token of gratitude the nation has named it the Student Movement.

Just as the outbreak of the Revolution in 1911 on the tenth of October was an accident—it was the intention of the revolutionists to time the explosion some three weeks later, but the

arrest of one of their members precipitated the blaze in Wuchang (capital of Hupeh province)—so the Student Movement was accidentally precipitated on the fourth of May. But unlike the Revolution, the outbreak could not have been better timed, since in another few days the whole nation would be mourning over the humiliation of the Japanese Twenty-one Demands. And unlike the Revolution, it rallied the nation immediately behind it to a man. Consequently the Revolution took four months to accomplish—the Manchus abdicated on February 12th, 1912, and the North and South were united under the new Republic—whereas the Student Movement attained its immediate object in one month. Can the culmination of popular opinion be more eloquently attested?

The first gigantic parade of students in Peking occurred in November, 1918, when China celebrated the signing of the Armistice in Europe and twenty thousand students, including six or seven hundred girls, marched through the main thoroughfares and also cheered enthusiastically before the Allied legations. Since then the psychological value of a mass parade has been appreciated as well as tellingly demonstrated.

About the end of April, 1919, the award of Shantung to Japan at the Paris Conference came as a thunderbolt to the nation. It was bad enough to have to be reminded a week later of the Japanese ultimatum, but the Shantung injustice was a pill which no patriot could swallow. On the morning of May 4th students from thirty-three colleges in the Capital, fifteen thousand strong, paraded the streets as a demonstration against the Shantung decision. Three thousand repaired to the Legation Quarter to ask the Allied ministers to aid in securing justice for the Republic, but the police of the special extraterritorial district refused to let them through. After waiting in vain for two hours, the crowd made for the residence of one of the universally execrated "traitors" Tsao Ju-lin, then minister of communications. They demanded from the gendarmerie guarding his house that he should appear and show cause why he had "sold" his country to Japan. The demand was rejected, nor were any delegates welcomed. Then the students rushed the guards, broke into the house, smashed the furniture and curios, etc. In the *mêlée* some of the outbuildings caught fire. It happened that the three

The Supreme Court, Peking. In the Background, at the Other End of the Block, is the Ministry of Justice.

(*Courtesy of* The Eastern Times)

Students in Peking offering themselves to be Imprisoned.

(*Courtesy of* The Eastern Times)

INAUGURATION OF THE NATIONAL STUDENTS' UNION IN SHANGHAI.

"traitors" were all neatly trapped—the other two being Lu Tsung-yu, minister of finance, and Chang Tsung-hsiang, minister to Tokyo. Tsao and Lu, however, managed to escape, but Chang—perhaps the least reprehensible of the unholy trio—was caught and roughly man-handled. Police reinforcements having in the meanwhile arrived, some thirty students were haled to the police headquarters.

The next day the government sought to punish the arrested students summarily; whereupon began the first student "strike"—namely, cessation of classroom work—in which they were supported by their college principals! Two days subsequently the students were released, but the "traitors" were also eulogized in special mandates promulgated by the President. Now thoroughly aroused—the chancellor of the Government University and the minister of education had been pressed to tender their resignations as a penalty for inability to cope with the students—the entire student body declared a general strike, formed their Union, and began street-speaking campaigns which resulted in several clashes with the police. By this time the whole country had been sympathetically stirred and in city after city the students likewise struck. A month after the students found parading the streets in Peking were arrested, and over a thousand were kept in detention without proper nourishment for several days. The next day more were arrested, and on the third day their comrades in all the schools numbering thirty thousand *offered* to be similarly imprisoned if those arrested for no crime but that of lecturing at street corners were not liberated. The government wavered and set the patriots free.

Meanwhile the students had already appealed to the merchants to support their cause. The latter responded in a general strike which almost paralyzed the whole country. Moreover the efforts of the students were seconded by the protests of provincial officials. Four days after the liberation of the imprisoned students, the resignations of the three "traitors" were accepted, but normal conditions were not restored in Shanghai, where the commercial strike was worst, spreading to the operatives of all callings and trades, until June 14th—exactly forty days after the accidental outburst. The national "traitors" having been driven from office, the

immediate aim of the students was attained, and there the first phase of the Student Movement ended.

Here is the grand culmination of the gathering momentum of Chinese public opinion. The one epoch-making movement in the wake of the 1911 Revolution, it continues the spade-work initiated by the heroes at Wuchang eight years previously. The shackles of the past have been forever sundered, and the people can no longer be trampled upon. Irresistibly they are making themselves heard, and they are determined to play a greater part in the molding of the new nation. And once more has it been proved that the voice of God speaks through the mouths of the people: *Vox populi, vox dei.*

That the China of to-day is no longer that of yesterday is graphically shown by the following incidents which occurred during the street lecturing and wholesale arrests of students in Peking. When the first thousand students were detained, more were arrested the next day. But imprisonment was only a holiday to them. Most boys were prepared to be so incarcerated, and many had beddings strapped to their backs. As they were led off to their temporary detention quarter in the Law School of the Government University, the youngsters were in the best of spirits. Several foreign spectators wanted to photograph them and were duly rewarded. When the police tried to interfere, the boys chided them for their lack of humor: "Wait a minute! Can't you see that I've come fully prepared to be imprisoned? But before I go, let me give this kind foreigner a souvenir." (!) It was an unpleasant task which the guardians of peace had been called upon to perform, but their sympathy was never doubted. So when one group of students began to lecture at one street corner, the police finding themselves unnoticed by their superiors, appealed to the boys to move on and lecture at the next corner: "We are with you, sure, but we want no trouble; *please* go further down." And the same entreaty would be made at the next corner, etc.

The strength of unity having been proved, the students at once entered upon the second, and third and fourth phases of their patriotic propaganda—namely, to prevent China's delegates at Paris signing the unjust Versailles treaty unless with express reservation in regard to the Shantung clauses; to

arouse the nation to unite in boycotting Japanese goods; and to educate the less educated masses by establishing free schools and issuing helpful publications. In all this they were nobly supported by their sisters, who were willing to parade the streets for the same cause, to suffer the same imprisonment, and to be scandalously treated like criminals by the unfeeling militarists. The girls of the Women's Normal College led their sisters just as the boys of the Government University took the lead among their brothers. On one occasion the former defied their principal and participated in a mass parade rather than be kept back by the fear of expulsion: and when the front door of the premises was closed by order of the irate principal, they stormed the wooden back gate and arrived at the rendezvous in time to keep their pledge! When the male students were arrested the girls were at first left alone, and the soldiers demurred not to the latter's rebukes: "Our country is in danger; yet you arrest those who are rousing the nation to protect itself. Have you no patriotism? Are you not also citizens of the Chinese Republic?"

And the results of the combined efforts of China's new manhood and womanhood? The nation has been stirred as it never had been before. The students' courage and patriotism have thrilled their fellow-citizens and sent a new ray of hope pulsating through their blood. Not only has the country been awakened but it has also been reunited on the altar of common defense, despite the nominal breach between the so-called North and South. Hence the coöperation of the merchant and laboring classes, and hence the vigorous prosecution of the Japanese boycott in Canton, the capital of the Southern "Constitutionalists," as in North China.

Here is the great moral awakening—an awakening possible only because the nation has been infused with a new spirit of patriotism, an awakening dreaded no less by the militarists in Japan. Out of such awakening has come a realization of the precariousness of the Republic: within there is the protracted disunion between the North and South and without there is the steady Japanization by a relentless neighbor, abetted by many traitors among the nation. It was fondly hoped that the world's remakers would aid the Republic and stay Japan's hand, but the Chinese were soon disillusioned by

the "Big Four." Hence the determination first to purge the country of its "traitors" and then to die in glory rather than live in dishonor; and hence the adamant resolution not to be beguiled into signing one's own death warrant at Versailles.

When the boycott was first begun, the Japanese treated it light-heartedly and said it would last only five minutes. To-day, it is as potent as ever, and it is many times five minutes—as its skeptics would care to count. One criticism leveled against the students is that they have unlawfully interfered with trade by compelling Chinese merchants to submit their goods to inspection by the former's appointees. The bulk of merchants had the patriotism to coöperate by stowing away their Japanese goods or else contributing them as in the days of anti-opium crusade, for a public bonfire—and the value of such goods consumed by fire is by no means small. But a few unfortunately had the selfishness to resent the students' actions and instigate the arrest of a few boys—for example, in Tientsin. On the other hand the young patriots maintain that in the beginning it was their duty to stand by the merchants and, by their example, inspire the latter to prosecute the boycott to the utmost extent. At any rate, the merchants have since taken over the campaign arrangements with the result that Japan is the loser by some forty per cent of its Chinese trade. Judging by the circumstances, the students were not unwarranted in their assumption that unless they used drastic means the merchants would be too timid to carry the boycott through, but the lead having once been followed the latter adhered loyally to their pledge. Hence at a mass meeting in the metropolis the president of the Peking chamber of commerce publicly promised that the merchants in the capital would maintain the boycott to the utmost rigor: the pledge was observed and there is now no question of their fidelity.

Having aroused the nation, prevented the signature of the Versailles treaty and assisted the merchants to enforce the Japanese boycott, the students then directed their energies to the enlightenment of their less educated brothers and sisters. For instance, by issuing publications, by popular lectures showing them the real situation, internally as well as externally, but especially by establishing free schools and main-

taining them out of their own funds. No praise can be too high for such self-sacrifice, for the students generally also teach in these schools. The scheme is endorsed everywhere with the greatest enthusiasm, and in Peking alone it is estimated that fifty thousand children are benefited by such education. As a student critic has himself appraised it:—"The establishing of free schools is one of the most glorious outcomes of the movement. This unprecedented attempt at universal education is most far-reaching in results. It sounds the keynote of China's salvation."

Even if the Student Movement had ceased its labors with the attainment of the above four objects, it would have entitled itself to the nation's undying gratitude. But the students were destined to play an even greater part in the regeneration of the infant Republic, just because the moral revolution is still to come and the people have yet to enter upon their own birthright.

The dignified refusal of China's delegates to sign the Versailles treaty has won the approval of the impartial world, and the United States Senate has signified its sympathy in unmistakable terms. A few months ago, all this good work was in grave jeopardy of being hopelessly wrecked. And again it was the students who stiffened the people's backs and warned the government in time. In January, 1920, the Japanese government offered to commence negotiations with Peking concerning the restoration of Kiaochow by Japan, as the Versailles treaty had become effective. The pro-Japanese militarists nearly fell into the trap, and for some time it looked as if the Peking government was going to respond to Tokyo's suggestion. The nation took alarm and telegrams, as usual, poured into the Capital, protesting against the contemplated procedure. The students finally warned the government in April, giving it four days to reply to their ultimatum; otherwise three million students in fourteen provinces would go on strike for three weeks commencing from April 14, 1920, 9 a. m.

The ultimatum took the form of the following telegram despatched by the National Students' Union from its headquarters at Shanghai:—

"Diplomatic failures have stirred the people. Your treach-

erous actions have caused the people to gnash their teeth. That the people are against direct negotiation with Japan in regard to the Shantung question, that China cannot give in on the Foochow incident, and that the Sino-Japanese Military Pact must be repudiated have been sufficiently expressed to need further comment. Since the fourth year of the Republic (1915) harmful treaties have been secretly made with Japan—such as the Twenty-one Demands, the Exchange of Notes respecting the Kiaochow-Tsinan Railway, the Agreements of the Tsi-Shun, Kao-Hsu, Manchuria and Mongolia lines, and other contracts arising out of loans which impair China's sovereignty, military and police functions, finance and communications, etc. But you have undoubtedly heard more than once the repeated declarations of the people that they can in no wise recognize the treaties as valid.

"Since May 4th, 1919, we have forsaken our sacred studies and exhausted ourselves in the service of the country. In other words, we are doing our bit for the safety of our motherland and eventually for self-protection. China is now facing great dangers. The present is the critical time for our unfortunate nation. Our conscience does not allow us to be silent any longer. Let this be our last warning to you. In order that the sovereignty and territory of the Republic may be maintained, you are required within a period of four days, to rebut entirely Japan's notification and then announce the abolition of the Military Pact. To dawdle means that you are willing to be traitors. We, the students, cannot bear to see our glorious Republic demolished through your hands. Though lacking in strength, yet we are able to meet you empty-handed. Do not think that foreign help and arbitrary measures are dependable. Do not think that the people and the students can be deceived. The classics say: 'Oh sun, when wilt thou expire? We will die together with thee.' We hope you will take this dilemma into careful consideration."

At the same time the following statement in English was issued to the foreign residents in the port. It is here appended to make the students' attitude thoroughly understandable:—

"On Wednesday morning (April 14, 1920) the students of

this city (Shanghai) will join with their brothers and sisters throughout China in a general strike against the Peking Government. This is not a strike against individuals of the Government, for we have no quarrel with individuals. We are leaving our studies in protest against Japanese activities in our country and elsewhere on the Asiatic mainland, which give every indication that Japan proposes to Koreanize our motherland.

"You will remember the Twenty-one Demands. You will remember how Japan took advantage of the fact that your countries were engaged in war or were not free to give careful attention to Far Eastern questions; how at that time Japan made a major effort to destroy China's integrity. You all know how since then Japan has been keeping both the North and South in China divided, how she has fomented and subsidized strife within our land, how she has debauched our officialdom, impeded our commercial development, mortgaged our national resources, filled our land with morphia and opium, and also used every dishonorable means to weaken our young Republic as well as stifle its growth. These acts culminated in two facts: in the Sino-Japanese Military Pact of May, 1918, and in the Shantung decision at the Paris Conference.

"The provisions of the Military Pact are even now unknown to us. We only know that it is one of a long series of secret agreements and treaties which have been made between the officials of Peking and the Government of Japan. We only know that through these treaties China has lost her sovereign rights over her army and navy, her arsenals and naval bases, her police and her means of communication. In return for sacrificing such basic rights of sovereignty to Japan, the Peking officials have received Japanese money. But we, the rising generations of China, we shall carry the burden of winning back these rights all through our lives. So when we strike to-day, it is the beginning of an effort to win back in fair fight what the traitors of our land have sold for a mess of pottage.

"With regard to Shantung, you are as well aware of the fate of our sacrificed province at the Peace Conference as we are. Perhaps Shantung does not mean to you what it does to us. Perhaps you do not feel that one province can be a loss

to a weak country. But we Chinese feel that a dagger has been thrust into the heart of our country, and that unless the dagger is torn out and the wound healed, our country must die. We are now taking whatever means we can to tear this dagger out, and we call upon you as liberty-loving human beings to help us.

"The strike which we will call on Wednesday morning concerns only China. It is our effort to initiate a nation-wide demand for good government and true patriotism. We know that you fear our strike; for you have been told that we are young, inexperienced, dangerous boys and girls who are only disturbing you in your efforts to trade, to teach, and to heal our countrymen. We know that last year when we successfully prevented the Peking Government from signing the German Peace Treaty by our strike, you suffered inconveniences and that your Settlement was disturbed and that you were forced to call out volunteers to maintain peace. There is no need for us to say that perhaps you were in error last year. That matter is settled. This year we have more experience and we realize that if we are to succeed in our struggle with the Peking officials, our battle must be with and among the people of China and not among foreigners.

"We, therefore, from the outset give you every assurance that the students will take every precaution to prevent disturbances in the International Settlement and to prevent inconveniences to foreigners. There will be no demonstrations in the Settlement. There will be no parading in the Settlement. There will be no students marching with banners and signs in the Settlement. But we hope that the merchants, shopkeepers and laborers will join us in our movement. So we ask your indulgence for whatever annoyance this may cause you. On the other hand, we shall brand as disloyal any Chinese who uses this occasion to interfere with the food supply, water supply, and also with the light of the foreign inhabitants. We crave your sympathy, not your antagonism. We are creating an agency which will watch with the greatest attention any manifestations in our movement which may cause offense to the foreigners friendly to China. And we shall stamp out any effort that our opponents may make to discredit our movement by annoying you.

"Friends of Great Britain, America and France! You who have your Magna Charta, your Declaration of Independence, your French Revolution, you who have fought and bled for liberty, you who have just sacrificed your sons in the cause of democracy, can you see China bleed and not wish to heal its wounds? Can you see our nation destroyed by autocracy, by corruption, by debauchery, and not wish to help us? We ask your sympathy. We ask you not to prejudge us. We are fighting your battle as much as our own, for what you have done on the Atlantic we must do on the Pacific, although our strength is not a match with the strength that you brought against autocracy and corruption."

Here is a power in the land, although the idea of its counterpart occurring in the West may be inconceivable to Europeans, and although the students were tried by the acid test of repression. Whereas the Peking government was caught unprepared eleven months previously, it has since taken every precaution not to be taken again by surprise. In fact, the protracted imprisonment of student leaders, including also a few young ladies, without further violent outbursts on the part of their comrades, seems to have emboldened the militarists, and on receipt of the students' union's ultimatum soldiers were at once posted outside the different colleges and schools, thus effectually preventing any parade or demonstrations. The four-day limit expired, and for once there appeared to be some disunion among the entire student body of the country. Those in Shanghai kept their word and struck; the others delayed for a week or two, while still others waited for more developments before joining in the strike. Eventually, however, the students rallied together, and although the presence of soldiers outside the schools precluded any parades, street lecturing or demonstrations in the cities, nevertheless they abstained from attending classes—thus contrasting strangely with last year's spectacle of schools entirely empty of pupils.

None the less, it was a foregone conclusion that opposition would further antagonize the students. Some merchants responded and many laborers pledged their support; but the general attitude was one of patient forbearance, the outcome

of the desire to give the government a chance to demonstrate its wisdom or foolhardiness before taking the law into the people's hands. The momentum of popular opinion increased in weight and even the more enlightened militarists joined in the reverberating chorus of "There must be no direct negotiation with Japan!" Finally, the perseverance of the students was rewarded and on May 22, 1920, Peking declined Tokyo's suggestion. The full text of this reply will be reproduced in a subsequent chapter: here it is pertinent to quote the following significant extract:—"China, however, has not signed the German Treaty of Peace and is not now in a position to negotiate directly with Japan on the question of Tsingtau. Furthermore, the people throughout China have assumed an indignantly antagonistic attitude toward the question of Kiaochow."

As if all this is insufficient to make the nation indebted to the young patriots, one other achievement must yet be noted. That the Mikado's government desires to Japanize China, that for this purpose she has employed every possible means of exploitation, and that it is only a matter of a few years before Nippon's dream will be an accomplished fact, foreign residents in the East are well aware. But the democracies of the West are not in such a well-informed position. Hence no less eminent an authority than Premier Lloyd George of Great Britain is reported to have declared to one of the Chinese delegates at Paris that he had never heard of the Japanese Twenty-one Demands! And this state of blissful ignorance will be persisted in unless the newspapers in the West choose to publish more news about China and the Far East. Thanks, however, to the Shantung question, and thanks especially to the unflinching courage and self-denying patriotism of the Republic's rising generations, China now occupies the first page of Western newspapers. Even the worm will turn, and the persistent repression of students by unpatriotic officials virtually at the behest of Japan, has given China the best possible advertisement. The boycott of Japanese goods, the illegal imprisonment and brutal treatment of students, the strike against pro-Japanese officials, and the present hostilities against the "sellers" of the country—all this has opened the world's eyes to the true colors of Japan, once the idol of

popularity. The patriotism of the students has stirred the Republic to its innermost depths; it has also stirred the conscience of the impartial world to the immoral actions of Japan to question with President Wilson:—"Shall the military power of any nation or group of nations be suffered to determine the future of peoples whom they have no right to rule except the right of force? Shall the strong nations be free to wrong weak nations, and make them subject to their purpose and interest?"

How the world thus morally aroused will assist a nation of four hundred million souls it is perhaps not easy to say, but the significant action of the American Senate in the Shantung question, for example, has already infused a tremendous reserve supply of energy to the half despondent though by no means cowering Republic. And the latest declaration by the British and Japanese governments (July 8, 1920) that the Anglo-Japanese Alliance would not be continued after July, 1921, unless in a form consistent with the Covenant of the League of Nations, is convincing testimony that the wishes of China are being at last given respect to.

Hats off, therefore, to the students of the Republic and the Student Movement! If the Revolution had restored their patrimony to the Chinese, the Student Movement of 1919 and 1920 is restoring the people to their rightful place—in the moulding of their own destinies and in the esteem of the world. Never has constructive nationalism been more conclusively attested, and never has the strength of unity been more heartening. A few students, unfortunately, had to pay the supreme price—bruised and battered by the soldiers, they subsequently succumbed to their injuries either at their homes or in the prisons—but never was a sacrifice more worth it or its cause more gloriously ennobled. Undeterred, however, their living comrades have sworn to uphold the task of consecrating their martyrdom until China is actually strong and righteous. If so, the future of the Republic can never be in doubt.

On the other hand, have the students no faults? And are their well-wishers entirely satisfied with their actions? No, our admiration is not blind, and after all the young patriots are only human beings. Nor are the students themselves less candid in this respect, and many of them will be the first to

confess their shortcomings. The student critic we have already quoted in connection with the establishment of free schools, for example, deprecates the employment of demonstrations and strikes to attain the students' objectives. The demonstration method is certainly impressive, but he reminds his English reading fellow-workers that it has its lawless aspect:—"for when thousands of people with a sense of being wronged gather together, even the educated can hardly refrain from committing violence on the slightest provocation." And as regards the cessation of all school work, the students themselves are the final losers. It has no doubt achieved the end in view, "but to resort to this method too frequently is undoubtedly unwise: it means not only a wanton squandering of time, but it also diminishes efficiency."

Probably the most serious flaw in the whole movement is the fact that it has let loose a new spirit of independence which it has not been easy to curb. As the above-quoted student puts it:—"Strike, primarily adopted as a measure against the government, seems to have shifted its target to the school authority. If one cares to read the records of the numerous student strikes of the past eight months (September, 1919, to April, 1920), one would find as many strikes declared against the school authority as against the government. The change is altogether consistent with its original aim. Where complaint of wrong is refused thoughtful consideration and denied redress, the only way that remains is strike. But it would be diabolical for one to think that strike is almighty!" Hence the attempt of students in seven or eight of the leading institutions in Peking three months ago to get the school authorities to abolish the system of regular examinations on the plea that "most modern educationists in both Europe and America now decry the examination system as being inefficient." But the radical reformers were eventually made to see the folly of their agitation, since their principals had been their staunchest supporters all through the critical days of their nation-wide campaign for a better and more righteous government.

That there is danger of such restlessness getting beyond control is not to be gainsaid, since several principals had to resign owing to the students' violent opposition. On the other hand, it is a mistake to suppose that the students are insen-

sible to their great mission. That many of them flushed with the victory over their government would get impatient at being kept within ordinary bounds is perfectly natural; at the same time the bulk of the students are committed to a greater task than that of rebelling against constituted authority. The fact is, that synchronous with the nation's changed mentality, the leaders of to-morrow have also developed a new spirit of self-assertion and independence which cannot be denied. It would be rash to suppress such exuberance altogether, whilst the best solution would be to look at it sympathetically and direct it to constructive channels. Just as the nation at large is determined to play a greater part in shaping the Republic's fortunes, so the students of to-day desire to participate more largely in the life of their institutions. Purely matters of administration, such as looking after the school's budget and employment of teachers, properly appertain to constituted authorities, but the students contend that matters of discipline affecting especially their own members may be left to them, either partially or wholly. In other words, they desire some measure of self-government which will enable them to take a more active interest in the welfare as well as efficiency of their alma mater.

In the existing circumstances the argument of the students does not appear to be exaggerated, for if there had been such self-government in matters of student discipline and student activities, much hair-splitting and ill feeling could have been obviated. After all, the aim of educators should be to develop the young students so that they can intelligently organize and efficiently govern themselves, since the days of imposed initiative are long over. Consequently, it will do the rising generation a world of good if they be encouraged rather than discouraged to form student associations, provided care is exercised that their activities are confined to things within their proper province; and such early experience in the complexities of self-government will be the best training for the citizens of an infant democracy. Hence the experiment is being successfully tried in a few leading institutions in North China especially—remember that it was the students of Peking who fired the first shot against the pro-Japanese militarists and that it was the students of Tientsin who assisted the boycot-

ting merchants most loyally—including Nankai College (Tientsin) of which Dr. Chang Po-ling, already referred to, is the founder and principal.

Therefore, the Student Movement deserves all the praise and encomium lavished upon it, despite the few errors to which unpracticed hands and inexperienced brains are prone. But as already pointed out by the students themselves, they are learning new lessons from their past mistakes, and hence the future can never be dark. The seeds of future blessings have been sown, and already the nation is much better for it. And as already noted, even the unpromising soldiers have been awakened to think and reason for themselves, about their conditions, about their country and about those who would use them as dupes as in the past. Such is the contagious influence of the students' intense patriotism: need more be added?

Twenty years ago the late Sir Robert Hart, already referred to, prophesied that "in fifty years' time there will be millions in serried ranks and war's panoply at the call of the Chinese Government. . . . And if the Chinese Government continues to exist, it will encourage—and it will be quite right to encourage—uphold and develop the national Chinese movement . . . China will be acting within her right and will carry through the national programme." The prophecy has been fulfilled—not in 1950, but 1919-1920. This is why a famous Chinese statesman told a foreign critic not to be impatient at China's slow progress: "for if she once begins to wake up, you will soon complain that she is going too fast!" Are there any who still insist that the Republic of China is too slow?

CHAPTER X

VOICE OF THE PEOPLE

WE have said that the Chinese are proverbial for their veneration of learning; they are none the less proverbial for their respect for constituted authority. Hence their traditional obedience to the Fifth Commandment, and hence their ingrained obedience to their rulers. This explains why they are so law-abiding, docile and long-suffering. More or less unemotional and unexcitable in nature, they go about their daily routine calmly and almost stoically. As long as the limit of their patience is not transgressed, they are willing to endure evils and discomforts to a greater extent of forbearance than perhaps any other people on earth. But once the breaking point of patient elasticity is reached, then woe to their oppressors. Rebellions occur and then a new set of people administer the country.

In some cases such admirable docility is purblind, and the consequence is the advantage taken by their unscrupulous rulers to exploit them until overweening ambition ruins itself. This is why Chinese civilization has remained stagnant for so long, since docility and conservatism go hand in hand to perpetuate the existing state of things, however intolerable they may appear to Western eyes. And this is also why great reforms have taken such considerable time to bring about, unless they are those which touch them to the quick. But so long as the breaking point is not reached, they are content to live from hand to mouth, to continue in the old ways handed down by their forefathers, to tolerate a great measure of discomfort and also to look complacently at life with more easy-going outlook than many other less philosophical people.

While this national characteristic has its good qualities, it has also its serious drawbacks. Hence with the gradual spread of enlightenment, men have begun to perceive the

untenability of their old philosophy. As long as every other nation is similarly philosophical, the old system may govern the conduct of men; but the sad fact is that China is well ahead of her times in point of moral ethics, whereas she is well behind the other nations in respect of material progress calculated in modern terms. She may believe in the rule of right and so spurn the agency of force, but others will not be too proud to fight. She may believe that others like her should strive to be "Superior Men" and treat one another like respectable gentlemen, but many will not hesitate to grab what they can and let the devil take the hindmost. She may even believe that "what you do not wish others do unto you, do not do unto others," but many nations unfortunately will not be deterred by such scruples. In a word, the promised millennium being yet a long way off, when in Rome one has to do as the Romans do—with nations as with individuals. Hence the country is beginning to wake up in the matter of national defense, and hence the people are readjusting their modes of living and thinking to the changed environment.

How the process of readjustment is being carried out, the previous chapters will have shown; there are many other aspects to this complex transformation which will be discussed in subsequent chapters. Here we may amplify the fact already noted that with the gradual spread of enlightenment, the people are getting more and more articulate, patriotic as well as independent. The old stoicism is disappearing and men now prefer to live in greater comfort. The old docility is vanishing, and men will kick hard against oppression and mail-fisted autocracy. The former long-suffering habit is giving way to a new spirit of watchful waiting, and downtrodden people will not hesitate to make themselves heard. As in private so in public affairs, the habit of taking things for granted is being discarded, and men will ask the reason why until a satisfactory answer is forthcoming. Otherwise they will take the law into their own hands: rules are made for man, not man made for rules.

In previous chapters we have already mentioned several instances of such growing articulation—*e.g.*, the girls' plea for a strong and righteous China, the boys' ultimatum to the government, the guild merchants' reply to the Japanese

dealers' threats, etc. Another eloquent manifestation is the increasing number of popular organizations established to advance the people's interests. Before the Great War in Europe, there were few such organizations, although the merchants' guilds and chambers of commerce are exceptional in this respect. Since last year's Student Movement, however, when the students' courage and initiative have inspired the people to greater personal effort, the number of popular organizations has increased at least ten-fold, if not twenty-fold. Consequently at the end of last year when arrangements were made to hold a people's mass meeting in Tientsin, the committee was reported to consist of representatives from the following organizations:—Ten Men Groups, People's Union, Chamber of Commerce, Provincial Assembly, Church National Salvation Society, Fish Merchants' Guild, Anti-Narcotic Society, Wood Workers' Guild, Native Products Investigation Society, Iron Workers' Guild, Paper Merchants' Guild, Water Carriers' Guild, Women's Patriotic Society, Philanthropic Society, Mohammedan Society, Wet Farmers' Guild, Cotton Guild, Christian Church, Spinners and Dyers' Guild, Cantonese Guild, Fukien-Kuangtung Guild, People's Industrial Society, Hemp Workers' Guild, Bankers' Guild, Money Merchants' Guild, etc.

Allowing for some inevitable overlapping, it is nevertheless obvious that the population is fairly well represented. Perhaps the following are the most potent organizations influencing the people to-day:—(a) The Students' Union, (b) The National Students' Union, (c) The National Organizations' Union of China, (d) The Popular Education Association, (e) The Western Returned Students' Union, and (f) The World's Chinese Students' Federation.

Of student organizations the strongest is the Students' Union formed in May, 1919. It has its counterpart in almost every big city, and in Shanghai alone the Union represents a membership of 15,000 boys and 5,000 girls from eighty-three institutions. A month later when the need was felt for a central organization to secure unity of purpose and promptitude in action, the National Students' Union was established at Shanghai—the national representative of over thirty branch unions.

Of popular organizations the most influential is the National Organizations' Union of China—sometimes called the "All Classes People's Union" or "Union of All Classes." Founded last year it is said to have no less than 300,000 members in all centers. Its objects are "to serve the country, to obtain moral sympathy from friendly countries in internal affairs and any kind of help in world affairs, to regulate the steps of the people, to lessen their fiery spirit, and to adopt more moderate measures." The classes or organizations included within it are the following:—

"1. The Students' Union, composed of delegates from the local student bodies of all schools.

"2. The Christian National Salvation Society (now merged in the Popular Education Association).

"3. The Women's Patriotic United Purpose Society, composed largely of delegates from girls' schools.

"4. National Merchants' Union, composed of representatives of the merchant class.

"5. The Press Union, composed of representatives of the newspaper press.

"6. Local representatives of the gentry.

"7. Local representatives of the Mohammedans.

"8. Local representatives of the Protestant churches. In some centers the local chamber of commerce is also represented."

Springing out of the above-mentioned associations and taking its members from all of them is the Ten Men Group Society. It is modeled after the military organization—ten men being united under a leader, ten groups under a chief, and one hundred groups under a general. Its method of operations being most widespread, it is undoubtedly the best organized of all.

In addition there are also the unions of laborers and even beggars who are pledged to the same cause. These may not be so influential as the others, although the laborers are rapidly making their own power felt in the community by their strikes and lockouts; nevertheless their existence exhibits the thoroughness of the popular awakening. In Tientsin, for example, the constitution of the Beggars' Union provides for the "boost-

ing" of native goods and street-speaking campaigns. Each member will daily contribute a small moiety of his earnings to a general fund, "for the purpose of obtaining an inexpensive work-house where the members can eventually support themselves without begging," and every member will take an oath promising not "to steal, use opium, wine, cigarettes or poison of any kind." How far the pledge has been kept it is difficult to ascertain, but it was related that at the height of the Student Movement activities last year the beggars of Peking, at any rate, were patriotic enough to refrain from stealing for five days!

However much the people are indignant over the aggressions of their island neighbors, they are none the less thankful from the bottom of their hearts that it was Japan who has really awakened as well as united them on the altar of common defense. Consequently, their growing articulation is nowhere more effectively developed than in the people's stand against the Japanese boycott and Shantung question. We have seen manifestations of this in the thousand odd telegrams which the people despatched to Paris, in the merchants' reply to the Japanese consul-general, etc. The following additional evidence will further illuminate the subject.

The first is a declaration in English, issued by eight organizations in Shanghai in January, 1920, to set forth the objects of the boycott, when it was reported that diplomatic pressure would be exerted on the Peking government to suppress it:—

"In view of the report that pressure has been brought from certain diplomatic quarters to bear upon the Chinese Government to stop the boycott movement against Japanese goods, the undersigned organizations deem it advisable to make known the exact situation of the boycott movement and their views about it.

"The boycott is not, as is sometimes reported in the Japanese papers, instigated by American or British residents in China; nor by Chinese officials; nor by the students. The students, however energetic they may be, being mere youths and forming only a small percentage of the population, could not have made the movement attain such influence as it already has in so short a time and in so large a country. The boycott is

a spontaneous protest of the Chinese people against Japan's aggression and injustice which have marked her dealings with China during the last few years, and which are clearly shown in the Twenty-one Demands, in the Shantung case, in the recent Foochow outrage, in her ceaseless efforts to support and make use of the Chinese militarists and corrupt politicians to serve her own ends to China's ruin, and in many other ways which the Chinese people deeply resent and strongly object. As it is a spontaneous movement, the boycott spreads rapidly and irresistibly and soon gets the support of the whole nation.

"It is reported that Japan, by threats of various kinds, is asking the Chinese Government to stop the movement. That the Chinese Government cannot stop such a movement is obvious to all, for no government on earth can compel its people to buy the goods of another nation which they do not desire. Could the Japanese Government compel its people to buy the goods of another nation against their wishes? While it is entirely out of the power of the Chinese Government to stop the boycott movement, we must clearly point out that there is only one way open to the Japanese Government if it wants to stop the boycott. Japan must remove the causes of the boycott by reversing her policy of aggression and injustice to that of moderation and fair play, by giving up all pretensions over Tsingtau and Shantung, and by ceasing further support to the corrupt militarists and politicians, whom the Chinese people have repudiated and would have eliminated long ago but for the Japanese support given them. If Japan would do all this, the boycott movement would automatically cease and Japan would win the lasting friendship of the Chinese people. If Japan would not do so, the whole nation is determined to carry out its plan at any cost until justice is accorded to China.[1]

"We are a peace-loving people and desire to live in peace and harmony with the rest of the world. We realize that the boycott inflicts hardships, not only on the boycotted nation

[1] According to a Reuter's message, at a general meeting of the Japan League of Nations Society, held in Tokyo, on April 23, 1921, and presided by Viscount Shibusawa, Mr. R. Kamei, of the editorial staff of the *Jiji Shimpo,* strongly denounced the retention of Japanese troops in Shantung, etc. Japan, he declared, showed no sign of redeeming her pledge to return Shantung to China. "What," he asked, "have we gained by making ourselves an object of hatred?" Japan's friendless position to-day, he asserted, was a just retribution for her behavior during the war.

but also on ourselves. We are willing to undergo this hardship in the hope that we and our children may enjoy the blessings of world peace, which the present policy of military aggression on the part of a stronger Power threatens to menace, and we are confident that with the cause of right on our side we shall win.

"(Signed) The Kiangsu Educational Association,
The Shanghai Educational Association,
The World's Chinese Students' Federation,
The National Association of Vocational Education,
The Western Returned Students' Union,
The Overseas Chinese Federation,
The Chinese Christian National Salvation Association,
The Shanghai Fire Brigade Association."

The second is a letter of warning sent by the Chinese compradores in Tientsin to the secretaries of the British, American, French, Italian, Russian and Belgian chambers of commerce, the China Association and the British-American Association of that port. The compradore being the equivalent of a Chinese manager of a foreign firm—he is the middleman between his foreign employer and his Chinese clients—he is an important factor in the commercial life of the foreign community. As a rule he is an easy-going person and not much concerned over political questions, domestic or external. Hence the following message dated June 4th, 1919, is all the more significant:—

"Sir—In view of the present serious situation and the future danger to the peace of the East, the Compradores' Association at a meeting held May 31st, have unanimously and solemnly passed the following resolution which we beg to submit to your esteemed chamber (or association) for serious consideration.

"This association have noted with grave concern the decision made by the Peace Conference in Paris allowing Japan to inherit the rights and privileges taken from China by the Germans in Shantung on account of a secret treaty now known as the London Pact. China entered the World War on the

side of the Allies, because she was led to sympathize with the noble principles of justice and fairness, announced at one time or another by the spokesmen of the Allies, and because she was opposed to the spirit of militarism and the acts against humanity which characterized the enemy countries. She certainly did not anticipate, as a consequence of her action, that the Allies themselves, treating her like an enemy country, would bargain away her territory and trample upon her rights, without consultation, and in undeniable contravention of the avowed principles at the basis and heart of the League of Nations. This unjust decision, if effected, will inevitably cause the most unfortunate eventualities when the Chinese nation as a whole reflects on it and fully realizes its meaning.

"Considering China's foreign trade, there exists the most intimate relations between your body and ours, both collectively and individually. We share together its prosperity and suffer in common from its depression. Should we allow the present condition with respect to Shantung to remain uncorrected, the prestige which is enjoyed by Western merchants in China will be seriously endangered. Furthermore, Japan's sinister greediness for Chinese market, economic rights and territory having, by this decision, been not only unchecked but encouraged, she will in the future, as she does now, seek to make herself mistress of the Orient. The spirit exhibited by her at the Paris Conference foreshadows the spirit which will hereafter dictate her policy in the Far East. On the other hand, the Chinese people, greatly disappointed and provoked by the decision made at Paris, are bound to react to such a degree that the consequences of their reactions upon the foreign traders in this country will be simply incalculable and enormous.

"Looking at China's import trade alone, Japanese goods have almost entirely displaced the European and American products during the past four years. Even without the Shantung question to aggravate the difficulties in the development of China's foreign trade, it will take years of strenuous labor on the part of Western merchants before their trade is restored to pre-war conditions. With the addition of public unrest and popular dissatisfaction among the Chinese people, because of the unfair and unjust treatment they received from Paris, the hope of a *status quo ante bellum* recovery in the

import trade (not to mention further developments) by the Western merchants will be well-nigh impossible. The universal uneasiness of the Chinese nation is a seed for an even more disastrous conflict in the future than the war just ended in Europe. This, of course, we should consider it a part of our responsibility to avoid.

"This association feeling greatly concerned about this hidden danger, earnestly request you to draw the attention of your Government to the necessity of maintaining a strictly fair and just attitude in its attempt to settle the questions affecting the Far East, and ultimately the world.

"Assuring you, Sir, of our highest esteem, we are,

Yours respectfully,

The Compradores' Association."

By way of parenthesis it may be remarked that both the American and British communities in China have since appealed to their governments to help the Chinese to secure the justice due them and at the same time suggested the proper measures for the solution of especially the Tsingtau problem. Whether or not the above message from the compradores had any immediate effect on the action thus taken it is hard to say; nevertheless the articulation of even this class of China's population is full of future promise.

So far we have heard the utterances of men who are more or less expected to speak out their minds in the hour of national crisis. How about those who are not generally credited with so much intelligence? As regards laborers and beggars, wood workers and iron workers, and even water carriers, we have seen how they, too, have organized themselves; then how about the laborers who have returned from France? What do they think of the international situation? The following letter addressed to and published in a Chinese daily newspaper printed in English in the Capital, furnishes a convincing reply which shows perhaps more than anything else the thoroughness of the nation's awakening:—

"Sir—I am a native of Lai-chow-fu, of Shantung province. I was in the Japanese military service during the siege of Tsingtau and later recruited by the French as one of the Chinese laborers in France. Many a time have I escaped

death within a hair's breadth, but I am thankful to say that I still live and will be ready to render service to my own country. I discharged my duties in Tsingtau and in France faithfully, so I feel I have acquitted myself creditably in the name of my fatherland. To my great disappointment Japan now claims to be the successor of Germany in Shantung province and moves heaven and earth to enforce the terms of the Twenty-one Demands.

"The recent European war showed that war was a war of man-power and resources, and in my humble opinion, it would take Japan at least ten years to conquer China, should a war break out with her. For the first three years, China would suffer as much as the Belgians and Serbians did in this Great War, but commencing from the fourth year Japan would be hunted down like Germans and Austrians.

"Stand firm, my countrymen! Do not let our present pro-Japanese government go too far. Right is always on the top of might. Thousands of my fellow-workers are behind the country.

Yours sincerely,

Chao Hsi."

In earlier chapters we mentioned that the protagonists of the present hostilities in North China are wise enough to appeal to public opinion and that the dashing patriot, General Wu P'ei-fu, is instrumental in the powerful federation of eight provinces now arrayed against the pro-Japanese Anfu club, headed by General Hsu Shu-tseng and his protector Marshal Tuan Ch'i-jui. The latter having declared war on the generals championing the people's cause, the former replied with the following circular telegram to the whole country. As published in foreign newspapers, the denunciation dated Paoting-fu July 12, 1920, reads as follows:—

"In view of the fact that the hostility between the North and South has been going on for months and years, and that the Government has been unable to cope with the difficult situation, it is imperative that we should act together to save the nation. We shall therefore take the same attitude towards internal affairs and promote peace between North and South in concert, so that our people may enjoy order and prosperity.

We are not at all willing to become hostile towards each other, thus bringing destruction to the nation. Being military men and entrusted with the sacred duty of protecting the country we, Ts'ao K'un and others, are uniting ourselves in support of the Central Government. So long as the Central Government is supported and in strong position, reforms can be undertaken without difficulty.

"The Anfu Party, relying upon its dominant position in Parliament and having usurped governmental power, has however been directing the national policy for the personal benefit of its members. Its acts are against the will of the people. It has created a critical situation which threatens the country's existence. Its activities have undermined the Central Government and the Constitution. Worst of all, it has been threatening the Government with force of arms. All these intrigues have been planned by Hsu Shu-tseng.

"Knowing the treachery of the Anfu Party and its leaders, the President issued a mandate dismissing Hsu Shu-tseng as high commissioner of the northwestern frontier defense force and taking away from him the control of soldiers in order to avoid the disaster from party politics. At the same time Chow Shu-mou, on account of the resignation of Chin Yun-peng from the premiership, was nominated to be his successor, in the hope that there would be a reorganization of the Cabinet at an early date and the nation's foundation might be consolidated by means of civil methods. Unexpectedly there came the terrible news that there was an extraordinary change in the situation. Tuan Ch'i-jui appointed Tuan Ch'ih-kuei as commander-in-chief, despatched the frontier defense force towards Pao-ting (capital of Chihli province and headquarters of the signatories' federation), and declared war against the Chihli troops. He also planned to capture Kiangsu, Hupeh, Honan and Kiangsi. He has been bringing pressure to bear upon the President in demanding the issue of a mandate for a punitive expedition. At present the President is being watched. He has thus lost his personal freedom. His power has been usurped by the several traitors who are working for their personal ends. The Government is in danger. These tyrants are now enemies of the entire nation. The Constitution provides that the Chief Executive is vested with the power to appoint and also to dismiss officials. Now on account of the dismissal

of Hsu Shu-tseng, these traitors have ignored the Government's order and resorted to arms.

"As to the Chihli side, we have the following to say:—Since the Chihli troops were despatched to Hunan (to fight the South), they have endured hardships and so it is only fair to give them a rest. For that reason they were ordered by the Central Government to withdraw from the Hunan front and return to their old camps in Chihli. They have not done anything in violation of law and therefore do not deserve any punishment. However, with the intention to kill all his opponents by one stroke, Tuan Ch'i-jui made use of their withdrawal from the Hunan front as an excuse. For the sake of Hsu Shu-tseng and also for that of the Anfu Club, he declared war against the Chihli troops and did not hesitate to besiege the President's Palace with soldiers and take away the Presidential powers.

"We always consider it our duty to preserve peace. We are now finding it impossible to avert the struggle between the members of one family and are driven to resort to arms in redressing the wrong which has been done to us, to save the Chief Executive from the impending danger and, last but not the least, to prevent the country from going to pieces. We want to exterminate all the traitors in order to strengthen the position of the Republic. It is the present situation that has reduced China to such a deplorable state of affairs, over which we are deeply grieved. We hope we shall receive the sympathy of all our elders and brothers in this important undertaking.

"(Signed) Ts'ao K'un, Military Governor of Chihli;
Chang Tso-lin, High Military Commissioner of Three Eastern Provinces;
Wang Chan-yuan, Military Governor of Hupeh;
Li Shun, Military Governor of Kiangsu;
Ch'eng Kuang-yuan, Military Governor of Kiangsi;
Chao T'i, Military Governor of Honan;
Ts'ai Cheng-hsin, Tartar General of Chahar;
Ma Fu-hsiang, Defense Commissioner of Ninghsia, Kansu."

General Wu P'ei-fu, as division commander, is a subordinate of the first signatory; so his name does not appear on the

above denunciation. At the moment of writing (July 25th, 1920) the Anfu club has been worsted; Marshal Tuan Ch'i-jui has resigned from all his offices, including his position as director general of the frontier defence force, and also telegraphed an apology to the provinces; the defense force of some 60,000 men is being disbanded, and the Chihli troops are rounding up Hsu Shu-tseng and his remnants to disarm them. The final settlement and pacification will require some more time, but the issue is already settled. The side espousing the popular cause has scored a decisive victory and many students are reported to have also taken part in their battles. Such is the influence of public opinion and such is the triumph of the long suffering people.

Finally we append the following reply of the Chinese piecegoods dealers at Shanghai to the British firms in Manchester. The rate of sterling exchange having during the last six months risen adversely to the Chinese, the latter requested a postponement of payment. The Manchester firms declined to entertain the suggestion and many British firms in Shanghai took the attitude that there was no redress for the Chinese, since they had made enough money when the sterling exchange was low and in favor of the Chinese buyers. Whereupon the newly inaugurated Shanghai exchange maintenance association, representing over thirty commercial organizations who were confronted with a loss of over thirty million dollars, issued the following statement in English on June 26th, 1920:—

"Foreign opinion on the exchange situation maintains that the Chinese merchants had accumulated a great deal of profit during the last few years and should not become panic-stricken when they are faced with a loss. This may appear to be reasonable and just when we look at the question superficially, but it is not when we study the real state of affairs. Therefore we venture to present the following facts.

"Though the exchange situation was favorable to the Chinese last year, very few were actually benefited by the rise. For fear of a sudden drop during the months of March, April, May and June, many settled their rate beforehand. But prior to the arrival of the goods, exchange went up and the purchasers paid according to the low rate of exchange. Secondly, the goods ordered last year mostly were not delivered on time. Chinese importers lost a great deal of prestige and 'face' with

their own clients, the dealers. Those who had settled their exchange had to pay cash to their banks and await arrival of the goods. When the exchange was at its highest, the Chinese were closing their accounts for the New Year and were unable to take advantage of the situation. This shows that the Chinese did not enjoy the fruits of the rise in the exchange.

"Foreigners further contended that, after the signing of the contract, the Chinese purchasers should carry out their obligations. They are legally correct; but let us ask the Chinese and foreign press in Shanghai to publish some of the contracts in order to disclose their contents and let the public pronounce its opinion on the documents as to their equity. Because of their ignorance of the world situation and the laws of equity, Chinese merchants have suffered considerably during the last several decades. Equity is the principal feature of any contract in the law of civilized nations, but let us look at our contracts here.

"Provisions are made whereby the foreign agent may delay his delivery, while the Chinese purchasers must be bound by the rigidity of the contract to take delivery within the stipulated term of time. Is that equity? Because of our peace-loving disposition we refrain from arguing and execute our obligations. If the terms of these contracts are to be considered as sacred, we are afraid that not only the Chinese merchants will feel dissatisfied, but the world will soon express its disapproval.

"Besides, commercial relationships depend much on mutual trust and friendly feelings. If there is any difference in feeling, the effect on the commercial situation will be great. It is needless for us to emphasize this point. In facing an economic crisis, people should not treat their fellows as if under normal conditions. When the exchange situation threatens us with a panic, the buyer and seller should be sympathetic and each feel the position of the other. They should deal with facts and not with theories; nor should they utilize the latter for the sake of argument. In a word, it is beyond the power of the Chinese to control such disasters as rice famines, armed conflicts, financial stagnancy and sudden drops in the exchange rate. The financial strength of the Chinese in Shanghai is within the general knowledge of the foreigners."

Here we have the voice of the people of all classes—from the richest to the poorest, from the highest to the lowest—speaking out their minds in unequivocal language. Where clearness is needed, no specious arguments will be admitted to cloud the issue, and where firmness is required, no mincing of words will be spared. If the people had been meek and silent, they are now self-assertive, and the impartial opinion of the world can pronounce its judgment. And if they had been diffident in the past to express their grievances—for there are always two sides to a question—they do not hesitate now to appeal to the law of equity and justice. If there had been opportunities for selfish gain at the expense of Chinese ignorance, the ground is now clear for a respect based on mutual understanding of each other's problems and points of view. That being the case, the mutual friendship born of such understanding will stand the strain of time more effectively than the polite friendship of the past. If so, all concerned will be the gainers thereby.

In the past Chinese politeness has always been mistaken as actual consent. Where any other straightforward mortal will say No when he means No, the Chinese merchant as well as the Chinese official will hesitate to say No, since he is too polite to hurt the other person's feelings. And where any other mortal will say "No, thank you" the Chinese will say "Thank you"—he is too courteous to decline offhand. To those who understand the Chinese and their methods of transacting business, commercial or official, the procedure has its disadvantages as well as advantages; but to those unaccustomed to Chinese politeness an embarrassing affirmative is always taken for granted as a written Yes. Hence officials have been known to acquiesce in foreign demands, however impossible of acceptance they might be, just because they could not muster enough courage to come straight out with a firm but polite No. Nowadays such politeness is being slowly discarded, and Chinese prefer to treat with foreigners on an equal footing of law and equity, frankness and straightforwardness. And in view of the embarrassments of the past, the new procedure is decidedly preferable. One at least can know exactly where one stands in a given question or dispute and thereby its solution can be expedited.

CHAPTER XI

IMPROVED COMMUNICATIONS

IN view of the vastness of country and the density of population, China's most pressing problem to-day is perhaps that of better communications. Although the written Chinese language is understood in all parts of the Republic, yet the paucity of modern means of communication has given rise to various provincial as well as district dialects. This is at once seen from the fact that there are less than seven thousand miles of railways in actual operation in a territory of over four million square miles for a population of four hundred millions, whereas the railway mileage in the United States is three hundred thousand miles for a population one-fourth of China's size! Such being the case, it was inevitable that men in the past should have developed a sense of provincialism at the expense of nationalism. To-day, as already stated, thanks to the increasing number of newspapers, the spread of general enlightenment, and the remarkable awakening of the masses, articulate patriotism is being rapidly developed. With the advent of still better communications than those now obtaining in the country, the welding movement will be further accelerated and the nation will enjoy greater happiness and prosperity.

Nevertheless, considerable progress has been made along this line, and were the requisite funds available, the showing could have been more creditable than at present. And just as the political disturbances of the past eight years have paralyzed educational reform, dislocated trade and stultified industry, so they have retarded the progress in providing modern facilities of communication.

The most outstanding reform in this direction is indubitably that of railroad construction, the history of which dates from the early seventies. At the end of this chapter will be appended a special discussion of the subject by Mr. John Earl Baker, American adviser to the Ministry of Communications.

Here we may supplement his paper by the following paragraph from the same pen, as an illustration of the great possibilities in store for railway development:—

"An agricultural train, the first of its kind in China, was inaugurated on the Peking-Hankow line early in the autumn of 1918. It carried samples of improved seeds, modern implements of cultivation, and other educational matter. It was accompanied by trained lecturers, who explained the principles of selective breeding of seeds and animals and the advantages of thorough cultivation. The train proceeded slowly from point to point over the whole length of the line. Large audiences were encountered generally, attracted no doubt by the brass band which was aboard the train also, but being once gathered, benefited by the real purpose of the occasion. The results of propaganda of this sort are never immediate but, if persevered in, the effort will ultimately bear fruit of profound importance to China."

There are at present in actual operation 6,027 kilometres of government railways, with 383 km. under construction; 773 km. private and provincial railways; and 3,780 km. concessioned railways—a total of 10,963 km. or 6,852 miles.

While new railways have to wait for the necessary funds to construct new tracks and purchase new locomotives, there is now a growing appreciation of better roads and highways and of salving them from their present state of neglect and disrepair. Consequently, in the principal towns there are broad, macadamized roads, with trees planted on both sides; and hence there are sufficient good roads in Peking for the present number of some nine hundred automobiles. But in many places and districts the country roads are impassable, especially in rainy seasons. There is therefore a great deal yet to be done in this respect; but since the masses have come to appreciate better means of communication, it will not be long before the movement in favor of good roads will be pushed ahead, once the country resettles to normal, well-ordered conditions.

Next to railroads the waterways constitute the principal means of communication. In addition to the large navigable rivers—for example, 595 miles of the 3,158 miles of the Yangtze River are navigable by ocean-going vessels—there are thou-

sands of miles of canals. The fertile plains are all dug up until Eastern China becomes almost a huge web of waterways. Hence in Kiangsu and Chekiang, two of the most wealthy and progressive provinces, the canal mileage is estimated at no less than 25,000 miles.

If the Great Wall running from east to west across the northern part of China is one of the wonders of the world, the Grand Canal running north to south from Tientsin to Hangchow (capital of Chekiang province) for 850 miles is no less a marvel. Begun in the time of the great floods in mythological China, over four thousand years ago, by Yui, one of the semi-divine emperors, who is said to have given thirteen years of his labors to the work of irrigation and draining away the water to proper channels, it was excavated in sections, the last to Tientsin being completed towards the end of the thirteenth century. With the passage of time, it has been sadly neglected, and navigation is interrupted for months in the year. Recently it is being improved by money borrowed from the American Siems-Carey Railway and Canal Company, after American Red Cross engineers, interested in discovering the causes of floods and famines in certain sections of China, had recommended the loan.

In 1913, a national conservancy bureau was established under the presidency of Mr. Chang Ch'ien, the creator of the "Model City," already referred to, who was then minister of agriculture and commerce. A Dutchman, Mr. H. van der Veen, was engaged as consulting engineer. Since then other conservancy schemes have been taken in hand, although their results, handicapped especially by funds, are only gradually seen. The following paragraph from the "Trade Returns" for 1919, published by the Chinese Maritime Customs, summarizes the latest efforts in this direction:—

"Owing to their limited resources, the operation of the beneficent schemes of the Chihli River Improvement Commission (Tientsin) and of the Kwangtung Conservancy Board (Canton) was considerably restricted, though in both cases useful work was done. On the other hand, the improvement of the Grand Canal under the Siems-Carey Railway and Canal contract is reported to have advanced satisfactorily, while continued progress was made with the various stages of the work of the Liao River (Newchwang), Haiho (Tientsin),

Whangpoo (Shanghai), and Min River (Foochow) Conservancy Boards, all provided with funds derived from taxation of foreign and native trade . . . The Chefoo harbor works made great progress during the year, and the breakwater now affords considerable protection from north-east winds. Progress was also made with the investigation of the development of the Shanghai harbor, undertaken by the Whangpoo Conservancy Board in collaboration with the Customs Marine Department."

Chinese shipping is still in its infancy, apart from the volume of trade carried by native junks along the coast and inland waters. Nevertheless, a beginning has already been made by the founding of the China Merchants Steamship Navigation Company, in Shanghai, in 1872. This premier Chinese shipping enterprise has now over thirty ships aggregating sixty thousand tons. Other native companies operate on a much smaller scale, and numerous launch services are maintained in inland waters. Excepting for one or two companies navigating a few vessels between south China ports and the Straits Settlements as well as Dutch East Indies, the first concern to engage in trans-Pacific trade is perhaps the China Mail Steamship Company, organized in 1915, with a capital of ten million dollars to be shared equally between Chinese and American shareholders.

The greater volume of shipping business is operated by foreign companies, since under the treaties between China and other states the subjects of treaty powers are permitted the right to engage not only in the coasting trade but also in inland waters navigation. Whatever may have been the causes for the backwardness of Chinese shipping, in at least one instance has it been recorded that a Chinese company could not compete with a foreign concern on equal terms. Because of the most-favored-nation clause, aliens are held to possess rights exactly like those of Chinese themselves; so the clause effectively bars any government subsidy to Chinese companies. A case in point arose in 1890, when an attempt was made to subsidize the China Merchants Steamship Navigation Company, by remitting a portion of the import duties on goods imported by native merchants in their vessels, as well as by relaxing the customs examination of the personal effects of Chinese officials traveling therein. However, it was discov-

ered that the exemptions would constitute a violation of Article 3 of the American treaty of 1880, which provides that no other or higher duties will be imposed upon American vessels or cargoes "than are imposed or levied on vessels or cargoes of any other nation or on those of Chinese subjects." The British minister in Peking protested, and the proposed immunities were canceled.

Hence Japanese companies, for example, are the best situated in this particular. Not only are they known to have been subsidized by their government, but they are able to compete with both Chinese and foreign companies on equal or more favorable terms.

It is now proposed to utilize the twelve German and Austrian vessels seized on the declaration of war between China and the Central Empires as a nucleus for China's merchant marine. The total tonnage of the sequestered vessels is 45,000 tons. Five of these can go to Europe and America, and the rest can ply between nearer foreign ports. Time and energy, of course, will be required before funds can be forthcoming to erect wharves and warehouses, etc.; but as a temporary initial measure, it is proposed to share the wharfage and warehousing accommodation with existing foreign firms and thus give time for the new venture to develop itself.

At the Paris Peace Conference last year the Chinese delegation presented a list of desiderata or wishes for substantial assistance from the Allied Powers. This list is set out in full as one of the appendices to the present volume, under the title of "Questions for Readjustment." One of the desiderata describes the growth of the Chinese postal service and suggests that, China being already a member of the Universal Postal Union, the Powers should withdraw their own post-offices from Chinese soil. Originally the postal department was a branch of the Maritime Customs service, but since 1911 it has been administered by the Ministry of Communications—the other departments of the Ministry being telegraphs, railways and shipping. Its rapid growth in both efficiency and public confidence is an earnest of the wonderful potentialities of the Republic.

The information set out in the above list of desiderata quotes postal statistics for the year 1917. Including those for 1919, the figures for recent years may be tabulated as follows:—

	1915	1916	1917	1918	1919
Ordinary Mails	209,261,000	230,335,420	256,275,250	277,137,500	311,237,300
Registered Mails	14,761,900	16,978,400	18,488,690	21,112,200	24,070,850
Express Mails	2,753,195	3,082,544	3,585,320	3,990,550	4,589,170
Insured Mails	25,333	35,909	32,140	28,778	25,672
Number of Parcels	2,033,323	2,232,100	2,640,355	2,738,090	3,551,105
Weight in kilograms	7,904,129	8,484,200	10,006,321	10,850,034	14,788,916
Value	$27,187,277	29,282,300	34,893,500	40,109,700	54,602,207
Post-offices and agencies	8,510	8,797	9,103	9,367	9,762
Town and rural box offices	4,482	4,561	4,890	5,146	12,595
Courier lines in *li* (1 mile = 3 *li*)	410,000	421,000	432,000	449,000	467,000
Steamer and boat lines in *li*	63,600	64,700	68,600	69,800	72,000
Railway lines in *li*	19,000	19,000	19,500	20,000	20,000
Revenue	$6,798,580.28	7,630,416.84	8,574,352.24	9,500,000	11,230,000
Working expenses	$6,495,987.76	6,693,013.58	7,151,834.08	7,590,000	8,290,000
Surplus	$302,592.52	937,403.26	1,422,518.16	1,910,000	2,440,000

Concerning telegraphs the following paragraph, appearing in the *Statesman's Year Book* for 1919, is a handy summary:

"China has a fairly well developed telegraph service. Telegraphs connect all the principal cities of the empire, and there are lines to all the neighboring countries. The telegraph lines have a length of nearly forty thousand miles. The administration is now completely under government control. Five foreigners (Danes) are employed in the Telegraphs. There is also a Danish telegraph adviser in the Ministry of Communications and a Danish expert in wireless telegraphy. Wireless telegraph stations have been installed at Kalgan, Peking, Hankow, Nanking, Shanghai and Canton, etc. In August, 1918, the Chinese Government contracted with the Marconi Wireless Company for the purchase of two hundred wireless telephones for the use of the Chinese army, each to have a radius of forty miles. In October, 1918, the Government contracted again with the Marconi Company for the erection of three powerful wireless stations at Kashgar, Urumchi, and Lanchowfu to connect with a smaller station at Sianfu which will act as auxiliary to the land lines.[1] Since 1912 uniform telegraph charges have been introduced, but the rates are higher than in any other country in the world."

In regard to the proposed installations at Kashgar (Sinkiang), Urumchi (Outer Mongolia) and Lan-chow-fu (Kansu)—all of which are yet untouched by the modern railway—Major Dockray, of the Marconi Company and member of the British Aviation Corps during the war, has been engaged as supervising engineer by the Ministry of Communications, which has now also a Radio Section to take charge of all wireless stations. The three powerful plants will be equipped with the latest Marconi arc ethers, and these comprise the latest Marconi receivers, similar to those used by the British Admiralty during the war, as well as special aerials for directional working, so that communications can be maintained during atmospheric disturbances. The telephone system has been installed in many leading cities, and the telephone

[1] The Marconi contracts were preceded by one concluded with Mitsui and Co., in February, 1918, when the Japanese firm was to erect in Chefoo, in north China, a station capable of communicating with Japan.

habit is also being gradually developed. In Peking the telephone is found in almost every well-to-do home, not to speak of public offices and business houses, and in T'ai-yuan-fu, capital of the "Model Province," the go-ahead General Yen Hsi-shan is also in telephonic communication with all his magistrates.

As we write (August 10, 1920) a semi-official statement from the Chinese Telegraphs Administration gives the following additional information about the progress in wireless telegraphy. The first Chinese wireless station was erected at Woosung, on the coast ten miles from Shanghai, in 1908, and since then radio-telegraphy has developed considerably even in conservative China. In 1913 the first station was erected at Peking; six years later it was removed to a site within the Temple of Heaven. Here is another significant sign of the country's awakening: the place where ancient emperors offered sacrifices to their alleged divine ancestor being converted into a wireless station at the time the Peace Conference was sitting at Paris! Since plans have already been formulated for the introduction of commercial aviation, it is now proposed to erect a station in every provincial capital as an aeroplane direction center; so ere long the most distant parts of the Republic will be linked up with the Capital and the coast by this means. Thus Kashgar, the most outlying post in Sinkiang, in the far west, is over two thousand miles from Peking, the distributing center for west and northwest China being Lan-chow-fu (capital of Kansu province) which is 744 miles from Peking. The station at Urga (capital of Outer Mongolia) will be completed next winter (1920)—750 miles northwest of Peking—and already the Capital is in radio communication with Canton, a distance of nearly 1,300 miles.[1]

A moment ago we referred to China's list of desiderata submitted to the Paris Conference, and the Republic's desire for the withdrawal of all alien post-offices from Chinese soil. In the same topic China likewise demands that "no foreign wireless or telegraphic installations of any kind shall be set up on Chinese territory, and that all such installations as may have

[1] On January 8, 1921, the American Federal Telegraph Co. was given the right to erect five powerful stations in Shanghai, Peking, Hankow, Harbin and Canton, capable of direct communication with the United States, Japan, the Philippines and Singapore, in consideration of a loan of $4,600,000, repayable in ten years.

already been set up on Chinese territory shall be handed over forthwith to the Chinese Government upon due compensation being given." These foreign installations found especially in Shanghai and Peking, etc.—some private but mostly government plants—interfere not a little with the working of Chinese stations, but the foreign private stations, it is understood, will be closed when China joins the International Radio Telegraph Union. For this purpose the Republic has applied for admission and will take part in the convention to be held next year, in 1921.

Trained experts being needed for this new service, the College of Posts and Telegraphs at Peking has graduated three engineering classes of more than thirty students, whilst another class of thirty-two will soon complete their training, after which they will proceed to the Marconi workshop in London or to Japan for further training. Over seventy operators have passed the required examinations and been distributed among the various stations. New training stations are being put up, and the latest is one erected two years ago in Peking, which is able to receive messages from all over the world. It is claimed that its operators "have overheard conversations between Premier Lloyd George in England and President Wilson in the Atlantic which were carried on by wireless telephone. It received the first news of the conclusion of the peace conference in Europe, and of China's refusal to sign the peace treaty." Since April, 1920, all wireless stations have been opened for public correspondence, and the oldest station—that erected in 1908 at Woosung—is reputed to be the most profitable, making a net income of four thousand dollars every month.

The growth of aeronautics in the belligerent countries has also found China a new enthusiast. In addition to one hundred machines purchased from the British firm of Vickers, Limited, for the Ministry of War aviation department, the Ministry of Navy recently signed a contract with the Curtiss Aeroplane Company, of New York, to supply $2,500,000 worth of hydroplanes. Moreover, the Ministry of Communications has bought six Handley-Page commercial machines, to carry from twelve to twenty passengers and two tons of mail or cargo. On May 7, 1920, the first aerial mail passenger service from Peking to Tientsin was inaugurated. Piloted by

(*Photo by Tien Hua, Peking*

CITIZENS' CONVENTION, PEKING. NOTE THE WHITE PENNANTS WITH PATRIOTIC EXHORTATIONS AND THE NUMBER OF UNIFORMED SOLDIERS.

(*Courtesy of* The Trans-Pacific)

HANDLEY-PAGE MACHINE IN TRIAL FLIGHT AT NANYUAN AVIATION FIELD, PEKING.

(*Courtesy of* The Trans-Pacific)

COMPETITION BETWEEN THE CANAL AND THE MODERN RAILWAY.

Captain Mackenzie, the Handley-Page No. 1, surnamed "Kin-Han," made the journey in one hour, namely, one-third of the time occupied by train. It was in the nature of a trial trip and so carried among its fourteen passengers Sir Beilby Alston, British Minister in Peking. Everything went off beautifully and, whereas it took Sir Beilby's predecessor sixty years ago fully three days each way to go from the Capital to the nearest port, he now ran down in the machine in the morning, lunched with friends in Tientsin, made a few calls in the afternoon and then returned in an hour!

Although China has at present a number of airmen, trained both abroad and at home, more are being sent to foreign countries. The latest are five who went to the Curtiss Aviation School at Manila, and six to England to watch operations at the Vickers' factory. Therefore elaborate plans are afoot to develop commercial aviation as an aid to railway communication, and the recent visit of two Italian airmen, the winners of the Rome to Tokyo flight, has fired the people's imagination. As General Ting Kinn, director of the department of aeronautics, Peking, recently declared in a press interview at Shanghai:—"China is determined to take advantage of all the air rights secured by the treaty which she signed on September 13, 1919. We are aware of the importance of aeronautics in modern warfare, but what prompted the Government to emphasize this branch of work is the fact that it is a civilizing device bringing the remote corners of the globe into closer relationship." Two air routes have already been mapped out: Shanghai to Peking, and Peking to Urga (capital of Outer Mongolia). The former route may be opened in the spring of 1921, and it will not be long before one can breakfast in Peking, lunch at Shanghai, have tea at Foochow (capital of Fukien province) and then dine at Hongkong or Canton! Mail, passenger, freight and topographical services will be maintained, and this new auxiliary will be especially useful in the suppression of bandits who infest various districts and terrorize the population.

So far so good, but as already stated, the country is tremendously handicapped by the lack of funds—to build new railways, to improve existing roads or macadamize them, to push forward conservancy schemes, to knit the country closer together by all modern means of communication, to install

telephones in all cities instead of just a few larger cities, etc. Nevertheless, the people's eyes have been opened and ere long the things now hoped for will be consummated. The beginning has more than been made and, whereas it now occupies at least six days to go from Peking to Canton by train and boat, soon it will be possible to accomplish the journey comfortably in twelve hours by air.[1]

Having discussed the progress in other facilities of communication, it remains to note the advance in railway development. Its story is typical of many other developments in China. We therefore append the following article written specially for this volume by Mr. J. E. Baker:—

Six centuries ago, Marco Polo, returning to Europe, described a city of Cambalu, much more magnificent than anything his hearers and readers had ever seen. His tale of the methods of trade and of government, of the peace, safety, general comfort and rare luxury enjoyed in the land of the Khans was discounted considerably as the exaggerations of a lying vagabond. But students of comparative history now know that Marco Polo was not far wrong, and he who visits the city of Kublai Khan even to-day will be convinced by its noble plan, massive walls, magnificent roofs, and other evidences of illimitable labor and large-scale organization, that Peking of the fourteenth century was the peer of any contemporary capital.

Europe, blocked on the east by the Turks, but tremendously stirred by the Crusades, discovered a new world in the west. This act signalized the possibility of thinking along new lines rather more than it did physical daring or the acquisition of new resources. An age of scientific research ensued, the most practical achievement of which was the invention of rotary motion from a steam engine, by James Watt. This was in 1780, and up to this time there was nothing in the world to indicate that Chinese civilization lacked any element contributing to national strength. China—ancient, magnificent, unknown, protected on the east by the ocean,

[1] The Shanghai correspondent of the *London Morning Post* cabled on July 2, 1921, as follows:—"A daily aviation mail service between Peking and Tsinanfu began yesterday, and it is expected that the service will be extended to Shanghai by September 1. British and Chinese pilots fly the machines. Eight passengers were carried with the mails on the opening flight, and a large crowd gave them an enthusiastic reception at Tsinanfu."

and on the west, north and south, by her Mongol conquerors, or by the immense spaces which they once had occupied—had nothing to fear from any "outer barbarian" and had no trouble in keeping them "outer." It was not until 1839 that any Western Power cared to challenge China to battle. England's shipping and gun power—products of Watt's rotary engine—won the "Opium War," but the effects were so local that a second war was required in order to secure a fulfillment of the peace terms by which the first war was concluded. Even the second victory was considered in the light of a local raid from pirates by the imperial house, and it was not until 1860 when Peking was captured by the English and French allied forces who burnt the imperial palace, that the reigning house was convinced that any nation more powerful than China existed in the world. But most Chinese, when they saw the flames of the Summer Palace, read in it not the weakness of China, but the decadence of the Manchu house. With the rise and fall of dynasties history had made them familiar, but not with the triumph of red-haired people over Chinese. To the Chinese mind, the remedy for the situation was to get rid of the Manchu dynasty, and for twelve years, from 1852 to 1864, the Taiping rebellion laid waste the Yangtze valley and destroyed probably twenty millions of people, in the effort to change the dynasty. That effort failed, largely due to the help which the "red-haired" barbarians gave to the Manchus. And then the idea began to take shape that China needed foreign machinery.

The first suggestion for a railway was made before the end of the Taiping rebellion, in 1863. The line proposed was to run from Shanghai inland to Soochow. The suggestion was quashed. Not until 1875 was anything of the sort entertained by Chinese officials, and even then the Shanghai-Woosung line was opened by means of a ruse—so the Chinese maintain. At any rate, they bought out the line and tore it up. It was 1881 before a permanent line of rail was laid—from the Tongshan mines to Hsu-ku-chuang. Five more years passed before an extension was made to this short piece of line—in 1866. But in 1889 the throne sanctioned an extension to Tientsin on the grounds of military expediency. A war with the French on the southern border had brought to the ruling authorities one more evidence of weakness.

From 1863 to 1889—twenty-six years—may seem to some

minds a long time to hold out against so useful an instrument as the railway. But consider, for a moment, comparative circumstances. In Europe, Watt's invention occurred after three hundred years of scientific inquiry. In China there has been no intellectual stir since the days of Kublai Khan. Europe had used rail trucks in and about mines for two hundred years, and had used the steam engine first for pumping out mines, then as a stationary source of power in factories, and finally as a beast of burden in mines years before the modern railway as a common carrier was thought of. The Europeans brought the railway, track, locomotive and organization all complete, and asked China to accept it as it stood. It was thirteen years after the success of the "Puffing Billy" proved the entire practicability of the locomotive before the British parliament gave a charter to the Liverpool and Manchester, the first common carrier railway in England. It was twenty-two years after the production of the "Puffing Billy" that the first railway was opened on the Continent. Japan—small, compact under an autocratic form of government—took eighteen years to get ready for the railway—from 1854, when she was opened to foreign intercourse, to 1872 when she opened the line from Yokohama to Tokyo. China permitted her first permanent line of railway to be built only eighteen years after the first suggestion, and in view of all the circumstances, to make railway construction a national policy within twenty-six years compares well with either Japan or Europe.

The imperial government next ordered an extension to Shan-hai-kuan. In 1894, the imperial railway administration was formed and surveys were made for extensions north of the Great Wall and toward Peking. Construction followed closely and had reached a point fifty-seven miles north of Shanhai-kuan when Japan forced the war with China. As soon as this war was over, railway construction began again. Peking was reached in 1897. A contract was made with a Belgian company to build from Peking to Hankow, and with an American company to build from Hankow to Canton. In 1898, a loan was secured from the British to extend the line northward toward Mukden.

But in the meantime European statesmen had professed to see in Japan's victory over China the beginning of the disintegration of China. Hence they began to intrigue and cast

lots for her garment. Russia insisted upon the privilege of building a line for herself across Manchuria, east and west, and north and south. France insisted on building for herself a line crossing the southern border of China and penetrating to Yunnanfu. Germany seized upon a position midway, at Kiaochow, and drove a line westward to Tsinanfu. Their political writers and publicists generally openly declared that these railways marked the regions to be claimed by the respective nationalities when China finally succumbed. England quickly followed by demanding the right to build *for China* the railways in the Yangtze valley. In this way the enthusiasm for railway construction, which had been displayed by the Chinese government for a decade, was turned to suspicion if not hostility. Leaders in the provinces, not so well-informed of the benefits to be derived from railways, saw in them principally the means by which foreign control would be fixed on China. The Boxer uprising followed as a natural course. Swift defeat followed, and with it a huge indemnity which stripped China of any resources she might have had for railway construction. Thereafter, China was compelled to seek from foreign sources the means for any large internal development.

The Boxer insurrection, however, had two other important effects. First it convinced patriotic Chinese of the hopeless inefficiency of the Manchu house and, second, together with America's "Open Door" policy, it convinced foreign nations that procedure in China must be more considerate of Chinese sensibilities than it had been in the past. Hence no further attempts were made to extort railway concessions like those secured by Russia, France and Germany, mentioned above. But any and all overtures were resisted by the provinces without distinction. The British were so resisted that the Shanghai-Nanking contract, agreed to in principle in 1898, was not signed until 1903. The Canton-Kowloon contract was not signed until 1907. Belgian contracts, backed by both France and Russia, were concluded in 1902 and 1903. However, all of these contracts specified ownership of the line by the Chinese government, but reserved a considerable degree of administrative authority to the representatives of the foreign financial powers. This form of contract pleased the Chinese little better than did the actual concessions to Russia, France and Germany, and in view of the fact that European politicians agreed

that the one suited their purposes as well as the other, the Chinese are scarcely to be blamed.

The result was that Chinese men of wealth and provincial officers determined to build railways on their own responsibility. Of the necessity for a railway system, there was no longer any doubt. But further foreign infiltration was to be resisted at all costs. A short line from Shanghai to Woosung, and another from the Pinghsiang collieries to the water course at Chuchow had already been built by Chinese in 1898. Large sums were raised to build along what is now the line of the Tientsin-Pukow, the Shanghai-Hangchow-Ningpo, the Canton-Hankow, and the Hankow-Szechuan routes. How much of this so-called "local movement" was purely patriotic, how much was merely anti-Manchu, and how much was the desire for downright "squeeze," every reader will have to decide for himself. Of the patriotism which animated the mass of the people in supporting opposition to foreign control there is no doubt. Certainly the railway program was a handy subject upon which to thwart the imperial house and demonstrate its weakness both at home and abroad. And when the record of these provincial lines is read, it is a most sordid tale of inefficiency and abuse of financial trust.

Pressed by foreign interests on one side, and resisted by the provinces on the other, confronted by the hopelessness of the "local" effort and feeling the necessity of getting on, the central government finally compromised on the Tientsin-Pukow and the Shanghai-Hangchow-Ningpo projects by accepting foreign financial assistance, but at the same time reserving to itself practically all of the administrative control of the railways to be built. This was in 1908. In the meantime, the central government had bought back a small private concession for the Taokow-Chinghua line and made it a government railway; it had under way the construction of the Peking-Kalgan line; and it forthwith redeemed the Belgian loan on the Peking-Hankow and brought that important line strictly under Chinese control. So far as danger from foreign control goes, the situation upon all but those first three lines held by Russia, Germany and France left little to be desired.

But other forces were at work, and the Manchu house was tottering. Three years later, when it was proposed to apply a Tientsin-Pukow form of contract to the Canton-Hankow

and the Hankow-Szechuan railways, the usual opposition which was raised touched off the revolutionary magazine, and the mild explosion expelled the Manchus and ended the empire.

The Manchus abdicated in 1912. In September of the same year, the Republic contracted for the construction of a trunk line from the coast to Kansu—Lung-Hai line. The following year a contract was made for the construction of a long interior line, paralleling the Peking-Hankow about one hundred and fifty miles westward and running from Tatungfu (Shansi) to Chengtu (capital of Szechuan). During the same year a contract was made for a line from Pukow to a point on the Peking-Hankow. In 1914 and 1915, contracts were made for lines from Nanking to Pinghsiang, from Shasi to Changsha, and from Yunnanfu to the Bay of Yamchow or Kuantechow. Then followed the Siems-Carey contracts. All told, these contracts called for the construction of nearly ten thousand miles of line. Why have they not been built? China has interposed no delay. China has urged that work proceed as rapidly as possible. But the great European war drew off all the energies of the other parties to these agreements. The Lung-Hai has been completed as far as a junction with the Tientsin-Pukow. The Canton-Hankow has been completed as far as Changsha (capital of Hunan province). With her own resources China extended the Peking-Kalgan line to Fengchen.

During the period of the war, determined attempts have been made by Japan to enter the field of railway construction in China. These attempts have been resisted by the Chinese people in the same spirit and with much the same success as other foreign attempts were resisted from 1898 on. While Japan has been willing to grant "Pukow" terms on paper, the Chinese feel that paper terms will mean nothing in the face of extraterritoriality and Japan's "navy of 500,000 tons absolutely idle." Hence, although contracts have been made for some three or four thousand miles of line, Japan has built less than a hundred miles in pursuance of those agreements, and the making of them cost the Chinese signers dearly—one of them, his house burned by a mob of students, another so severe a beating that his life was endangered, and all three of them the title of "sell country traitors." The attempt to mutualize Belgian and Japanese interests on the Lung-Hai line was frustrated by popular clamor. And an attempt to extend the

Shantung railway to Shansi has been blocked similarly—at least for the time being.

The advent of the Republic was signalized not only by these large contracts for new construction but also by a vigorous effort toward improved administration. The imperial railway administration had been formed in 1894 to handle railway affairs. But the foreign demands for concessions which immediately followed the war with Japan naturally were handled in the department of foreign affairs. For several years, therefore, that ministry overshadowed the imperial railway administration in activities in railway matters. In 1903, however, the board of foreign affairs was relieved of all administrative duties in connection with railways and the board of commerce was charged with the responsibility. In 1906 a separate department—the Yu-ch'uan Pu—was formed, with control of railway, postal and telegraph affairs. This was reorganized under the Republic in 1912 as the Chiao-tung Pu. The Chiao-tung Pu found its work of reorganization upon the various government lines badly handicapped by the diversity which existed. The "battle of concessions" had added to the purely Chinese lines, railways built by Germans, by Japanese, by British, by Belgians, by French and by Americans. China, like every other country on the globe, let the first builders of railways build according to their own notions of good practice. Each line, being conceived separately and often in hostility, held aloof from every other line. Besides the national difference inhering in each line, there were personal differences of the officers of the lines—officers who for the most part were strangers to those upon the lines with which they were connected. To eradicate these differences and weld the various lines into a government system became the immediate task of the new Republican administration.

The Chiao-tung Pu was fortunate in the early appointment of Dr. C. C. Wang, graduate of Yale and of Illinois, to the work of reorganization. Dr. Wang called attention to the fact that "accounting is regarded as the key to management, supervision and control of railways." Encouraged by the vice-minister Yeh Kung-cho, Dr. Wang memorialized the minister, Chu Ch'i-ch'ien, saying:—

"Each line had its own kind of accounts and rendered them in its own way. The accounts of each road were not only dif-

ferent from each other but sometimes changed from year to year. . . . Under such circumstances, the multifarious nature of the railway business renders an efficient control of the different lines extremely difficult and makes intelligent judgment of the management of the various railways impossible. . . . Our railway enterprise is still in its infancy and the evils are still easy to remedy. But if we miss the present opportunity and wait until the trunk lines are completed, our difficulties will be more than doubled. Therefore the question is not to regret or complain over the past but to endeavor to make the best out of the future."

This memorandum, dated February 10, 1913, was answered immediately with instructions for Dr. Wang to submit a plan of procedure. Two days later such a plan was submitted. It provided for a special commission consisting of representatives of the ministry, of the railways, and expert advisers, together with a group of assistants who should take part in the work so as to be educated in what was done. This group was formed and as expert adviser Dr. Henry C. Adams, of the University of Michigan, was employed. This was a particularly happy choice. Dr. Adams for years has been professor of political economy, business administration and accounting at the University of Michigan, and for twenty-five years was statistician for the Interstate Commerce Commission of the United States. In the latter capacity he had taken a leading part in the formulation in 1907 of the uniform classification of accounts prescribed for the hundreds of railways in the United States. The members of the commission made an unusually cosmopolitan group. They represented experience gained in England, France, Belgium, Germany, America, India, Africa, Japan and China. Yet in spite of the differences which naturally would arise, by July 22, 1914, a classification of capital expenditure was promulgated. Classifications for additions to property, for operating revenues and for operating expenses followed swiftly. In time to be effective January 1, 1915, classifications of income accounts, profit and loss accounts, surplus appropriation accounts, and a balance sheet were issued. Rules for the compilation of locomotive and of train kilometres, and a form for the annual report covering the financial and more important physical operations of the

year, followed shortly. An experimental tabulation of returns submitted on the annual report form was made for the period covering the first six months of the year 1915. This "Preliminary Report on the Statistics of the Government Railways in China" appeared promptly during the early months of 1916.

Of course, the progress toward uniform accounting has not been without a few ups and downs. Following the death of Yuan Shih-k'ai there ensued an administration which was indifferent, if not hostile, to the entire idea. The commission was disbanded, many of the members were discharged, the work of tabulating the report for the full year of 1915 was shelved, and Dr. Wang was transferred to the department of posts from which he resigned. The latter fact, however, caused his appointment as a councillor to the Ministry from which position he could give some impetus toward a revival of the work. The program was interrupted by the Chang Hsun "Manchu restoration" episode, and by the suppression of the *Peking Gazette* which at the time happened to be printing the report for the year 1915. But better days were ahead, and at the present writing (July, 1920) the work of publishing annual reports is up to date. Four reports have appeared, covering the years 1915, 1916, 1917 and 1918, and the report for 1919 is expected to appear shortly. Furthermore, the standardizing of accounts has been advanced by the formulation of a uniform set of rules and blanks for station accounts and for store accounts. These have not been officially promulgated as yet, due to delays in printing, translating, and making certain revisions which seemed advisable. Engineers' and workshop accounts have been definitely programmed for the near future.

Following Dr. Wang's suggestion the original commission for the unification of accounts has been transformed into a standing committee. This committee sits once or twice a year for the purpose of making revisions of the present classifications, for extending the work of unification to detailed branches of the service, and to act as a board of reference in case the interpretation of the rules is in doubt. The decisions in such cases form precedents for the future and bear a relation to the classifications similar to that of court decisions to statutes or constitutions.

While there is considerable yet to be done on the program of standardizing accounts, enough has been accomplished to put

into the hands of the Ministry of Communications powerful instruments of control. The efficiency of the several lines can be measured in many respects, such as number of employees, car and locomotive performance, fuel consumption, and other features of management. Intelligent supervision is possible if there be the will or the courage to use the information provided. So far as accounting control is concerned, the Chinese government railways are now a system in fact as well as in name.

The year following the birth of the Republic saw also the first attempt to knit the services of the individual lines into a continuous unit. The first step was that of providing "through" passenger service over the five most important lines. These lines were the Peking-Mukden, Peking-Hankow, Tientsin-Pukow, Peking-Kalgan (now the Peking-Suiyuan), and the Shanghai-Nanking. In 1915 the Shanghai-Hangchow-Ningpo was added to the list. "Through" cars could not be arranged for, due to differences in heating and lighting fittings of the cars on the different lines. But train schedules were made so as to provide for continuous journey, and "through" baggage is transferred at junctions without trouble to passengers. Arrangements were made during the same year, 1913, for through service with the Manchurian, Korean and Japanese railways. In 1914 the Chinese government railways joined the international through traffic organization, which linked up China with the capitals of Europe by means of the Trans-Siberian railways. The advantages of this move were not enjoyed long, due to the war.

Through parcels service, both domestic and foreign, was next provided for. In 1917 a "collect-on-delivery" feature was added. By this arrangement it is possible for a resident of Kalgan, say, to order a package of goods in Shanghai, or Kobe, have same shipped to Kalgan where, after inspection, he may pay purchase price of the goods as well as the transportation charges to the station master and be free of further inconveniences.

For the purpose of making settlements between the lines engaged in international through traffic, the Japanese railway administration was constituted a clearing house for the period of five years. For domestic through traffic the Peking-Mukden railway was given the same responsibility for the same

period. This period came to an end in 1918. Instead of passing the work of the clearing house on to another of the lines, as the original intention had been, the Ministry of Communications established as one of its own divisions a through traffic administration, of which the clearing house was made a subdivision. Both the international through traffic and the domestic through traffic settlements are made with the participating lines through this clearing house.

The establishment of the through traffic administration in the Ministry has quickened tremendously the movement toward a consolidation of the individual lines into a single system. Up to this time practically nothing had been done toward duplicating in goods service what had been accomplished in passenger, baggage and parcels services. The loans upon the various lines were secured by mortgages upon the rolling stock as well as the roadway and structures. This created an impression that wagons were, therefore, peculiarly the individual property of a given line, and must not be allowed to move off that line. With few exceptions, shipments passing from one line to another must not only be reinvoiced, but must also be transferred from the cars of the delivering line to those of the receiving line. Some individual arrangements between contiguous lines were made for "unbroken" shipments of coal, but this was severely restricted. In other countries, of course, the through movement of goods traffic has been found to be more important than through arrangements for passenger traffic—at least more important to the prosperity of the country. With this in mind, the subject of general interchange of goods wagons has been pressed for several years, and finally was agreed to in principle in the fall of 1919 to go into effect on the first of January, 1920. Wagons are not absolutely pooled by this arrangement, and there is a penalty for excessive delay of a "foreign" car by any line, but the practice of transfers at every junction is now unnecessary. Still it is necessary to reinvoice the shipment at the junction point in most cases, but this will not be necessary after the first of January, 1921. After that date it will be possible on all the lines in the through traffic conference (which means the contiguous government lines) to offer a shipment at any station for a station on any other line, pay the freight charges for the entire haul, and have it go through to destination without change. To simplify

this practice, during the fall of 1919, a uniform classification of goods was compiled by the through traffic conference. In applying rates under this classification all weights and all distances are to be calculated in the metric system. The uniform classification, together with the through-invoicing, will go into effect January 1, 1921. As a matter of fact, a portion of it went into effect July 1, 1920—but only for certain selected commodities. The accounting for interchange of rolling stock and for through goods traffic is to be done in the clearing house of the Ministry of Communications. In fact, it has already begun—for rolling stock on January 1, and for the selected commodities of goods traffic July 1, 1920.

The objections urged by several of the lines against general and unlimited interchange of rolling stock were not entirely unfounded. There was a shortage of rolling stock and each line feared that its wagons once off the line would be slow to return. This objection is being answered by the purchase of cars to the extent of a twenty per cent. increase to the capacity of wagons owned at the end of the war. But another objection will be more difficult to answer. Nearly all of the contracts with foreign financial groups for the construction of railway lines have specifically reserved to the lending syndicate the privilege of purchasing materials to be obtained abroad, and specifically provide that, other conditions being equal, the materials shall be purchased in the home markets of the syndicate. Officers in charge of rolling stock very naturally make designs according to their inherited ideas, and if they were inclined to strike out on new lines, the manufacturers of their home country are able to bring pressure to bear through the bankers to whom these officials owe their appointments. It is well known, of course, that wagons, locomotives, and machinery in every country have certain details of design or material peculiar to that country. Imagine, then, the variety to be found on lines in China, built as they have been by English, French, Belgian, German, Japanese and American money. Workmen familiar with the repair of one of these types and provided with tools adapted to the repair of that particular type do not take kindly to other types and are not deft at the work. Hence the repair of cars belonging to one line by shops of another line offers considerable prospect of inconvenience and waste.

Encouraged by the success of the commission on the uni-

fication of railway accounts and statistics, the Ministry set about obtaining uniform design of rolling stock by similar means. In 1917, a commission on railway technics was appointed. After something over a year of study of the designs upon different lines, a design for a standard 40-ton goods wagon was prepared tentatively. In the meantime expert advisers were employed of British, French, American and Japanese nationality. It was realized that the standard of the wagon or locomotive would depend somewhat upon the conditions of bridges and other factors related to roadbed, and that roadbed perhaps should be adapted to the best standards of rolling stock. Hence the work of the commission was divided into two sections, one on engineering and the other on rolling stock. Under the former clearances, capacity of bridges and standard section of track have been standardized. In the other, the design of the goods wagon has been decided upon in all of its most important details. Probably one of the most unexpected of the decisions was in favor of the 33-inch wheel, instead of the meter wheel and the 42-inch wheel which had prevailed hitherto. With standard designs of rolling stock and structures there will be little hindrance to the movement of a loaded car anywhere on the government lines from any other line. Fortunately the gauge of track has been kept standard from the first—except one short line of meter gauge in mountainous territory. Also the coupler height has been kept uniform and the coupler type has conformed to the well-known M.C.B. standards. In fact, more than half of the couplers in use on the government lines are of a certain particular make.

The new standard goods wagon will have no effect upon the diversity of the 12,000 wagons now in use or on order. For a number of years this diversity will remain. Yet every day that the standard car is postponed makes the task of obtaining absolute uniformity more difficult. In ten years, instead of 12,000 wagons the government lines will have probably 25,000. However, many of the present wagons will have been retired from service by that time. Hence if all new wagons are purchased specifying the standard design, by the end of ten years fully 18,000 out of 25,000 wagons will be of the standard design.

The same individuality that marks rolling stock, accounting

methods, and tariff arrangements is to be found in the operating rules upon the various lines. Signal indications differ widely. Rules for the movement of trains both under ordinary and under exceptional conditions are very diverse. If a trainman from one line should stray upon another, he would have to learn the language of train movement all over. The first study of this subject was made at a general traffic conference in 1918, and in 1920 a special conference of traffic officials and locomotive superintendents was held upon the subject. A tentative set of standard train rules was drawn up, and the standards for future installations of fixed signals were considered. Plans for reducing the present diversity of fixed signals can be held in abeyance for some time, without serious inconvenience.

Probably the most encouraging feature in the railway situation in China is the financial aspect. It is difficult to make comparisons over long periods, for no statistics could be compiled upon the same basis prior to 1915. The financial history of the government lines is well exemplified in the history of the Peking-Hankow road. Beginning with revenues of $7,588,000 in 1906—its first complete year—its revenues in 1919 increased to $26,313,680. In other words, its revenues have more than trebled in thirteen years, without any increase in length of line. The first available figures for the entire government system are for the year 1915, when revenues amounted to $57,000,000. In 1919 for the same lines, they aggregated to $83,047,390—or an increase of about 44 per cent. in four years. At this rate revenues will double about every ten years. Whilst operating revenues increased $25,000,000, operating expenses during the same period increased only $7,000,000 from something over $30,000,000 to $38,440,540. Because of certain accounting adjustments, the 1915 figures of expense were overstated by perhaps one million dollars; so the increase should be reckoned as $8,000,000 rather than $7,000,000, to be strictly fair. But even so, the increase in operating expense has been only 28 per cent. compared with a 44 per cent. increase in revenue. The result is that net revenues in 1919 were 64 per cent. greater than in 1915—and the return upon the cost of the property increased from 6.4 to 10.7 per cent. Compared with present day returns upon railways in Europe and America, the Chinese return is a magnificent result.

This growth in earning power shown by the lines as a whole

is exemplified, and explained in part, by a comparison of individual lines. In making this comparison it is necessary to arrange the lines in two groups, of which one consists of what may be termed the "long" or "trunk" lines and the other, the "short" lines.

GROUP I—"LONG" LINES (Results for 1918)

	Name of Line	*Kilos. Operated*	*Year Completed*	*Per Cent. Earned on Investment*
1.	Peking-Mukden	987	1897	22.7
2.	Peking-Hankow	1306	1905	15.8
3.	Shanghai-Nanking	327	1908	6.2
4.	Tientsin-Pukow	1107	1912	6.2
5.	Peking-Suiyuan	490	1915	5.6

GROUP II—"SHORT" LINES

1.	Taokow-Chinghua	152	1905	7.1
2.	Cheng-Tai	243	1907	8.4
3.	Kaifeng-Honan	185	1907	4.2
4.	Kirin-Changchun	127	1910	10.6
5.	Shanghai-Hangchow-Ningpo	286	1910	1.5

In the list above, the lines have been arranged in order of greatest age. In the first group, it will be noticed that the greater the age, the higher the per cent. return on the investment. In the case of the Shanghai-Nanking, the line is not only the shortest of the group, but it labors under a tremendous water competition which has forced rates to very low levels—probably the lowest freight rates in the world—and it has access to no fuel supply on the line, which make costs for this purpose very high. In the second group, there is more irregularity. The Kirin-Changchun had an abnormally prosperous year in 1918. Its 1917 return was under 5 per cent. and its 1919 return will be under 8 per cent. The Kaifeng-Honan line had a bad year in 1918, and its 1919 return will be about 7 per cent. The Shanghai-Hangchow-Ningpo lies in two unconnected pieces, so far apart that neither can contribute to the traffic of the other.

In addition, three other short disconnected lines have been left out of the comparison. These pay no returns at present. One, the Changchow-Amoy, is only 28 kilometres long. Another, the Chuchow-Pinghsiang, is principally a mine facility, and only 90 kilometres long, but up to the time that it was

put out of business by the military disturbances about it, a return of about 5 per cent. was earned annually. The third, the Canton-Kowloon, is 143 kilometres long, and is in effect the terminus of the Canton-Hankow line—a line which so far has not been completed.

These comparisons clearly show that relatively few years have been required in China to make its railways among the most profitable in the world, and that their growth in traffic and productiveness is steady and substantial. The world over, short lines are looked upon as merely feeders for "trunk" lines. Yet in China, even the short lines pay after a few years.

The physical performance upon China's railways is also a source of pride. Engines on Chinese railways have lower tractive capacity than those in other continental countries, but with the same engines the average number of tons of goods hauled per train increased from 206 in 1915 to 257 in 1918, or 25 per cent.

1915	206	tons	per	train
1916	227	"	"	"
1917	244	"	"	"
1918	257	"	"	"

In 1918 every goods wagon on the Chinese government railways carried on the average 75 capacity loads each. It carried each of these loads on the average 184 kilometres. The 1916 record of goods wagons in the United States was a little over thirteen capacity loads hauled on the average 413 kilometres. While the American haul is two and a quarter times as long as the Chinese haul, the number of loads carried by the Chinese wagon is nearly six times the number carried by the American car. The Chinese wagon gets a fresh full load every five days; the American wagon hauls a full new load every twenty-eight days. It surely didn't take twenty-three days to carry the American load the extra 229 kilometres!

The locomotive performance is similarly good. Each Chinese locomotive in road service in 1918 ran an average of 47,500 kilometres, compared with the peace time record in England of 40,583. This was no sudden spurt, for in 1915 and 1916 the records were only slightly lower. These locomotives had an average age of eleven years, so it cannot be

said that they are being sent to the scrap heap. Nor has the record been made at the expense of exorbitant repair costs, for it has been shown already that operating expenses have not increased as fast as operating revenues, either on an actual or on a percentage basis.

These results have been made practically without the help of comparative records. While the standard system of accounts went into effect in 1915, the results from it were not available until late in 1918, due to causes which were detailed above. The tools for systematic promotion of improved performance have but recently been forged. The Republic itself is only eight years old. Time is required not only to forge the tools, but to adapt them to the work for which they are intended. The prudent statistician is satisfied with not less than a five-year average to establish norms for criticism of railway working.

Those who would criticize Chinese progress on railway matters should recapitulate the record. China's first permanent railway was opened in 1881, nine years after the opening of the first line in Japan—which country was opened to foreign contact eleven years before the close of the T'aiping rebellion. Eight years later the imperial government was an active supporter of railway extension, compared with thirteen years from the success of the "Puffing Billy" to the chartering of the Liverpool and Manchester as a common carrier in England. Railway extension was proceeding nicely when the war with Japan ushered in the land-grabbing era which put China on the defensive against everything foreign. Forced to grant to the aggressive Powers in 1896, 1897, and 1898, the complete domination of lines contracted for, only by stubborn craft during ten years of negotiation could China secure complete recognition of her rights of control. Who shall be held responsible for these ten years of obstruction?

The prophets of 1904 professed to see no difference between the terms on the Shanghai-Nanking and those on the Chinese Eastern. Shall the Chinese be blamed for taking the foreigners at their word? What alternative had she, then, to playing off one set against another until she was able to gain "Pukow" terms out of the eagerness of financiers to gain a foothold? To be sure, four years were consumed, after "Pukow" terms were secured, in putting away the Manchu house, but who will say

that these four years were wasted? Then with the advent of the Republic came contracts for ten thousand miles of line, and the effort to reduce to order the chaos on the lines already built. That those ten thousand miles of line are not built is no fault of China's, and eight years of the Republic finds fourteen lines built by six different nationalities governed by a standard accounting system which is complete in its main outlines. During those eight years there has been put into effect through passenger service, through baggage service, through parcels (express) service, interchange of rolling stock, uniform classification of goods, the adoption of the metric system as standard for weight and distance, centralized audit of all interline revenue, and the beginning of standardized design for rolling stock and structures.

These eight years have been eight successive periods of increasing prosperity on the railway lines controlled. In spite of flood, plague and famine, in spite of what have been termed revolutions by some and merely disorders by others, each year has seen an improvement over its predecessor. Administrative and financial progress have gone forward together. Foreign comparisons are not to be feared.

CHAPTER XII

INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL PROGRESS

IF a country with four hundred million people and a territory of over four million square miles—one-eighth greater than that of Europe—is proverbial for its respect for learning, its obedience to the Fifth Commandment, and its admirable national characteristics of industry, thrift and peaceableness, it is perhaps most proverbial for its wealth of untold natural resources. To the Westerner China is a veritable Ali Baba's cave, and one of its northern provinces alone is reputed to contain enough coal to last the whole world for thousands of years. The population being predominantly agricultural and a goodly portion of the country most fertile, it has wheat and other cereals sufficient to feed the entire human race. Besides, what is already known is based on casual investigation, and the resources of the country have yet to be thoroughly inventoried by expert statisticians and scientific authorities.

In the light of the people's moral awakening, what is its effect on the wealth producing civilization of modern China? Are the fabulous resources already tapped scientifically, or are they still allowed to lie dormant? And the industries that once carried the Celestial Empire's name far and wide—where do they now stand? In the high tide of promise and success, or are they also in the ebb tide of impatient stagnation? An answer to these questions will be suggested in the following pages. Here it may be summed up as follows: the general awakening of the nation is not without its energizing influence on the national industries; nevertheless, the satisfactory progress cannot be termed an industrial revolution, without overshooting the mark.

Instead the phenomenon may be described as a period of promising transition which will inevitably lead to the final

revolution in the nation's industrial system. This is not because of lack of energy on the people's part. The causes are rather to be sought in extraordinary circumstances—the war in Europe, the civil war in the Republic, and the lack of modern communications. While the hostilities in Europe continue, foreign manufacturers are unable to supply China's demand for latest goods and machinery, owing to the absorbing interests nearer home and scarcity of shipping. While the civil strife is unreconciled, all trade and industries are paralyzed, and every field of activity succumbs to the benumbing influence of militarism. But even then, Chinese artisans, farmers, and merchants are competent to cope with the adverse situation—such is their remarkable vitality and resourcefulness—provided the country is blessed with adequate means of rapid communication. If laboring under disheartening difficulties, the nation is yet able to register creditable industrial progress, its industrial future may be better imagined than described when, it is earnestly hoped, in the next decade or so the country will have, for example, at least 20,000 miles of railways as well as other modern facilities for intercommunication. Prophecies are usually discounted, but in the present case whether one prophesies or not, China's industrial future can never be in doubt. After all, we are thinking of the future in terms of the present—a present which is in every way gratifying when all the surrounding circumstances are taken into consideration.

Admittedly it is beyond the scope of the present volume to traverse the field of industrial and commercial progress with anything like comprehensiveness. All we can do is to discuss here and there some of the numerous indications. There is no question whatsoever of China's wonderful potentialities in this respect; therefore some survey of the progress already made will portray the vista of rich possibilities.

Considering that the country's industries have been built up for centuries on the old, primitive hand-driven methods, it is rash to expect that they can all be transformed in a decade or two which, as already stated, in a nation of vast distances and long epochs, seems but a matter of an overnight. Hence, the possibilities about to be mentioned will concern chiefly the new or modern industries. Perhaps in another generation or two the majority of native industries will also be modernized;

meanwhile the influence of modern Westernism has touched only the fringe of the nation's resources.

China is sometimes referred to as the Land of the Blue Gown, because the blue cotton gown is worn so very much by the bulk of the population. This may come as a shock to those who have heard it said that people in this land of milk and honey, where men and women eat and drink from vessels of gold and silver, wear nothing but robes of silk and satin. If this is the case, they may be assured that both cotton and silk gowns are worn—the former by the middle and lower classes, and the latter by the well-to-do, especially when silk textures make the coolest apparel in hot seasons. But the Chinese do not eat or drink from vessels of gold and silver, for that is a privilege reserved for earthly monarchs and powerful potentates. It may be cruel to shatter such a myth, but it is better to know that humanity is the same all the world over than to hug the delusion that some portion of the human race is regally favored while another portion is left to starve and die.

The cotton gown being therefore a national garment, it is only natural that China's industrial progress should early develop along that direction. Twenty years ago, it is said, there was not one Chinese mill in the country; to-day, according to statistics compiled in June, 1920, "there are 35 Chinese-owned cotton mills in operation, of which seven have weaving equipment. These 35 mills operate 728,112 spindles and 2,890 looms and have 277,316 spindles and 1,500 on order." In addition 17 mills are being erected, for which 318,016 spindles and 1,510 looms have already been ordered. Consequently their annual production is at least 250 million pounds of yarn and 60 million yards of cloth. If we add to the Chinese-owned mills the number of those operated by foreigners, then the total for the whole of China will be no less than 1,500,000 spindles and 7,000 machine looms—not to mention the tens of thousands of native hand looms in use throughout the country.

Since the advent of the Republic in 1912, there has been a steady decrease in the importation of foreign cotton goods and corresponding increase of Chinese mill-made cotton goods. Cotton exports from China increased from 805,711 piculs (one picul is equal to 133 and one-third lbs.) in 1912 to

1,292,094 piculs in 1918. Last year the export decreased slightly to 1,072,000 piculs, but the "Trade Returns" for 1919 notes that "the products of mills in China are increasing in favor and their rivalry with the foreign article, though not formidable as yet, is beginning to make itself felt."

The primitive methods of growing cotton being unsatisfactory, steps have already been taken to produce better results. The Chinese cotton mill owners' association in Shanghai—already referred to in connection with their patriotic offer to relieve the rice shortage in that port a few months ago—has appointed a committee on extension and improvement, under the chairmanship of Mr. H. Y. Moh, the "Cotton King" of China. The association has established seventeen experimental tracts, in seven of the fourteen cotton-producing provinces, in addition to three experimental stations erected by the government at Peking, Wuchang (capital of Hupeh province and opposite Hankow, on the Yangtze River) and Nan-tung-chow, China's "Model City." Moreover, the association is also sending students to the United States to specialize on cotton culture, and a number of young men in the experimental station areas are sent by the association during the summer holidays to the cotton fields to study the crop conditions. As indication of the growing interest in the subject, "there is a keen demand for technical knowledge, and to supply this the association is translating from English to Chinese several textile works by recognized British and American authorities. It publishes a daily market report to members, so interior mill owners are kept in touch with yarn and cotton prices in Shanghai and foreign ports." Accordingly we find the following significant statement in the "Trade Returns" for last year:—"Recent estimates of China's total production (of raw cotton) vary from 10,000,000 to 12,000,000 piculs, a figure which places her third on the list of cotton-producing countries. In view of the world-wide demand, reflected in the unprecedented prices now paid for raw cotton, China is now in a position to take advantage of these favorable circumstances and to become a formidable competitor of her rivals"—namely, first, India and, second, the United States.

While we are on the subject of new mills, the following

further testimony from the above "Trade Returns" is interesting:—"The development of wheat cultivation and the attendant increase in the flour-milling industry are a conspicuous feature of the economic industry of recent years. Many writers have drawn attention to the wheat-producing potentialities of Manchuria, but less is known of these of north China and the central Yangtze regions where, however, the greatest advance has been made in respect of increased production. To illustrate the change that has taken place, no comparison could be more effective than that between the figures of 1913 and those of 1919, when 119,451 and 2,694,271 piculs of flour respectively were exported. . . . The imports of flour, which were 2,596,821 piculs in 1913, had shrunk to 271,328 piculs in 1919. Of wheat 4,453,471 piculs were exported abroad in 1919, against 1,848,071 piculs in 1913. Besides this, there is a very large interprovincial trade in wheat and flour, and there can be no doubt that owing to its comparative cheapness, the use of wheat flour is becoming as general in China as it is in Japan, where the production has increased 54 per cent. in the past ten years." In corroboration of the foregoing, the number of machine flour mills is estimated by one authority at seventy, with a daily capacity of 35,000 barrels, consuming about fifty million bushels of wheat annually.

After cotton comes silk, the most valuable of China's exports. The export figures for 1913, the previous "record" year, and 1919 are respectively 149,000 and 165,000 piculs—the export of raw silk which represents 25 per cent. of the world's supply, alone accounting for 100 million taels, or one-sixth of the entire export trade for last year. Chinese silk having deteriorated and in consequence suffered adversely from competition with that of other countries, efforts are now being made to improve sericulture by modern, scientific methods, especially as 90 per cent. of the cocoons at present used for breeding are known to be more or less diseased. Mainly through the instrumentality of Mr. Ting Ju-lin, a prominent silk merchant, who on his own initiative had been for some years engaged in improving the quality of Chinese silk, an international committee for the improvement of sericulture in China was formed, at Shanghai, of both Chinese and foreign chambers of commerce as well as the foreign silk association.

As a result, the Peking government promised a monthly grant of four thousand taels, the services of an expert from Indo-China were secured, and schools established at six stations in Kiangsu and Chekiang—the principal silk-producing districts. One of these stations is attached to the University of Nanking, established by missionaries. In addition to identifying itself with the movement for the improvement of cotton culture in coöperation with the Chinese cotton mill owners' association, this enterprising institution is giving a short course in sericulture, trying to produce commercially certified silkworm eggs, according to the Pasteur method, and also experimenting with the production of the mulberry on a commercial scale. As regards seed cocoons, "the stations of its silk institute will select specimens from the silk districts, classify them, and study them according to their value, both to the breeder and spinner. The best varieties and their cross-breeding will be sorted out, and the seeds thus produced will be distributed to the breeders."

As the "Trade Returns" for 1918 remarked:—"The superior quality of Chinese silk is fully established and universally recognized; it only remains to secure an increase of quantity by the adoption of scientific culture." Last year the United States was the greatest buyer, and the "Trade Returns" for 1919 reports:—"The increase in value when expressed in gold was from about U. S. $6.50 a pound to something like U. S. $15 for best chops steam filatures—a striking testimony to the increasing popularity of silk fabrics in Europe and America." [1]

After silk comes tea, the second of China's staple products. Within recent years the trade in this commodity has been severely handicapped owing to keen competition with teas manufactured in other countries. Hence attempts have also been made to introduce modern scientific methods. "Among these are an experimental and testing farm in Anhui, working under the auspices of the Ministry of Agriculture and Commerce; the Ningchow Tea Plantations, Limited, which is

[1] A Chinese silk commission, representing the raw silk industry of China, attended the International Silk Exhibition held at New York, February 7-12, 1921. Included in the party were three Chinese working girls and one machinist who staged an actual demonstration of Chinese silk reeling processes.

the first Chinese tea estate to adopt manufacture by machinery; and the China Model Tea Estate, Limited, which also uses improved methods. The greatly altered conditions brought about by the war and by the eclipse of Russia may not improbably lead to a change, long contemplated and desired by many, namely, the removal to Shanghai of the tea business hitherto done at Hankow (Hupeh), Kiukiang (Kiangsi) and Foochow (capital of Fukien province). The market for all kinds of tea would then center in one place, which would undoubtedly be of advantage to all concerned." As regards the experiments at the Ningchow plantations, last season they produced 70 piculs of fine tea which fetched 40 taels per picul, but it is stated that "this estate will come into full bearing (estimated production 5,000 piculs per season) in about seven to eight years from now."

As evidence of the country's industrial progress it is interesting to note that the following industries are assuming positions of importance:—soap and candle factories, match factories, ice and aerated water factories, factories for the preparation of egg products, knitting mills, canneries, cement and brick works, chemical works, dockyards, shipbuilding and engineering works, electric light works, furniture factories, glass and porcelain works, cold storage plants, tanneries, oil mills, paper mills, printing and lithographic works, railway shops, rice hulling and cleaning mills, sawmills, modern silk filatures, silk mills, sugar refineries, tobacco factories, water works, woolen factories and arsenals. Hence the "Trade Returns" for last year reports as follows:—

"Many new industrial banks were established by Chinese during the year on foreign lines in support of various trade interests. The development of industrial enterprises—in textiles especially—was apparently only limited by the impossibility of obtaining the necessary machinery. There are few foreign-type articles of domestic use that are not now manufactured in China by factories on modern lines, the majority of them without foreign assistance. Out of a long list the following may be mentioned:—enameledware; silk and cotton clothing and underwear; toilet articles; umbrellas; woolen yarn; mother-of-pearl, bone, and horn buttons; chemicals; needles; electric lamps; telephone appliances; asbestos manufactures; wine; beer; beet sugar; glassware; window glass.

Weaving and flour mills were exceptionally active during the year. Shipbuilding on a considerable scale may now be counted as one of the established industries of China, capable of great expansion. According to Lloyd's shipping returns there were launched from Chinese yards during 1919 vessels aggregating 12,307 tons. A new building yard at Shanghai has recently been added. New mining enterprises have recently been started in different parts of the country, and such old-established institutions as the Hanyehping Corporation and the Kailan Mining Administration are greatly extending their plant and operations."

One of the newest industries known to the Western world is the export trade in soya bean and bean products. Its story reads almost like romance and since 1909, when it first became prominent as an article of export, its production has increased in the space of ten years by 50 per cent. So the manufacture of beancake and bean oil is now "one of the most important industries in China."

The following comparative table setting forth the ten principal exports of the country will show best the remarkable strides China's industries have made:—

	1913	1919
Raw Silk	Piculs 149,000	Piculs 165,000
Seed oils	1,287,000	4,433,000
Beancake	11,818,000	20,725,000
Beans	10,325,000	15,119,000
Wheat	1,848,000	4,453,000
Flour	119,000	2,694,000
Raw cotton	739,000	1,072,000
Sesamum seed	2,035,000	2,838,000
Goat skins	7,794,000	13,832,000
Tea	1,442,000	690,000

The total exports for last year were valued at Tls. 630,-809,411, equivalent at the average sterling exchange for the year of 6 shillings and 4 pence, to £199,756,331—the highest figure yet recorded in the history of the country—and for the first time in the annals of China's foreign trade the imports and exports more or less balanced, the imports being valued at Tls. 646,997,681. This is partly due to a general rise in prices, but it is also due to the results of increased production in almost all exports except tea and certain metals, the demand for which fell off with the termination of the World

War. Of the export total that of raw silk, as already mentioned, represents 100 million taels. The other articles come in the following order:—seed oils, 46 million; beancake, 44 million; beans, 39 million; cereals (including flour), 36 million; raw cotton, 30 million; skins and hides, 26 million; seeds and seedcake, 25 million; eggs and egg albumen and yolk, 25 million; tea, 22 million; metals, especially iron ore, 22 million; wool, 14 million; sugar, 9 million; frozen and preserved meats, 8 million; cotton goods, 7½ million; coal, 7 million; straw braid, 7 million; tobacco, 7 million; cigarettes, 6 million; ground nuts, 6 million; lard, 4¾ million; bristles, 4¾ million; fibers, 4 million; chinaware, 3¾ million; animal and vegetable tallow, 3½ million; grasscloth, 3 million; liquorice, 2¼ million; lace, 2 million; and camphor, 1½ million.

That modern industries have come to stay is eloquently proved by the following import figures for 1913 and 1919:—

		1913	1919
Building materials	Tls.	2,444,787	5,786,924
Casks, empty and shooks	"	634,714	3,171,626
Electrical materials	"	2,322,339	4,991,811
Gasoline, etc.	"	465,577	2,174,748
India-rubber goods	"	360,529	1,461,198
Machinery	"	4,650,001	14,100,439
Kerosene oil	Gallons	183,984,052	199,309,753
Lubricating oil	"	2,449,586	5,915,435
Soap and soap-making materials	Tls.	2,684,511	3,329,426
Locomotives and tenders	"	768,628	10,296,347
Railway cars and wagons	"	1,193,823	4,833,224
Motor cars and lorries	"	485,182	2,158,998
Bicycles	"	128,957	168,644
Liquid fuel	Tons	12,065	37,148
Paper	Tls.	7,169,255	10,212,652
Iron ores	Piculs	1,596	614,515
Iron and mild steel, manufactured and old	"	3,520,049	4,948,536

If during the war the cry of the belligerent nations had been for ships, ships, and more ships, the cry of modern industries in China is machinery, machinery, and still more machinery. As the customs report, already cited, puts it:—"The development of industrial enterprises was apparently only limited by the impossibility of obtaining the necessary machinery." The Chinese government treasury may be in difficulty, but the merchants and trading classes are affluent. Hence, as already stated, almost 600,000 spindles and 2,400 looms are under

order for the growing number of Chinese owned cotton mills, etc. And hence the import of cigars and cigarettes despite the growing production of native-made commodity, notably by the Nanyang Brothers Tobacco Manufacturers, increased respectively from mille 38,565 and 6,209,037 in 1913 to mille 49,176 and 7,771,947 in 1919—an aggregate of 21 million taels for last year, which constitutes an evidence indeed "of a considerable degree of comfort and prosperity throughout the land." But modern industries having taken their place in the pulsating life of an awakened nation, foodstuffs and dyes, etc., are now imported in decreasing quantities, to wit:

		1913	1919
Rice and paddy	Piculs	5,414,896	1,809,749
Coal	Tons	1,690,892	1,172,823
Dyes, aniline	Tls.	5,401,820	3,042,917
Indigo, artificial	Piculs	319,576	18,795
Flour	"	2,596,821	271,328
Matches	Gross	28,448,155	16,598,943
Milk, condensed	Dozens	483,720	402,326
Sugar of all kinds	Piculs	7,111,728	5,187,875

Just as the ancients in the West produced feats of engineering which even to-day excite the envy of modern engineers—such as the gigantic pyramids and sphinxes of Egypt, the Colossus of Rhodes, the hanging gardens of Babylon, etc.—so the Great Wall—over 1,000 miles in length and 2,000 years old—the Grand Canal, the wonderful bridges and architectures and the salt wells of Tze-liu-tsing of China are now equally admired. The last are situated in the western province of Szechuan, one of the richest provinces still waiting to be linked up with the coast by the railway. The borings to a depth of 3,000 feet, sometimes through solid rock, with mere bamboo poles shod with iron, and with power supplied mostly by the brawn of the human—a labor requiring years of unceasing toil—are universally acclaimed as one of China's extraordinary engineering feats. There are over 4,000 wells in the whole district, and in 1914 a total of 4,282,354 piculs of salt were produced. As evidence of the need of scientific development, it may be pointed out that the natural gas, which is found in abundance in the district, is almost an entire dead loss, being allowed to burn at will and thus lighting up the place for miles at a time.

In these days of modern factories and workshops, the most

conspicuous of China's industries are its arsenals, ironworks and shipbuilding yards. Of the first there are no less than fifteen, all erected by the government and situated in twelve provinces. The two in Shanghai and Hanyang appear to be the most efficient, to judge from occasional reports of their production; otherwise the supply is unequal to the demand. For example, during the last few years' civil strife the import of munitions of war jumped from Tls. 166,532 to Tls. 14,093,-024. This, of course, is owing to the extraordinary situation. The figures for 1913 and 1919 are however Tls 6,738,454 and Tls. 2,496,578. There are also seven government mints in seven provinces, and a new one is in course of erection at Shanghai.

As to shipyards, the "Trade Returns" already cited, reports that "shipbuilding on a considerable scale may now be counted as one of the established industries of China, capable of great expansion." The most noteworthy of these Chinese yards is the Kiangnan Dock and Engineering Works, situated at Shanghai on the Whangpoo waterfront. Originally started as a naval yard fifty years ago, it is now a commercial enterprise, though owned by the government. Occupying over forty acres of land it is China's premier shipbuilder. The technical staff comprises both Chinese and foreigners, the proportion being fifteen foreign experts to nine Chinese engineers. On an average it has built one ship in two weeks, some of them executed to the order of foreign governments. It has a dry dock of 545 feet long on blocks, with a depth of nineteen feet on sill, and six berths for steamers of 500 feet or more, besides numerous berths and slips for smaller vessels. In the summer of 1918 the United States Shipping Board contracted with the works to build four 10,000-ton deadweight cargo steamers, and within the last two months (June-August, 1920) two of these have been launched—each 439 feet long, 55 feet beam, with a loaded draft of 27 feet six inches and equipped with a triple expansion engine—which are easily the largest ships ever constructed in China. They have been christened respectively *Mandarin* and *Celestial*.[1] It was understood that upon the quartette proving satisfactory—they are built strictly

[1] The other two steamers *Oriental* and *Cathay* have since been launched; while *Mandarin* has made her maiden voyage to San Francisco, and *Celestial* performed her first official trial outside Woosung successfully (May, 1921).

according to the specifications of the American Shipping Board—the Kiangnan Dock might be given a further option to construct eight more sister vessels. The original contract provided for the supply of 35,000 tons of steel by the United States government—a quantity which was believed to be sufficient for a total of 120,000 tons shipping—and payment of thirty million gold dollars. Considering there are other foreign shipbuilders in Shanghai, not to say in other parts of the world, the acquisition of the above contract is regarded as a distinct feather in the cap of the foremost Chinese shipbuilding yard.

Quite near the Kiangnan Dock is the Nicholas Tsu Engineering Works, the best example of private enterprise. Father of Lieutenant Etienne Tsu, who served as an airman with the French army during the war and was decorated with the Croix de Guerre, Tsu started about eighteen years ago in an unpretentious way. Since then he has built up a shipbuilding trade which, as regards private owned yards, is certainly the most creditable. In comparison his yard is smaller in size than the government-owned neighbor; even then, there are no less than one thousand men on the monthly pay roll. The work is done entirely by Chinese, except that in conformity with the requirements of the Maritime Customs and harbor regulations, under which the shipbuilder's plans drafted by his own draughtsmen must be approved by a recognized foreign engineer, a foreign consulting engineer is retained. Like the Kiangnan Dock, the Nicholas Tsu Works also repairs and builds vessels, although on a smaller scale: for example, prior to the order of 10,000 tonners by the American Shipping Board, its two 3,500 tonners for transporting salt to Indo-China were the biggest vessels launched on the Whangpoo River. And like the former, the latter also manufactures rails and railway cars, bridge beams, boilers, tramcars, etc., for various railway lines and business houses. In addition, the latter possesses a unique advantage unknown to the former. Namely, Tsu himself is the owner of an iron mine not far from Nanking (eight hours' train journey from Shanghai); hence with the installation of a blast furnace in the Shanghai works, producing a daily output of over thirty tons of pig iron, he is independent of outside ore supply.

Undoubtedly the most convincing prognostication of

China's industrial future is the achievement of the Hanyehping Company, one of the Republic's modern wonders. Like many other industries, its story is also one of romance and marvel. Founded in 1890 by Viceroy Chang Chih-tung, whose epoch-making treatise on "China's Only Hope" in favor of sending students abroad we have already noted, it is the first as well as leading steel works in the country, supplying a goodly portion of steel rails and girders for the different railways. It is a commercial enterprise; but owing to the Revolutions of 1911 and 1913 and also inability to secure money from the government, it has since borrowed between fifty and seventy million Yen from Japanese banks, as a result of which the Japanese government steel plant at Yawata is said to have secured an advantageous contract for both ore and pig iron. Accordingly, in the course of the famous Twenty-one Demands presented by Japan in 1915 and consequent Sino-Japanese treaties, it was agreed between Peking and Tokyo that "if in future the Hanyehping Company and the Japanese capitalists agree upon coöperation, the Chinese Government, in view of the intimate relations subsisting between the Japanese capitalists and the said Company, will forthwith give its permission. The Chinese Government further agrees not to confiscate the said Company, nor without the consent of the Japanese capitalists to convert it into a state enterprise, nor cause it to borrow and use foreign capital other than Japanese."

Altogether the company possesses three plants—a steel works at Hanyang, opposite Hankow and Wuchang on the Yangtze and Han rivers; an iron mine at Tayeh, 65 miles down the Yangtze River; and a colliery at Pinghsiang, near Changsha (capital of Hunan province), about 218 miles south of Hankow. The iron mine being situated 18 miles from the bank, the ore has to be shipped 83 miles to Hanyang, although there is a standard gauge railway line connecting the mine with the river front. To overcome this inconvenience, a new iron and steel works is being erected at Tayeh, under the supervision of Dr. Oshima, a Japanese engineer. The colliery at Pinghsiang operates two mines, and their combined daily output is about 3,000 tons. Part of the coal is sold in the open market, but the bulk goes to make coke for the steel works at Hanyang. The ore deposits at Tayeh are believed to be the richest in the whole country and their total

is estimated at one hundred million tons. "At present the ore is simply blasted in quarries, after the vein has first been stripped off the rocks on both sides. The limestone is suitable for use as flux in the blast furnaces. The quarried ore is loaded into mine wagons and transported by self-working inclines to the railroad terminus where, by means of toppers, it is dumped into railway cars. Extensive improvements are now being made with a view to producing one million tons annually," reports a foreign observer.

The iron and steel works at Hanyang occupies an area of one hundred and seventy acres. From its favorable situation —Hankow, on the opposite bank, will soon develop into the Chicago of China, when the Canton-Hankow line is completed and the Hankow-Szechuan is also constructed—it is provided with every transportation facility, since ocean-going steamers can come to the wharf on the Yangtze frontage. Land having been purchased south of the works on the other side of the Tortoise Hill—one of the principal scenes in the Revolution of 1911—it was proposed to connect the present plant with the new site by a tunnel through the hill. Owing to the above-mentioned Twenty-one Demands the local population have come to regard the Hanyehping Company as a Japanese concern and since then have successfully opposed the tunnel construction. "The layout of the company is such that the product is moved in proper sequence from start to finish from east to west, as follows:—

"1. Blast furnace, where iron is extracted from iron ores.
"2. Melting shop, or open hearth plant, where the iron from blast furnaces is manufactured into steel.
"3. Rolling mills, where steel ingots from the melting shop are rolled into sections of various shapes.
"4. Finishing shop, where the products are cut and finished for the markets. From the finishing shop, the finished products are transported back to the wharf by a railway line running parallel to the plants."

While the present managing director of the company is a former minister of foreign affairs, the superintendent of all the work is Dr. Z. T. K. Woo, a graduate from Sheffield University. As already stated, Dr. Oshima is in charge of the

construction of the new steel works at Tayeh which now occupies 670 acres, and when all the machinery is complete, it is claimed, it will become the most modern steel and iron foundry in the whole Far East. The company has in addition to the properties already named, also manganese mines in Hupeh and Hunan, and likewise a low phosphorous iron mine in the former province. As part discharge of the company's obligations it shipped last year 300,000 tons of ore from the Tayeh mines and 50,000 tons of pig iron from the Hanyang works to the Japanese steel plant at Yawata. Railroad construction having been greatly retarded since the outbreak of the World War, the rail mill at Hanyang has only been running at one-half of its normal efficiency. On the whole, however, notwithstanding the civil war and other adverse factors, the production seems to have steadily increased, to judge from the following figures of exported iron and steel products reported by the customs authorities at Hankow:—

	Rails		*Pig Iron*	*Iron Ore*
1914	Piculs	290,743	1,201,473	4,950,960
1915	"	70,572	1,415,340	5,050,416
1916	"	149,231	1,740,964	4,830,050
1917	"	326,842	1,879,317	5,413,811
1918	"	11,098	2,006,794	5,390,280
1919	"	10,879	1,709,398	6,317,388

With a view to making the country more and more independent of foreign steel—the figures for steel import in 1913 and 1919 are respectively 149,701 and 214,031 piculs—one new blast furnace was installed two months ago and another is already under order. The former is situated near Hankow, on the Yangtze River, and erected by the Yangtze Engineering Works, Limited, a Chinese company. The furnace is designed to produce one hundred tons of sand cast pig iron per day, and at the inauguration ceremony Mr. Wong Kwong, the general manager, who is a graduate from the United States, gave expression to the following remarks:

"It has often been commented on that China, with her vast population and territory, should do more in the development of her iron industry, which is the backbone of all industries, than she had done in the past; and acting on this principle, we have been bold enough to make this modest attempt in adding one more furnace in China Proper to those already in existence in

Hanyang, so long the solitary beacon in this realm of industrial possibilities. Our aim is not one of rivalry with others but of mutual help and coöperation, as we believe that there is room for more. The plant which you see to-day is modern in every respect, and with the exception of the furnace, the hot stoves and dust catcher with their connections, the whole plant and equipment were designed by the engineering staff of the Yangtze Engineering Works, and the materials for the whole plant (excepting pumps and three ready-made engines) were fabricated and erected by us. Owing to the considerable delay attending the acquirement of the required land, the foundation work was not commenced until the latter part of January, 1919, and the furnace would have been completed earlier, had it not been for the one or two months of flood we had last year, and the month of snowing weather we had in the early part of this year."

The latter, which is now under order, will be erected by the end of 1921—ten miles west of Peking, on the Yungting River, in a district rich with iron, limestone and other raw materials. The concern putting it up is the Lung-Yen Mining Administration, one-half of the capital being subscribed by the government. The requisite machinery is being ordered from America, and the furnace when completed will be the beginning of a new steel plant intended to produce every form of steel and iron products. Its installation will be a great step in the industrial development of the country and a suitable complement to the furnaces already in operation in Hanyang, Ta-yeh and Hankow.

In addition to these there are many successful joint enterprises between Chinese and foreigners—notably the Anglo-Chinese Kailan Mining Administration, in Chihli, producing three million tons of coal a year; the Sino-Japanese Pen-shi-hu Coal Mining Company, in South Manchuria, producing three hundred thousand tons of coal and fifty thousand tons of iron a year; and the Sino-Belgian Lin-cheng Coal Mining Administration, in Chihli, producing some two hundred and sixty thousand tons of coal a year.

One of the latest is the Sino-American Yunnan Ming Hsing Mining Company, formed last September by the provincial government of Yunnan and the Orient Mines Company of New York, to work the silver and lead mines of the province. Since March, 1918, one million dollars have already been expended on

investigation work by thirty odd American engineers under Mr. J. W. Finch. Although three of its five directors are Americans, yet it is registered as a purely Chinese corporation operating under a Chinese charter. If joint mining enterprises between Chinese and foreigners had not been promising in the past, the present undertaking will go a long way towards inducing mutual coöperation by reason of the fair spirit manifested by the American partners. For example, although one-half of the entire interest is owned by the Chinese, yet they are not required to bear any of the initial expenses for purposes of prospecting and investigation, etc. Situated on high tablelands in the southwestern part of China, Yunnan abounds in minerals, being one of the largest tin producers. In size it is smaller than Szechuan, but there are only thirteen million people to 146,718 square miles. Even at present the province is inaccessible to other parts of China, and a native of Yunnan traveling from Peking finds it quickest to entrain to Shanghai, thence embark for Haiphong, the nearest port in Indo-China, either direct or via Hongkong, and thence entrain on the French concessioned line to Yunnanfu, the provincial capital—a journey of over fifteen days! Assuredly with the Sino-American development of the silver, lead and other mines of Yunnan, the problem of convenient communication with the outside world will be attended to seriously.

As a concrete proof of the country's industrial possibilities the example of Wusih (literally meaning "Tinless") in Kiangsu may be noted. Distant three hours by train from Shanghai, it is already competing with the Republic's commercial and industrial metropolis. Because of its numerous canals it is generally referred to as the "Venice of China"; now because of its remarkable economic strides, it is known as the "Industrial City of China," just as Nan-tung-chow is the "Model City of China." Being easy of communication and with a population of some six hundred thousand, it is famous for its silk industry: "the silk produced is noted for its strength and sheen, and many of the 'chops' are well known in the New York and European markets." According to *Millard's Review*—an American weekly published at Shanghai—of July 17, 1920, the following are some of the city's leading industries:—

"Fourteen modern steam silk filatures that produce the beautiful skeins of China silk so popular in America and Europe.

Eleven modern mechanical rice mills. Five large flour mills with machinery just like that to be seen in Minneapolis and Duluth. Three large cotton textile mills using English machinery that produce much of the yarn consumed in the Yangtze valley. Two cotton seed and bean oil mills. One modern electric light and power plant. One modern telephone system with 600 branch phones. One modern brewery. (This brewery is not yet in operation, but the equipment is all on the ground. Yes! It's the famous American brewery that raised the storm in China missionary circles a year ago. The equipment was bought in America and brought to China by a Chinese merchant.) Four modern style banks—Bank of China, Bank of Communications, Shanghai Commercial and Savings Bank, and the Kiangsu Bank. In addition there are approximately 30 native style banks. A few miles of modern paved roads which are being extended, and probably more than 150 miles of modern canals that are so congested with traffic that the visitor often has difficulty in getting through. One new cotton mill under construction, the machinery for which is to be half American and half British, and in addition two more large cotton spinning and weaving mills are on order and awaiting machinery. There are 120 primary schools, 4 middle schools, 1 high school, 1 technical textile school, and 1 sericulture experimental station. The public library in the center of a beautiful park has 170,000 volumes and they have all been accumulated since the Revolution (1911). The library was formerly a temple—certainly a good use for a temple—while nearby another temple has been converted into a hospital. Adjoining the library is an institution, the like of which exists nowhere else in China to the writer's knowledge: that is, a public lecture hall, where meetings are held three times a week. The attendance averages 200 and the lectures cover public health, sanitation, education and similar subjects. The school attendance is about 17,000, about twenty per cent. of the number being girls. . . . Probably the most modern cotton spinning mill is electrically operated, and the electrical equipment contains the trade mark 'A.G.E.'—I think that is the combination that stands for the great before-the-war German electrical enterprise. This is the only cotton mill in China outside of the new American equipped mills at Shanghai that the writer has seen that has individual motors connected directly to the spinning frames, thus eliminating the forest of overhead shafting

and belting, so general in older-style mill construction. . . . There are said to be approximately 20,000 employees in the various factories, most of them being women, especially in silk filatures. The wage runs from 15 cents for beginners to 45 cents a day for the older employees."

Here is in brief an indication of the country's almost illimitable industrial possibilities. Through the occasional holding of commercial and industrial exhibitions, the commercial classes have learned to appreciate the necessity of so manufacturing their goods as to command a salable market even in foreign countries. Hence the perfume products of the H. A. Manufacturing Company, first organized in 1915 in San Francisco and three years later at Shanghai, are known as far as South America, Mexico, Cuba and the United States; and the macaroni delicacies of the Hing Wah Paste Manufacturing Company, established at Shanghai four and a half years ago, are rapidly becoming known all over the world through the company's "Rooster Brand." Hence the successful Nanyang Brothers Tobacco Manufacturers, first established at Singapore fifteen years ago and since then removed to Hongkong and Shanghai, which employ no less than 2,000 girls and 1,000 men without any foreign assistance, are already a formidable competitor with foreign tobacco manufacturers: two years ago they presented two million cigarettes of their own make to the American army in France as a token of China's tribute to Uncle Sam. Hence there are now thirty-four modern match factories with an annual output of 150,000 tons. And hence, to mention still another new industry, the paints of Chen Hua Company, established two years ago at Shanghai and growing from a partnership capital of $10,000 to a limited company of ten times that amount, are also being exported to Singapore, Straits Settlements, and Japan, etc. It is reported that the plant was recently visited by Mr. John Dewar, of the International Paint and Composition Company, London, who after thorough examination of its paints, "expressed much satisfaction at the excellent work done by this pioneer Chinese paint company."

Six or seven months ago a special high industrial commissioner was appointed by the government to tour the provinces and ascertain existing commercial and industrial conditions,

with a view to accelerating the intensive as well as extensive development of the nation's industries, both native and modern. This appointment was followed by that of another charged with the duty of making investigations regarding the country's hides, fur and wool, and that of still another to investigate into the trade in cereals, etc. In the end such increased attention will tremendously encourage the industrial development, but it appears from press reports that gratifying results are already being shown. For example, the high industrial commissioner, in reply to a request from the Chinese chamber of commerce in Tientsin, recently tendered the following advice concerning the proper method of cataloguing and assembling Chinese products for export to foreign countries:—

"The principal exports of our country are in their order of importance: silk, tea, cotton, beans, hides (raw and prepared), hemp, hair and bristles, peanuts, medicinal herbs, raw varnish, vegetable oils, dried flesh and fish, straw and tobacco. The great difficulty with foreign merchants in endeavoring to purchase Chinese goods for export is the lack of proper clearing house facilities among the Chinese for getting the products together in large quantities. Foreigners wish to ship in cargo lots, but at present they are compelled to employ compradores and native agents to scour the country to get together any large shipment of one particular product. Therefore, your Chamber should guide its members who wish to do export business into lines which will enable them to collect correlated and similar products in one locality. There is, however, another deterrent to foreign trade which should be at once banned—namely, the adulteration and false impersonation of goods. Trademarks and descriptions must be absolutely accurate and truthful; otherwise, the commercial prestige of China will suffer grievously."

Needless to say, the advice will be acted upon, and the dialogue reported at a mass meeting held in the same port to boycott "inferior" goods and develop national industries, noted in a previous chapter, will show the direction of the industrial wind. Whereas Chinese products used to be exported to foreign countries through the medium of foreign traders in the treaty ports—a process which is necessarily slow and cumber-

some but one dictated by the inability of Chinese producers linguistically to negotiate directly with foreign buyers—that method is gradually being discarded. As mentioned in an earlier chapter, many of the Western returned students are temporarily entering the commercial field, and this is especially true of the growing import and export trade. Consequently, on the one hand Chinese products are being expeditiously brought to the attention of foreign consumers by the producers themselves, and on the other hand the foreign traders in China are free to devote themselves entirely to the increasing task of bringing improved foreign commodities to the notice of Chinese consumers, a process which will ultimately promote a greater volume of international trade between China and the world. Already the volume of the Republic's foreign trade has exceeded during the last two years the 1,000,000,000 tael mark. This would work out at 2.50 tael per capita of China's population, whereas Australasia, we are told, can boast of a foreign trade sixty-five times that of the Republic. Once, however, the start in the right direction has been made, and especially with the construction of say 20,000 more miles of new railways and other intercommunication facilities, it ought not to take the Chinese long to develop a foreign trade of Tls. 65,000,000,000 in imports and exports.

Pre-eminently the best testimony of the Republic's material progress is the remarkable increase in its foreign trade. Whereas the number of treaty ports—that is, ports or marts which are opened by Sino-foreign treaties to alien trade and residence—has increased from sixteen in 1867—shortly after the inauguration of the present efficient Maritime Customs service under foreign supervision—to fifty in 1919, the volume of foreign trade has soared from less than two million silver dollars to over two and a quarter billion dollars during the two corresponding years. (The unit of customs collection is however the Haikuan tael, which last year was worth $1.68 silver, or 6 shillings and 4 pence, or $1.39 gold. This rate is by no means uniform: for example, in 1912, one Haikuan tael was equivalent to $1.49 silver, or 2 shillings eight and five-sixteenths pence, or sixty-six cents gold. As the principal part of the customs revenue is reserved for the payment of foreign loans and other gold commitments abroad—e. g. the Boxer indemnity —the increased value of the tael in sterling is always an advantage to China.)

In terms of taels the gross value of last year's foreign trade in goods (treasure excluded) is Tls. 1,342,870,818. Of this the net value after deducting re-exports is Tls. 1,277,807,092. "These sums expressed in silver represent an enormous advance on those of any previous year. Expressed in gold at the average exchange rate on New York for the year, they show an increase of 219 per cent. over 1910 and of 150 per cent. over 1913." Of the entire trade the aggregate value of imports is Tls. 646,997,681 which is equivalent to £204,882,599, and that of exports Tls. 630,809,411 or £199,756,331. The import total means therefore an augmentation of Tls. 92,104,599 over 1918 and of Tls. 76,835,124 over 1913—a remarkable advance, we are told, despite the practical elimination of opium, which in 1913 represented 41 million taels and in 1919 only a quarter of a million taels. The export figure represents in sterling an advance of 55 per cent. over 1918 and of 288 per cent. over 1913; and in silver, of 30 per cent. over 1918 and 56 per cent over 1913. Altogether this is by far the highest figure recorded in the history of the country, and "for the first time since statistics were available, the value of her exports at the moment of shipment all but balanced that of her imports." [1]

A few pages back we gave some particulars about exports. As regards imports, of the total value of 647 million taels for last year cotton goods provided no less than 210 million; metals, 56.6 million; kerosene oil, 46.7 million; sugar, 35 million; cigarettes and cigars, 21.8 million; locomotives and railway cars, 15 million; machinery, 14 million; coal, 12.5 million; fish and fishery products, 11 million; paper, 10.2 million; and motor-cars, 2.1 million.

Bigger foreign trade spells larger revenue returns; hence the collection by the Customs rose from 36 million taels in 1918 to 46 million in 1919, although the pre-war year 1913, which constituted the next best record, netted 44 million.[2] The

[1] The net value of China's foreign trade in 1920, excluding treasure, totalled Tls. 1,303,881,530, of which Tls. 541,631,300 represented exports and Tls. 762,250,230 imports. This unfavorable trade balance undoubtedly reflects the general trade depression and overstocking in European and American markets as well as the fall in the price of silver, the famine in five provinces and the continuance of the political unsettlement in the country.

[2] The total Customs revenue for 1920 was Tls. 49,819,885 which, at the average exchange rate of 6s. 9½d. per tael, was equivalent to £16,918,002 sterling. All foreign loan and indemnity obligations secured on this revenue having been provided for, a balance of Tls. 23,150,000 has been retained by the Chinese government.

increase over 1913 may seem to be small, but leaving out of account the amounts contributed by opium—Tls. 1,531,000 in 1913 against Tls. 1,500 in 1919—the augmentation is actually 3.5 million. "The whole of this remarkable advance is due to export duties, the total of which includes duties levied on the home trade and slightly exceeded import duties." Here is an anomaly which should have been remedied long ago —namely the suicidal policy of levying duties on the home trade. But as already explained, in the list of China's desiderata presented to the Paris Conference last year, the Republic is bound by a treaty tariff, under which foreign imports pay only a nominal duty of five per cent. *ad valorem.* Consequently, under the same international arrangement, a duty of five per cent. is also levied on exports from the country! This is why the people of China are clamoring for fiscal and tariff autonomy.

In connection with the subject of foreign trade it is perhaps relevant to include statistics about foreign population in China as well as shipping movements. For this purpose we need to give the figures for the two latest years:—

	1918		1919		
	Firms	*Persons*	*Firms*	*Persons*	
American	234	5,766	314	6,660	
Austrian	16	271	5	27	
Belgian	20	360	20	391	
Brazilian	1	16	..	..	
British	606	7,953	644	13,234	
Danish	23	475	27	546	
Dutch	24	377	25	367	
French	156	2,580	171	4,409	(including in each year 918 *protégés*)
German	75	2,651	2	1,335	
Hungarian	..	7	..	..	
Italian	36	535	19	276	
Japanese	4,483	159,950	4,878	171,485	
Mexican	..	..	..	1	
Norwegian	11	279	12	248	
Portuguese	43	2,417	93	2,390	
Russian	1,154	59,719	1,760	148,170	
Spanish	9	298	8	272	
Swedish	3	530	4	632	
Non-Treaty Powers	36	343	33	536	
	6,930	244,527	8,015	350,991	

Concerning shipping movements, merchant vessels of the following nationalities entered and cleared at Chinese ports:—

	1918		1919	
	No.	*Tons*	*No.*	*Tons*
American	3,119	1,214,921	4,433	2,569,887
British	31,034	29,911,369	36,074	36,284,312
Danish	86	86,847	93	185,697
Dutch	416	575,757	362	462,782
French	365	230,223	471	414,161
German	..	..	..	..
(In 1914 the share of German shipping was 3,906 vessels with a total tonnage of 4,026,493. Three years later when a state of war existed between Peking and Berlin, the figures dropped to 233 and 17,054 respectively.)				
Italian	464	28,796	298	53,142
Japanese	24,961	25,283,373	27,182	27,532,449
Norwegian	191	257,669	311	302,959
Portuguese	172	60,350	118	50,292
Russian	1,949	795,529	2,803	708,474
Swedish	8	20,168	18	53,650
Non-Treaty Powers	..	..	16	19,368
Chinese Shipping	43,638	16,984,523	49,043	22,553,448
Chinese Junks	87,164	4,798,181	88,532	4,536,314
	193,567	80,247,706	209,754	95,725,935

By way of comparison it is interesting to note that whereas during the last five years there has been a temporary diminution of foreign shipping, the number of alien firms and residents has increased considerably. Thus in 1914 there were 3,421 business houses and a population of 164,807, whilst the aggregate shipping for the same year was 220,591 vessels with a total of 97,984,213 tons.

Another proof of the country's remarkable possibilities is furnished by the working of the salt gabelle administration. In 1913 the Chinese government borrowed £25,000,000 from the banks of the Five-Power Group—Great Britain, France, Japan, Germany and Russia. In return, it was agreed that the loan was to be secured on the salt tax and that, moreover, a foreign adviser was to be employed to help reorganize the salt administration. A Britisher has since been so employed and the administration was reorganized.

According to statistics supplied by the inspectorate-general, the salt revenue jumped from $11,471,242.76 in 1913 to $60,409,675.75 the following year—a result due to the improved methods of collection. Since then the steady increase

has been well maintained and the total reported for 1919 was $80,636,503.33.

In addition the government exchequer has been considerably benefited by the scheme of reorganization. The various charges and obligations secured on the salt revenue having been provided for, the surplus was, according to the loan contract, to be handed over to the Chinese government. And the aggregate of such monthly releases almost trebled from twenty-seven and a half million dollars in 1915, the lowest year on record, to $75,213,449.13 in 1919—all in four years![1]

Consequently, considering the acknowledged wealth-producing abilities of the Chinese people, and especially the cheapness of native labor, plus the untold resources which have scarcely been tapped by scientific methods, the possibility of China's foreign trade reaching the respectable figure of sixty-five billion taels will not be long in attainment. What is needed is essentially foreign assistance—in some capital, in a goodly portion of expert knowledge, and in nearly all of the modern machinery to make use of the minerals, etc. Some of the expert knowledge is gradually being supplied by the foreign-educated men and women, and a modest beginning has already been made to manufacture some of the simpler modern machinery. Otherwise there is plenty of room for more foreign expert knowledge, for more foreign capital and for nine-tenths of the indispensable foreign machinery, in order to produce the maximum returns with the minimum of energy. Here is an unique opportunity in store for the West: what is its response?

[1] The net salt revenue for 1920 amounted to $79,064,103 which, though less than that of 1919, is yet in excess of that for 1918 by $7,498,583. Of this $64,019,879 has been retained as surplus balance after due provision for foreign commitments.

CHAPTER XIII

LABOR'S AWAKENING

WHILE labor unrest in Europe, America and other countries is occupying the attention of the world, what about the lotus-eating East? Probably the world has heard of agitations in Japan, furnishing another problem to be solved, but outside of student strikes in the general program of anti-Japanese boycott propaganda, China would appear to have no labor problem, although one-fourth of the Republic's four hundred millions are laborers. In China signs of change may not be so clear, but to those who have eyes to see there are here as well as elsewhere all the appearance, by no means deceptive, of a labor emancipation among a quarter of the world's population.

In the past the world in general has had only words of praise for the Chinese laborer. His industry and sobriety are proverbial. He asks for no holidays, except the few national holidays of the year, and demands no increase in wages, accepting meekly whatever his employer may be pleased to give him. In other words, he is efficient and reliable, a godsend to his employer, but a formidable rival to his competitor in the Occident. Hence the prosperity of the Straits Settlements, the Dutch East Indies, the Philippines, and the Pacific slope of the American continents owes much to the skill of his hands, and hence he is dreaded by the world of labor and, so dreaded, is being rigorously excluded from the United States, Australasia, South Africa, and in a milder form also from the Dominion of Canada.

To-day the world may be almost said to be lying at the Chinese laborer's feet. The recent war in Europe has made and unmade names—of places as well as of persons. At this date the public is familiar with the part of Chinese labor corps in the Great War—how they were recruited by the Anglo-French governments, how they made good behind the firing

lines and, when the crisis came, also "plugged the hole" in the last German drive, how they worked loyally for the Allies, and how they died in the cause of freedom and democracy. Their part in the war is an honorable one, and the Allied governments have not been slow to show their debt of gratitude. Such being the case, they deserve better treatment by the world in general than has hitherto been accorded to them. Hence the *London Times* recently supported the objections made at the international labor conference held at Washington, against the nominees which the League of Nations was entitled to appoint on the executive of the international labor office, being chosen exclusively from European countries. It pointed out that Belgium was included, while China and her Indian and Japanese neighbors were left out, despite their enormous populations, of whom the majority were manual laborers. "As such nominees are supposed to represent the nations of chief industrial importance, it is difficult to see how the Council of the League of Nations which, when formed, will finally decide the nominations, will be able to conclude that no Asiatic nation fulfills this provision."

As may be remembered, Section XIII or the labor convention of the German peace treaty provides that the following principles should be applied, wherever possible, to regulate labor conditions:—

1. Labor should not be regarded merely as a commodity or article of commerce.
2. The right of association for all lawful purposes for the employed as well as for the employers.
3. Payment to the employed of a wage adequate to maintain a reasonable standard of life as understood in their time and country.
4. The adoption of an 8-hour day or a 48-hour week as the standard to be aimed at where it has not already been attained.
5. The adoption of a weekly rest of at least 24 hours, which should include Sunday wherever practicable.
6. The abolition of child labor and the imposition of such limitations on the labor of young persons as shall permit the continuation of their education and assure their proper physical development.

7. The principle that men and women should receive equal remuneration for work of equal value.

8. The standard set by law in each country with respect to the conditions of labor should have due regard to the equitable economic treatment of all workers lawfully resident therein.

9. Each state should make provision for a system of inspection in which women should take part, in order to insure the enforcement of the laws and regulations for the protection of the employed.

Measured by these standards and principles, China is industrially very backward. Labor here is blissfully ignorant of either the 8-hour day or the weekly rest, and the employer secures the maximum return for the minimum expenditure. In such circumstances, the international labor conference at Washington has fixed the hours for the Republic as follows:— "Adult labor: 10 hours per diem, with a maximum of 60 hours per week. Those under 15 years of age will have an eight-hour day and a 48-hour week. A holiday will be granted every seven days. The factory law will be applicable to all establishments employing more than 100 hands. The law will be enforced in factories in foreign concessions or leased territories and will come into force immediately." It is stated that China's government representative protested against the decision, but was overruled by the conference when the question was put to vote.

No doubt it will require considerable time and adjustment before such recommendations can be carried out, but in the meanwhile, as evidence of the general awakening of sentiment in favor of the employed, it is worthy of note that there is at least one Chinese establishment which is acting up to the standards outlined above. Namely, the Commercial Press, Limited, which employing more than 3,000 persons, is easily the largest printing house in the Orient. According to a member of its staff, "the workmen are paid well: they are given a bonus in proportion to the record and importance of their service, and a certain amount or allowance is set apart as a pension for the old retired employees or the families of the deceased. Profit-sharing is a part of the system and the key men of each department are shareholders of the company. The Commercial Press runs a savings department which pays nine per

cent. interest per annum on fixed deposits and eight per cent. on current account on money deposited by its employees. This encourages many persons in its employ to put by their earnings against rainy days.

"The spacious, well-ventilated workrooms present a marked contrast to the stuffy apartments in which printers and factory hands in China have to spend their long hours. The company pays half of the membership fees for the employees when they join the Y. M. C. A. School privileges from kindergarten to high school training are maintained for their children. An evening school is kept for the younger members of the firm, and a self-improvement club, with school facilities, has been opened by the young men themselves under the patronage of the company. A small hospital has been established by the company for the sick employees and for injuries in the workrooms. An attendant is always present, and a Chinese foreign-trained doctor visits the hospital once a day. The clinic is open to outsiders as well as employees and their families. Nine hours' work and Sunday holidays are features very seldom found in a Chinese workshop.

"In the printing department a female worker is not only allowed to retain her position during childbirth, but she is given one month off before and another month after confinement. What is more, she is given an extra five dollars when she leaves and another five dollars on her return. Nursing babies of mothers working in the factory are allowed to be brought in to be fed during work hours. The humane side of these regulations stands out in bold relief when we remember that in most factories in Shanghai an expectant mother is not permitted to retain her position and that suckling babies are not allowed to be brought to the working mothers to be fed.

"A garden, made attractive with shrubs, flowers, and seats scattered about on the lawn, furnishes a delightful resting place for the employees when off duty. A fire brigade composed of twenty-six men is an important factor in the concern. The brigade also responds to calls in the neighborhood of the factory."

When its employees are so royally treated, it is natural that the Commercial Press is now one of the most successful business enterprises. Last year it declared a dividend of fifty per cent. and every $100 of its shares is to-day worth practically $200.



(*Courtesy of* The Trans-Pacific)

One of the Commercial Exhibits in the Tsinan Institute of the Shantung Christian University.

His Excellency Dr. W. W. Yen, Minister for Foreign Affairs.

(Photo by Underwood & Underwood, New York)

His Excellency Dr. V. K. Wellington Koo, Minister to London as well as Senior Delegate to the Assembly of the League of Nations and Chinese Representative on the Council of the League.

As indicating the trend of labor movement in the country, it is interesting to see that the example of the Commercial Press is being more or less followed. For example, another great concern in Shanghai, the Sincere Company, one of the two biggest Chinese modern department stores, encourages its employees on Sundays to devote an hour of their regular working hours to profitable recreation, such as attending useful lectures or interesting talks by prominent visitors. And in the factories of ex-minister Chang Ch'ien, the industrial magnate of the "Model City," Nan-tung-chow, 100 miles from Shanghai, already referred to, the employees are treated no less considerately.

When the Peace Conference was sitting at Paris and over 1,000 telegrams were sent by Chinese public bodies to their delegates, practically ordering them not to sign the German treaty except with reservations concerning Shantung, the signers of these messages included Chinese labor unions. Quite apart from the fact that this illustrates most eloquently the new wave of patriotism which is sweeping over the country, the signature of labor unions is a noteworthy sign of the times. Before the fateful days of August, 1914, such a phenomenon was unknown, but recent events have stirred the hearts of the Chinese as nothing else could, and as already explained, the Republic is to-day more united politically, especially on foreign questions, than she has been for many a long year.

"The right of association for all lawful purposes, for the employed as well as for the employers," says the labor convention of the peace treaty; but in China such a right has heretofore been exercised by the employers only, through their associations known as guilds and chambers of commerce. It has been reserved for the eventful year of grace, A. D. 1919, to see this right being taken advantage of by the employed.

Last September an association was formed in Shanghai, called "The Union for the Improvement of Chinese Labor." Its members were laborers, such as carpenters, masons, brass-smiths and mechanics in other trades, who united for purposes of mutual benefit and protection. At the first meeting, which was marked with great enthusiasm, it was announced that its objects would include the betterment of labor conditions in China by placing all trades and crafts under its jurisdiction.

For centuries, said the promoters of the movement, Chinese labor had no organized body to which it might turn in times of stress, especially where disputes with employers were involved, and it would be one of the aims of the union to act as such a body. The main purpose, however, was connected with matters of mutual benefit and protection, rather than to act as a defense against employers.

Accordingly, ample provision would be made for the education of children of workmen by the establishment of schools for their use. Hospitals would also be erected to which only laborers and their families might be admitted. The union would also publish a newspaper in the interests of the laboring class. It would be printed in the simplest characters possible, so that it might be read by even the most unlettered. As in all Chinese institutions, the sense of mutual help and mutual responsibility was uppermost in the minds of the promoters; so the union enjoined its members to assist one another in times of trouble, to grant assistance whenever such was asked for, and, above all, to keep the peace, even in time of excitement. Nor could they quarrel among themselves, but must refer all disputes to the union for advice and settlement. Every Saturday evening and Sunday afternoon prominent persons, Chinese and foreigners alike, would address the members on economic questions in order that they might know something about labor conditions in other countries.

To the West the Chinese laborer is known as an incurable gambler, but the fact is that the Western laborer has access to many forms of recreation which are denied his Chinese confrère. The union hoped therefore that its lectures would take the minds of its members away from the gaming table and make them thrifty. For this purpose a savings bank would be established and members encouraged to put away some of their earnings for the future. Finally the union insisted that its members should adhere strictly to its regulations, and infractions thereof, which could not be explained satisfactorily, would be punished by expulsion. This may not appear to be of much consequence now, but all appearances indicate that some day the lot of the expelled person will be an unenviable one: may not capitalists then insist on employing only union men?

So far the union is established at Shanghai, but its promoters plan to make the movement nation-wide. For several

months, they claim, they have been sounding the labor population in various provinces and the results seem to augur well for the future. Representatives are being sent out to establish branch organizations in all the provinces, and it is confidently anticipated that in the near future the union will be known throughout the Republic.

Here we have the Chinese labor union ball started arolling in real earnest, and who can doubt its future? The union's usefulness is obvious to the workers, since here is the much needed medium for conveying their sentiments to employers as well as the community, and in the case of injustice done against them they will be able to take united action to protect themselves. Besides, the union will provide a means of peaceful negotiation and timely avoidance of trouble between employers and employees, and also a valuable meeting ground for mutual coöperation between employers and employed. The union will insist that its members perform their work efficiently and loyally, while the employers will see that the men are treated properly and paid adequately.

In addition to the above Shanghai is also credited with four important labor organizations—namely, the Progressive National Labor Union, the Returned Chinese Laborers' Association, the Chinese Labor Union, and the Labor Union of China. Originally a part of the Cantonese guild and intended to be political in character, the first is now industrial in scope and has a membership of nearly 4,000. The second is entirely non-political and is composed of some 1,600 laborers repatriated from France. The third claims a membership of about 3,000 and, being more or less political in character, is known to include universal suffrage among its demands. The fourth is perhaps the smallest and newest, having only three hundred members.

According to George E. Sokolsky, in the August, 1920, number of *The Trans-Pacific*, the Chin Woo Athletic Association is no less a labor organization:—"This is not, strictly speaking, a labor organization, yet in Shanghai alone it affects about forty thousand persons, and it now has many branches in many important centers of China. The association was founded in 1909 for the purpose of supplying instruction in physical culture, more especially in the Chinese art and science of 'Kung-fu' (boxing). In addition to Chinese

gymnastics, the association provides football, basketball, tennis and track sports, a camera club, classes in Mandarin dialect, a Chinese orchestra, debating society, etc. The Chin Woo Athletic Association is really a social settlement along Western models—but unlike similar institutions in other parts of the Orient, it was not founded by foreigners, nor has it any foreign members, advisers or teachers. It is a Chinese organization, founded, supported and entirely managed by Chinese. Its members go into factories and schools and teach Chinese gymnastics to workers and students, who in turn come to look upon the Chin Woo Athletic Association as a parent organization. It has therefore all the force of a labor union without having organized as such, and without having a clearly defined social-economic program. It is rather a labor club, providing opportunity for workingmen to mingle and exchange ideas, and out of this will eventually come greater organization."

Will strikes and industrial lockouts be fashionable hereafter? In other words, will the fact that such a union is organized mean that society must live in constant fear of strikes and derangements of trade? How about the infiltration of Bolshevik ideas among the awakened labor elements? Will the knowledge of comparative legal immunity enjoyed by trade unions, brought back by the laborers returning from France, provide a Damoclean sword to hang menacingly over the community? How will the Chinese government deal with strikers? Will it deport them until normal trade is resumed, as was done by the Portuguese government some years ago in the case of the Oporto strikers, or will it allow them to run amok and paralyze all trade and industry?

These are pertinent questions and assuredly one cannot be indifferent to the outlook, when one-fourth of China's four hundred millions are concerned. Whether strikes will be fashionable or not it is difficult to say, but certainly they are not unknown. Partly as a protest against the practice of ruthless exploitation, and partly as a means of securing an increase of wages in proportion to the increase of cost of living, strikes have of late become quite common in Shanghai and other cities. As such the strikers' demands have been sympathetically met, since the men were asking for the redress of a legitimate grievance. Incidentally, as a foreign news-

paper in Shanghai put it, the strikes "revealed that there was shameless exploitation of the men by their employers, who granted them a scale of remuneration for their toil which could not by any stretch of imagination be called a fair living wage, even on the basis of the laborer's standard of life. . . . If the laborers are not exploited by their employers, they are considered fair game by labor contractors who care not for efficiency just so long as they manage to secure their rake-off, known in this country by the highly expressive name of 'squeeze.' "

On the other hand, the more broad-minded employers are not slow to adopt deterrent methods. Some 20,000 mine-workers in a northern district having recently walked out on strike because their demand for an increase of wages was not promptly met, it is instructive that the Hanyehping Company is treating its mine-workers handsomely. The following are the impressions of a foreign eye-witness:—

"A township is being built (June, 1918), which in every sense of the word may be considered 'Model.' No difficulty is too great, and no expense is being spared to insure that the work people will be well-housed and cared for, both mentally and physically. This in itself entitles the Hanyehping Company to the thanks of all China's well-wishers and provides an example to all future Chinese undertakings which they would do so well to follow. The houses are built on modern European lines with plenty of room, light and fresh air. They are mostly all fitted with electric light, for which the company intend making a nominal charge—probably less than the actual cost to them of generating the power. They are further fitted with efficient cooking ranges and domestic facilities, while at the same time each house is provided with its own private enclosure both back and front. The streets are wide and thoroughly made, with fine stoneware culverts on either side and delightful sidewalks; all are splendidly lit by electricity and will soon provide a picture entirely pleasing to the eye.

"Above all this, the company have built, equipped, and placed at the disposal of their employees a magnificent club house, where there will be provided all kinds of indoor and outdoor games and recreations; also a library, reading room, and accommodation for residents. The intention is to run the

club on the best foreign lines. . . . Surrounding the club house will be grounds laid out as tennis courts, bowling green, Japanese beer garden, open air bath and everything likely to conduce to the health and happiness of the company's employees."

The latest perhaps to proclaim the message of coöperation between capital and labor is Mr. H. Y. Moh, the "Cotton King of China." Three months ago when he dedicated his new cotton mill at Chengchow (Honan), situated at the junction of two important railway lines, which covers over fifteen acres of ground, employs 4,500 workers, and has a capacity for 1,200 looms and 50,000 spindles, he gave expression to the following significant remarks:—

"The modern capitalist values highly the energy of his employees because it is the unseen capital of industry. The employees must be trained to exert their energy economically or scientifically. It should not be wasted. The employer should always be on the alert as to the increase of his employees' energy through proper boarding, sanitation, peace of mind and timely rest. Human efficiency can be increased through education. It is the duty of the employer to educate the laborers. The more he tries to do so, the more efficient his men will become.

"Bearing these points in mind, this mill, in the very near future intends to dig a certain number of artesian wells in this city to supply clear and pure water for the free use of the inhabitants, to put up a reading room equipped with selected books, daily papers and magazines, to establish Y. M. C. A. classes of a particular nature adapted to this locality, and to build up a vocational school for poor children, who will be trained as carpenters, masons, mechanics, etc. We have taken the lease of a large piece of land on which a temporary building has already been erected for Y. M. C. A. work. Two teachers for a proposed vocational school have been selected and sent to Shanghai for training. As a matter of fact this mill will always be ready to coöperate with people here in pushing on social service work that will benefit the public. This mill is not only owned by the shareholders, but also by the employees; not only jointly owned by the shareholders and employees, but also by the people of this city. So this

mill should be considered as public property from which people can get money for their labor. Everybody here should help it and foster it, not squeeze it, kick it or make trouble with it."

According to cable reports Lenin and Trotsky have declared that Bolshevism was spreading widely in China, where they expected a soviet revolution. They then intended to use a yellow invasion against Western Europe, etc. To the nervous reader the foregoing may not be pleasant reading, but as a matter of fact there need be no excitement at all. Not only will this new bogey prove as short-lived as the ex-Kaiser's "Yellow Peril," but the idea of a soviet revolution in China will quickly evaporate in the light of greater understanding of socio-economic conditions in the Republic.

To begin with, the bulk of this nation even under the Manchus was never so downtrodden as the Russians under the Romanoffs or the French under the Bourbons, and cut-throat animosity between different classes is conspicuous by its absence. As explained in a previous chapter, Chinese society is constructed on a horizontal foundation, unlike the vertical stratification in India, and even a beggar like the founder of the Ming dynasty (A. D. 1368-1644) could rise to become an emperor. So could also the all-highest "Son of Heaven" be deposed and exiled for his crimes, as was abundantly shown in Chinese history. The law of merit and demerit works unerringly for the common good; hence, execrated by the nation, General Hsu Shu-tseng and eight other leaders of the Anfu club have been proscribed by the government, and are now hiding in the Japanese Legation, in Peking.[1] Hence the Chinese Revolution of 1911 is a mere child's play when compared with the French Revolution or with the present reign of terror in unhappy Russia.

It is true that a few newspapers have been suppressed on the ground of being Bolshevik organs, but it is open to question how far such pretext was not camouflaged under the

[1] General Hsu has since escaped and, it is reported, likewise fled the country. The Japanese Minister having repeatedly declined to surrender the Anfu refugees but promised to look after their safe custody, the Wai-chiao Pu has lodged several strong protests against the negligence, if not connivance, of his legation guards and also declared that China would hold Japan responsible for any future untoward developments arising out of Hsu's escape.

militarists' determination to repress bold criticism and unconventional ideas. And it seems also to be true that in one or two isolated places some sort of anarchist-Bolshevik doctrines were propagated, but so far as can be ascertained, the results have been almost nil. The very soil of China in fact does not lend itself to the growth of such immorally un-Chinese ideas as the nationalization of China's women, since nowhere in the world is womanhood so much respected as it is in this country where the Fifth Commandment is most punctiliously obeyed. "Down with the bourgeois!" cried the insensate destroyer, but there is no room in this land of horizontal stratification for any vertical distinction between bourgeoisie and aristocracy. The royal road of success is open to everybody, and the only recognized aristocracy is that of intellect and education. Besides, as Sir John Jordan has suggested, "the land laws are good, and the peasants are holding their land direct from the state." Therefore, whatever may be the sanguine expectations of Lenin and Trotsky, it seems inherently improbable that Bolshevism can ever take root in China, unless Chinese mentality should in the meanwhile undergo a radical transformation favorable to the reception of this hydra-headed monster.

The only possible eventuality is perhaps when Chinese employers remain purblind to the modern economic tendencies and persist in the vicious practices of the past. While the ordinary laborer is no devotee to the fetish of labor violence, nor an easy victim to the wiles of agitators, he is to-day certainly more intelligent than he used to be. Appreciating the greater need of coöperation between capital and labor, the daily journals are devoting much space to articles and paragraphs of interest to the industrial world. Hence the doctrines of Karl Marx and other socialists, that workers are producers of wealth, are being assimilated, thanks to translations in the Chinese press, and hence even before the formal inauguration of the quasi trade-union last September, various laboring classes have already united themselves in the form of guilds and associations. Such being the case, the laborers can no longer be regarded as unawakened, and unless the employer is incurably avaricious, he will not fail to respond to new labor influences. After all, the Chinese business man can be relied upon to make a good lieutenant of his common sense,

since the cataclysmic effects of Bolshevism are too painfully evident everywhere.

Therefore, the so-called Bolshevik menace is more imagined than real. And the strike epidemic being confined to treaty ports, the government has so far been a mere spectator. At the end of 1916 the number of factory hands was officially estimated at 560,000 and that of mine workers 406,000. Since then no official returns for the whole country have been published—the work of compilation being hampered by the civil war and other causes—but perhaps a million each would be an approximate figure for the present number of factory operatives and mine workers. Of this total it seems that the proportion subject to labor agitators' influence is less than one-thirtieth, and the majority being employed in treaty ports, labor troubles as such are comparatively unknown to the Chinese authorities.

That labor strikes can be formidable was plainly shown, especially at Shanghai, Canton and Tientsin when last year, in response to the patriotic demonstrations of students and merchants on the Shantung question, various labor organizations likewise went on strike. The local population experienced great inconvenience; there was an almost complete stoppage of industrial life, and in some cases the economic situation assumed an uncompromising temper for many anxious days. What is a happy augury, however, is the fact that such sympathetic strike was enforced for patriotic reasons, for so soon as the national "traitors" were relieved of office, the normal life was immediately resumed. For such universal strike to be repeated in the form of genuine industrial lockout, like the railwaymen's strike in England, it seems the day is yet distant; and it may be doubted if it will ever come about. Just as the Chinese are proverbial for their peaceableness, so they are proverbial for their spirit of common sense. If the laborer's claims are reasonable, the same will be granted; and as long as the wages are sufficient to keep the body and soul comfortably together, the laborer will be content to work for the employer. What room is there for undignified bargaining over preposterous demands?

It is well known that previous to the passage of the trade disputes act in 1906 by the British parliament, strikes were practically unknown in England, while since then labor unions

have become almost sacrosanct and regarded themselves as being above the law. How far the Chinese parliament will go in enthroning labor it is not easy to say, but it seems hardly possible that it will go so far as to enact a law similar to the British statute. The just claims of Chinese labor will in time be handsomely met, as is indicated by the action of the corporations already mentioned; but it is a far cry from that to the placing of Chinese labor practically above the law and making it a virtual dictator to the community.

In our survey of labor's awakening, mention must be made of the thousands of laborers who have returned from France, Mesopotamia and Russia, etc. As already stated, the story of the Chinese labor corps is a thrice-told tale. Not only has their efficiency as workers behind the firing lines earned the gratitude of their employers, but their heroism and humanity have endeared them to those they had helped. Among the scores of incidents related of Chinese laborers in Flanders, the following are typical:—

During the Battle of Picardy, a British officer commanding a group of laborers was caught by the sudden advance of the Germans. He was gassed and could not move. The laborers stood around him and fought the Germans with all sorts of weapons. The officer was finally saved by the relief forces, but all except a few of the Chinese died around him. "Thus," he said, "I owe my life to the laborers under my command."

At another period of the "Big Push" by the Germans, the laborers working behind the lines offered to help the wounded who were streaming back from the front in all kinds of conveyances. When official permission was given, they gave their own cigarettes and rations of food to the wounded, and lighted the cigarettes for them. The wounded soldiers were greatly touched by the kindly act, and one of them remarked:—"The Chinese laborers have hearts just as good as ours."

On another occasion a French lady in a certain suburb of Paris lost a bag containing some money. Somehow or other the suspicion fell among the Chinese laborers quartered there. Protesting their innocence, the laborers were jealous of their good name. And rather than the incident should tarnish the reputation of their country, they forthwith raised a subscription among themselves and presented the lady with a purse of

five hundred francs to comfort her for her loss. Needless to say, the popularity of the laborers became greatly enhanced thereby.

The exact number of Chinese laborers serving with the Allied armies has never been published, but according to British officials connected with the labor corps the total never exceeded 180,000. At present it seems that a majority of laborers have been repatriated, although a small percentage is perhaps remaining to help France rebuild her devastated towns. Ever since the signing of the Armistice they have been doing most of the salvage operations in the battle-scarred regions, and their work has elicited the following significant remark from a distinguished visitor:— "It looks as if the Occidentals are good for destruction, while the Orientals are good for construction."

Now that they have returned, the question is: What is to be done with them? While in France they had been handsomely treated: good work, good pay, good time and good recreation. Not only had they their own Chinese games, but they had also foreign games, regular concerts and moving picture shows. Then there was the admirable International Y. M. C. A. with a splendid staff of over 150 Chinese, British, French, American, Danish and Dutch secretaries, to watch solicitously over their spare moments and act as the connecting hand between their folks at home and themselves sojourning abroad. No time was wasted, so for those who were illiterate or too old to study regularly, the new Chinese phonetic system was taught which could be mastered in six weeks. For those who could read and write a little a selection of 600 Chinese ideographs was prepared, which could also be learned within a few weeks. Then for those who were fairly well-educated, classes in English, French, geography, history, mathemathics, Chinese classics, etc., were given in many camps. In addition there were also helpful lectures demonstrated by special apparatus or illustrated by motion pictures and stereopticon slides, on public questions such as sanitation, forestry, road building, national consciousness, the Great War, citizenship, etc.

In other words, these men are entirely different from what they were when they sailed from China. They have seen the world and perhaps also seen more of actual life than many of

us can boast. Their mental horizon has been broadened, and they are more or less educated. In their own special line they have become experts, and they have learned something of organization and team-work. They know the value of co-operation and they understand the meaning of efficiency, the modern key to industrial success. Being mostly Shantung men, they are quite patriotic in their way, and one shipload of laborers returning from France via the Pacific, actually refused to land when the vessel called at Japanese ports. They said the Mikado's government had behaved unfairly to China; so being Chinese, they could not land and enjoy themselves. Such being the case, how will they take to their old environment?

To be sure, they will not rest content with the scale of wages they used to get before they went abroad. But will they be satisfied with the backward physical conditions they see around them—neglect of sanitation and utter indifference to comfort? Discontent breeds restlessness and discontent seeks means of satisfaction. In Shanghai where labor strikes have of late been quite frequent, already the charge has been made that "the returned laborer from the scene of recent conflict in Europe may be said to be the stormy petrel of the Chinese labor world." And in some official quarters, the returned laborer has even been dreaded as a potential Bolshevik.

A new spirit being abroad in the land, even among the easily-contented labor elements, the returned laborers no doubt find splendid soil for the sowing of their transplanted seeds—seeds of organization and efficiency, of proper pay for proper work, of intimate relationship between employer and employee, and of necessary give and take between labor and capital, etc. Whether or not they will prove stormy petrels will depend upon how the country will make use of their Western-acquired knowledge and experience. So long as their fellow-workers are not given the same amount of equitable consideration as has been accorded to them in France, allowance being of course made for local conditions, they will surely make their influence felt; and here is a point which employers will undoubtedly bear in mind and act accordingly. Such influence can only bring good in the end to all concerned, and the days of sweated labor being gradually discredited, labor and capital will move on a higher plane of coöperation and sympathy.

That is one way in which the returned laborers will influence their environment. Another way is to help develop the country's new industries with their skill and knowledge. If they had helped with credit to bring success to the Allied armies—in the fields, mines, factories, docks, etc.—they surely could assist China's infant industries to make the next big stride forward. At present, unfortunately, owing to the political unsettlement, their expert services do not seem to be much availed of. But the day of reconstruction will come, when the militarists shall have been dethroned, and then there will be plenty of work for these men who know how to do things well on a large scale—to reclaim and colonize China's thinly populated frontiers, to develop the country's iron and steel industry, to build roads and railroads that shall connect the distant parts of the Republic, and in a general way to help make China more prosperous, more united physically as well as morally.

There is perhaps a third way where the services of these laborers may be employed with advantage. At the beginning of this chapter we observed that the efficiency of the Chinese laborer has caused him to be dreaded by his Western confrères and so influenced his exclusion from a number of countries on the Pacific. In an earlier work ("The Legal Obligations arising out of Treaty Relations between China and Other States," sections 37-38) we discussed the details of Chinese exclusion as well as discrimination in countries where Chinese laborers were allowed to land or remain. Here it suffices to say that such anti-Chinese legislation is far from being uniform in different states. For example, any laborer may enter Canada if he can pay the poll-tax of five hundred gold dollars; but no Chinese whatsoever may enter South Africa, unless he is a government official. By passing a reading or dictation test in a prescribed language, which may be either English or another European stock, a Chinese may be admitted into Australasia, but only a few specified exempt classes are permitted to enter the United States.

As regards discriminatory enactments, those imposed on Chinese residents who entered the Transvaal, etc., before the act of union was passed by the British parliament, are most irksome, while contrary to the Sino-American treaty of 1868, Chinese school children in California have to study in special

Oriental schools. In 1912 the state legislature of Saskatchewan enacted that "no person shall employ in any capacity any white woman or girl, or permit any white woman to reside or lodge in or work in or, save as a bona fide customer in a public apartment thereof only, to frequent any restaurant, laundry or other place of business or amusement owned, kept or managed by any Chinese." Three years later the Quebec legislature passed a law requiring those operating public laundries, meaning thereby Chinese, to pay a provincial tax of $55 gold in addition to their annual license fee of $50 gold.

The existing treaties between China and Great Britain, etc., provide for most-favored-nation treatment for the subjects of contracting parties, in each other's territories and dominions. Therefore, the former may at the proper time see fit to impeach the anti-Chinese legislation as a violation of international good faith predicated by the treaties and conventions concluded with the latter. Meanwhile may not some amelioration be adopted as suggested in various influential quarters? Otherwise the government of the Republic may conceivably follow the precedent set by the Union of South Africa and debar any alien from entering China on the ground that he is "deemed on economic grounds, or on account of standard or habits of life, to be unsuited to the requirements of the Republic or any particular province thereof."

The suggested compromise is that of importing Chinese laborers to the Pacific slope to till the fields, etc., on a strictly limited contract basis. Said Secretary Frank Jordan, of the State of California, in an interview reported in an Oregon newspaper (November 20, 1919) :— "The farmers of the United States, especially those in the middle west and on the Pacific coast, are facing the most critical time in their history, and unless some provision is made for labor many of the larger farms will be abandoned and production seriously cut. The farmers of California are almost a unit in favoring Chinese importation, and it is our plan to memorialize Congress for a relaxation of the restrictions now imposed upon these Orientals for a definite period. Under the proposed regulations they would not compete with free labor, but would be the means of greatly increasing agricultural production."

This is a distinctly eloquent sign of the times, especially as the labor unions of the Pacific coast have all along been the

stoutest champions of Chinese exclusion. Nor is this the only expression in the United States in favor of such relaxation; for in addition to similar advocacy by a writer in a recent number (July, 1920) of the *New York Annalist*, and by Judge Marcus Kavanaugh at the annual banquet of the Illinois Retail Dry Goods Association about the same time, a special delegation from the Hawaiian Islands was recently in Washington requesting the House of Representatives Immigration Committee to modify the law and admit 40,000 Chinese laborers to work on the Hawaiian rice and sugar plantations.

If the proposed relaxation should come to pass, the best Chinese available will surely be the returned laborers who have tilled enough fields in France left unplowed by the fighting *poilus*. At any rate the measure will go partially towards adjusting the delicate industrial relationships between the nations concerned. If the gratitude of Allied governments for the assistance of Chinese laborers in the war means anything, the proposed amelioration will perhaps commend itself. The treaties guaranteeing most-favored-nation treatment are unmodified; consequently all legislation discriminating against the Chinese should be rescinded. Otherwise, with the awakening of China's labor millions, the aggrieved party may one day retaliate and abstain from all form of assistance or employment with, say, foreign shipping companies, 40,000 Chinese sailors being reported to be on British ships alone. Whether our fears will materialize or not may be problematical; nevertheless they are not so impossible as may be easily dismissed. The wisest policy is, however, to seize time by the forelock and accord justice to whom justice is due.

CHAPTER XIV

JUDICIAL REFORMS

HAVING discussed the awakening of one-fourth of the world's population in matters educational, intellectual, social, economic, commercial and industrial, it remains to survey their progress in things judicial and international. In view of the nation's tremendous international awakening, thanks also to the Shantung question, our next four chapters will discuss the Republic's self-respecting international attitude, its rupture with the Central Powers, its entry into the World War, and its participation in the Peace Conference; here we will note its judicial reforms.

As explained in previous chapters the unit of China's civilization is the family, not the individual. Although the paterfamilias is supreme over all, yet the members of the family are severally responsible for one another's behavior and well-being. On the one hand the system develops a sense of mutual responsibility, and on the other that of mutual help. Should a member happen to disgrace himself, the reputation of his family is likewise involved; so a man is generally careful not only of his own conduct but also of that of his brothers and relatives. On the other hand, if a member of the family is destitute, the others are in duty bound to assist him; and the opprobrium of neglecting one's own family or relations is certainly not easy to live down.

While the system has its weaknesses—for example, the dispensation may be abused and able-bodied members may be encouraged to become parasites rather than independent citizens—it is nevertheless true that it has worked satisfactorily. Hence there is no great necessity for the institution of laws and statutes to govern a self-restraining community. The people being mutually responsible for one another's good conduct, the state is relieved of much of the duty of instructing them in the ways of correct behavior. So whatever laws there

are, are intended only for those who cannot be so trusted—namely, for the wilfully misbehaving section of the community. Hence the laws for restraint or punishment of such incorrigibles must appear Draconian especially to Westerners, and hence such laws are mainly penal or criminal in nature.

Whatever might have been the merits of such a body of laws in the days when the Middle Kingdom was splendid in her isolation, they soon proved unworkable on contact with Westerners. Consequently, as soon as China was opened to foreign trade and residence, the treaty Powers insisted that their nationals must be amenable to the jurisdiction of their own judicial officers, rather than that they should come under these Chinese laws. The exercise of such judicial powers especially by foreign consuls on Chinese soil is known as consular jurisdiction or extraterritoriality—a system which, inaugurated in the Sino-British treaty of 1843, has continued until to-day. In recent years the Chinese have repeatedly urged the abolition of such extraterritorial rights, involving as they do the exercise of an *imperium in imperio*, and a similar claim was included in the list of China's desiderata presented to the Paris Conference last year.

Recognizing the temporary nature of the anomalous dispensation, Great Britain was the first to express its sympathy with China's aspirations, in the Sino-British agreement of 1902, in the following words:—"China having expressed a strong desire to reform her judicial system and to bring it into accord with that of Western nations, Great Britain agrees to give every assistance to such reform, and she will also be prepared to relinquish her extraterritorial rights when she is satisfied that the state of Chinese laws, the arrangements for their administration, and other considerations warrant her in so doing." The United States and Japan followed the next year, and five years later Sweden expressed similar consent, "as soon as all other treaty Powers have agreed to relinquish their extraterritorial rights."

Outside of the writings of foreign publicists endorsing China's plea, no definite action has been officially taken by the treaty Powers to assist the Republic in this direction. Last November, however, the Conference of British Chambers of Commerce held at Shanghai and attended by the British Minister Sir John Jordan, passed the following important resolu-

tion:—"While the Conference sympathizes with the desire of the Chinese to see extraterritoriality abolished, and realizes the benefits that would accrue through throwing the country open to residence and trade, it considers as essential preliminaries to the surrender of extraterritorial rights the establishment of stable government, a satisfactory code of laws, and satisfactory arrangements for the administration of such laws, and this Conference suggests that efforts should be made to carry into effect the agreement by Great Britain to assist China in reforming her judicial system in pursuance of Article 12 of the Treaty of 1902."

From the point of view of the abolition of extraterritorial rights, the above resolution is, comparatively speaking, an advance on the phrascology of the 1902 treaty, since "and other considerations" of the latter may or may not be treated liberally by the contracting parties, the exact interpretation of which depending upon the nature of political interests involved. Hence Sweden, for example, is prepared so to relinquish, not on its own initiative, but so soon as "all other treaty Powers" have so agreed. Unanimity of opinion among treaty Powers being in the circumstances second to impossible of attainment, the promise to assist would seem to imply half-hearted consent.

Presently we shall return to discuss this promise of abolition, but the essential preliminaries suggested by the British chambers of commerce may provide a convenient outline for our survey of judicial reforms. Here we may dismiss the first condition in a few words: the present régime in the Republic is only transient, and in the circumstances can never become permanent. Soon the country will settle down to a well-ordered government; the irresponsible Tuchunate, or system of powerful military governors, each of whom is officially designated as a Tuchun, will give way to a real, democratic form of government; and the era of peace will usher in a new epoch of constructive activity as well as prosperity for Chinese and foreigners alike.

Ever since the beginning of the twentieth century the Chinese government has been endeavoring to seek a "satisfactory code of laws." This does not mean that the old code was poor and unworthy of its name. On the contrary, no less eminent an authority than Sir George Staunton, who trans-

lated a century ago the "Laws and Statutes of the Great Tsing Dynasty" (*Ta Tsing Lü Li*) which was dated 1641, has appraised it in his preface as follows:—"By far the most remarkable thing in this code is its great reasonableness, clearness, and consistency, the business-like brevity and directness of the various provisions, and the plainness and moderation in which they are expressed. There is nothing here of the monstrous verbiage of most other Asiatic productions, none of the superstitious deliberation, the miserable incoherence . . . but a calm, concise and distinct series of enactments, savoring throughout of practical judgment and European good sense, and, if not always conformable to our improved notions of expediency, in general approaching to them more nearly than the codes of most other nations. . . . In everything relating to political freedom or individual independence it is indeed woefully defective, but for the repression of disorder and the general coercion of a vast population it is equally mild and efficacious." As to the estimation in which the code was held by the people, he observed:—"All they seem to desire is its just and impartial execution independent of caprice and uninfluenced by corruption."

Now, however reasonable its provisions may be, time has rendered it obsolete. It purports to be the *corpus juris* of China, but is in substance a criminal code. Its civil provisions hardly go beyond marriage and succession, while the adjective law it contains is negligible. The scantiness of the former renders the code incompatible with the needs of a modern society, while the want of adjective law must have been severely felt when fifteen years ago torture was abolished as a means of obtaining evidence. So when some of China's treaties came to be revised in 1902-1904, after the Boxer troubles, and as a consequence Great Britain was the first to express its willingness to relinquish its rights of extraterritoriality, the attempts to codify new laws commenced. At the earliest stage of the work the veteran lawyer-diplomat, Dr. Wu T'ing-fang, returning from his diplomatic mission to the United States, was appointed one of the law revision commissioners. The commission prepared a number of draft codes which constituted an almost complete codification of civil, commercial and criminal laws. Japanese experts were associated with the commission, and the work became a semi-adaptation of Japanese

legislation which, as is well known, is thoroughly permeated with German conceptions.

These drafts, however, were never officially promulgated until, with the advent of the Republic, some of its provisions were tentatively enforced by the new government. The provisional constitution of March 10, 1912, under which the country is still being governed, provides that "no citizen may be arrested, imprisoned, tried or punished except in accordance with law;" hence the government decreed, three weeks later, that the draft criminal code should thenceforth apply in every criminal case. At the same time, recognizing that its text was in many places defective, the revision of the draft code was ordered, and for this purpose a new codification commission was formed which was also to overhaul the several drafts prepared by the former commission. A first revised draft of the provisional criminal code was approved at the end of 1914, but as the reform under it was not sufficiently extensive, a second revision was undertaken. In the meanwhile the commission was reorganized and Dr. Wang Ch'ung-hui, doctor of civil law of Yale University and former minister of justice, was appointed its chairman at the end of 1916. Subsequently the commission's staff was enlarged, its status definitely fixed by a presidential mandate of July, 1918, and the services of the following were enlisted: Mr. Tung K'ang, chief justice of the supreme court; Mr. Lo Wen-kan, a graduate from Oxford and formerly procurator-general of the Republic; and Monsieur Georges Padoux, the distinguished French jurist who assisted Siam, after nine years' work as legislative adviser, to recover partially the former rights of extraterritoriality.

In February last year, the commission completed its second revised draft, and translations in both English and French have since also been published. To indicate the nature and scope of this draft, we may translate the following from the commission's preface to the French edition:—"The new arrangement of the provisions is more logical and more scientific than the original, but the draft preserves nearly half of the articles of the text now in force. Some of the provisions are undoubtedly open to criticism. Take, for example, the intricate systems relating to suspension of punishment and conditional release. But as they have been in vogue for more

than eight years, the Chinese judges have become accustomed to them; and as, on the whole, the systems have worked fairly satisfactorily, the Commission has deemed it advisable to maintain them rather than substitute new rules which would necessitate a fresh apprenticeship for Chinese magistrates. This explains the presence in the draft of various articles which, from a purely theoretical point of view, could have been greatly improved.

"Another consideration which made the Commission decide not to introduce too many changes into the Provisional Code was this: this Code is very nearly the same as the Japanese Code of 1907. Further on account of the similarity in the languages, Japanese judicial literature is readily accessible to Chinese magistrates. On the other hand, the chief European and American works on criminal law have not as yet been translated, and there are few Chinese who are able to read the original texts. The introduction of too many notions or formulas borowed from Western legislation would frequently compel the tribunals to apply rules, the spirit and import of which they do not understand, owing to the paucity of available literature on the subject.

"Where there are modifications of the original provisions the Commission has been obliged to reconcile the practical necessities and Chinese traditional usages with the principles of more modern scientific criminology. A perusal of the draft would easily prove that a great deal has been borrowed from the criminal legislation of the most advanced and recently published codes. The Commission is particularly indebted to the Hungarian Criminal Code of May 28th, 1878, the Dutch Criminal Code of March 3rd, 1881, the Italian Criminal Code of June 30th, 1889, the Austrian Draft Criminal Code of 1893, the Soudan Criminal Code of 1899, the Swiss Draft Criminal Code of 1903, the Egyptian Criminal Code of February 14th, 1904, and the Japanese Criminal Code of 1907, which served as a basis for the wording of the original text. Reference has also been had to the Preliminary Revised Draft of the German Criminal Code of 1909, and to the resolutions of the German commission of 1914 on criminal law reform and to the counter-draft code prepared by a number of German criminologists in 1911."

Of course, this draft is not final until it is sanctioned by

parliament. Nevertheless, there is good reason to suppose that, except perhaps for a few minor verbal changes, it will become law as at present published. To the foreigner Chinese law has always appeared unnecessarily harsh and cruel. If so, the following from the chapter of the new draft on judicial discretion regarding punishments, will be hailed as a welcome innovation:—

"Punishments shall be determined within the prescribed maximum and minimum after due consideration of all the circumstances of the case. Special consideration shall be given to the following:

(1) The state of mind of the offender.
(2) The cause of the offense.
(3) The motive for the offense.
(4) The provocation for the offense.
(5) Any peculiar circumstance affecting the offender.
(6) The mode of living of the offender.
(7) The past conduct of the offender.
(8) The intelligence of the offender.
(9) The results of the offense.
(10) The conduct of the offender after the commission of the offense.

"In addition to the circumstances specified in the last preceding paragraph, the economic condition of the offender shall be given due consideration in determining the amount of fine.

"Punishments may be reduced by reason of extenuating circumstances."

In other words, the new code aims at making the criminal law as humane as possible and thus approximate to the Western standard. If a person is adjudged guilty, he will be decently punished. And the utmost penalty is to be punished with death, or with imprisonment for life, or with imprisonment for a period of not less than twenty years, with or without deprivation or suspension of civic rights or forfeiture of property.

Since the completion of the draft criminal code the commission has been engaged upon a new code of criminal procedure. According to a member of the commission, the first part dealing with such questions as jurisdiction, arrest, de-

tention, examination of accused persons, the summoning and examination of witnesses, searches, attachment of property, etc., has been drafted, but as the work is only in a preliminary stage it has not been made public. Like the second revised draft of the criminal code, the code of criminal procedure is being compiled with the highest regard for the constitutional rights and privileges of all citizens. In this respect it will compare favorably with the legislation of the more progressive nations. It affords ample protection to accused persons as well as witnesses. "In order to give the public the benefit of more liberal and protective rules, the commission is at present (September 15, 1920) considering the advisability of asking the government to enact without further delay some of the main provisions which have already been agreed upon, principally those dealing with the summoning, arrest, and detention of suspected persons. The commission also has under consideration certain schemes for providing a summary procedure in petty cases, and rules controlling frivolous appeals —a widespread evil about which complaints are often heard. The limitation of appeals is, however, a difficult matter to suppress wholly without undue interference with the rights of litigants and defendants."

Simultaneously the commission is working on a new code of civil procedure, as the old draft is more or less modeled upon existing German procedure. The two codes of procedure having been completed, the civil code and the commercial laws will be finally undertaken. Altogether the work will require another five years. At the moment of writing (September 27th, 1920), in recognition of the work performed by the commission, two of its members have been appointed to the highest judicial offices: namely, Mr. Tung K'ang, to be Minister of Justice, and Dr. Wang Ch'ung-hui, to be Chief Justice of the Supreme Court. Mr. Kang Yung, formerly minister of justice, succeeds the latter as chairman of the commission.

The amount of care bestowed upon the efforts at law codification being as above explained, the resultant codes may assuredly be described as "satisfactory." Time alone will show whether in actual operation they proved workable or otherwise; meanwhile the law codification commission deserves well of the country.

As regards the third essential preliminary suggested by the British chambers of commerce, namely, "satisfactory arrangements for the administration of such laws," it may be noted that as early as 1907 the Law of the Organization of the Judiciary, which may not improperly be called the Judicature Act of China, was passed. The first attempt to put the courts on a systematic basis, the tribunals were divided into four classes:—the Local Court, the District Court, the High Court, and the Supreme Court, with a procuratorate of corresponding rank attached to each of them. The Local Court has since been abolished, and cases of first instance now go to the District Court, from which an appeal lies to the High Court and from the latter to the Supreme Court. In a court of first instance the trial takes place before one judge; in a court of appeal before three judges; and in a court of final appeal before five judges.

Owing to the extensive area of the Republic, the complete judicial organization requires not only time but also thousands of courts of first instance and a still larger number of competent magistrates. It is estimated that there are at present 44 high courts and procuratorates; 38 branch high courts and procuratorates, and 102 district courts and procuratorates, with the supreme court and the procuratorate general at the head of all. France, with only one-eighth of the population of China, is credited with 27 appeal courts, 320 courts of first instance, 3,000 justices of the peace, and 320 commercial courts.

On the other hand, prison reform has not been neglected, and the erection of model prisons is increasingly stressed upon. Many hard things have been heard about China's prisons in the past, but she was no wiser than the rest of the world. And to think that she is the only country where "hells above ground" have existed is to forget the debt that the world owes to John Howard, whose investigations and exposure of prison life in Europe in the 18th century aroused a sense of duty in mankind towards the criminal. In 1906 a special prison department was created within the ministry of justice by Tai Hung-tse, one of the high commissioners sent out the previous year to study the constitutional systems of the West. Popular interest in the matter was awakened, and the subject of prisons and prisoners was added to the cur-

riculum of the Peking Law School the following year. Two years later, construction of the first model prison began in the Capital, which, however, owing to the Revolution of 1911, was not completed until 1912. In 1910, the government sent a delegation to attend the international prison reform conference at Washington, and with its return the establishment of new prisons on the latest Western models was pushed ahead. The lack of funds handicapped the reform, and it was found more practicable meanwhile to improve existing prisons along with the erection of new ones.

There are at present 39 model prisons in all the provinces, and the number will be increased as soon as the requisite funds are available. From personal observation of the first and second model prisons in Peking, we can say that they richly deserve the adjective "model." And certainly they compare favorably in their general arrangement, cleanliness, comfort, discipline, etc., with some of the prisons in England. The following incident illustrates better than anything else the prisoners' appreciation of the efforts made to alleviate their condition. In the summer of 1917, one of the Tuchuns, Chang Hsun, attempted to restore the Manchu monarchy, but his success lasted less than a fortnight. According to the old law, on the ascension of a new monarch there would be a general amnesty for all prisoners. So when the King-Maker failed in his attempt, a few malcontents of the first model prison grew disappointed and then became sullen. At their instigation a score of the convicts joined them, and together they surprised the guards and mutinied. The superintendent of the prison immediately appeared on the scene. At this moment the other prisoners, numbering at least five hundred, rushed to his rescue and beat off the mutineers. All but the actual ringleaders surrendered and the latter subsequently paid the utmost penalty.

Such in brief are some of the endeavors in the direction of satisfactory arrangements for the administration of new laws. To be sure, there is a great deal which remains yet to be done. The numerous law schools scattered throughout the Republic are yearly turning out lawyers, but judges are not made in a day, especially judges who shall be respected by both Chinese and foreigners. In 1912 at Shanghai occurred the first trial by jury in a Chinese court, but that was the

first and last experiment, although it seems from the recent advocacy of jury system by Japanese lawyers that the Island Empire is no more favorably situated than the Republic in this respect.

On the other hand, the present administration of new laws is not without some measure of success. When a state of war existed between the Republic and the Central Empires as from August 14, 1917, the enemy shipping found in Chinese waters was seized and confiscated. The twelve vessels were adjudicated upon by the Chinese High Prize Court—the first of its kind in the long annals of the nation—and a separate decision given in open court against each captured prize. The text of the decisions has since been published, and rendered into English by Dr. F. T. Cheng, judge of the supreme court and doctor of laws of London University. Commenting on these decisions an English jurist observed as follows in a recent number of the *Contemporary Review* (London):—

"It is not proposed to consider in detail these decisions, but they are a definite contribution to that great field of prize law opened by Lord Stowell. The Chinese jurists, President Tung K'ang and President Yao Tseng, are in the line of a great legal tradition. But the main point about all these documents is the indication they give of a new social life in China, a life based on law and justice. In no other way can China claim so effectively the coöperation of the great nations of the world as by the proof of her determination to take her place in the front rank of law-abiding peoples."

Before proceeding to discuss the work and influence of the supreme court in the general scheme of judicial reform, we will return to the treaty Powers' promise to abolish their extraterritorial rights. As already remarked, the "essential preliminaries" of the British chambers of commerce appear to be an improvement over the vague phraseology of the 1902 treaty, but the element of perfect sympathy is still absent. For whether or not extraterritoriality is to be abolished, the Chinese people will sooner or later see that their government is stable and efficient, that their laws are in harmony with the requirements of modern times, and that the administration of justice shall be clean and respectable, since the

present condition of things is inimical to natural growth and development. Unless the foreign Powers go one or two steps further, the Chinese will still lack the encouragement so sorely needed to make them spur forward and put forth their best.

Take, for example, the question of suppression of opium, the trade in which was first legalized in the British treaty of 1858. It was a burning question a decade ago; to-day it is an accomplished fact, except for its recrudescence in outlying districts in the wake of the past years' disturbances. In 1907, the British government agreed with Peking that the import of Indian opium could cease in ten years if China herself was to accomplish such suppression within that period. But the agreement also contained the incentive clause—namely, that this decennial probation limit was revisable at the end of three years. Here was an unexpected encouragement; so the Chinese tackled the problem with commendable enthusiasm and determination. At the end of three years China's success exceeded all sanguine expectations, and in recognition thereof Great Britain agreed, in 1911, that the remaining seven-year period could be further curtailed if the Chinese suppression were continued. Encouragement added to encouragement, and success plus success performed wonders, and the British government finally announced, in April, 1913, that the trade in Indian opium would forthwith stop altogether.

Thus ended the campaign against the opium traffic, growth and smoking, and thus was demonstrated the potency of helpful incentive and sympathy. Now why can the same not be applied to this question of abolishing extraterritoriality? Considering that the people who have punctiliously obeyed the Fifth Commandment all these centuries will yet come into their own, and that their days will be long in the land which the Arbiter of Nations has given them, the foreign Powers will have everything to gain by the speediest restoration of normal order and development to this upward striving nation.

To consent to the surrender of extraterritorial rights is admirable, but this age is no longer one of mere chivalry. It is chivalry superimposed with a considerable grain of self-interest. Consular jurisdiction in China is admittedly a makeshift policy, and the system has long outgrown its usefulness. In fact, the perpetuation of an anomalous system only serves to handicap the foreigner in the development of the enter-

prises he had originally started out to promote, namely, trade and commerce. Extraterritoriality confines the foreign trader to the treaty ports and certain well demarcated areas, but denies him the right of developing new trade with the greater "unopened" parts of the vast country and its undeveloped resources. Whereas the abolition of this régime will at once throw open to him every nook and corner of the Republic. If confined to the treaty ports he is able to develop a creditable volume of international trade and commerce, will he not multiply the same a hundredfold, nay a thousandfold, were the whole country thrown open for his enterprise and resourcefulness?

The British chambers of commerce, indeed, fully realize "the benefits that would accrue through throwing the country open to residence and trade," and many other responsible Westerners are of the emphatic opinion that there is much more to gain than lose by surrendering the rights of extraterritoriality. If so, bearing in mind the wholesome example of Anglo-Chinese coöperation in the matter of opium suppression, we suggest that the admirable promise to relinquish should be perfected by an even more admirable honor clause or probationary time-limit. As regards the period of probation, it may be put either at five years when the balance of new Chinese codes will have been completed, or even at ten years. But in order to perfect the incentive, there should also be an additional saving clause, namely, that the time-limit may be reduced or extended in proportion to China's success or failure in this direction.

Assuredly the foreign Powers need never have to doubt the Republic's good faith in the matter, and the fact that the nation will thereby be tested is sufficient to put the people on their mettle. For China, to quote Sir Robert Hart, the great Irishman who served China as inspector-general of the maritime customs from 1864-1908, and published some outspoken essays on the Chinese question twenty years ago: "So to speak, would be on its honor, and the whole force of Chinese thought and teaching would then be enlisted in the foreigner's favor through its maxim regarding tenderly treating the stranger from afar. Such a change of principle in the making of treaties would widen and not restrict the field for both merchant and missionary, would do away with irritating privileges

and place native and foreigner on the same footing, would remove the sting of humiliation and put the Government of China on the same plane as other governments. . . . Restore jurisdiction (to the Chinese) and the feeling of responsibility to protect as well as the appreciation of (foreign) intercourse will at once move up to a higher plane."

In one of the appendices to the present volume will be found the list of China's desiderata submitted to the Paris Conference last year. The question of extraterritoriality will there be found fully reviewed, as well as the arguments advanced by the Chinese delegation in favor of its abolition. Here we may adduce a supplementary argument to reinforce the plea. Namely, although the administration of justice in China at present is such that the treaty Powers will not feel tempted to surrender their extraterritorial rights, yet unless some modification of the system is agreed upon the Republic will be always seriously handicapped in more ways than one. While the system was originally conceived as a protection for alien traders resident in the treaty ports, various practices have since grown up which cannot but be regarded as so many abuses of the system. As such they impinge gravely upon the prestige and even best interests of the Republic. As the *Peking and Tientsin Times* (British) recently commented on a case decided at the Mixed Court at Shanghai, one which has called forth protests from Chinese and foreigners alike:—"Little or no sympathy can be felt with China's demand for the abolition of extraterritoriality, but the Passeri case demonstrates beyond dispute the impossibility of carrying on under the present system. The Chinese government in Peking cannot be brought under the jurisdiction of a junior foreign official and an assistant Chinese magistrate in Shanghai. That was not the purpose for which the Mixed Court was created. Its jurisdiction is purely local. The case . . . brings foreign administration of justice into disrepute, and exposes the officials concerned to the charge of grossly exceeding the powers conferred upon them by usage and treaty."

A concrete example of the extraneous things which have grown up under the ægis of extraterritoriality is the practice for some of the Powers to establish their own post-offices in treaty ports as well as in the capital, Peking. This anomaly is without legal justification, and in none of the conventions

is there a provision therefor. As the American minister, Mr. Conger, put it to his government, when asked whether the United States should also follow the other Powers' lead in this direction:—

"They are not established with the consent of China, but in spite of her. . . . Their establishment materially interferes with and embarrasses the development of the Chinese postal service, and is an interference with Chinese sovereignty. The foreign post-offices are being established principally for political reasons, either in view of their future designs upon the empire to strengthen their own footing, or because of jealousy of that of others. . . . They will not be profitable, and I cannot find any good reason for their establishment by the United States. At Shanghai, where the foreign mail routes center, they are important, especially in taking charge of and starting the mails homeward, particularly since China is not a member of the International Postal Union."

That was eighteen years ago. Since then China has been admitted into the Universal Postal Union (March 1st, 1914), and so there can be no valid reason for the further existence of alien post-offices. On the other hand, the presence of such foreign institutions is always a potent source of abuse as well as danger, since according to the startling revelations in the *North China Daily News* (Shanghai) of some two years ago, the Japanese post-offices especially have been instrumental in the conveyance of opium, morphine and other contraband drugs into China. This is as it ought not to be. Surely, there is no excuse for the continuance of such alien establishments even though the judicial side of the extraterritorial régime may have to wait until the treaty Powers are prepared to abolish it. They ought in all justice and honesty to be promptly withdrawn.

We will not dwell further on the topic of abolition of extraterritoriality, but recommend the reader to study carefully China's case submitted to the Paris Conference as set forth in one of the appendices to this volume. If further light on the whole subject of extraterritoriality is desired, Chapter III, Part I, of the author's "The Legal Obligations arising out of Treaty Relations between China and Other States" may be

consulted. We will return to discuss the work and influence of the Supreme Court. Being the highest tribunal in the land, no apology is required for giving it special treatment. For apart from its legal status it has done considerable work by unconsciously evolving a definite system of law—the importance of which is perhaps not as yet fully realized by the people themselves, but which will nevertheless remain one of the reforms which time will only consecrate, not efface, and which tends perhaps more than anything else to bring China effectively into accord with the West.

For this purpose we append the following article written specially by Dr. F. T. Cheng, a judge of the supreme court and translator of "The Chinese Supreme Court Decisions," "Judgments of the High Prize Court of the Republic of China," etc., to whom we are also indebted for much of the material in the present chapter:—

It has been remarked that the late Ta Tsing Code, although it purports to be the *Corpus Juris* of China, is in substance a penal code. It is true that the law codification commission has drafted many codes, apart from the criminal code, which was adopted provisionally in place of the late code so far as it related to crimes, but the other codes have not yet been promulgated. Finding the law in such a state, or rather that there is no law at all in many cases, the Supreme Court often has to perform a task that belongs to the legislator—that of laying down the law under the name of principles. The first of these principles, which was destined to be the father of the rest, was laid down in 1913 in these terms: "Civil cases are decided first according to the express provisions of law; in the absence of express provisions, then according to customs; and in the absence of customs, then according to legal principles." That rule practically empowers the court to legislate whenever there is no law or custom; for under that rule the court is able not only to decide a particular case according to legal principles in certain circumstances, but also to declare what the legal principle is, which is in fact the making of a law. There is a similar provision in the Swiss Code (Article 4) which empowers the judge, in the absence of law and custom, to act as if he were the legislator. But such a power emanating from a code would be exercised only by way of exception,

whereas in a country the principal codes of which have not been promulgated, such power would be exercised as the rule.

It is in this way that the Supreme Court has been able to introduce all the leading principles of modern codes that best suit the special conditions of the country. This is very fortunate for China: for while her various codes have waited for years for sanction without success, most of the fundamental principles of law which obtain in civilized states have, through the medium of the Supreme Court, gradually found their way into this country and will no doubt remain permanently part of the law of the land. The tardiness in the promulgation, or rather non-promulgation, of various codes is merely an accident due mainly to the unsettled state of the country in the last few years which has turned the attention of Parliament to graver questions. But the building up of this unwritten law by the Supreme Court has its own advantages: it familiarizes the people with the idea of modern law step by step, since every principle introduced has been tested by actual experience. This body of unwritten law has now reached many volumes; it serves as a constant guide to the lower courts and is in fact daily applied.

To this body of unwritten law that has grown up by the declaration of principles must be added another body of unwritten law that has grown up through interpretation. The power of interpretation, or rather to "unify interpretation," was first conferred on the Supreme Court by the Law of the Organization of the Judiciary and then expanded by the Supreme Court Regulations, as follows: "(1) To explain and answer doubtful points; (2) To rectify, in the interests of the State, any erroneous interpretation of statutes or ordinances that may have been rendered by any public office or official. . . . The interpretation of any statute or ordinance rendered by the Court in one case shall be binding in another of the same nature."

In practice the facts of a concrete case are submitted to the court for opinion and the court gives its reply by a letter, which reply is, as a matter of course, followed. This power possessed by the court is unique: it recalls the *epistolæ* of the Roman emperors. It is now a matter of daily occurrence that request for interpretation is made to the court by one department or another, and in this way many defects in the

law have been remedied and much guidance afforded to the lower courts in their solution of difficult legal problems. It has been observed by one of the lord chancellors of England that the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council is the loving heart of the British Empire, because its administration of justice has inspired so much confidence in the people under British rule that even men by whom the faces of those who sit in the committee have never been seen and their voices never been heard, willingly submit their disputes to the committee for settlement. The same may be said of the Supreme Court of this country, which has inspired so much confidence in the people that it commands throughout the country a respect which authority alone could not obtain, and this is the more remarkable since the Supreme Court is still in its infancy.

It may perhaps be convenient here to give a historical sketch of the Supreme Court. The court was created less than twenty years ago, in the penultimate days of the Manchu monarchy. But an independent judiciary was a thing inconceivable in a monarchical country, nor was it considered imperative in old China that judges need be men of special training. In his "Hero and Hero-Worship" Carlyle observes that he fancies that there is in the poet "the politician, the thinker, legislator, philosopher." His fancy was certainly shared by old China in her choice of officials—the best essayist was necessarily the best judge and administrator. Consequently the Supreme Court was at first manned largely by persons who had distinguished themselves in literature rather than in law, and the result was little done and less accomplished. The advent of the Republic, however, brought about radical changes in all branches of the government, and the Supreme Court received its due share. Under the Provisional Constitution a "separation of powers" was effected and the Supreme Court, having thus secured its independence, began to work in a way worthy of its name.

First, it underwent a reorganization by a complete change of its personnel, followed by the appointment of men who had had a legal training. Secondly, it boldly asserted its independence, but in doing so it sometimes had to sail in rough waters. Two instances may be quoted, one of which in some measure recalls the well-known case furnished by the history of the English constitution, viz., *Stockdale v. Hansard.*

In 1915, when President Yuan Shih-k'ai literally had "law in his mouth and fortune in his hand," he gave instructions for the prosecution of a certain provincial governor for alleged embezzlement. The case was tried by Judge Chu of the Supreme Court who, upon finding that there was no evidence to support the charge, dismissed the case. President Yuan, who expected a conviction, was much offended and vented his wrath by instructing the Administrative Court to inquire into the conduct of the offending judge. Of course, nothing wrong could be found and, as a last means of gratifying himself, he reprimanded the judge for being "too subservient to the law" (*Chu shu fah lü*)—a phrase that has now become historic and will ever be written in golden letters in the annals of the reformed judiciary of China.

The other occasion on which the Supreme Court had to fight for its independence and emerged triumphantly was when it came into collision with Parliament on the question of jurisdiction over appeals in election cases. In 1916, when Parliament reassembled after the death of President Yuan, it was contended by the majority of its members that the Supreme Court had no jurisdiction over appeals in election cases, because the law was silent on the point; while the Supreme Court replied that according to its interpretation of the law—a function that it alone possessed—it had such jurisdiction. This bold attitude led Parliament to pass resolutions denouncing the decisions and declaring them null and void. The then government, too, was on the side of Parliament, but the Supreme Court was as fearless as it was right, pointing out that, though Parliament could make laws, its resolutions had not the character of law. Reason prevailed in the end, and Parliament gave in.

And lastly, as already stated, the Supreme Court developed a body of unwritten law. This body of unwritten law—of course using the word "unwritten" only in its judicial sense—has now been reduced to a codified form and supplies the needs of the country pending the promulgation of the various codes.

CHAPTER XV

SELF-RESPECTING INTERNATIONAL ATTITUDE

IN the light of the stirring events of recent years our task in discussing the Republic's new international attitude is considerably facilitated. One no longer has to invoke the aid of theories to prove that an independent, sovereign state should be accorded its proper status: all one need do now is to point to the facts and let the facts adorn their own tales.

Over thirty years ago W. E. Hall, the English jurist, discoursing on the status of non-Christian states such as China and Japan in the public law of Europe, remarked:—"Tacitly and by inference from a series of acts, states in the position of China may in the long run be brought within the realm of law; but it would be unfair and impossible to assume, inferentially, acceptance of law as a whole from isolated acts or even from frequently repeated acts of a certain kind." In 1898 Professor (now Sir) Thomas Erskine Holland similarly wrote:—"The Chinese have adopted only the rudimentary and inevitable conceptions of international law. They have shown themselves to be well versed in the ceremonial of embassy and the conduct of diplomacy. To a respect for the laws of war they have not yet attained."

In view of China's entry into the Great War and her part in the Paris Conference, such learned opinions now sound strangely outlandish. Nevertheless, they have their value from the historical standpoint, since many international lawyers took the attitude that China, as well as other states, could be admitted to the privileges of public law only on the express consent of the nations of Europe. International law, they said, originated from Christian Europe, and a non-European state wishing to enter the charmed international circle must first secure the former's sanction. That the theory is more than false has been demonstrated by the recent war itself; but all the same China had to wait patiently for her turn, since even in this year of grace 1920 she is semi-independent in many respects.

In 1909, J. B. Atlay, editor of the sixth edition of Hall's "International Law," appended the following note to the extract above cited:—"The mere fact that the Chinese government was invited to send representatives to such an assemblage (Hague peace conferences, 1899 and 1907) may be taken as an acknowledgment of its international status. How far China might be held to have forfeited her position by the gross breach of comity involved in the assault of the Peking legations in the summer of 1900 (during the Boxer troubles) was for some time a matter of speculation, but her inclusion among the Powers invited to the Hague in 1907 set the matter at rest." Since then the Republic has participated in most of the universal conventions, from the Hague and Geneva congresses to such minor international gatherings as legislated for the white slave traffic, protection of birds, bills of exchange, prison reform, hygiene and sanitation, etc. Consequently, in the 1916 edition of Wheaton's "International Law," the editor, Dr. Coleman Phillipson, remarks:—"Considering her rapid development of late, her increasing relationships with the West, her efforts to regularize her government, and to fall in line with the conceptions of international intercourse entertained by the civilized communities of the world, it may be said that, notwithstanding certain restrictions imposed upon her she (China) is now a member of the international circle."

Until the outbreak of the European War in 1914 China had signed the following universal conventions—Hague conventions, 1899-1907; Geneva convention, 1906; Convention relating to hospital ships, 1904; Convention for the creation of an international agricultural institute (at Rome), 1905; Hague opium convention, 1912-1914—and also adhered to the following—Convention for the publication of customs tariffs, 1890; Geneva convention, 1864; Universal postal convention, 1874-1906; and the Universal parcel post convention. Among the latest was the international air convention signed by her last September in Paris, about the same time that she signed the Austrian peace treaty together with the other Entente and Associated Powers.[1]

[1] China has since also participated in the Labor Conference (Washington, October, 1919), Financial Conference (Brussels, October, 1920), and the Communications Conference (Barcelona, March-April, 1921) of the League of Nations, not to speak of other minor gatherings.

Excepting "certain restrictions" which are still imposed upon the Republic, there is now no doubt about its international status, especially as a signatory of the Austrian treaty she is also an original member of the League of Nations. Hence, when the delegates of one-fourth of the world's population withheld their signatures to the Versailles treaty because of the Shantung clauses, the incident has caused greater solicitude to the chanceries of Europe than was at first light-heartedly imagined. Certainly such solicitude could not have been greater when contrasted with the Powers' rumored desire nineteen years earlier to partition the "Sick Man's" property as a punishment for the Boxers' assault upon the Peking legations!

An indication of the Republic's increasing relationships with the West is the growing number of states who are entering into treaty relations with the Peking government. Before the murder at Serajevo set the whole world ablaze there were seventeen such treaty states; now they have increased to two dozen, and the end is not yet.

If we neglect China's international relations before the advent of Russia, because the other states were not the equals of the Middle Kingdom, then 1689 is the beginning of the Celestial Empire's treaty intercourse with European states. In that year China and her great northern neighbor concluded their first treaty of peace at the border town of Nerchinsk, and in these days of trained diplomats it is interesting to note that China's real negotiators two hundred and thirty-one years ago were no other than two Catholic priests—Pere Gerbillon and Thomas Pereyra—appointed by the Chinese government to accompany its representatives as interpreters to the contracting parties. At that date the Celestial Empire was still the proud, unconquered victor and it was Russia who sued for peace and executed the peace terms. Then came the so-called "Opium War" with England and the treaty of Nanking, 1842—"the first 'treaty of peace, friendship and commerce' to which the sign manual of China had ever been attached on the new footing of equality." China was the vanquished, and since then she has always played the rôle of the "under dog."

The names of other states who have since concluded treaties as well as their first-treaty years are as follows: United States,

July, 1844; France, October, 1844; Belgium, 1845; Norway and Sweden, 1847; Germany, 1861; Portugal, 1862; Denmark, July, 1863; Holland, October, 1863; Spain, 1864; Italy, 1866; Austria-Hungary, 1869; Japan, 1871; Peru, 1874; Brazil, 1881; Mexico, 1899; Chile, 1915; Switzerland, 1918; Bolivia, March, 1920; and Persia, June, 1920. At present negotiations are progressing between China and Uruguay, and China and Greece. Last year Poland and Czecho-Slovakia desired to have similar treaties, but Peking was determined not to grant any extraterritorial rights to new states and so the negotiations were suspended. In addition, Congo Free State also concluded one with China in 1898, but it remained unratified until 1907 when C. F. S. was annexed by Belgium.

As incontestable proof of the Republic's new international attitude the resolution not to make further grant of extraterritorial rights is significant. Since, however, the old order of things is being rapidly replaced by the new, China's viewpoint is not unappreciated. Hence, in the latest treaties with Bolivia and Persia the grant of such dubious rights has been expressly withheld—the former in an exchange of notes effected after the signature, and the latter in the proper treaty itself.[1]

That is to say, the Republic is no longer the old meek, timid, good-natured grandfather who says YES to everything asked of him. Prior to 1914 the Peking government cowered before the least hint of force, and its demoralization could not have been more complete. Between 1884 and 1895 it lost several dependencies, and sixty years ago it was easily inveigled into parting with a big slice of its northeastern frontier in favor of Russia. And twenty years ago it resisted not when Power after Power demanded leased territories, railway and mining concessions—except in the notable case of Italy's demand for a port to be similarly leased, when it did resist and Rome ultimately withdrew. Hence, it agreed to the foreign claims for compensation with scarcely any murmur—claims which would have been non-suited in any other self-respecting country.

[1] In the preliminary treaty of peace recently concluded between China and Germany, the former rights of extraterritoriality were expressly renounced by Germany, and in future "lawsuits in which Germans are concerned shall be tried in modern courts and by modern codes, and the assistance of German lawyers shall be permitted."

Hence floated about the rumors of China's impending partition, and hence the various Powers' scramble for "spheres of influence," etc.

In 1914, China made a bid for a big show but was unfortunately dissuaded. Immediately on the outbreak of the European War and even before the threatened rupture between Japan and Germany, the astute President Yuan Shih-k'ai planned to retake Tsingtau by force. The Kaiser's armies were making short shrift of Belgian resistance and northern France lay at the feet of the relentless invader. Thereupon Yuan was warned not to plunge the Republic into the sad fate of bleeding Belgium, and thereby China lost her golden opportunity. Otherwise, the history of the Republic, internally as well as externally, would have to be rewritten, and most assuredly there would have been no Shantung question to disturb the peace of mind of many a premier or foreign minister in the world to-day.

The following year the infant Republic was put to the acid test. In January the Japanese minister in Peking presented the famous Twenty-one Demands, not to the Chinese foreign minister, but to the President of the Republic, in violation of all diplomatic etiquette. China resisted as long as she could until her neighbor clinched the argument by an ultimatum which she accepted on May 9th. But Yuan Shih-k'ai was no coward: to prevent any exercise of forcible means, he had one hundred thousand picked troops and one hundred and twenty guns posted around the Capital, no matter how many soldiers Japan was going to land, and he had the complete demands brought to the notice of the Allied governments abroad, despite Tokyo's warning to preserve the utmost secrecy. Already half-beaten, Japan had to resort to duplicity and prevarication in order to deceive the European public, going so far as to declare that her demands numbered only eleven, namely, those least offending to Chinese susceptibilities! The country was solidly behind the government and the latter retreated only inch by inch. Finally, Japan delivered her trump card, the Republic bowed to the inevitable and the unjust treaties were concluded on May 25th, 1915. Even then China's soul was unconquered; hence the publication of the "Official History of the Sino-Japanese Negotiations," which will be found in one of the appendices to this volume.

As already stated, the publication of such official history was unprecedented: it signified the determination to let the world hear also the Republic's side of the case, instead of waiting for truth eventually to proclaim its own tale. As in the Shantung question at the Paris Conference four years subsequently, nominally Nippon was the diplomatic victor, but actually China was the moral conqueror—in the sympathy of the world and in the union of the whole nation on the altar of common defense.

This admirable example was followed when, a year after, another Sino-Japanese dispute arose in Cheng-chia-tun (Manchuria) over a fracas between Japanese and Chinese soldiers. As usual the side in the wrong pretended to be in the right and presented a series of demands, including the stationing of Japanese police officers in Manchuria and the Chinese employment of Japanese police and military advisers. The negotiations lasted until January, 1917, at the latter part of which Dr. Wu T'ing-fang, the veteran diplomat and barrister of Lincoln's Inn (London), was appointed foreign minister. In the end Tokyo was practically out-argued in the essentials: it contented itself with the parting shot that while Peking would not consent to the stationing of police officers in Manchuria, "the Imperial Government will nevertheless be constrained to carry it into effect in case of necessity."

And this sums up the status of Japan in China; once she is on Chinese soil, she will not be dislodged (except by force) by arguments however sound or logical, and Peking may protest as much as it wants to! Does the world still wonder why the awakened Chinese people resent Japanese high-handedness in their land?

In the next three chapters we shall discuss the latest manifestations of the Republic's new international attitude—its rupture with the Central Powers, its entry into the Great War, and its participation in the Peace Conference. Such attitude, however, means something more than self-assertion: it means also an increasing amount of self-respect in place of the former spineless, self-degradation. The fact that the old foreign ministers were in very few cases neither returned students who could talk with foreign representatives in their own languages nor trained diplomats who could argue on both law and fact, may account for one-half of the past weak-kneed policies, but

the conservative as well as half-somnolent spirit of the times, with no patriotic public opinion in the country to support the government, is no less responsible. This is why the new spirit at present abroad in the land is so rich with promises for the future—for the Republic internally as for the Republic externally.

This new sense of self-respect is evidenced especially in the refusal to accept as foreign representatives men who are not acceptable in the eyes of the Chinese people—a right reserved to every independent sovereign state by the public law of nations. Between 1891 and 1918 there were at least five representatives so rejected.

In 1891, Henry W. Blair was appointed United States minister to China. Although he had already started for Peking, the latter telegraphed its objection to his appointment on the ground that in 1882 and 1888 he had "bitterly abused China in the Senate," and that he had "abused the Chinese laborers too bitterly while in the Senate and was conspicuous in helping to pass the oppressive Exclusion Act." The appointee at once resigned, at the same time explaining in defense that all he had said was that the coming of the Chinese was detrimental to the civilization of the American people, and that the Chinese quarter at San Francisco was a "seething, roaring, blood-curdling curse."

Twenty years later occurred the anomalous case of Baron Arthur von Rosthorn, appointed Austrian minister to China. At one time he was a Chinese government employee in the maritime customs, before being drafted into the diplomatic service. On being apprised of his appointment, Peking objected; but no ground was stated, although it was generally known that he had been strongly anti-Chinese. Vienna demurred to China's refusal, since the appointment had already been gazetted, etc. After some months he arrived at the Capital, when the Manchus were in the throes of the Chinese Revolution. The feelings against him having more or less subsided, he was suffered to present his credentials. Thus China was cajoled into accepting an individual it had previously rejected as *persona non grata*. The baron behaved himself and remained until the declaration of war between the Republic and the Central Powers necessitated his departure.

In July, 1918, diplomatic negotiations were opened between

China and the Holy See in Rome. The Chinese minister to Madrid was appointed concurrently minister to the Vatican, and Monseigneur Petrelli was nominated the first papal nuncio to Peking. France protested on the ground that China's action was a contravention of the Sino-French treaty of 1858 which had authorized her to assume protection over Roman Catholics in the Celestial Empire, while the Republic maintained that the convention in question did not preclude it from entering into diplomatic relations with the Vatican or with any Power. Later, however, China's attention was drawn to the fact that Mgr. Petrelli was on most intimate terms with the former German minister in Peking, so his appointment lent color to the popular belief that the Republic's action was the result of German intrigues. Thereupon his reception was declined.

The Pope made a fresh nomination in the person of Mgr. Pizani, who was known to be associated with Bolo Pasha, the notorious pro-German agent; consequently the Chinese government also declined to accept him. In the end negotiations with the Holy See were allowed to lapse until after the war, since China's allies did not consider it opportune for her to establish such relations with the Vatican which was considered to be under the influence of the enemy.

At the end of the same year occurred the case of Mr. Beelaerts van Blokland, Dutch minister in Peking. The following telegram was published by Reuter's agency, dated London, December 6th, 1918:—"China has demanded the recall of the Dutch Minister to Peking, who had been a most active pro-German, intimidated the Chinese from interning the Germans, from liquidating the German Bank, and tried to prevent the deportation of Germans to Australia, alleging that the Germans in Australia were ill-treated. The Chinese yielded to the threats because they feared reprisals on the 700,000 Chinese in the Dutch Indies. The Dutch Minister at Bangkok is also charged with attempting to sow discord between Allies and neutrals."

Here is indeed food for furious thought: China, the polite and amiable state, demanding the recall of an European Power's representative! But the publication of China's White Book a fortnight earlier amply justified the drastic act.

As already noted in a previous chapter, this White Book contains the "official documents relating to the War" (for the year 1917). Issued in English, in white paper covers, it has over 200 pages and is divided into five parts—the severance of relations and the declaration of war, the recall of Chinese ministers from Germany and Austria-Hungary, the departure of German and Austrian diplomatic officials, rules and regulations relating to the war, concerning the treatment of enemy persons and enemy property. Altogether 190 documents are included.

These documents show that Mr. Beelaerts erred grievously in excess of zeal for his German and Austrian protégés: he was not only too friendly but actually partisan. His language was couched in veiled threats and he even presumed to "protest in advance"—that is, before he had been requested by Germany or Austria to do so. He wrote:—"The Chinese Government will be held answerable for all losses which may result from such actions." "In invading the legal status of German, Austrian and Hungarian subjects, in violation of this universally recognized principle, the Chinese authorities seem to attach less value to the principles of international law than what I could expect." "The Chinese authorities have no right to regulate controversies of that character and I must protest most energetically against the attempt to do so in the provisional regulations." "It should therefore be clear that to whichever side victory in the war may fall, it is required by China's future vital interests that she should adhere to her former declaration strictly to observe the regulations of the Hague Conventions."

The demand for recall is a step in advance of the mere refusal to accept a foreign representative, and certainly is a marked contrast with the extraordinary case of Baron Rosthorn. This is by no means the first occasion where China has pressed such a demand, since another minister was indirectly recalled by his government in 1917, in consequence of a breach of diplomatic courtesy. It certainly is the first instance done entirely in the open.

So far so good, but much remains yet to be done in the vindication of national dignity and self-respect. For example, there is in the Capital to-day a foreign representative who dis-

tinguished himself in the Twenty-one Demands of 1915: China accepted him at the end of 1918 because the government of the day failed to uphold the Republic's self-respect, although even among mutual friends it was conceded that his appointment at the juncture, in view of his past career, could only react to the disadvantage of his own country. In another state a foreign diplomat was recalled by his government at the request of the other, twenty-four hours after he had intimated to the latter that he would not be present at a reception together with the representative of a certain neutral state well-known for his sympathies with one of the belligerents. An almost similar situation existed in Peking, but China was not strong enough to vindicate her dignity. Such a state of affairs is anachronous: it ought to be amended as soon as possible in consonance with the spirit of the times.

We have said that between 1884 and 1895 China lost several of her dependencies, such as Annam, Burma, Formosa, Korea, etc. At the time of the Revolution of 1911, the princes and nobles of Outer Mongolia declared independence, at the instigation of Russian adventurers. By a series of agreements extending to November, 1913, Russian diplomacy succeeded in creating a buffer state between Siberia and the new Chinese Republic as well as consolidating Czarist influence in the new semi-independent state. In June, 1915, the new relationships were confirmed in a tripartite agreement beween Autonomous Outer Mongolia, China as suzerain and Russia as the former's protector. Hence, while Outer Mongolia could manage its own internal affairs and conclude international treaties relating to commercial and industrial matters, China and Russia must be consulted as regards international agreements dealing with political and territorial questions.

As was expected, the Colossus of the North was not slow to reap its fullest advantage. Both commercially and economically its position was as favorable as China's was just the reverse, and in addition to lending the new government at Urga five million roubles, it also undertook to equip as well as train the Mongolian army. On the other hand, it did not take the Mongols long to find out the real intentions of their "protectors," and the majority of the people preferred to return to their ancestral fold. Despite the efforts of the Russian

government, Russian trade was not able to compete with that of the Chinese—partly because the former were out to reap large returns within a short space of time. A Russian merchant therefore once complained that his profits had fallen as low as twenty per cent! Then came the European War and the volume of Russian trade dwindled to nothing. The onrushing tide of Bolshevism on the further side of the frontier served to intensify the universal feeling of rejoining the Republic, and in November last year the Urga government formally petitioned Peking for cancellation of its autonomy.

Thus ended the misguided independence movement. In conformity with the new policy of taking the world into its confidence the Chinese government issued an official statement, setting forth the early relations between China and its northern dependency and also reproducing the Urga government's memorial praying for such cancellation. The statement concludes with the following pregnant passage:—

"The Government of China, in complying with this earnest appeal to restore the old order of affairs, is moved by the heartfelt desire to assist in the establishment of general peace on an enduring basis. It was impossible to continue arrangements which had obviously lapsed owing to the dissolution of the Russian Empire and which were a constant invitation to unrest. The policy now being carried out is in strict agreement with the frontier principles established by the late dynasty: for China sixty years ago anticipated the ruling of the Paris Peace Conference that a fundamental necessity exists to give all nations access to the sea—her cession of the left bank of the Amur, together with the right of navigation on that great waterway, coupled with frontier trade privileges, having conferred on the Russian people all that they could legitimately claim beyond Lake Baikal. To-day, as in the case of Persia, where an arrangement which had been made by the late Russian Government has likewise automatically terminated, and been replaced by a new Treaty freely entered into and more in consonance with existing circumstances, the frank appeal of the Urga Government to the Republic of the Five Races marks a new stage in world reorganization. It is now not too much to hope that in the not distant future general

peace and tranquillity will reign throughout every district of the Chinese domain, and promote all those high objects of civilization which are to-day so constantly in the thoughts and declarations of statesmen and peoples alike." [1]

Such language is most refreshing after the monotonous YES of the old mandarins to everything asked of them or remarked by foreign representatives. Perhaps the most signal vindication of national dignity and self-respect was exhibited at Versailles on June 28, 1919, and at Peking on May 22, 1920, when solely because of the inequitable Shantung clauses China declined to sign the German peace treaty and also to open direct negotiations with Japan over the proposed restoration of Kiaochow. More will be said about the first when we deal with China's part at the Paris Conference; here must be appended the text of China's reply to Tokyo on May 22nd last:—

"The Chinese Government fully appreciate the intention of the Japanese Government to restore Kiaochow and to prepare for the evacuation of their troops along the Kiaochow-Tsinanfu Railway, which are incidental to the carrying out of the terms of the German Treaty of Peace. China, however, has not signed the Treaty of Peace and is not now in a position to negotiate directly with Japan on the question of Tsingtau. Furthermore, the people throughout China have assumed an indignantly antagonistic attitude toward the question of Kiaochow. For these reasons and also in consideration of the amity between Japan and China, the Chinese Government do not find themselves in a position to make a reply at this moment.

"On the other hand, the state of war with Germany having ceased to exist, all Japanese military establishments within and without the leased territory of Kiaochow are unnecessary, and the restoration of all pre-war conditions along the Kiaochow-Tsinanfu Railway being heartily desired by the Chinese Government and the people of China, they propose to effect a proper organization to replace the Japanese troops in order

[1] As we go to press it is reported that the Chinese garrison at Urga has been driven out and that the Mongols are holding it with the assistance of a few thousand "White" Russians under one Baron Ungern.

to secure and maintain the safety of the whole line. However, as this is independent entirely of the question of the restoration of Kiaochow, the Chinese Government trust that the Japanese Government will not delay the execution of the evacuation."

Here we get glimpses of Sino-Japanese diplomacy. If the authorities in Peking were really representative of the people, the above reply would have been couched in firmer language —certainly one more to the point. On the other hand, Tokyo's favorite procedure is to bargain for something which, by right of law and reason, should never have been hers at all, as well as for something which, if she had been conscientious, would have already become nonexistent.

That Japan should never have continued in possession of Shantung is plain from China's refusal to sign the Versailles treaty, but it may not be so generally known that the Japanese troops, which Tokyo now offered to withdraw if Peking would open direct negotiations as desired, should have been evacuated at least five years ago—namely, when the German garrison at Tsingtau capitulated to Anglo-Japanese forces on November 7, 1914. But Nippon had her own designs to serve; hence the Twenty-one Demands of 1915 were presented partly because of Tokyo's displeasure at China's cancellation of the war zone around Kiaochow hinterland at the end of 1914. For example, in reply to such cancellation which was notified only after repeated requests to the Japanese authorities to withdraw their troops had proved abortive, the Japanese minister in Peking, in a communication dated January 7, 1915, described the act of revocation as "improper, arbitrary, betraying in fact want of confidence in international good faith and regardless of friendly relations."

We may smile at such language to-day, but it is none the less true that up to date the Japanese troops are still garrisoned in China's sacred province in actual defiance of the territorial government's protests. This aspect of the Shantung question will be found admirably set out in one of the appendices to this volume, under China's claim for the direct restitution of Kiaochow to herself, submitted to the Paris Conference in February, 1919.

Whereas in former days others could treat the Celestial

Empire with scant respect, such discourtesy will now no longer be brooked. What is sauce for the gander is sauce also for the goose: hence the Republic is rightly jealous of its own dignity and self-respect. A few months ago Japan issued a declaration regarding the necessity of retaining Japanese troops in Siberia and employed phraseology which seemed to treat both Manchuria and Korea as under Tokyo's sovereignty. Peking at once protested against the inclusion of the former, when the Japanese Legation replied reassuringly.

Similarly in the recent case of the former Austrian Lloyd steamer *Silesia*, confiscated by the Chinese government after the declaration of war against the Central Empires and renamed *Hwa Yih*, which was chartered by the Czecho-Slovak government to repatriate its troops from Siberia and detained at Trieste by the Italian naval authorities, the Republic upheld its dignity: it protested repeatedly until she was finally released. At one stage of the negotiations the Italian government observed that it could not interfere with the decision of the judiciary which had adjudged the steamer to belong to Italian owners, whereupon Peking replied that the prize court at Trieste had no jurisdiction at all over a ship flying the Chinese flag, in which case the seizure was a violation of international law. Italy proposed to submit the matter to arbitration, but China insisted that the vessel should be first returned to her, "after which, if the Italian authorities make application for the return of the *Silesia* and the Chinese Government cannot entertain the application, then the question may be submitted to arbitration."

Foreign Powers used to negotiate with one another concerning their interests in China and pledge themselves to guarantee the integrity and independence of the Celestial Empire. In each case Peking was never consulted or asked for an opinion: it was treated as good as deaf, dumb, mute and blind. When, however, in November, 1917, the United States and Japan concluded their Lansing-Ishii agreement, the new self-respecting attitude of the Republic asserted itself, and both governments were thereupon informed that China "could not allow itself to be bound by any agreement entered into by other nations."

This attitude is eloquently illustrated in the recent renewal of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance which, as usual, guaranteed

the integrity and independence of China. As Japan had been the greater gainer out of the compact than her ally, and especially as Japan's actions in China with the apparent connivance of Great Britain had aroused Chinese public opinion, it was generally hoped that the alliance would be discontinued. Accordingly, when Sir Beilby Alston, British minister in Peking, passed through Shanghai on his way to London, he was presented with a long memorandum by the representatives of prominent Chinese at that port and the following organizations: The Kiangsu Educational Association, Shanghai Chinese Chamber of Commerce, Chinese Bankers' Association, Chinese Cotton Mill Owners' Association, Shanghai Educational Association, Shanghai Fire Brigade Association, Western Returned Students' Union, World's Chinese Students' Federation, Overseas Chinese Federation, and the National Association of Vocational Education.

As an additional example of the growing articulateness of the Chinese people now fully awake to their international status, this memorandum in English merits more than a passing notice. It starts off with the following pertinent remarks: "This memorandum is drawn up in order to call the attention of the British Government to the rapidly growing public sentiment in China against the renewal of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance—at least in its present form. It is to be conceded at the outset that it is not an appropriate act for a third party to interfere when two governments desire to enter into an alliance or to renew an existing one, but it will be the duty of the third party to register its objection if the alliance so contracted directly concerns the welfare of the third party."

Having explained the original objects of the alliance, the document goes on to show that not only is there no need for its continuance but that Japan has repeatedly violated it to the grave prejudice of her ally—for example, in closing the promised Open Door in China and also by the 1915 Twenty-one Demands. The latter especially were embarrassing to Great Britain, "both during the war and at the Peace Conference, when dealing with the Shantung question." Then it proceeds to show how the former practice of treating the Middle Kingdom as a mere diplomatic appendage is a flagrant discourtesy to the government and people concerned, whereas with the ratification of the Austrian peace treaty the Repub-

lic has also become a full member of the League of Nations. However, "a renewal of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance under the existing or similar terms, taken with the previous interpretation of the Alliance in practice, will cause the Chinese strongly to suspect that, when China takes an appeal to the League of Nations for redress of her grievances, Great Britain and Japan will be found to have made a private agreement prejudicial to China's case, and which may adversely affect China's hope of obtaining justice from the League. This has been amply borne out by the secret agreement made between Great Britain and Japan on February 16, 1917, which was one of the chief factors, if not the chief factor, in deciding the Shantung question in favor of Japan."

Then the memorandum concludes as follows:—"In presenting this memorandum to the British Government we merely voice the sentiment of the Chinese people. In our humble opinion the changed conditions of the world to-day do not call for any further renewal of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. The motives of the Alliance, so far as China is concerned, do not exist to-day. The aggressive and imperialistic policy of both Russia and Germany has passed away and there is no further menace from any other Power. The violation of the objects of the Alliance by Japan seriously embarrassed Great Britain. The renewal of the Alliance, at least under the existing or similar terms, tends only to irritate China on the one hand and to cause Great Britain to share the distrust of the Chinese people so widely and deeply entertained towards Japan. China, from this time on, desires and means to exercise full sovereign rights and diplomatic independence in her international relationships. A renewal of the Alliance will only cause the Chinese people strongly to suspect Great Britain's having some other motives, as the Covenant of the League of Nations fully covers the ground of the Alliance and China is an original member of the League."

All this is gratifying enough, but the *coup de grâce* is reserved for the Chinese government to proclaim likewise its unequivocal attitude. On June 6, 1920, a month earlier than the above memorandum was presented and therefore before the departure of the British minister from Peking, the Wai-chiao Pu (Foreign Office) issued the following significant *communiqué* in English:—

"Three months ago the attention of the Chinese Government was drawn to statements appearing in the world's press regarding the renewal or termination of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. Inasmuch as an important element in the text of both of the 1905 and 1911 agreements was Section B of the Preamble, which treated of matters affecting China's international standing and international relations without the prior assent of China having been obtained, and inasmuch as public opinion throughout the Republic had long shown deep resentment at this condition of affairs, the Government decided that the time had arrived to address representations to the British Government.

"Instructions were consequently sent to the Chinese Minister in London to make formal inquiries regarding the reports appearing in the press and to point out that, while obviously the international arrangements of other Powers did not in the ordinary course of events concern others than the high contracting parties, the treatment of China merely as a territorial entity in the written text of any such agreements would no longer be tolerated by the public opinion of the country and would be viewed by all as an unfriendly act. To these first inquiries China received the following verbal reply: first that the question of the renewal or termination of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance had not yet come up for consideration; secondly, that inasmuch as the successive agreements had been couched in the same language, it would naturally follow that if the Alliance were renewed it must follow the same lines.

"In consequence of this reply a memorandum was prepared analyzing the three successive Alliance instruments and establishing clearly: (A) that the original instrument of 1902 was radically different from the 1905 agreement in that the independence of Korea was specifically guaranteed in the first; (B) that the second agreement of 1905, so far from being identical, included India for the first time within its scope, whilst Korea was relegated to a subordinate position and clearly earmarked for annexation; (C) that the third agreement introduced into the Preamble the definite statement, 'having in view the important changes which have taken place in the situation, etc.,' and then definitely dropped all reference to the numbered articles to either Korea or the Indian frontier, because acts to which Russia's assent had been obtained

had made mutual pledges regarding these matters superfluous.

"In view, then, of the fact that beneath the framework of what is on the surface a self-denying ordinance, vital and far-reaching changes have acquired the sanction of the high contracting parties, Chinese opinion is not unnaturally distrustful of any renewal of this agreement, all men holding that China had suffered enough from its operation during the World War in the matter of Shantung.

"Furthermore, as the formal ratification of the Austrian Treaty has made China a member of the League of Nations which, she assumes, was created in good faith, she is advised that a contract regarding her affairs between other members of the League cannot be entered into without her prior consent having been obtained, Article 10 being a sufficient guarantee that her territorial integrity will be respected.

"So far China has not received a reply to her memorandum. She is anxious for that reply so that she may address an identical note to Japan and establish definitely the national attitude on a question vital to the peace and prosperity of her people."

Since then, according to a Reuter's telegram dated London, July 14, 1920, the League of Nations has announced that the British and Japanese governments had decided to renew their alliance for another twelve months. On the other hand, the two governments are of the opinion that "the Anglo-Japanese Agreement of July 13, 1911, though harmonizing with the spirit of the Covenant of the League of Nations, is not entirely consistent with the letter of that Covenant, which both Governments earnestly desire to respect." Accordingly, Great Britain and Japan "recognize the principle that if the said agreement be continued after July, 1921, it must be in a form which is not inconsistent with that Covenant."

In well-informed circles this is taken to mean that the alliance will not be renewed after next July. Whether this interpretation is correct or otherwise will be proved in another few months,[1] but it is significant that China's unambiguous

[1] This interpretation seems now to be borne out by the latest march of events. It having been presumed all the time that the above notification to the League of Nations was an actual denunciation for the purpose of terminating the agreement, the subject of its renewal was taken up by the

attitude is already receiving due attention. For example, when telegraphic summaries of the Wai-chiao Pu's declaration reached London, members of the British House of Commons at once requested to be furnished with the full text, but Premier Lloyd George replied that it could not be published "at present." As an American editor in China commented, the premier's reply implies that "China must have put over something hot."[1]

Hence a few days later the *London Daily News*, a leading liberal organ, urged courageous and farseeing statesmanship

Conference of British Premiers, held in London, June-July, 1921. The Canadian delegation was firmly opposed to such renewal, and the Lord Chancellor of England declared that last year's joint notification to the League did not constitute a denunciation, that therefore the agreement would continue until July, 1922, and that the same would remain valid until twelve months after effective denunciation by either party. On July 7, 1921, the following communication signed by Lord Curzon and Baron Hayashi, the Japanese ambassador in London, was addressed to the League:—

"Whereas the Governments of Great Britain and Japan informed the League of Nations in their joint notification of July 8, 1920, that they recognized the principle that, if the Anglo-Japanese Alliance Agreement of July 13, 1911, is continued after July, 1921, it must be in a form which is not inconsistent with the Covenant of the League, they hereby notify the League, pending further action, that they are agreed that, if any situation arises whilst the Agreement remains in force in which the procedure prescribed by the terms of the Agreement is inconsistent with the procedure prescribed by the Covenant of the League of Nations, then the procedure prescribed by the said Covenant shall be adopted and shall prevail over that prescribed by the Agreement."

A few days later President Harding informally invited the Principal Allied and Associated Powers to participate with the United States in a conference to be held at Washington to discuss the question of limitation of armaments and consider the Pacific and Far Eastern problems; the official statement issued from the White House adding that "China has also been invited to take part in the discussion relating to Far Eastern problems." The invitation has been accepted, China included, and it seems that the conference will be held in Washington in November, about the time this volume will be published. In which case it appears to be a foregone conclusion that the Anglo-Japanese alliance will be merged in the general deliberations of the larger Pacific Conference.

[1] In the course of his speech in the House of Commons, on July 11, 1921, reviewing the march of events in connection with the Anglo-Japanese alliance and cordially accepting the invitation of President Harding on behalf of the British government, Mr. Lloyd George made the following references to China:—"In China there is a very numerous people with great potentialities, who esteem our friendship highly, and whose interests we, on our side, desire to assist and advance. . . . We also aim at preserving the Open Door in China, and at giving the Chinese people every opportunity of peaceful progress and development. . . . China will be treated as she is—an independent Power. We made the same communication to the Chinese Government as to the other Governments."

on the part of Great Britain and the association of China with the Anglo-Japanese alliance as an equal partner. Furthermore, China should be welcomed not only to the Assembly but also to the Council of the League of Nations; for, said the journal, "nothing will more surely arouse China to the responsibilities of her nationhood than its recognition by the Western Powers."[1]

As final instances of self-assertion and exercise of inherent sovereign rights, we may mention China's assumption of authority over the Russian-concessioned Chinese Eastern Railway and her latest stand on the national tariff question.

According to the Sino-Russian agreement of 1896, Russia was permitted to construct a railway across northern Manchuria as the shortest prolongation of its Trans-Siberian Railway terminating at Vladivostok, which was subsequently extended in a southerly direction to Port Arthur, leased from China in 1898 after Germany had occupied Kiaochow on a ninety-nine years' lease. The agreement provided for a Chinese president, though the managing director was to be Russian and part of the capital was to be subscribed by China. In 1909, when the railway company attempted to exercise powers detrimental to China's sovereignty, Peking protested vigorously and in the end the sovereignty of the territorial sovereign was formally acknowledged. Since the war and since the revolution in Russia, the railway has deteriorated in more senses than one, and rather than the Bolsheviki in Moscow should ride astride the important artery, China lost no time in exercising control. The southern extension to Port Arthur was in 1905, under the treaty of Portsmouth, transferred by Russia to Japan and so is at present administered by the latter. At one time, however, Tokyo attempted to seize control also of the Vladivostok-Manchuli line, but Peking was supported by the Inter-Allied Railway Technical Commission and therefore is now administering the railway, with Dr. C. C. Wang, a graduate from Illinois and Yale, as co-director of the administration, pending the formation of a stable Russian government.

[1] China was on December 15, 1920, elected by the First Assembly of the League of Nations to a seat on the Council of the League, together with Belgium, Brazil and Spain—these constituting the four non-permanent members of the Council—for the year 1921.

At the end of this volume will be found as one of the appendices the questions for readjustment submitted by China to the Paris Conference in April, 1919. One of these vexed problems is that of tariff autonomy. As an instance of the Republic's imperfect status, or "certain restrictions imposed upon her" referred to in Dr. Coleman Phillipson's work already quoted, the fact may be noted here that unlike other sovereign states, China cannot establish a national tariff of her own, but imports and exports are dutiable according to a scale of tariff laid down by treaty arrangements between China and other Powers. Other states may levy duties from 20 per cent. to 200 per cent., depending on the nature of the imported articles, but the Republic can only charge a duty of five per cent. *ad valorem*. The treaties provide for periodic revision every ten or twelve years, but since the inauguration of the treaty tariff in 1858, there have been only two revisions —in 1902 and 1918, and then to make the nominal five per cent. really effective! The various aspects of this complicated question will be found admirably set out in the appendix above mentioned.

Here we are concerned only with the Republic's latest stand in the matter. When the tariff on imports was revised in 1918—that is, to make the nominal five per cent. specific—it was hoped that until justice could be accorded to China in this direction two years after the war in Europe, the increased levy would bring in an additional revenue of twenty million taels, whereas the trade report issued for 1918 predicted that the increase would come to about four million taels—namely, one-fourth of the import duties actually collected in 1917. This revised tariff came into force on August 1, 1919; so the trade report for last year felt it was too early to estimate its effect on the total customs revenue of forty-six million taels, or £15,000,000 odd. At any rate China's position becomes more and more intolerable since, by the 1918 revision, some duties have been doubled and others reduced.

Under the circumstances the Republic felt compelled to frame a national tariff independent of the treaty tariff for collection of duties on the goods of non-treaty states as well as ex-treaty states such as Germany and Austria-Hungary. To this, as reported in the press, the diplomatic body in Peking objected on the ground that its introduction would act

seriously in restraint of China's foreign trade, that there was no precedent for the proposed procedure, that by virtue of the most-favored-nation clause all treaty Powers were entitled to claim that the duties enumerated in the treaty tariff should be imposed upon articles imported into China by their nationals, irrespective of the countries from which they came, and that therefore the new national tariff could only be applied to goods which were originally manufactured in non-treaty countries and imported from non-treaty states by non-treaty subjects.

It would be taking us too far afield to discuss here the most-favored-nation clause, treaty rights of treaty states, and status of non-treaty states, etc.; it will suffice to refer the reader to the author's "Legal Obligations arising out of Treaty Relations between China and Other States," published in 1917, where every phase of treaty rights and limitations will be found discussed in great detail.

Obviously the objections of the foreign diplomats are far from being unassailable; so the Wai-chiao Pu took the opportunity to press home its arguments. Whereas China had no remedy against the goods of treaty states, it certainly had every jurisdiction over goods of non-treaty states. Hence goods produced in a non-treaty state but shipped to China from the port of a treaty Power should be likewise dutiable according to the national tariff. Since it is the practice in all countries to require importers to produce certificates of origin of goods imported, the same procedure would thenceforth be adopted in Chinese ports. Accordingly, "if the procedure suggested by the Diplomatic Body that goods imported into China by nationals of treaty Powers, no matter what the country of origin might be, should pay duty according to the tariff schedule fixed by treaty agreement, were to be followed, then the privileges gained by the treaty Powers through the treaty tariff would be given *in toto* to non-treaty Powers. This, it is feared, is contrary to the original purpose of the treaty, while the Chinese Government would have issued its nationally adopted tariff to no purpose at all."

Such an attitude is eminently fair and seems to have been acquiesced in by the foreign diplomats. In any case the discussion can never become indefinite, since the treaty Powers' representatives will ere long meet with China's delegates to

reframe a new treaty tariff. We will not pretend to forecast the future; but it is well to remember that the Chinese people having awakened and prepared themselves to shoulder their international responsibilities, it is to the interests of the Powers no less than to those of China that the Republic should at the earliest opportunity be accorded a status in keeping with its size and potentialities.[1]

[1] Owing to the collapse of the Romanoffs as well as the Bolshevik repudiation of the diplomatic and consular officials appointed to China by the former Petrograd governments, Peking has since September 23, 1920, withdrawn all diplomatic and consular privileges from such officials, taken over the administration of ex-Russian concessions in Hankow and Tientsin, and assumed jurisdiction over all Russian nationals, Russian assessors having been engaged to assist the Chinese judges. As soon as there is established a stable government for all Russia, recognized by China and the Powers, the foregoing arrangements may be subject to revision and adjustment.

CHAPTER XVI

RUPTURE WITH THE CENTRAL POWERS

WE have said that the Republic is no longer the old, amiable grandfather who never refused any request put to him, but an awakened infant democracy, self-respecting, self-assertive and determined to vindicate its prestige and rights of sovereignty. The best proof lies in the series of events leading from China's breach with the Central Powers through entry into the war to participation in the Paris Conference and adherence as an original member of the League of Nations.

On February 1, 1917, the German government announced that its previously declared methods of submarine warfare would from that day commence to take effect. Three days later, the American minister in Peking notified the Wai-chiao Pu that his government had already severed diplomatic relations with Germany, and requested the Chinese government to follow the United States in its protest. Peking responded and, on February 9, China formally protested to Berlin.

The note declares that "the new measures of submarine warfare inaugurated by Germany, imperilling the lives and property of Chinese citizens to even a greater extent than the measures previously taken, which have already cost so many human lives to China, constitute a violation of the principles of public international law at present in force; the tolerance of their application would have as a result the introduction into international law of arbitrary principles incompatible with even legitimate commercial intercourse between neutral States and belligerent Powers." The Republic, therefore, "sincerely hopes that with a view to respecting the rights of neutral States and to maintaining the friendly relations" between it and Germany, the latter would not carry out its intentions; but "in case contrary to its expectations, its protest be ineffectual, the Government of the Chinese Republic will be

constrained, to its profound regret, to sever the diplomatic relations at present existing between the two countries."

On March 10 the German government replied. On that very afternoon the parliament in Peking had empowered the government to break with Germany; so when the reply was delivered at 9:30 p. m. the same evening, it came too late. On the whole, the reply was friendly, although no one expected that Berlin would condescend to listen to Peking. The note begins by expressing surprise that the Chinese protest was accompanied by a threat:—"Many other countries have also protested, but China, which has been in friendly relations with Germany, is the only state which has added a threat to its protest. The surprise is doubly great, because of the fact that, as China has no shipping interests in the seas of the blockaded zones, she will not suffer thereby." And then the note significantly concludes as follows:—"The reason which has prompted the Imperial Government to adopt this conciliatory policy is the knowledge that, once diplomatic relations are severed with Germany, China will not only lose a truly good friend, but also be entangled in unthinkable difficulties."

While the matter is now of mere academic interest, it is interesting to study the desperateness of Berlin's condition. Unable to meet the Republic's charges, it suggested that China's protest was out of place because China had no shipping interests in the blockaded zones. Yet in the German foreign minister's note to the Chinese minister in Berlin, dated January 31, 1917, he said:—"With reference to the details of the planned naval measures in the annex enclosed, the Imperial Government begs to express its hope that the Chinese Government will warn Chinese vessels of the danger which they run in entering the forbidden zones described in the annex as well as warn Chinese citizens against entrusting passengers or goods to ships frequenting the ports of the forbidden zones." And in his reply of March 10 the German minister in Peking likewise remarked:—"The Imperial Government is nevertheless willing to comply with the wishes of the Government of the Republic of China by opening negotiations to arrive at a plan for the protection of Chinese life and property, with the view that consideration be given to the shipping rights of China."

Four days subsequently, at 12 o'clock noon, occurred the rupture between the Republic and Germany. The German minister and his staff were handed their passports, and the following presidential proclamation was issued:—

"China has observed strict neutrality since the outbreak of the war in Europe. A note, however, was received from the German Government on the second day of the second month of this year (February 2, 1917), warning us of the danger to neutral ships sailing from the latter date in certain zones as defined according to the new blockade declared by Germany, etc. The Government thereupon decided that, inasmuch as the German method of attacking merchant ships has already caused considerable loss of Chinese life and property and as the new submarine policy would cause even greater menace and injury, China, moved by the desire to uphold international law and to discharge the duty of protecting the life and property of her people, lodged a strong protest with the German Government and stated that, unless Germany withdrew her new policy, China would be compelled to sever diplomatic relations with Germany. It was then hoped that Germany would not persist in her policy but would maintain the friendly relations hitherto existing between the two countries. But a month has passed, and Germany has not yet abandoned her submarine warfare. On the contrary, many merchant ships of various countries have been sunk; and on several occasions our people have suffered losses of life. A formal reply was received on the 10th inst. from the German Government, stating that it was difficult for Germany to abandon her blockade policy. This is, indeed, disappointing to us. In the cause of international law and in the interests of the protection of the lives and property of our people, diplomatic relations with Germany are hereby severed."

This is China's answer—to Berlin, to the United States, and to the world. In accepting Washington's invitation the Chinese foreign minister thus wrote, on February 9, to the American minister in Peking:—"The Chinese Government, being in accord with the principles set forth in Your Excellency's note and firmly associating itself with the Government of the United States of America, has taken similar action by

protesting energetically to the German Government against the new measures of blockade. The Chinese Government also proposes to take such action in the future as may be deemed necessary for the maintenance of the principles of international law." But the result was attained only after a series of melodramatic events in which opposition was the conspicuous note.

For China the amiable grandfather to protest and then to break with a European state over a war taking place in far-off Europe sounded incredible to most Chinese. And when the European state concerned was no other than the most powerful militarily—did it not seize Kiaochow because of so flimsy an excuse as the murder of two German missionaries?—it was feared that condign punishment would soon be visited on China's poor head by the state that so far had been winning the war. Hence the prevalence of pro-German feeling—with some it was one of dread, with others of partiality, thanks to German propaganda. Then prominent Young China leaders, including the first provisional president of the Republic and likewise the first premier of the Republic, telegraphed their opposition. Dr. Sun Yat-sen, in addition, telegraphed to Premier Lloyd George, just before parliament voted to break with Germany, protesting against China being "coerced" by the Allies to go into the war and prophesying troubles in China similar to the 1900 Boxer outrage. Fortunately public opinion had been intelligently educated to appreciate as well as approve of the government's momentous foreign policy, and the irrational opposition of disappointed politicians was discounted—one Chinese editor, well-known for his sympathies with the side espoused by Dr. Sun's party, for example, characterizing some of his irresponsible statements to the British premier as being reminiscent "of Don Quixote, astride the steed Rosinanthe, charging at windmills as if they were mounted knights oppressing the weak."

Then after the various political leaders had promised to support the cabinet and everything was ready for rupture with Germany as early as March 5—that is, nine days before the actual breach—the President of the Republic General Li Yuan-hung, the hero of the 1911 Revolution, suddenly interposed a delay. According to newspaper reports, on Sunday, March 4, "the cabinet met at the President's Palace to obtain his official approval and his seal upon the documents

The cabinet members, however, found him in a mood to object to too precipitate action by the cabinet without his knowledge, and in the argument that ensued with the premier, it is said that he insisted upon his constitutional right to declare war and make peace." The premier replied that as the head of a responsible cabinet he had the right to presidential concurrence in the unanimous decisions of the cabinet, and since the President could not agree to the cabinet's plans the only course open to the premier was to resign. The latter left for the railway station and, dictating his letter of resignation to his secretary, left by a special train for the nearest port, Tientsin, three hours away. President Li meanwhile had learned that the cabinet's policy was endorsed by the public, including parliamentary leaders, and so changed his mind. Delegation after delegation left for Tientsin to persuade the premier to return, but to no avail. Finally the vice-president of the Republic had to go on the same mission, and two days later the premier returned. On March 10 the cabinet appeared before parliament to ask for authorization to break with Germany. After a stormy debate the lower house upheld the government by 331 to 87, and the senate by a majority of 150 votes.

This then marks the end of Sino-German diplomatic relations, although the so-called "third step"—the other two being, first, protest and then rupture—or declaration of war remained yet to be taken. But for practical purposes the treaty status of Germany was thenceforth non-existent: the treaties and agreements, etc., concluded between the two countries were suspended, though not formally abrogated, and it was competent to the Chinese authorities to adopt all necessary precautionary measures. That Germany had a great deal to answer in the eyes of Chinese is obvious from the baneful effects of its mailed fist policy since 1897. If two missionaries had been murdered by outlaws, their dependents could at most claim compensation from the local officials, but Germany preferred to adopt high-handed measures. Its fleet seized Kiaochow that same winter, and a few months subsequently, on March 6, 1898, the famous Kiaochow convention was extorted—giving Germany the lease of Kiaochow Bay for ninety-nine years and the right to construct, with Sino-German capital, two railways from Tsingtau to Tsinan, the capital of Shantung province.

Naturally the other Powers interested in China were not indifferent, and they, too, desired to preserve the balance of power. Thus was ushered in the international scramble for leased territories, etc. Russia demanded the lease of Port Arthur and Ta-lien-wan (now known as Dalny or Dairen); Great Britain, Wei-hai-wei; and France Kwang-chow-wan Bay on the south—the first for twenty-five years, the second "for so long a period as Port Arthur shall remain in the occupation of Russia," and the third for ninety-nine years. Next came what Lord Salisbury called the "battle of concessions" for railway and mining privileges. For example, within ten months of the Kiaochow convention the British railway concessions totalled 2,800 miles; Russian, 1,530; German, 720; Belgian, 650; French, 420; and American, 300. And with that came the inevitable rumors of early partitionment of the decrepit Celestial Empire.

In the eyes of misguided patriots the high-handed actions of Germany were laid at the doors also of foreigners in general. Hence started the Boxer outbreak to drive all aliens into the sea, in the province where Berlin disturbed what proved a hornet's nest. As already stated, China has been heavily punished for this madness and saddled with an indemnity of £67,500,000 which, in 1940, would have more than doubled. When the troops under Count Waldersee embarked for the Allied relief of the besieged legations in Peking, the Kaiser instructed them to grant no quarter to the Chinese, so that the latter would never dare look at a German in the face again! The imperial command was obeyed, and the tale of outrages committed by German soldiers on defenseless Chinese men, women and children, makes nauseous reading. Hence the bronze astronomical instruments in the Peking Observatory were removed to Berlin, and hence the German share of the Boxer indemnity totalled one-fifth of the whole amount—Tls. 90,070,515 or Mks. 275,165,423.325, out of Tls. 450,000,000.

Moreover, for the unfortunate assassination of the German minister Baron von Ketteler, China had to erect a monument in the Capital within almost a stone's throw of the present Wai-chiao Pu, so that the regrets of this country for an act of irresponsible homicide might be permanently preserved and publicly proclaimed. In addition, an imperial prince—Prince Chun, afterwards the prince regent in 1908-1911—was to

proceed to Berlin and tender personal apologies at Potsdam Palace. The Kaiser insisted that the Chinese envoy should kneel in his presence, but the latter declined and for a time it looked as if the incident would terminate in open hostilities between the two states. Finally, wiser counsels prevailed and the breach was averted.

The whirligig of time brings its own revenge. To-day the astronomical instruments are being restored by the Berlin government and its representatives have arrived to await the Republic's pleasure and conclude new commercial treaties.[1] Commenting on China's protest of February 9, 1917, threatening to sever diplomatic relations if its remonstrance proved ineffectual, the *Vossische Zeitung* tearfully remarked that even so weak a state as the Far Eastern Republic dared to look defiantly at the German nation! And we give the benefit of the doubt to the ex-Kaiser whether to-day in his safe retreat in Holland he would look at a Chinese squarely in the face.

When Peking protested to Berlin, its note declared that its attitude was "dictated by the desire to further the cause of the world's peace and to maintain the sanctity of international law." Here we have the true significance of the Republic's rupture: the respect for the sanctity of international law. In the solemn words of President Wilson's historic address to Congress (April 2, 1917), asking that body to declare the existence of a state of war between the United States and Germany:—"The German Government has thrown to the winds all scruples of humanity or for the understandings which are supposed to underlie intercourse throughout the world. At present the German warfare against commerce is a warfare against mankind. The challenge is to all nations and in making choice of action, our motive should not be revenge, or the victorious assertion of physical might, but only a vindication of the right of human beings of which we are only a single champion."

Besides, China's action is entirely independent of external pressure or persuasion. In Dr. Sun Yat-sen's telegram to Premier Lloyd George he protested against China being "coerced" by the Allies to go into the war. This accusation falls rather flat when confronted by the following evidence

[1] A preliminary treaty of peace between China and Germany was signed at Peking on May 18, 1921, and ratified by both governments on July 1, 1921.

from the *Far Eastern Review*, an American-owned monthly published at Shanghai, of April, 1917:—"Apart from informal visits to and fro, there was only one exchange of formal documents between the Allied ministers and the Chinese government bearing upon the question and the Chinese made the first move by preferring a request for three rather modest concessions, to which the Allies replied in a non-committal paragraph of French (February 28, 1917) which did little more than acknowledge receipt of the communication.

"China's foremost interest in severing relations with Germany—with a probability of entering the war later—is to obtain a footing which will give her a voice in the eventual disposition of Kiaochow and the other German concessions in Shantung which Japan is now holding and making very much her own. For this reason probably more than for any other, the Allies have kept rather aloof and were willing enough for China to follow America's course. To bring China into the war and to give her a fair deal, it would be necessary to enter into delicate diplomatic negotiations with Japan, negotiations with a view to loosening that nation's hold upon something which she had already got, which is not pleasant work at best and is especially awkward in the middle of a European war."

China's request for "three rather modest concessions" was in fact preferred unofficially, but as already stated, the Allies' reply was non-committal. It was only after the Republic had formally broken off with Germany that it bargained with the Entente; even then their reply yielded no more satisfactory results. Consequently, China's action all the way through was entirely independent, one solely dictated by the desire to obtain a *locus standi* in the *post-bellum* peace conference and so the better to advance her claims in respect of Kiaochow and Shantung, etc.

The following newspaper comment made at the time by a Chinese vernacular daily in Peking reflects the bulk of intelligent opinion:—"The whole policy of Germany has been dictated by the Kultur of Nietzsche—'Deutschland über Alles.' If this is not killed once for all, it will destroy the whole world. China owes it to the world and humanity to fight Prussian militarism. For the Germans, the scientific geniuses and the descendants of Goethe, we have nothing but love and respect,

but to the Prussian militarists, the swaggering worshipers of the sword, the least we can do is to answer the call which has been sounded by the United States and other neutrals. When we envisage a question which threatens to undermine humanity, we cannot think of our own interests alone, but must be up and arm ourselves."

That the attitude of the Republic was pregnant with momentous results goes without saying. Externally satisfaction was everywhere expressed that, to quote from Reuter's summary of French opinions in Paris, "a country such as China, whose civilization traces its origin back to the remotest ages and who pays worship to letters, philosophy, and sciences, has spontaneously placed herself by the side of the nations which defend the ideals of humanity, justice and progress." And internally it signified that the nation had embarked upon a new, vigorous foreign policy. By accepting Germany's challenge to ride roughshod over all considerations of law and humanity, the infant democracy was vindicating its prestige in the council of nations. Seventeen years previously, her actual dismemberment was regarded as inevitable; in 1917, by her masculine action, to quote further from Reuter's message, "China has placed herself without risk of bloody sacrifices, but only by her adhesion to the great principles of international law, and from the very first, on an equal footing with the nations fighting for civilization."

Between the two there is a very far cry indeed: yet it is none the less true. In 1864 Dr. W. A. P. Martin, the learned sinologue, translated Wheaton's "Elements of International Law" into Chinese at the expense of the Chinese government; to-day international law, according to a reported suggestion from the Chinese peace delegation to the Ministry of Education, is to be studied likewise in the middle or secondary schools. Four years ago when the writer assisted a band of Chinese pupils to acquire the rudiments of international law, there were six or eight in his class. Last year, thanks to the Shantung decision, over twenty took up the same subject, although it was understood as extra curriculum and no grades or marks were to be given for attendance. Do we wonder then that at least a thousand telegrams were despatched from China to the Chinese delegates in Paris, all bearing the same mandate: "No signature except with reservation regarding Shantung?"

CHAPTER XVII

ENTRY INTO THE WAR

IN the ordinary course of things the "third step" or entry into the World War would have followed soon after the rupture between China and Germany. Unfortunately, ugly complications supervened and their reverberations are heard even to-day. Another series of melodramatic events was enacted, including the abortive attempt to restore the Manchu monarchy, before the Republic actually declared war on both Germany and Austria-Hungary on August 14—five months after the formal breach between China and Germany.

The United States having in April declared war against Berlin, Chinese democrats urged that the Republic should likewise promptly follow suit, especially as the Chinese minister was still detained on German territory. Premier Tuan Ch'i-jui summoned a conference of provincial military governors at Peking to explain the necessity of the so-called third step, and on May 7th the President, through the cabinet, requested parliament to authorize the declaration of war. Owing to various reasons the legislature delayed and in the press many publicists argued in favor of or against the contemplated declaration. K'ang Yu-wei, for instance, known as "China's Modern Sage" championed the latter view:—"Should Germany be victorious, the whole of Europe—not to speak of a weak country like China—would be in great peril of extinction. Should she be defeated, Germany still can—after the conclusion of peace—send a fleet to war against us. And as the Powers will be afraid of a second world war, who will come to our aid? Have we not seen the example of Korea? *There is no such thing as an army of righteousness which will come to the assistance of weak nations.* I cannot bear to think of hearing the angry voice of German guns along our coasts!"

On the other hand K'ang's pupil, Liang Ch'i-ch'ao, heartily endorsed the proposed declaration:—"The peace of the Far

East was broken by the occupation of Kiaochow by Germany. This marked the first step of the German disregard for international law. In the interests of humanity and for the sake of what China has passed through, she should rise to punish such a country that dared to disregard international law. Such a reason for war is certainly beyond criticism. . . . Some say that China should not declare war on Germany until we have come to a definite understanding with the Entente Allies respecting certain terms. This is indeed a wrong conception of things. We declare war because we want to fight for humanity, international law and against a national enemy. It is not because we are partial towards the Entente or against Germany or Austria. International relations are not commercial connections. Why then should we talk about exchange of privileges and rights? As to the revision of the customs tariff, it has been our aspiration for more than ten years and a foremost diplomatic question, for which we have been looking for a suitable opportunity to negotiate with the foreign Powers. It is our view that the opportunity has come because foreign Powers are now on very friendly terms with China. It is distinctly a separate thing from the declaration of war. Let no one try to confuse the two."

On May 10th a mob of over a thousand men gathered outside the parliament buildings, shouting "You must vote for the declaration of war!" The police offered no help to the besieged M. P.'s and many of the latter were roughly handled by the hooligans. Public opinion was stirred at the rabble's coercing the legislature, and "there seems to be little doubt that some official of the government had incited and promised protection to the mob, as it collected at ten o'clock in the morning, and was not dispersed until eleven at night, when the report was circulated that a Japanese journalist had been killed." Telegrams of protest poured in from the provinces and Premier Tuan's colleagues in the cabinet deserted him. The democrats demanded that Tuan should resign, whereas his military friends urged him to remain.

On May 19th parliament registered a majority of votes for the declaration of war, but no formal decision would be taken as long as Tuan continued as premier. The military governors who had assembled for conference in Peking since April 25, then left amidst forebodings of dire consequences, after

having first sent the President a petition criticizing the virtually finished permanent constitution approved by parliament, and demanding the latter's dissolution. In reply parliament renewed its clamor for Tuan's retirement and on his refusal so to do, the President dismissed him and appointed Dr. Wu T'ing-fang, foreign minister, concurrently acting premier. A few of the northern provincial military governors thereupon declared their independence of the central government and, amidst the approval of the country, President Li Yuan-hung replied firmly:—"If it be your aim to shake the foundations of the country and provoke internal war, I declare that I am not afraid to die for the country. I have passed through the fire of trial and have exhausted my strength and energy from the beginning to the end for the Republic. I have nothing to be ashamed of. I will under no circumstance watch my country sink into perdition, still less subject myself to become a slave to another race."

The southern provincial military governors supported the chief executive wholeheartedly, and then America uttered a friendly warning through its minister in Peking:—"The Government of the United States learns with the most profound regret of the dissension in China and desires to express the most sincere desire that tranquillity and political coördination may be forthwith reëstablished. The entry of China into war with Germany or the continuance of the *status quo* of her relations with that Government are matters of secondary consideration. The principal necessity for China is to continue her political entity, to proceed along the road of national development on which she has made such marked progress. . . ."

On June 9, the northern military governors who had been meeting amongst themselves at Tientsin sent an ultimatum to Peking, threatening to attack the Capital unless parliament was dissolved. The President became isolated and wavered. The British adviser to the Chinese government, Dr. G. E. Morrison, the famous *London Times* correspondent of former days, remonstrated with General Li to stand firm; the Japanese constitutional adviser, Dr. N. Ariga counseled differently. Dr. Wu declined to countersign the mandate dissolving parliament and resigned from the premiership. The commander of the Peking gendarmerie was appointed his successor and

duly countersigned the fateful document on June 12. Immediately the President issued an explanation, confessing to having been forced to issue the mandate. However, he did it in order to save the Capital as well as the country from internecine hostilities and he would resign as soon as he had the opportunity.

Three days later Chang Hsun, one of the leading militarists, arrived in Peking as "mediator." The provinces which had declared independence now promised to return to the central fold, whilst Chang Hsun prepared clandestinely for his *coup d'état*. On July 1 he put the ex-boy emperor on the throne and announced the Manchu restoration. President Li was asked to resign; he refused and was kept prisoner. The southern provinces thereupon declared their independence and President Li was escorted by Japanese troops to the Japanese legation. On July 4th he sounded the clarion call to protect the Republic and the whole country, with the exception of three provinces, rallied to his appeal. Ex-Premier Tuan emerged from his retirement and offered to lead the Republican troops into Peking. In the hostilities that ensued Chinese aeroplanes for the first time were requisitioned and dropped bombs on important railway junctions as well as the Forbidden City of Peking. The King-Maker refusing to surrender, the Capital was attacked on July 12th; two days later the victorious Republicans entered and Chang Hsun fled to the Dutch legation for asylum. On July 15th General Tuan became premier, despite the opposition of the southern provinces; President Li resigned and, on August 1st, Vice-President Feng Kuo-chang succeeded in his place. Thirteen days later, China declared war on the Central Empires.

Such was the series of kaleidoscopic events which culminated in the declaration of war, but the end was not yet. The dissolved parliament could have put up a better fight, if the various parties had been only united. But dissension was rife, and the Chin-pu-tang or Progressives, one of the influential parties, sided with the militarists' conference at Tientsin, thus destroying the quorum in parliament before its formal dissolution. So when Premier Tuan formed his cabinet after the fiasco of the Manchu restoration, four portfolios were awarded to the meritorious party. The other influential party —the Kuo-min-tang or Democrats—raised the constitutional

standard finally in Canton, under the leadership of Dr. Sun Yat-sen and Mr. T'ang Shao-yi.

Since then the nation has been divided into the so-called North and South: the remnants of the dissolved parliament continuing their interrupted sessions in Canton, whilst a bogus parliament elected on laws framed by the militarists functioned in Peking. The North calls the Constitution-defending South "rebels," while the latter calls the North usurpers. The disunion developed into open hostilities and an unsuccessful peace conference was called twice to bring about a reconciliation. To-day the country is still disunited and both parliaments are undissolved. There has practically been no fighting for the last two years, although a strategic move by the South in Hunan three months ago routed the Northern troops and precipitated the events which culminated in the present collapse of the Anfu club and General Hsu Shu-tseng as well as the penitent retirement of Marshal Tuan Ch'i-jui. The victorious troops have declared for the purging of the Augean stable and reconciliation between the North and South, and we can only hope that the nation's fondest expectations will not be disappointed as in the past.[1]

That is, however, rather disgressing: but such a narrative is necessary if we are to understand aright the position of the Republic at the moment of and since such declaration of war. The political atmosphere being most unaccommodating, the momentous declaration was received by the nation with almost pathetic indifference, and those who yelled in front of the parliament buildings so lustily on May 10th showed no signs of enthusiasm three months subsequently. Besides, most of the foreign ministers were away for their summer holidays, and the only ones remaining in Peking were the

[1] The military government of the Constitution-defending South having cancelled its independence, a presidential mandate was issued on October 31, 1920, announcing the unification of the country. Shortly after, however, dissension arose among the provinces of the South and, while the majority were reconciled with the government in Peking, one or two still preferred to hold aloof from it. Since then Dr. Sun Yat-sen has been inaugurated as the "President of China" by the "extraordinary parliament" in Canton, and the Republic appears to be divided as before. It seems, however, that the militarists on both sides are to blame, and once the civil authority is restored the unification of the country will soon be effected. The present political unsettlement is inevitable in the transition from the old to the new, and having undergone the ordeal, the Republic will be all the better for it.

representatives of the Netherlands—who had charge of German interests—and Austria-Hungary. The knowledge that the declaration would be imminent no doubt robbed the "third step" of much of its excitement, but the general public was more absorbed in apprehension of the imminence of civil war within the Republic. The day passed off quietly except that, in reply to China's declaration of war, the Austrian minister reminded the Wai-chiao Pu that the same had not been passed by parliament! The latter promptly returned his letter and in turn Baron von Rosthorn was reminded that, as he had already received his passports, he was not entitled to address the Chinese government!

Thus did the Republic enter the war on the side of the Allied and Associated Powers. On the same day the following proclamation was promulgated by presidential mandate:—

"On the 9th day of the 2nd month of this year the Government of the Republic addressed a protest to the German Government against the policy of submarine warfare inaugurated by Germany, which was considered by this Government as contrary to international law and imperilling neutral lives and property, and declared therein that in case the protest should be ineffectual this Government would be constrained, much to its regret, to sever diplomatic relations with Germany.

"Contrary to our expectations, however, no modification was made in Germany's submarine policy after the lodging of our protest. On the contrary, the number of neutral vessels and belligerent merchantmen destroyed in an arbitrary and illegal manner was daily increasing and the lives of our citizens lost were numerous. Under such circumstances, although we might yet remain indifferent and endure suffering, with the meagre hope of preserving a temporary peace, in so doing, we would never be able to satisfy our people who are devoted to righteousness and sensible to disgrace, nor could we justify ourselves before our sister States which have acted without hesitation in obedience to the dictates of a sense of duty. Both here and in the friendly States, the cause of indignation was the same, and among the people of this country there could be found no difference of opinion. This Government, therefore, compelled to consider its protest as ineffectual, notified the German Government, on the 14th day of the 3rd month

last, of the severance of diplomatic relations, and at the same time the events taking place from the beginning up to that time were announced for the general information of the international public.

"What we have desired is peace; what we have respected is international law; what we have to protect are the lives and property of our own people. As we originally had no other grave causes of enmity against Germany, if the German Government had manifested repentance for the deplorable consequences resulting from its method of warfare, it might still have been expected to modify that policy in view of the common indignation of the whole world. That was what we have eagerly desired, and it was the reason why we have felt reluctant to treat Germany as a common enemy. Nevertheless, during the five months following the severance of diplomatic relations, the submarine attacks have continued exactly as before. It is not Germany alone, but Austria-Hungary as well, which has adopted and pursued this policy without abatement. Not only has international law been thereby violated, but also our people are suffering injuries and losses. The most sincere hope on our part of bringing about a better state of affairs is now shattered.

"Therefore, it is hereby declared that a state of war exists between China on the one hand and Germany and Austria-Hungary on the other, commencing from ten o'clock of this the 14th day of the 8th month of the 6th year of the Republic of China (August 14, 1917).

"In consequence thereof all treaties, agreements and conventions, heretofore concluded between China and Germany, and between China and Austria-Hungary, as well as such parts of the international protocols and international agreements as concern only the relations between China and Germany and between China and Austria-Hungary are, in conformity with the law of nations and international practice, hereby abrogated. This Government, however, will respect the Hague conventions and its international agreements respecting the humane conduct of war.

"The chief object in our declaration of war is to put an end to the calamities of war and to hasten the restoration of peace. All our citizens will appreciate this to be our aim. Seeing, however, that our people have not yet at the present time re-

covered from sufferings on account of the recent political disturbances and that calamity again befalls us in the breaking out of the present war, I, the President of this Republic, cannot help having profound sympathy for our people when I take into consideration their further suffering. I would never have resorted to this step which involves fighting for the very existence of our nation, were I not driven to this unavoidable decision.

"I cannot bear to think that through us the dignity of international law should be impaired, or our position in the family of nations should be undermined or the restoration of peace should be retarded. Let the people of this entire nation do their utmost in this hour of trial and hardship in order to safeguard and develop the national existence of the Chung Hua Republic, so that we may establish ourselves amidst the family of nations and share with all mankind the prosperity and blessings drawn from our common association. Let this proclamation be published in order that it may be generally known."

As already stated, were fates more propitious, China could have entered the war two or three years earlier—in the first week of August, 1914, before Japan despatched its ultimatum to Germany, and again on at least two other occasions in 1915 and 1916. In both the latter she was thwarted by Japan, since one of the Twenty-one Demands accepted by the Republic bound Peking to assent to whatever disposition of German rights in Shantung which Tokyo might later make with Berlin. It was to Japan's interests that China should be kept out of equal participation as a co-partner in the Peace Conference, and this she succeeded in doing until Peking courageously broke away from Tokyo's domination and aligned itself with the stand adopted by Washington. Even then astute Nippon played her cards dexterously, with the result that both the United States and China entered the war blissfully ignorant that she had already concluded her famous Shantung secret agreements with the Entente Powers between the intervals of China's protest to and rupture with Germany. Certainly Japan is a past master in the art of Shylockian diplomacy; fortunately for the Republic, the moral awakening of its peo-

ple has taken place and the diplomatic victor at Versailles is finding the Shantung "spoil" a veritable white elephant.

As in the other two steps, this third step was also adopted independently of external pressure or persuasion. After China had broken off diplomatic relations with Germany, Dr. Wu T'ing-fang, minister of foreign affairs, invited the foreign ministers to the Wai-chiao Pu. After some discussion he presented formally the government's wishes in the event of the Republic's actual entry into the war: (1) That the Allies would agree to the postponement of the Boxer indemnity for a period of ten years, so as to assist China's finances. (2) That for the same purpose the foreign Powers would agree to an increase in the import duty. (3) That the provisions of the 1901 Boxer protocol impeding the effectiveness of China's precautionary measures against the Germans would be cancelled. And in return Peking would be responsible for the supply of primary materials and assistance in respect of man-power. The negotiations proved fruitless and each side stood exactly as before.

On May 1st the cabinet decided upon the declaration of war, "without asking conditions or returns" from the Allies, and six days later parliament was requested to vote on it, with the unhappy results already noted. When the attempt to restore the Manchu monarchy was discredited and Premier Tuan had formed his cabinet, the foreign ministers visited the Wai-chiao Pu and congratulated the new incumbent on his appointment (he had at one time functioned as Chinese minister in London): they expressed the hope that it would not be long before China would be coöperating with them against Germany, but nothing about "conditions or returns" was mentioned.

As soon, however, as the Republic had declared war against the Central Empires, then the Allies responded. Cordial telegrams were received from the Entente and Associated governments, and one and all assured Peking that they "will do all that rests with them to insure that China shall enjoy in her international relations the position and regard due to a great country." Accordingly, they agreed to the postponement of the Boxer indemnity for a period of five years, commencing from January 1, 1918, Russia, however, consenting to the

suspension of only one-third of its annual share. In addition, the customs tariff was to be revised by an international conference, with results already noted in a previous chapter.

In terms of financial benefits "China thus gains the use of some £16,449,600 sterling for five years and has the hope that the total amount may be remitted by and by. Whether the postponement will be an actual gain at this time is questionable, since exchange is so tremendously in China's favor. It will be a distinct advantage if the interested Powers eventually make a present of the amount to China, as they ought to, but if the payments have to be made later when the exchange will have become normal, then China will have lost just what she could have saved by taking advantage of the high price of silver in the war period. She will, however, benefit by the total amount due to Germany and Austria, which was cancelled when she declared war and thus abrogated treaties with those countries. In her coffers will remain some £772,320 annually, an actual advantage of some millions of pounds" (*Far Eastern Review*, October, 1917).

The circumstances attending the nation's entry into the war being as already explained, it is not surprising that the Republic's value as a co-belligerent has to be discounted. The protracted strife between the North and South not only divides the country into two armed camps, but also dissipates the energies which otherwise would have been devoted to the active prosecution of the war. As it is, from the military and economic standpoint, China is a sad failure: instead of fighting the Germans and their allies in Europe, Chinese soldiers actually slaughter one another in their own country! And instead of the nation's resources being marshalled for the aid of the Republic's allies, they are frittered away by an inflated soldiery who prey upon defenseless people and goad their paymasters to greater, unholy ambitions! If the present unhappiness in the country owes its origin to the "third step," then Germany has indeed a great deal to answer for. Fortunately, in view of the positive gains which the nation has derived from this momentous step—morally as well as internationally—the failure to make good in the war can only be regarded as a blessing in disguise.

As indications, however, of China's efforts and limitations the following deserve to be noted, even though they appear in-

significant when compared with the achievements of her stronger and better prepared sisters. A war participation bureau was organized to train soldiers for campaign in Flanders, but owing to the poverty of the treasury the necessary funds were slow in forthcoming. At one time the United States was about to advance a special loan to its sister democracy to finance the expedition to Europe, but the negotiations fell through owing to the scarcity of transportation facilities. Due to political disturbances, the training of troops proceeded cautiously, and when the Armistice was signed in November, 1918, China's contemplated expedition was yet in its elementary stage. Thereupon the men were drafted into the northwestern frontier defense force and ex-Premier Tuan appointed director-general. As already noted, during the last few weeks this force has been disbanded and General Tuan has promised never to take part again in active politics. In the end China participated in the Allied expedition to Siberia to stem the tide of Bolshevism as well as in the Inter-Allied Railway Technical Commission to help reorganize Russia's railways.

Bleeding from civil war and crippled by lack of money as well as shipping, the Republic could still have put up a braver show for the common cause if only its island neighbor had not been so unscrupulous and aggrandizing. Nor was there a righteous government really representative of the people to vindicate the honor of four hundred million souls. In January, 1918, Peking concluded with Tokyo the so-called "Arms Contract," under which Japan agreed to supply China with arms and ammunition to the amount of Yen 40,000,000—a transaction sinisterly reminiscent of the "Fifth Group" of the Japanese Twenty-one Demands, binding the Republic to purchase from Nippon at least fifty per cent. of its needed munitions of war. The ostensible object of the loan was to equip the Chinese expedition to Europe, but really both the proceeds and arms went to help the Northern militarists to crush the Constitution-defending South.

A few months later came the Sino-Japanese Joint Defense Pact, the exact terms of which, it is believed, have even now not been published. Nominally the agreement was to provide for mutual assistance against hostile influence in Siberia, but popularly and especially from the suspicious mystery en-

shrouding the whole transaction, Peking is understood to have consented to Tokyo's leadership in the matter of military and naval defense. The extracts which have so far been published are regarded as only the most innocent stipulations, since the pact was renewed even after the termination of the formal hostilities with the Central Powers. To-day it is yet unabrogated, although all Allied troops except those of Japan have been withdrawn from Russian territory. Hence the nation's insistent demand for the immediate cancellation of the pact and all that it entails, openly as well as clandestinely.[1]

The war measures adopted provided for the internment of enemy legation guards, the registration and inspection of enemy subjects and their residences, disarmament of enemy subjects bearing arms, the liquidation of enemy banks, the confiscation of enemy ships found in Chinese waters, the administration of former enemy concessions and settlements, and the establishment of prize courts, etc. As regards the last, there is now available an English translation of "Judgments of the High Prize Court of the Republic of China," together with appendices containing prize court rules, detailed rules of the high prize court, regulations governing capture at sea, and regulations governing the safekeeping of captured property in the naval warehouse. The cases reviewed by the learned judges relate to twelve enemy ships—nine German and three Austro-Hungarian, including the steamship *Silesia*, already referred to. For the remainder of the war most of these vessels were chartered to the Allies for transportation purposes.

A month before the Armistice, on October 3, 1918, the Republic extended its recognition to the Czecho-Slovaks operating in Siberia as a co-belligerent in the following terms:—

"The Chinese Government has always sympathized with the Czecho-Slovak aspirations for an independent national existence. Considering that their object has been to oppose Germany and Austria-Hungary and their efforts are identical with those of the Allied nations, the Chinese Government had allowed the passage of the westbound Czecho-Slovak forces on the Chinese Eastern Railway who were also afforded other facilities. Whereas the Czecho-Slovak military situation is

[1] By an exchange of notes in Peking on January 28, 1921, the cancellation of this pact was announced.

daily improving, the Chinese Government hopes that by their military forces they would accomplish their object of combating against Germany and Austria-Hungary and, therefore, hereby recognizes the Czecho-Slovak troops operating in Siberia as co-belligerents against Germany and Austria-Hungary and accords them the same treatment as has been accorded to the troops of other Allied Powers. The Chinese Government further recognizes the right of the Czecho-Slovak National Council to exercise supreme control over that army and is prepared to enter into communication with that Council whenever necessary," etc.

Great Britain, in November, 1917, promised to support the Jewish claim in regard to the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people; so the Shanghai Zionist Association appealed to the Chinese government for similar sympathy. The latter replied on December 14, 1918, declaring that it had adopted the same attitude towards the Zionist aspirations as the British government. This declaration was greeted with intense joy by the petitioners in Shanghai, whereupon they observed: "This statement, coming as it does on the eve of the Peace Conference in Europe, when the fate and self-determination of all peoples, great and small, will be decided, will assuredly evoke sentiments of gratitude and good-will for the Chinese Republic from Jewry throughout the world."

Here we have another testimony to the new international status of the awakened Chinese people. Instead of being always the supplicant for favors from European Powers, the Republic has actually assumed the rôle of a patron and accorded its recognition and sympathy when appealed to—a situation in marked contrast with that which occurred when the new Chinese Republic, established on February 12, 1912, on the abdication of the Manchus, had to wait until October, 1913, for formal recognition from the majority of the treaty Powers!

Such is in brief China's efforts in the war—a part indeed not commensurate with one-fourth of the world's population and their rich resources. But as already shown, the Republic is more to be pitied than condemned, and it may be questioned if any other state similarly situated could have done better

under the circumstances. Hence the memorandum presented by the Allied Powers on October 30, 1918, created some sensation. Portions of it read as follows:—

"It would appear that a clear understanding on the part of Chinese officials and other public men, of the manner in which the Chinese Government has fallen short of doing what could reasonably be expected of it as a co-belligerent, and of the result which a continuance of this condition would have upon public opinion among the Associated Powers and, therefore, upon the standing of China after peace is concluded, is requisite both in the interests of China and of the Powers with whom she is associated. The essential difficulty has been that instead of devoting its energies single-heartedly to performing in the fullest manner its duties towards its associates, the Chinese Government, during the past year, has engaged its force almost entirely in internal affairs and in an attempt, by military means, to solve the internal difficulties.

"Concentration upon the international duties of China would have been, and still is, a most effective means of providing a basis for unified national action and is the only manner in which the Chinese Government can at present redeem its standing among its associates. Action required for this purpose is, first of all, the concentration of national resources and revenues upon constructive work, so as to enable China to give actual assistance to the Allied cause; also, within China such measures should be promptly carried through as will effectively protect the interests of the Associated Powers and put proper restrictions upon resident enemies; in connection with this, individual officials showing lack of energy or a positive bias favorable to the enemy, should be replaced by men in sympathy with the declared policy of the Chinese Government and ready to carry it out."

The memorandum then goes on to enumerate China's twelve omissions and commissions. Coming on the eve of the Armistice in Europe, the document produced mixed feelings in the Chinese people. Interpreted as a warning to the Peking authorities not to go too far in the solution of internal difficulties by military means, nor too slack as representatives of the nation to discharge onerous international duties, it was

hailed with satisfaction by the people; but construed as a reminder that China's poor efforts in the war would react to her disadvantage at the Peace Conference, it was somewhat resented, especially as Japan, one of the signatories, had been one of the chief stumbling-blocks in the unification of the country. At any rate, a commission consisting of government deputies and the secretaries of Allied legations was constituted to devise ways and means to ameliorate the situation.

On the other hand, the Allies themselves are not entirely free from blame. For example, in the matter of deportation of enemy subjects from China they exhibited both weakness and vacillation. When everything was ready for deportation, the promised shipping facilities could not be procured. Then Germany threatened to take reprisals on Allied subjects in its jurisdiction if Germans were really deported from China; whereupon the deportation order was, upon the advice of the Allies, stayed, although in the end the deportation was carried out in March-April, 1919, four or five months after the signing of the Armistice.

Whatever may have been the omissions or commissions of their government, the sincerity and loyalty of the Chinese people cannot be questioned. And the most eloquent in this respect is the Chinese labor corps serving with the British and French armies in France, Mesopotamia, Egypt, and South Africa, etc. The romantic story of these laborers is now as familiar to the world as the Shantung question; so there is no need to enlarge on the subject. Not only have they made good as noncombatants behind the firing lines, but when the pinch of necessity came and every man was needed to bar the German advance, they downed their tools more than once and filled the gap as combatants until they were ultimately relieved.

If circumstances militated against Chinese soldiers dying with Allied comrades in Flanders, their place has been nobly taken by these laborers, for no less than two thousand of them have perished in France. This is part of China's sacrifice in the war; and the Anglo-French governments have paid grateful tribute to it by setting aside permanent places for their interment. And if Chinese soldiers were prevented from going to Europe, the aid of Chinese laborers and skilled mechanics—in workshops, tank shops, factories, docks, fields and mines, etc.—in releasing a corresponding number of Allied effectives

who otherwise would have remained to "carry on" behind the firing lines, may justly be regarded as a substitute for the assistance of the contemplated Chinese expedition.

Then there is the edifying example of Chinese sailors and firemen on board Allied ships all through the war. Germany's submarine warfare held no terrors for these sturdy representatives of the Republic, and many of them were Christians. A gentleman once asked some of them in London why they were willing to run the risk of being torpedoed on board British ships. They answered: "This is the time England needs us most, and this is the time to prove to our English fellow-seamen that we are made with them of the right stuff." A recent official estimate puts their losses at eight hundred on Allied ships—another part of China's sacrifice in the war.

In addition there are Chinese students who worked in the Allied countries in various capacities—as medical attendants in hospitals whose doctors had already gone to the front, as engineers in munition plants, as Y. M. C. A. secretaries among their own countrymen in France, etc. Conspicuous among these are Lieutenant Etienne Tsu, son of a Chinese shipbuilder in Shanghai, the airman who was decorated for valuable services with the Croix de Guerre, much valued by all French soldiers, and assigned to duty on the personal staff of the officers commanding the French aviation corps; and Private Sing Kee, who was decorated by the United States Government with the Distinguished Service Medal for "extraordinary heroism in action." Lincoln Eyre described, in the *New York World*, Sing's heroism as follows:—

"With the American Forces on the Vesle, September 2, 1918. Private Sing Kee . . . was in charge of a message center in Bazoches. In the ebb and flow of the battle tides this stricken village has been sometimes in the enemy's, sometimes deserted by both and given over to the shrieking thunder of shells. During one of these periods of emptiness Sing Kee deliberately remained in the cellar assigned to him, disregarding orders to fall back. He knew that Americans roaming about ahead might come back to the message center to make their reports and he decided he had better be there to receive them and send them back to headquarters by dog or pigeon messenger. So he stuck in that shell-rocked cellar for

twelve hours all alone. A large part of the time he had to wear a mask, Bazoches being flooded with gas. When the bombardment slackened the next morning and our troops reentered the village, they found Sing Kee busily engaged with burying the last of his dog couriers—'gas casualty.' Sing explained: 'Tough luck. Bully fine dog.' "

Of course, the number of such students serving with the Allies is comparatively insignificant; nevertheless, at least two of them are known to have given up their lives as another part of China's sacrifice in the war. Recently it came to light that the success of tracking down the elusive German raider *Emden* in the South Pacific was due to two Chinese farm hands on an island. The cruiser had landed a party to dismantle the wireless station and one of the Chinese was ordered to conduct the invaders to the place. He took the Germans the longest way around, but only after he had passed the other Chinese and told him to go ahead and give the warning. When the party arrived at the station the message had already been sent out and British ships were hurrying to capture their prey. Thus was the troublesome raider cornered and put out of commission.

If Chinese officials had been lukewarm in their support of the war the same could not be said of the Chinese people. For instance, in subscriptions to various Allied war loans they have shown the utmost enthusiasm. Especially eloquent in this respect is the way they contributed to the United War Work Campaign funds. Originally the Chinese were asked to contribute two hundred thousand dollars, but they responded right loyally and the total netted was one and a quarter million dollars!

Here we have the plain, unvarnished tale of China's part in the World War—her own domestic worries, her well-meaning efforts and intentions amidst distracting circumstances, and her sacrifices in the war. After all is said and considered, she can truthfully be said to have done her little bit, and if the fates had been more benevolent, she could have done more worthily. Nevertheless, the moral support of one-fourth of the world's entire population can in no wise be disparaged, since the struggle for democracy is likewise a struggle for the triumph of morality over brute force. Traditions of the im-

memorial past may enjoin the Republic to "sweep the snow off one's own door and not worry about the frost on a neighbor's roof," but the new respect for international law has dictated the divers steps culminating in the entry into the war. The nation which believes in the Golden Rule, although in its negative form, has always insisted that reason is never so feeble that it must be reinforced by might. Assuredly by her manly stand for law and order, international law and international morality, she has contributed not a little to the present victory of right over might and morality over brute force. We therefore leave the last say to the impartial judgment of posterity.



China's Sacrifices in the War. Lithographed from a Special Painting, Executed by Mr. T. P. Yang, combining Six Actual Photographs of Chinese Labourers' Graves in France.

(*Photo by Tien Hua, Peking*)

Armistice Parade of 10,000 Chinese and Allied Troops inside the T'ai Ho Tien Palace, Peking.

CHAPTER XVIII

PARTICIPATION IN THE PEACE CONFERENCE

WITH the signing of the Armistice in November, 1918, the Allies began preparing for the Peace Conference. Everywhere there were enthusiastic rejoicings at the conclusion of four years' nightmare, and China was no exception to the rule. In Peking the government declared a three days' holiday from November 28th, and the celebration by the foreign and Chinese communities left nothing to be desired. Beginning with a grand parade of ten thousand Chinese and Allied troops within the precincts of the holiest of the holies of the Forbidden City and terminating with a mass lantern procession and blaze of illuminations, the official peace celebrations were executed on a most elaborate scale—one certainly unprecedented in all the annals of China.

The grand parade took place in the T'ai Ho Tien or Great Peace Palace, where the Manchu emperors used to hold audiences. Eighteen years earlier there was also an Allied celebration in this selfsame palace: then it was in honor of the Allied victory over the Boxers and the troops were led by Count Waldersee, the German general and senior Allied commander. To-day the celebration was held at the expense of defeated Germany; can the irony of fate be more poetic? Two decades ago the empire's rulers tacitly proclaimed the reign of fire and sword against "foreign devils" in the country; to-day China and the Allies were united in mutual felicitations at the dawning of a new day of international concord and cooperation. To the booming of guns and tolling of bells Chinese aeroplanes circled above the brilliant gathering and dropped red and white messages of congratulation.

In this connection the address delivered on the terrace of the palace by the President of the Republic, His Excellency Hsu Shih-ch'ang, before the multicolored assembly of Allied and neutral ministers, Chinese and Allied flag-bearers, officials

and special guests, both Chinese and foreign, deserves to be recorded as a memento of the unique occasion:—

"This is a day just after the victory of the Allies and a day of celebration in China. I, as the head of the Chinese people, am extremely fortunate to attend this celebration. Weapons have been laid aside and tranquillity once more reigns. The violent have been defeated, and the war has ended most successfully. Thus right is justified, and a new and glorious page has been written in the history of the war. The Allied soldiers, as well as those of my own country, will join with me in rejoicing, for we are one at heart and in principle.

"There is a saying in Europe that might cannot conquer right, and another that pride cometh before a fall. Compare these with some maxims of China: Soldiers fighting for the right are strong, while those that fight for might are weak—One who strives to do the right gains the most assistance, while one who does wrong gets the least aid. It is dangerous to arouse the enmity of many persons. Selfish ambition cannot succeed. Both Chinese and foreign histories show the truth of these maxims which are world wide in their effect. When man strives with man, there is individual competition. When nation strives with nation, there is national rivalry, but right should always be the deciding factor. If one state selfishly imperils right and endangers the safety of the world, how can the nations fail to take action?

"The Allies, supporting right, have therefore utilized all the resources of their countries. But they knew that right must triumph and that theirs would be the ultimate victory. We, guided by the same spirit, joined them. Now, fortunately, right has triumphed, and the powerful enemy has surrendered. Hereafter right will shine again with the brightness of celestial bodies, and the merit of Allied nations will be everlasting. Their victory is the greatest in history.

"To-day's parade and celebration are now concluding and the soldiers of Allied nations are in one enclosure, friends together. I earnestly hope that we shall never forget this memorable occasion of celebration of right over might, and I hope we shall always observe this principle, and that the nations of the world will maintain peace forever. This is my sincere wish and great expectation for the future."

As soon as the Armistice was signed in Europe, the Ketteler monument in Peking was demolished—first "strafed" by over-exultant Allied soldiers in the early hours of the morning and then removed by the Chinese government. The monument having been erected to commemorate the nation's apologies for the unfortunate murder of the German minister in 1900, it is now re-erected in a popular resort—the Central Park, once the grounds of the Manchu emperors and adjacent to the Great Peace Palace—as a Victory memorial. On one side is the Chinese inscription "Right Overcometh Might," and on the reverse side, the words in Latin: "In Memoriam Juris Vindicati."

In conformity with other Allied and Associated governments the Republic likewise appointed its peace delegates. These arrived at Paris about the middle of January, 1919. Headed by Mr. Lou Tseng-tsiang, minister of foreign affairs and China's delegate to the 1907 Hague peace conference, the Chinese delegation as communicated to the Peace Conference, numbered altogether fifty-two men. Associated with Minister Lou were Dr. C. T. Wang, the Southern leader and vice-president of the senate; Dr. V. K. Wellington Koo, minister to Washington; Dr. Sao-ke Alfred Sze, minister to London; and Mr. Sun-tchou Wei, minister to Brussels. In addition there were seventeen technical experts recruited from the ministries of foreign affairs, of war, of justice, of communications, of agriculture and commerce; and five foreign advisers—Sir John MacLeavy Brown, counsellor of the Chinese legation in London; the late Dr. G. E. Morrison, political adviser to the president of the Republic; Mons. Henri de Codt, legal adviser to the ministry of foreign affairs; Mons. Georges Padoux, adviser to the law codification commission, already referred to; and Mons. Georges Bouillard, counsellor on railways.

The story of China's part in the Paris Conference is now more or less familiar to the world, especially her classic battle with the "Big Four" for the vindication of her moral and legal rights in the whole Shantung question. Nevertheless, the complete story remains yet to be told, since there are now available two historic documents. The one is an excerpt from the official minutes of the Chinese delegates in Paris delib-

erating together, and the other is an official summary submitted to the Peking government of the work accomplished or attempted by the accredited representatives.

Remembering the train of ill-starred events which led eventually to China's non-signature of the Versailles treaty, it is not surprising that misfortunes befell the delegation from the very outset of their momentous mission. When Minister Lou's party got to Japan, *en route* for Europe, about the middle of December, 1918, there were insistent rumors that one box full of important documents had been either lost or stolen. Then when the delegates assembled in Paris, they were at once informed that, like Belgium, Serbia, Roumania, Greece, Brazil, Portugal, Poland and Czecho-Slovakia, the Republic could only be represented by two spokesmen at the plenary meetings of the Conference—the "Big Five" alone being entitled to send five members. Minister Lou requested the good offices of the French foreign minister and the latter consented to help. He moved that China might be given three seats at the Conference, but the proposal was turned down by the assembly.

About March-April, 1919, it was reported in the newspapers in China, both Chinese and foreign, that malign influences were at work among the Chinese delegates which could only serve to damage the Republic's interests. According to the official minutes of the delegates' deliberations, specific pro-Japanese charges against one technical expert who had studied in Japan were made by a number of Chinese students in France and Great Britain. The person accused stoutly denied the charges before the delegation and there the matter terminated. Incidentally it transpired that during Minister Lou's brief sojourn in Tokyo he had never engaged to bind himself or his colleagues at the Paris Conference to play "second fiddle" to Japanese delegates. When Minister Lou called on the Japanese foreign minister, Viscount Uchida, there was the customary exchange of courtesies through the medium of interpreters. Casually the latter remarked that as regards the Tsingtau question the Japanese government would, in consonance with its previous attitude, act according to the Sino-Japanese conventions of 1915.

"And what did Minister Lou reply?" the expert who was present at the Tokyo interview, was asked.

"As far as I can remember, there was nothing in the reply which could be construed as limiting Minister Lou's freedom of action in any way."

"We understand that the conversation was both recorded and signed—is it true?"

"No, there was no record whatsoever, nor is there such a procedure in informal diplomatic conversations."

This testimony is important, because a month or so earlier the Japanese delegation referred point blank to such promise between the two foreign ministers.

Towards the end of January, it will be remembered, there occurred the first clash between Chinese and Japanese delegates at the Conference, when Dr. Koo made his admirable speech in support of China's unimpeachable claim to the direct retrocession of Tsingtau. Baron Makino replied, mentioning that the same had already been settled by formal agreements between Tokyo and Peking, meaning thereby the agreements of 1915 and 1918. Thereupon President Wilson requested that the Conference be furnished with all the documents in question. Dr. Koo assented, but Baron Makino preferred to consult telegraphically with his government.

A few days later being the Chinese New Year holidays, there developed in Peking the famous threat by Mr. Obata, the Japanese minister. In brief, the Chinese government was told to warn its delegates in Paris not to embarrass any further the position of their Japanese colleagues but the two delegations were to act together in close harmony. And to drive home the hint, one of the secretaries of the Wai-chiao Pu was told that about a million Japanese soldiers and half a million tons of Japanese warships were then lying absolutely idle! The incident created a profound sensation on the whole nation and indirectly supplied the light that kindled the fuse of the Student Movement, noted in a previous chapter. The threat miscarried and it returned, like the boomerang, to smite its sender.

As an instance of the tortuous practices of diplomacy in China, the exact wording of Mr. Obata's threats deserves to be recorded. The affair having created a furore, as editor of one of the two Chinese daily newspapers published in English at the Capital, we sent a representative to find out, together with several other pressmen, the truth from the vice-minister

of foreign affairs who then had charge of the Wai-chiao Pu. The results of the interview confirmed in the main the reports already published, although there were a few minor discrepancies. Said Mr. Ch'en Lu, the vice-minister:—

"On . . . the following day (January 31st), the Chinese New Year Eve, Mr. Obata communicated to the Wai-chiao Pu his wish to see me on some urgent business. His request was at first refused on account of the New Year holidays. But Mr. Obata insisted on seeing me. He came to the Wai-chiao Pu on Saturday, the Chinese New Year Day, accompanied by Mr. Nishida, Secretary of the Japanese Legation . . . Mr. Obata first told me he had received three telegrams from Tokyo, stating that the Chinese delegates in Paris were adopting an unfriendly attitude and opposing Japanese interests too strongly. They (Chinese delegates) had also declared to the foreign correspondents in Paris that they were prepared to disclose at any moment the secret agreements entered into between China and Japan. The Japanese Minister then pointed out that as these agreements were concluded between the two countries, according to ordinary diplomatic usage, mutual consent should first be obtained before they could be disclosed. So Mr. Obata demanded two things from the Chinese Government: (1) The Sino-Japanese secret agreements must not be made public without the approval of the Japanese delegates; and (2) the Government should at once send a telegram to the Chinese delegates instructing them to modify their attitude. Mr. Obata added that if these demands were not accepted, Japan would take what steps she deemed necessary to maintain her international position. He then left the Wai-chiao Pu, leaving these demands for the consideration of the Chinese Government.

"The next day, having read the report in the *North China Star* (Tientsin) respecting his visit to the Wai-chiao Pu, the Japanese Minister telephoned to me that as no outsiders were there when he talked about the matter with me I, and not he, should be held responsible for giving publicity to what had taken place during our interview. Then I sent a member of the Ministry to see him in his Legation and to explain to him that I, like himself, would not be responsible for whatever reports that might have appeared in the papers regarding the

interview. Moreover, what had been published in the local papers was by no means an accurate account of the interview; so in my opinion the said reports did not matter much."

Whether or not the instructions demanded by the Japanese minister were despatched to the Chinese delegation it is not clear, but as a matter of expediency it was arranged in Paris between the two delegations that each might be informed of the kind of documents the other intended to forward to the Peace Conference. Thereupon the Japanese first showed to the Chinese the documents they proposed to send, and a few days later one of the Chinese technical experts went to return the same courtesy to the Japanese delegation. In the absence of Baron Makino, he was received by Mr. Ijuin, Japanese ambassador to Rome, who objected to the declaration that such information was purely a matter of courtesy.

"On the contrary," he emphasized, "this is in agreement with the understanding between our two governments that in the matter of communication of secret documents to the Conference there should be mutual consultation beforehand. Such understanding is mutually restrictive and is not binding only on our government. Do you know it?"

"What you have said is perfectly clear. But I do not understand what you mean by 'mutual consultation' and 'mutual restriction.'"

"Minister Lou must surely know it. Will you please report the matter to him?"

"Yes, I will."

A few hours later one of Baron Makino's secretaries called on the above Chinese expert to explain what Mr. Ijuin meant by objecting to the use of the word "courtesy." He said:—

"According to Mr. Ijuin, when two countries concluded a secret treaty, if one party wishes to publish it, the consent of the other party must first be obtained. This is quite in conformity with reason and is at least morally correct."

"I am glad to have the opportunity also to refer to this subject," was the reply. "When I returned and reported the conversation to Minister Lou, he was astonished at Mr. Ijuin's reference to 'mutual consultation' and 'mutual restriction.' According to Minister Lou it was quite possible that when he passed through your country, called on your For-

eign Minister, and the conversation touched upon the Paris Conference, he might have agreed that in matters of mutual interest there should be coöperation between the two governments. But he never had in mind what Mr. Ijuin referred to as mutual consultation and mutual restriction. As regards your reference to secret documents, it is already agreed between Baron Makino and our delegation before the Big Four that all documents, secret or otherwise, should be communicated to the Conference."

"Mr. Ijuin's meaning I have just explained, but it need not be looked upon as an extraordinarily important affair!"

What beautiful bluffing and graceful retraction! That summarizes the nature of Japanese diplomacy: if you can call off the bluff, then the game is yours.

The Japanese secretary then requested to see Minister Koo. The latter happened to be in and so received the visitor. Said the latter:—

"In view of the number of mutual interests common to both China and Japan *vis-à-vis* Europe and America, I feel that it is unfortunate that our two delegations should not know each other. I hope that in future we can get to know each other more intimately."

"I am always happy to meet your delegation. Unfortunately I have lately been rather occupied with various meetings and so could not find the necessary time."

"I understand, and unhappily Baron Makino is also similarly situated. In connection with the statement you recently made before the Conference regarding the Shantung question, if you could before making it have talked it over with Baron Makino, would it not have been fine?"

"When Baron Makino was about to discuss the Shantung question with the Conference, we were entirely ignorant. It was only an hour before the meeting began, when we were asked over the telephone to attend, that we knew that Baron Makino had brought forward this question. We were taken completely by surprise. So when I was instructed to address the meeting, I was unprepared and only spoke from what I knew. You referred a moment ago to talking it over with Baron Makino. Under the circumstances, how could I consult with the baron?"

"Do you mean to say then that the blame should be rather on Baron Makino?"

"Oh, no, that's not what I mean. Please do not misunderstand."

"At any rate, it would be best if we can get together more and so know each other better."

"I heartily agree with you."

Here we catch a glimpse of the two outstanding delegates from the Far East: Dr. Koo, the splendid fighter and debater, and Baron Makino, the astute diplomat who even outwitted European experts of his calibre. The one pleaded most eloquently for China's sacred province and was congratulated by the Allied delegates for his powerful speech; the other most adroitly stood pat on the racial equality "herring," with a semblance of injured pride, and then successfully clinched the Shantung argument by his threat to bolt from the Conference.

The "Big Four" having at the end of April decided the Shantung question against the Republic—see the claim of China for direct restitution to herself of the leased territory of Kiaochow, the Tsingtau-Tsinanfu Railway and other German rights in respect of Shantung province, which is reproduced in full in one of the appendices to the present volume—the whole nation rose as one man in indignation and bitterness. As already stated, at least one thousand telegrams poured into the laps of the Chinese delegates, insisting that there should be no signature of the peace treaty unless with express reservations regarding the outrageous Shantung clauses. The cabinet in Peking that had authorized the delegates to sign at their discretion if advised by the Conference, had to be replaced by one more obedient to popular will, and as is now well known, the Chinese delegates abstained altogether from the signing ceremony on June 28, 1919.

Concerning the Republic's desire to sign with reservations, even a few hours before the formal signature, the Chinese delegates left no stone unturned to promote their country's cause. On June 27th, Dr. Koo called on Mons. Stephen Pichon, the French foreign minister, who conveyed the message of Mons. Clemenceau that the Chinese delegation could file their letter of reservation after signing the German treaty.

"Will this sort of reservation filed after signature have any effect?"

"In my opinion, it will be equally effective."

"If this is true, why will not the Conference receive our statement before instead of after signature?"

"The Chairman of the Conference has ruled that no statement in the nature of a reservation could be admitted before signature."

The next day, June 28th, at 3 p. m. the final ceremony was to take place at Versailles. That same morning Mr. Hoo Wei-teh, minister to Paris, on behalf of the delegation attempted to negotiate with the Conference secretary-general so that China's letter of reservation could be presented simultaneously with its delegates' signatures; but his efforts were unsuccessful and the letter was politely declined. In so returning the notes, observed the reply, "it is intended to permit the Chinese Delegation to sign the treaty in the session of this afternoon, if it thinks it ought to do so without any reservation, as was indicated to the Chinese Delegation upon instructions from the Supreme Council." But the Republic's representatives, "feeling the injustice of the settlement of the Shantung question by the Conference"—to quote from the statement issued by the delegation that same evening—and "rather than accepting by their signatures Articles 156, 157 and 158 in the treaty against which their sense of right and justice militated," they refrained from signing the treaty altogether.

The contents of these three famous articles are now more or less familiar to the public; here they deserve to be reproduced in full, especially as they are understood to have been drafted by Tokyo itself:—

"*Article 156.* Germany renounces, in favor of Japan, all her rights, title and privileges—particularly those concerning the territory of Kiaochow, railways, mines and submarine cables—which she acquired in virtue of the Treaty concluded by her with China on March 6, 1898, and of all other arrangements relative to the province of Shantung. All German rights in the Tsingtau-Tsinanfu Railway, including its branch lines, together with its subsidiary property of all kinds, stations, shops, fixed and rolling stock, mines, plant and material for the exploitation of the mines, are and remain acquired by

Japan, together with all rights and privileges attaching thereto. The German State submarine cables from Tsingtau to Shanghai and from Tsingtau to Chefoo, with all the rights, privileges and properties attaching thereto, are similarly acquired by Japan, free and clear of all charges and encumbrances.

"*Article 157.* The movable and immovable property owned by the German State in the territory of Kiaochow, as well as all the rights which Germany might claim in consequence of the works or improvements made or of the expenses incurred by her, directly or indirectly, in connection with this territory, are and remain acquired by Japan, free and clear of all charges and encumbrances.

"*Article 158.* Germany shall hand over to Japan within three months from the coming into force of the present Treaty the archives, registers, plans, title-deeds and documents of every kind, wherever they may be relating to the administration, whether civil, military, financial, judicial or other, of the territory of Kiaochow. Within the same period Germany shall give particulars to Japan of all treaties, arrangements or agreements relating to the right, title or privileges referred to in the two preceding articles."

According to the secret minutes of the confidential sessions of the "Big Four," which have since been made known to China in a private communication and reported in the press, Japan consistently adhered to her stand in the Sino-Japanese agreements of 1915 and 1918. The following passage occurs at the end of the communication:—

"It should be mentioned that the Japanese delegates throughout these conversations made it clear that, in the event of any failure of China to carry out her share of the bargain —if, for example, she refused to coöperate in the formation of the police force or to admit the employment of Japanese instructors—Japan reserved the right to fall back, in the last resort, on the Sino-Japanese agreements of 1915 and 1918. President Wilson expressed the hope that, in the event of such failure on the part of China, Japan instead of appealing to the agreements, would voluntarily apply for mediation by the Council of the League of Nations. The Japanese delegates pointed out that, if China carried out her obligation loyally,

the case would not arise, and that, *even if the matter were submitted to the League of Nations, Japan nevertheless must reserve her right in the last analysis to base herself on the agreements.* President Wilson insisted that nothing he had said should be construed as a recognition of the notes exchanged between Japan and China, because they were based upon original demands against which the Government of the United States had earnestly protested."

That being the case, it is clear as daylight that under the Versailles treaty Japan has obtained more than she would have got under the Sino-Japanese treaties and notes of 1915 and 1918. She has promised *ad nauseam* that she would return the leased territory to the Republic, but as observers in Shantung can testify, she would return the shell whilst she herself would keep the kernel.

Such being the great betrayal of a fellow-ally in the war by the "Big Four"—mainly because of the secret agreements between Japan and Great Britain, France, Italy and Russia—the only dignified course left for a self-respecting Republic to do was to withhold its assent to the treaty containing the iniquitous Shantung clauses. The following presidential mandate was therefore issued on July 10, 1919, for the information of the nation, marking as it did another landmark in the new international policy of four hundred million people:—

"The convocation of the Paris Conference for the conclusion of the peace treaty with Germany is a matter of great importance, and our plenipotentiary delegates have been repeatedly instructed to exercise vigilance in conducting the negotiations. A telegram dated June 28th from Plenipotentiary Delegates Lou Tseng-tsiang, etc., has been received to the effect that in regard to the Shantung question, after they had made a declaration to the Conference expressing their desire to make a reservation, they first suggested that a clause stipulating same should be inserted in the Treaty. This was rejected. Then they proposed that a clause be appended to the treaty. This was rejected again. Then they requested that a clause be made outside the treaty, but the Powers still refused to agree. Afterwards they expressed their intention of merely issuing a declaration in that connection without us-

ing the word 'reservation.' This request was also not granted. As a last measure they suggested that they would prepare letters to be presented to the delegates of the Allied and Associated Powers at the time of signing, declaring that their signatures to be affixed to the Treaty should not be an obstacle in future to their making a request for readjustment of the case in question. This was again rejected. Under the circumstances they were forced to absent themselves from the Conference on the date of signing, but they despatched a letter to the Chairman of the Conference making it clear to him that their Government reserved the right to make a final decision regarding the Peace Treaty with Germany, etc.

"A perusal of this telegram makes us deeply lament the situation. The question of Kiaochow is one relating to our country, Japan and Germany. Since its submission to the Peace Conference several months ago our claims have not been attained for various reasons and circumstances. When we study the situation in the friendly countries and consider also the conditions in our own country, our hearts begin to ache and we have something to fear. Certainly such a question did not arise in one day's time, nor can it be regarded as entirely solved by our signing or not signing the peace treaty to-day. Although we have not yet signed the peace treaty with Germany, we cannot half-way cease to participate in the Peace Conference.

"Hereafter, as the diplomatic questions will become more complicated and important, we have to pay special attention to the good-will of friendly Powers. We should see wherein lie our advantages and disadvantages so as to adopt measures to save the situation. At the same time, we should consider our international position in order to adopt the safest and soundest policy.

"All these are matters which need the most careful study and best solution. All citizens of the Republic should understand that in this world where universalism prevails, international intercourse is a matter of the first importance, and no country can afford to be isolated from the rest of the world. What a country should do is to follow the world tendency and take adequate measures to deal with the international situation. All citizens should be guided by their patriotism to walk on the right path calmly, but they should not indulge in

clamors or commit any rash action, so that the Government and the Plenipotentiary Delegates may devote their whole energy to draw up plans and use all their efforts to carry them out. Only in this way will the Government and People be united together to tide over the critical situation. This is that on which our national fate depends, and we hereby bring it to the knowledge of the nation." [1]

On September 10, 1919, the Austrian peace treaty was signed by the Allied and Associated Powers and Austria at St. Germain, when Minister Lou and Dr. C. T. Wang affixed their signatures and seals on behalf of the Chinese delegation.

Comparatively speaking, the Austrian treaty was smooth sailing, and its provisions relating to China are similar to those of the German treaty, with the exception of the clauses concerning Kiaochow and the return of astronomical instruments removed from Peking. Even here, however, the Republic had to put up a stiff fight. Not only did the Austrian delegates seek to revise some of the provisions greatly to their favor, but Italy also attempted to claim the ex-Austrian concession in Tientsin on various grounds. As the latter has already a concession in the same port, the Allied delegates for once were unanimous in support of China. Italy then consented to withdraw its untenable claim but asked the Conference to request the Chinese government so to administer the disputed territory that there would be no prejudice to the sanitary well-being of the Italian concession adjoining thereto, etc.

On July 26th, Dr. Koo called at the French foreign office and was received by the chief of the Far Eastern division. The latter advised the Chinese government to lose no time in effectuating the improvements desired by the Italian authorities so that, on the one hand, the Allied confidence in China's good faith might be vindicated and, on the other, a good impression might be produced on the Allies favorable to an early consideration of the desiderata presented by the Republic to the Conference a few months earlier. The foregoing was subsequently confirmed by an exchange of correspondence between the Conference Chairman and Minister Lou, the hope being expressed by the Supreme Council that the improvements desired would, in the interests of the Chinese and foreign

[1] On August 1, 1919, a presidential mandate was issued declaring the termination of a state of war between China and Germany.

Chinese Peace Delegates leaving St. Germain Palace after the Signature of the Austrian Peace Treaty. Minister Lou is on the left, looking down, and Dr. C. T. Wang on the right.

populations in Tientsin, be carried through within one year after the treaty was signed.

The Austrian treaty has since been approved by parliament (203 out of 205 votes in the house of representatives, and 90 out of 91 in the senate) and ratified by the President of the Republic (June 18, 1920). China became thereby an original member of the League of Nations. It is significant that a year ago rumors were circulated in Peking that the peace treaty with Austria would not contain the League of Nations Covenant, so if China wanted to join the League she still had to sign the German treaty. Needless to say, the ruse was detected and the bluff unceremoniously called off.

The German and Austrian treaties excepted, the next item of importance is China's list of desiderata or wishes submitted to the Peace Conference early in April.[1] They are set out in full in one of the appendices to this volume, under the caption of "Questions for Readjustment." Briefly, the document is a dignified protest against not only the inequitable restrictions on the Republic's sovereignty but also the numerous violations of such acknowledged sovereignty. The arguments in support of the claims are ably marshaled and presented to the Conference with all possible clearness.

On the whole they were favorably received and Mr. Clemenceau, on behalf of the Supreme Council of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers, said on May 14th that the Council fully recognized the importance of the questions raised. Unfortunately, the immediate object of the Conference was to formulate peace with enemy countries and not to undertake the greater task of formulating a world peace. Hence, no official deliberation on the subject was possible. The Supreme Council therefore suggested that "these matters should be brought to the attention of the Council of the League of Nations as soon as that body is able to function." On April 22nd, however, namely, three weeks before the actual decision of the Shantung question, President Wilson, at a meeting of the "Big Three," thus substantially addressed himself to Minister

[1] In addition the Chinese delegation also put in a strong claim for the abrogation of the Japanese treaties and notes of 1915. While the claim did not incorporate the entire history of the protracted negotiations over the Japanese Twenty-one Demands, which history is included as one of the appendices to this volume, it embodied the relevant documents and subjected them to a searching analysis in order to lay bare the far-reaching effects of Japanese demands and pretensions.

Lou and Dr. Koo, in the presence of Premiers Clemenceau and Lloyd George:—

"As soon as the proposed League of Nations is established, we will give China all our assistance and aid her to remove all present inequalities as well as restrictions upon her legitimate rights, so that the Republic of China shall truly become a perfect, independent, sovereign, great state. . . . Such sentiments, I am happy to state, are also shared by Baron Makino, who will likewise be glad to assist in this worthy direction."

Such are the recorded sentiments of the Allied and Associated governments, and naturally the Chinese delegation was led to discern in them some ray of hope in the pending solution of the Kiaochow problem. So when a week later the Shantung decision was announced, the Chinese representatives' feelings could be better imagined than described. Therefore, when it was explained to the Chinese delegation that President Wilson's reason for consenting to the award in Japan's favor was in order to secure the latter's adherence to the League of Nations, under which China "eventually would secure justice," one of the Chinese envoys observed that (1) "the ruling force in any League constituted at this time will be the same major Powers that composed the Council of Five at Paris and which made the decision in the Shantung question;" (2) "it is not logical to assume that a League of Nations created by the same body as the Treaty and in conjunction with the Treaty is designed to reverse the terms of the Treaty;" and (3) "it is only the so-called weak nations that are asked to depend for justice and security upon the League of Nations, while the so-called Powers openly decline to rest their own positions and security on the League alone and plainly regard its assurance to be insufficient."

Concerning China's participation in the deliberations of the numerous committees, Dr. Koo was elected late in January by the various small states to serve on the League of Nations Commission and Dr. C. T. Wang, to serve on the International Ports and Waterways Commission. These were signal honors conferred upon the Chinese delegation and they partially assuaged the disappointment felt over the allotment of only two seats at the Conference. Not much is recorded of Dr. Wang's share in the latter commission's activities, but in the efforts of Dr. Koo at the former commission

one gains an insight into the arduous labors of the committee which was to set up an edifice to lay the foundations of the world's future peace. In addition, China was also represented at the Economic Commission by Dr. Alfred Sze, assisted by two technical experts. This commission being one of the most important and complicated bodies, its work was divided into various sections, and the labors of different sections were apportioned among the three representatives.

On the other hand, the Republic failed to secure any representation on the International Labor Commission, although Minister Lou pointed out to the Conference that there were no less than 150,000 Chinese laborers who had assisted in the war. Similarly, China was unrepresented on the Reparations Commission. Towards the end of March, one of the American delegates pointed out that both the United States and China had not filed their indemnity claims against Germany. The former had definitely decided not to demand an indemnity for her military expenses; so what was the latter to do? The Chinese conferred together and finally decided to refrain likewise, on account of the following reasons:—

1. So that China's action would be in harmony with that of her sister Republic.

2. Since the declaration of war China had admittedly not taken a very active part in the war.

3. To waive the demand for an indemnity would strengthen China's claim for compensation and reparation of losses.

4. Since the Republic was hoping that the other Powers would waive the balance of their Boxer indemnity, it was therefore impolitic for it to press for such indemnity.

As regards reparations, the latest reports to hand show that according to the findings of the Reparations Commission, the amount which China owes to Germany is eleven million dollars odd, whereas that owed by Germany to China is thirty-three millions—leaving a credit balance of twenty-one million odd dollars in the Republic's favor.[1]

Among the list of China's desiderata all reference to the

[1] In the preliminary treaty of peace concluded between China and Germany, the latter engages to pay the former, in addition to the expenses for the internment of Germans in China, a war indemnity—a portion in a lump sum equivalent to half the proceeds of the liquidated German property in China, a second portion in four million Mexican dollars, cash, and the remainder in Tientsin, Pukow, and Hukuang railway bonds. In return the latter declares that she "has no intention of joining the Allied Clearing House."

Boxer indemnity was omitted. This is explained in the summary submitted to the Peking government by the fact that the question had already been discussed before the technical commissions concerned, so that it was now a matter for individual negotiations between China and the governments interested. Of course, as already stated, the German and Austrian shares have lapsed since the declaration of war between China and those countries.

On November 27, 1919, the Bulgarian peace treaty was signed at Neuilly by the Allied and Associated Powers, including China, and Bulgaria. Minister Lou and Dr. C. T. Wang having already sailed from Europe, Dr. Koo signed on the Republic's behalf. Up to date China has also declined to sign the Turkish peace treaty, since it provides for the continuation of the capitulations or extraterritorial privileges in Turkey. As Peking's new policy is not to grant further extraterritorial rights to new treaty states, it is felt that signature of the Turkish treaty would be inconsistent with the Republic's action.[1]

Here is the bald statement of China's part in the Peace Conference. She entered it with the highest of expectations and came away sorely disappointed. Just as the war has made and unmade celebrities—of places as well as of persons—and unheard of geographical names before August, 1914, such as Ypres, Mons, etc., are now forever immortalized by the Allies' sacrifice, so Shantung has now become world famous. As a recent American periodical put it:—

"You are reading a great deal about Shantung. It has stolen the first page of all the newspapers, and its part in the spoil of the great war is attracting greater attention than the revised ownership of any other territory. . . . This bit of the earth's surface, rich in no particular except in its tremendous population, totally unknown to the great majority of people a few months ago, has through its acquisition by Germany, its seizure by Japan, and its cession to Japan by the terms of the peace treaty, become the most talked of part of the world to-day."

[1] The Hungarian peace treaty was signed on June 4, 1920, at Trianon, by Dr. Koo together with the plenipotentiaries of the Allied and Associated governments and Hungary.

And in this connection the following poem published in a New York weekly is peculiarly apposite:—

"In the west you free Jerusalem,
But in the east you sell
T'ai Shan, the Holy Mountain.
I hear a temple bell
Breathing, like a perfume,
From its exalted place,
The presence of Confucius,
The wisdom of a race,
The future of a people,
The only one of all
Whose conquerors are conquered;
Whose history is tall—
Taller than Fujiyama,
Taller than Koyasan,
Taller than that red sun
Consuming from Japan—
And my face is in the flowers,
And my brow is in the dust,
And my heart is sick with perfume,
And I weep because I must:
I weep for you, O masters,
O conquerors, O slaves,
As I hear you stir in China
The quiet in your graves."

WITTER BYNNER,
in *New York Nation*, May 24, 1919.

In view of the efficiency of the Japanese publicity bureau in foreign countries, it is open to question whether China could not have done better in the Shantung problem if she had likewise a similar propaganda service. Just as the Allies have learned to emulate the Germans in their propaganda campaign in neutral countries, so Peking is beginning to practice the axiom that if you want people to know the truth, you must take it to them and not wait for them to come to you. Even now the attempt does not go beyond the publication of *communiqués* and past histories—*e.g.*, in the 1915 Twenty-one Demands, in the recent question of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, etc. Accordingly whatever publicity there was in Paris was done through private initiative, chiefly by Chinese students

studying abroad. The joint labors of the China National Defense League in Europe, Le Comité Démocratique Chinois en France, and the Central Union of Chinese Students in Great Britain, for example, might not amount to much when contrasted with the publicity avalanche of Japanese agents; nevertheless, they were not all in vain. They at least showed the existence of a genuine desire to arouse foreign public opinion —so valuable nowadays in international negotiations—and so had their value.

About the middle of February, 1919, Baron Makino issued a lengthy statement to the newspaper correspondents in Paris which gave a distorted version of the relations between China and Japan, and China replied from Peking two months later. Peking's reply was effective in its way—another illustration of the Republic's growing self-assertion—but its effect could have been heightened considerably were it given on the spot in Paris immediately after the publication of the Japanese delegation's dementi. Here we may properly reproduce a passage from China's reply to the Japanese contention that Shantung should be awarded to Nippon partly because she had won it by the blood of her soldiers:—

"That the Germans were expelled from Shantung at a cost of two thousand precious Japanese lives in the Kiaochow operations is an incontestable fact. But the attention of the Chinese people has been attracted to the fact that, in the European war-theater, Germany was similarly expelled from Alsace-Lorraine largely through the coöperation of an American army of two million men, who had lost thirty times the number of lives Japan lost at Tsingtau and who have so far not claimed through their chiefs one foot of railways or one yard of the rich mining lands of the recovered French provinces. It is likewise a matter of public knowledge that England, who has made the fields of Flanders one vast cemetery for her youth, and laid upon herself the greatest national debt the world has ever known, has not asked of Belgium one single concession or requested that she must be granted anything that others may not have."

In addition, the above reply might also have rejoined that against the sacrifice of two thousand Japanese lives in Shan-

tung, which Tokyo has held since November, 1914, and administered for its exclusive benefit, there are no less than three thousand Chinese lives dedicated to the victory of Right over Might, and China has asked for no compensation whatsoever beyond the restoration of what is morally as well as legally hers—a claim which the Peace Conference has, however, adjudicated in favor of the illegal occupant.

To be sure, the Republic's part in the peace congress is unimportant when compared with that of many others. Yet it is one which is not without its effect upon others associated with it. For example, cabled messages of the signature ceremony on June 28th, at Versailles, read as follows: "At 3.40 p. m. a rumor ran like a flashlight that the Chinese delegates did not appear and refused to sign the treaty, thereby producing a great commotion among the Conference members and perturbation especially among the Japanese delegates." Since then both statesmen and legislators have declared the Shantung clauses indefensible; hence the American Senate adopted last November the following pregnant reservation to the German treaty: "The United States withholds its assent to Articles 156, 157, and 158, and reserves full liberty of action with respect to any controversy which may arise under said articles."

Diplomatically, therefore, China has not gained much; in fact she has failed to secure what is admittedly her proper due. Morally, however, she is the enviable gainer all around. Because of the Shantung decision the Allies are her moral debtors, and the world is her ardent well-wisher. Here is an ultimate asset which is worth so much more than Japan's empty diplomatic victory. Consequently, the Republic is not without its glory. We are told that this war has not ended in a military victory, nor in a diplomatic victory, but in a great moral victory. If so, China's part in the Paris Conference may justly be said to have culminated in an unprecedented moral victory for one-fourth of the entire human race.

CONCLUSION

IS THE REPUBLIC WORTH HELPING?

IN the foregoing pages we have endeavored to portray how China has progressed. The details of the picture may not be all clear cut, and here and there the proper symmetry may be lacking. Nevertheless, despite the blemishes of an amateur's production, this much may have stood out in bold relief: the phenomenal awakening of one-fourth of the world's population.

To those that wish China well, the transformation now taking place in the Republic is a genuine gratification. But to those that wish China ill, the spectacle inspires fear and apprehension. On the other hand, the awakening of the Chinese people is a solid fact, no matter whether others wish them good or evil. And as such, the world cannot further remain indifferent to the Republic's future.

If skeptics there are who seek to discount the infant democracy's success, let them restudy the history of the other republics. As a matter of fact, the Chinese are no wiser than other members of the human race. As an American newspaper published in North China recently pointed out, it took the United States at least twelve years before the federal constitution was adopted: "During the period between the Declaration of Independence (1776) and the adoption of the Federal Constitution (1790), the history of the United States contains many dark pages. Soldiers clamoring for pay due them, even to the extent of invading the assembly room of Congress and chasing the members through the windows, a bankrupt central government, depreciated bonds and paper money, armed insurrection and rebellions were some of the things which remind one of the problems that Americans had to face in the early days of the Republic—problems that were quite as difficult as those facing China at the present time."

The present may be dark, but the future is most promising —just as was precisely the case with the United States at the end of the 18th century. If anything, China is perhaps better situated than were the Thirteen Colonies—not only in density of population and vastness of territory, with the consequent inexhaustible supply of natural resources, but also in the prestige and esteem which an admiring world now associates with an old nation's awakening and its unswerving stand on the Shantung question. Hence, as was declared a few months ago by Hon. Charles R. Crane, in almost his first public utterance as the new United States minister to China: "China stands higher at this moment in the estimation and confidence of the world than ever before in her history. . . . The day is past when any man or any government can damage the integrity of China, corrupt her officials or poison her people. Most of the nations that have tried this in the past—and they were many—have been smashed into oblivion. We are now living in a new and historic era, in which the people themselves count more than their governments."

As has been shown, however, the Republic is at present considerably handicapped, both internally and externally. Externally there are treaty restrictions and injustices which not only infringe upon its sovereign rights but also seriously embarrass its natural growth and development. We refer to such anomalies as tariff autonomy, extraterritoriality, most-favored-nation clause, international garrisons, leased territories, etc. When the Chinese delegation submitted their list of desiderata, they were told that the time was premature for the discussion of those problems. And, as already stated, President Wilson specifically, and in the presence of Premiers Clemenceau and Lloyd George, made the following promise to them:—"As soon as the proposed League of Nations is established, we will give China all our assistance and aid her to remove all present inequalities as well as restrictions upon her legitimate rights, so that the Republic of China shall truly become a perfect, independent, sovereign, great state. . . . Such sentiments, I am happy to state, are also shared by Baron Makino who will likewise be glad to assist in this worthy direction."

The above was uttered in April, 1919, although in justice to President Wilson it should be added that the foregoing was

not his exact phraseology but our translation of the Chinese summary transcribed from his remarks. Since then the League of Nations has been established, and the first plenary meeting will meet at Geneva early in November, 1920. Dr. Wellington Koo will attend as the senior Chinese delegate and China will call upon the "Big Four" to redeem their promise.[1]

When the Republic announced the existence of a state of war between it and the Central Powers as from August 14th, 1917, the Entente Allies assured Peking that they "will do all that rests with them to insure that China shall enjoy in her international relations the position and regard due to a great country." At the forthcoming meeting of the League of Nations the Republic will also call upon its recent allies to fulfill their pledge.

WHAT WILL BE THEIR RESPONSE? The fate of four hundred millions will hang on the reply.

Internally, China is in the material sense still backward. In education she is estimated to spend only nine cents *per capita* of her population, whereas Japan spends $1.72 and the United States $5.72. In railways she requires at least another 20,000 miles to supplement her existing 6,000 odd miles in order to link up the principal sections of the country, not to speak of the necessary highway, waterway and port improvements. Hence, the total income of 400,000,000 people is estimated at twelve billion dollars a year, which is only one-

[1] The First Assembly of the League of Nations sat in Geneva from November 15 to December 18, 1920. At almost the last meeting of the Assembly on December 18, Dr. Koo made the following declaration:—

"On behalf of and with the authority of my Government, I have the honor to inform the Assembly that there are certain subjects of vital interest to China affecting international relations which, under the provisions of the Covenant of the League of Nations, the Republic of China intends to bring to the attention of the Assembly or of the Council. In view, however, of the fact that at this first session of the Assembly it has been devoting, and in the opinion of the Chinese Delegation should devote, itself to the perfecting of the organization of the League and to the definition of its rights and duties as set forth in the Covenant, the Chinese Delegation will not lay these subjects before the Assembly at the present session. But I respectfully declare, in the name of the Chinese Delegation, that in thus refraining from bringing these subjects to the attention of the Assembly, I reserve the full right of the Republic of China as a Member of the League to present the subjects to the Assembly or to the Council at a more appropriate time in the future, and do not waive any right to which the Republic of China may be entitled."

Associated with Dr. Koo as delegates were Mr. T'ang Ts'ai-fou, minister to The Hague, and Mr. Wei Sun-tchou, minister to Brussels.

fifth of the United States' 110,000,000 and the Republic's entire wealth at seventy-five billion dollars, which is about equal to that of Great Britain ten years ago.

On the other hand, China is far from being bankrupt. The central government may be in financial straits and may have to borrow loans from willing lenders, but there is plenty of money in the country and modern industries are fast growing up. The public debt which the Republic has to pay would probably work out at twenty shillings *per capita* of the population, whereas that of Great Britain is said to be £200 or four thousand shillings per head. Hence, a representative of the United States department of commerce, after three years' careful study of China's needs on the spot, has recommended that foreign Powers might lend the Republic a lump sum of five billion dollars for improvements in railroads, waterways, terminal systems and highways: "China's resources are sufficient and her credit sound enough to warrant the investment."

And hence the proposal of the newly formed International Consortium to finance the Republic on a large scale jointly and severally. As Mr. Thomas W. Lamont, representative of the American banking group who recently visited Japan and China to conduct negotiations which led to the formation of the Consortium, took care to explain in the *New York Tribune* immediately on his return:—"With Japan's changing ideas toward China and facing the situation in China itself . . . with its banking, economic and transportation systems in a backward state, the Consortium comes, with its new policy, not of imposing some large plan of exploitation and control upon China, nor of securing great concessions from her, but of wishing to render China assistance in the development of great basic public enterprises.

"The Consortium plans to do this with the approval and coöperation of the Chinese Government and people, with safety of investment for the people of the United States, Great Britain, France and Japan, to whom Chinese securities will be offered; with an excellent interest return to such investors; with a fair profit to the bankers; and with the hope on the part of the Consortium that within a few years it will have been able to assist China to reach such a point in the development and management of her enterprises that, as a Consortium,

it will be able to withdraw and leave the entire field to Chinese handling, and to such private foreign enterprise as may continue to be attracted by the opportunities of China.

"I do not mean to indicate that the Consortium is an eleemosynary institution. It cannot possibly function unless it has a fair margin of profit to work upon, but certainly if the principle laid down for its organization is carried out, we shall see no more 'spheres of influence' set up in China. Even though the way be long and difficult, we ought to be able, through the Consortium, to attain a greater degree of sympathy and partnership among the nations involved, and thus contribute as a unit and with one mind towards the assistance of China."

Intelligent public opinion in China welcomes the Consortium as above outlined, since the country is too large to be financed by any one Power all at once. With the return to normal conditions and efficient administration by a really representative government, it will not be long before the Chinese can independently develop their basic enterprises; meanwhile the Consortium, if properly guided, can do a real service to the Chinese people. But as Mr. Lamont also pointed out, the success of the Consortium depends, to a large extent, upon the individual investors in the West, not the governments involved—"upon the peoples of the respective nations, upon their good will, interest and active participation." This is where Western nations can assist an upward striving democracy: what is their response?[1]

In the past China has lived as a peace-loving nation. Recent experience, however, has taught her that to enjoy peace she must be prepared against external attacks. Before the Peace Conference met at Paris, the Chinese had hoped that the

[1] Contrary to expectations the Consortium has up to June, 1921, not made any financial advance to the Chinese government. It is reported that some sort of negotiations has been started, but the terms demanded by the foreign bankers are unacceptable to the Chinese. The Consortium having in the meanwhile aroused the opposition of a section of the populace, an influential Chinese banking group has been formed to assist the government, and in thus encouraging the Chinese bankers to organize themselves for the benefit of their country, the Consortium seems to have partially served its purpose. There is now a distinct tendency towards coöperation between Chinese and foreign bankers, and when the Consortium eventually comes forward to assist China on a large scale, this coöperation will prove valuable to all concerned.

world remaking assembly would aid them to secure justice and consideration "due to a great country." After the disappointment over the Shantung question, who will blame them if they should suddenly turn militarist? If their friends and recent allies would also betray them, what hope is there for them but to arm themselves to the teeth?

We do not suggest that the Chinese will turn militarist or Bolshevist, but its possibility should not be overlooked, especially if the expected assistance from the West is not forthcoming within a reasonable period of time. As the American minister, Mr. Crane, observed on another occasion:—"The people of China are the hardest working and most meagerly rewarded in the world. We must assist on our part to lighten their burdens. . . . The world needs the services of China at its best and fullest. It would be the greatest kind of crime to have China feel that she could not continue her longevity in security, and to force her to build up a militarism. . . . It is possible for even a pacifist nation to be provoked to such a degree that it throws itself into militarism. Once a nation has swerved into this track it is difficult indeed to get it back."

Why should the world assist the Chinese to lighten their burdens? Because the world owes to the Chinese a great debt. Until the foreign Powers opened the Middle Kingdom to the world's trade and commerce, the Celestial Empire was quite content to continue along its own beaten paths—happy in its splendid isolation. But the Powers would not let the old giant alone: having disturbed his slumber, they proceeded forthwith to tie his hands and feet. Hence the treaty tariff of five per cent. *ad valorem*, whereas Chinese goods entering foreign ports are dutiable at least twenty per cent. Hence extraterritorial rights, foreign post-offices, international garrisons, leased territories, etc. If China had tariff autonomy like other independent sovereign states, she would not have been so poor to-day. If foreign Powers had not wrung leased territories from her, there would have been no Shantung question to mar the Versailles treaty. And if there were no extraterritoriality there would be more contentment in the country.

Such being the case, the world is in duty bound to redress the wrongs done to the Chinese people—by the treaties no less than by the Paris Conference. If the League of Nations is willing, justice will yet be done to the Republic. And if

Western nations are willing, they can do much to assist the Chinese to lighten their burdens.

"The world needs the services of China at its best and fullest"—because it must be for some purpose that the nation obeying the Fifth Commandment has been preserved until this day. Human nature being imperfect, every nation has its share to contribute to the betterment of the human race. Who is there then to say that the Chinese people shall not be given the opportunity to put forth their best and thus fulfill the purpose obviously intended by the Arbiter of Nations?

China has sometimes been described as a civilization rather than a nation. This is because she has been handicapped both internally and externally. Let the League of Nations boldly accord justice to the Republic, let the nations of the West repay the debt they owe to the Chinese, let the Chinese be given an opportunity to put forth their best—and then, in the words of Monsieur Painleve, former French premier who recently visited China, "to-morrow China, whilst remaining a civilization, will become a nation, extensively decentralized but one and indivisible—an element of weight in the concert of civilized Powers."


CHINA
Scale of miles
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Railroads
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Semipalatinsk
Lake Balkash
Kobdo
ALTAI MTS.
MONGOLIA
Uliassutai
Irkutsk
WESTERN TURKESTAN
Kuldja
Manass
Kucheng
TIEN SHAN MTS.
CHINESE TURKESTAN
Turfan
DESERT
Aksu
Kashgar
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SINKIANG
Yarkand
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Cherchen
Kanchow
Koko Nor
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TIBET
Simla
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Dingri
Gyangtse
Batang
Cawnpore
Lucknow
Ganges R.
Khatmandu
Phadkila
BHUTAN
Darjeeling
Sadiya
Patna
Brahmaputra R.
Tropic of Cancer
Calcutta
Chittagong
Talifu
Yunnan
Mengtsz
Szemao
Mandalay
Irrawaddy R.
Mekong R.
SIAM
FRENCH INDO-CHINA


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Maochuria
Kerulen R.
MANCHURIA
Little Khingan Mts.
Aigun
Blagoveshchensk
Amur R.
Khabarovsk
Tsitsihar
Harbin
Sungari R.
Usuri
Nikolsk
Vladivostok
Changchun
Chengchiatun
Kirin
Shehpingkai
Changtufu
Tiehling
Hweiming
Liao R.
Sinmintu
Mukden
Sonjin
Seishin
Newchwang
Fenghwangcheng
Antung
Yungkow
Gensan
SEA OF JAPAN
MONGOLIA
Kalgan
Fengchen
GREAT WALL
Peking
Chinwangtau
Pingyang
Chinnampo
Port Arthur
Dairen (Jap.)
Keijo (Seoul)
Taiden
Taku
Tientsin
Gulf of Pechili
Chefoo
Weihaiwei
Jinsen
Taiyuan
Paoting
Chengting
Hwanghsien
Kiaochow
Tsingtao
YELLOW SEA
Mokpo
Fusan
Hiroshima
HONSHU
Tokushima
SHIKOKU
Shimonoseki
Korea Strait
Nagasaki
KYUSHU
Tsinchwachen
Taikiu
Tsinan
Kaifeng
Sianfu
Mienchin
SHENSI
HONAN
Chinkiang
Nanking
Wuhu
Soochow
Shanghai
Ningpo
EAST CHINA SEA
HUPEH
Hankow
Aoking
Ichang
Wuchang
Shasi
Kiukiang
Shaohsing
Hangchow
CHEKIANG
Nanchang
Wenchow
RYUKYU ISLANDS
Changsha
KIANGSI
Santuao
Pingsihang
HUNAN
Kweiyang
Foochow
FUKIEN
Kelung
Formosa Strait
TAIWAN (FORMOSA)
Tropic of Cancer
Kweilin
Changchow
Amoy
PACIFIC OCEAN
KWANGSI
Wuchow
Samshui
Canton
Swatow
Takau
Nanning
Kongmoon
Bashi Channel
Lungchow
Sanchiamai
HONGKONG
Victoria (Br.)
Pakhoi
Kwangchow (Fr.)
Haiphong
SOUTH CHINA SEA
Balintang Channel
Gulf of Tonkin
Kiungchow
HAINAN
LUZON
PHILIPPINE ISLANDS (U.S.)
Williams Engraving Co., N.Y.
108
from Greenwich
116
124

APPENDIX A

OFFICIAL STATEMENT BY THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT RESPECTING THE SINO-JAPANESE NEGOTIATIONS BROUGHT TO A CONCLUSION BY CHINA'S COMPLIANCE WITH THE TERMS OF JAPAN'S ULTIMATUM DELIVERED ON MAY 7, 1915

At three o'clock on the afternoon of May 7, 1915, His Excellency the Japanese Minister in Peking delivered to the Chinese Government in person an Ultimatum from the Imperial Japanese Government, with an accompanying Note of seven articles. The concluding sentences of the Ultimatum read thus:

> "The Imperial Government hereby again offer their advice and hope that the Chinese Government, upon this advice, will give a satisfactory reply by six o'clock p. m. on the ninth day of May. It is hereby declared that if no satisfactory reply is received before or at the specified time the Imperial Government will take such steps as they may deem necessary."

The Chinese Government, having received and accepted the Ultimatum, feel constrained to make a frank and plain statement of the facts connected with the negotiations which were abruptly terminated by this drastic action on the part of Japan.

The Chinese Government have constantly aimed, as they still aim, at consolidating the friendship existing between China and Japan, and, in this period of travail in other parts of the world, have been particularly solicitous of preserving peace in the Far East. Unexpectedly on January 18, 1915, His Excellency the Japanese Minister in Peking, in pursuance of instructions from his Government, adopted the unusual procedure of presenting to His Excellency the President of the Republic of China a list (hereto appended) of twenty-one momentous demands, arranged in five Groups. *The first four Groups were each introduced by a preamble, but there was no preamble or explanation to the Fifth Group. In respect of the character of the demands in this Group,*

however, no difference was indicated in the document between them and those embodied in the preceding Groups.

Although there was no cause for such a *démarche,* the Chinese Government, in deference to the wishes of the Imperial Japanese Government, at once agreed to open negotiations on those articles which it was possible for China to consider, notwithstanding that it was palpable that the whole of the demands were intended to extend the rights and interests of Japan without securing a *quid pro quo* of any kind for China.

China approached the pending conferences in a spirit of utmost friendliness and with a determination to deal with all questions frankly and sincerely. Before negotiations were actually commenced, the Japanese Minister raised many questions with regard to the number of delegates proposed to represent China, the number of conferences to be held in each week, and the method of discussion. The Chinese Government, though their views differed from those of the Japanese Minister, yielded in all these respects to his contentions in the hope of avoiding any delay in the negotiations. The objections of the Japanese Minister to the customary recording and signing of the minutes of each conference, which the Chinese Government suggested as a necessary and advisable precaution, as well as one calculated to facilitate future reference, were also accepted. Nor did the Chinese Government retaliate in any way when in the course of negotiations the Japanese Minister twice suspended the conferences, obviously with the object of compelling compliance with his views on certain points at the time under discussion. Even when delay was threatened owing to the unfortunate injury sustained by the Japanese Minister as a result of a fall from his horse, the Chinese delegates, in order to avert interruption, proposed that the conferences should be continued at the Japanese Legation, which proposal was accepted. Later, when, on March 22, the Japanese Government despatched large bodies of troops to South Manchuria and Shantung for the ostensible purpose of relieving the garrison—whose term of service had not then expired—the Japanese Minister stated at the conference, in reply to a direct question as to when the retiring troops would be withdrawn, that this would not be done until the negotiations could be brought to a satisfactory conclusion. Although this minatory step caused much excitement, indignation and alarm on the part of the Chinese people, and made it difficult for the Chinese Government to continue the conferences, they successfully exerted efforts to avert a rupture and thus enabled the negotiations smoothly to proceed. All this demonstrates that the Chinese Government were dominated by a sincere desire to expedite the progress of the con-

ferences; and that the Japanese Government recognized this important fact was made clear on March 11 when the Japanese Minister conveyed to the Chinese Government an expression of his Government's appreciation of China's frankness and sincerity in the conduct of the negotiations.

From February 2, when the negotiations were commenced, to April 17, twenty-four conferences were held in all. Throughout this whole period the Chinese Government steadfastly strove to arrive at an amicable settlement and made every concession possible.

Of the twenty-one demands originally submitted by Japan, China agreed to fifteen, some in principle and some textually, six being initialed by both parties.

In the Matter of the Demands to Which China Agreed

At the first conference, held on February 2, China agreed in principle to the first article of the Shantung group of demands which provides that China should give her assent to the transfer of Germany's rights in Shantung to Japan. The Chinese Government maintained at first that the subject of this demand related to the *post bellum* settlement, and, therefore, should be left over for discussion by all the parties interested at the Peace Conference. Failing to persuade the Japanese Minister to accept this view, the Chinese Government agreed to this demand in principle, and made certain supplementary proposals.

One of the supplementary proposals was in these terms:

> "The Japanese Government declares that when the Chinese Government give their assent to the disposition of interests above referred to, Japan will restore the Leased Territory of Kiaochow to China, and further recognizes the right of the Chinese Government to participate in the negotiations referred to above between Japan and Germany."

The provision for a declaration to restore Kiaochow was clearly not a demand on Japan but only a reiteration of Japan's voluntary statement in her Ultimatum to Germany on August 15, 1914, (a copy of which was officially transmitted to the Chinese Government for perusal on August 15), and repeated in public statements by the Japanese Premier. Appreciating the earnest desire of Japan to maintain the peace of the Far East and to cement her friendship with China, as evidenced by this friendly offer, the Chinese Government left the entire question of the conditions of restoration to be determined by Japan, and refrained from making

any reference thereto in the supplementary proposal. The suggestion relating to participation in the Conference between Japan and Germany was made in view of the fact that Shantung, the object of future negotiation between Japan and Germany, is a Chinese Province, and therefore China is the Power most concerned in the future of that territory.

Another supplementary proposal suggesting the assumption by Japan of responsibility for indemnification of the losses arising out of the military operations by Japan in and about the leased territory of Kiaochow was necessitated by the fact that China was neutral *vis-à-vis* the war between Japan and Germany. Had China not inserted such a provision, her position in relation to this conflict might have been liable to misconstruction—the localities in which the operations took place being a portion of China's territory—and might also have exposed herself to a claim for indemnification of losses for which she was in no way responsible.

In a further supplementary proposal the Chinese Government suggested that, prior to the restoration of the Kiaochow territory to China, the Maritime Customs, the telegraphs and post-offices should be continued to be administered as heretofore; that the military railway, the telegraph lines, etc., which were installed by Japan to facilitate her military operations, should be removed forthwith; that the Japanese troops now stationed outside of the leased territory should be first withdrawn, and those within the territory should be recalled at the time when Kiaochow is returned to China. Shantung being a Chinese Province, it was natural for China to be anxious concerning the restoration of the *status quo ante bellum*. Although the Chinese Government were confident that the Japanese Government would effect such restoration in pursuance of their official declaration, it was necessary for China, being neutral throughout the war, to place these matters on record.

At the third conference, held on February 22, China agreed to the second demand in the Shantung Group not to cede or lease to any Power any territory or island on the sea border of Shantung.

At the fifth conference, held on February 29, China agreed to give Japan the preference, provided Germany abandoned the privilege, to supply the capital for the construction of a railway from Chefoo or Lungkow to connect with the Kiaochow-Tsinanfu railway, in the event of China deciding to build that railway with foreign capital.

At the sixth conference, held on March 3, China, in the interests of foreign trade, agreed to open certain important cities in Shantung as trade marts under regulations approved by the Japanese Government, although this was a demand on the part of Japan for privileges additional to any that hitherto had been enjoyed by

Germany and was not an outcome of the hostilities between Japan and Germany, nor, in the opinion of the Chinese Government, was its acceptance essential to the preservation of peace in the Far East.

At the eighth conference, held on March 9, China agreed to the extension of the term of the lease of (1) Dalny and (2) Port Arthur, and (3) of the South Manchuria and (4) Antung-Mukden railways, all to 99 years.

Owing to the bitter experiences which China sustained in the past in connection with the leased portions of her territory, it has become her settled policy not to grant further leases nor to extend the term of those now in existence. Therefore, it was a significant indication of China's desire to meet Japan's wishes when she agreed to this exceptional departure from her settled policy.

At the same conference the Chinese Government also agreed to refrain from raising objections to the principle of coöperation in the Hanyehping Company if the latter should arrive at an agreement in this respect with the Japanese capitalists concerned. With reference to this question it was pointed out to the Japanese Minister that, in the Provisional Constitution of the Republic of China, Chinese subjects are guaranteed the right of protection of their property and freedom to engage in any lawful occupation. The Government were precluded, therefore, from interfering with the private business of the people, and could not find any other solution than the one thus agreed to.

As regards the single article of the Fourth Group, and the preamble thereto, the Chinese Government held that they were inconsistent with Chinese sovereignty. However, China, at this conference, expressed her readiness to meet the wishes of Japan so far as it was possible without infringing her sovereignty, and agreed to make a voluntary pronouncement that she would not alienate any portion of her coast line.

In connection with the South Manchuria Railway it is worthy of note that the provisions regarding the repurchase period in the agreement (36 years from 1902) was not mentioned in Japan's original proposal. Subsequently the Japanese Government, on the ground that the meaning of this provision was not clear, requested China to agree to its cancellation. To this request the Chinese Government acceded, though well aware that the proposed change could only benefit Japan. China thus relinquished the right to repurchase the railway at the expiration of another 23 years.

In connection with the Antung-Mukden Railway, the article, which was originally initialed at the conference, provided for the reversion of the railway to China at the end of 99 years without payment, but, at the subsequent meeting, the Japanese Minister

requested that the reference to the reversion without payment be deleted from the initialed article. In acceding to the Japanese Minister's request, China again showed her sincere desire to expedite matters and to meet Japan's wishes even at the sacrifice of a point in her favor, to which Japan had already agreed.

At the eleventh conference, held on March 16, China agreed to give Japan preference in regard to loans for railway construction in South Manchuria.

At the thirteenth conference, held on March 23, China agreed (1) to the amendment of the Kirin-Changchun Railway loan agreement; (2) to give preference to Japan if the revenue of South Manchuria were offered as security for loans; (3) to give preference to Japanese in the event of the employment of advisers for South Manchuria; (4) to grant to Japanese the right of mining in nine specified areas in South Manchuria.

In its original form the demand with reference to mining in South Manchuria tended to create a monopoly for Japanese subjects, and, therefore, was entirely inconsistent with the principle of equal opportunity. The Chinese Government explained that they could not, in view of the treaty rights of other Powers, agree to this monopoly, but they readily gave their acceptance when Japan consented to the modification of the demand so as to mitigate its monopolistic character.

In connection with the Kirin-Changchun Railway, the amendment agreed to involves a fundamental revision of the original agreement on the basis of the existing railway loan contracts concluded by China with other foreign capitalists, as well as an engagement on the part of the Chinese Government to extend to this railway any better terms which may be hereafter accorded to other railway concessionaires in China. The capital of this railway was originally fifty per cent Chinese and fifty per cent Japanese. The effect of this undertaking is to transfer the capital originally held by the Chinese, as well as the full control and administration of the railway, to the Japanese.

At the twenty-first conference, held on April 10, China agreed, in regard to the demands concerning Fukien Province, to give Japan an assurance in accordance with Japan's wishes at a future time.

As regards demands 2 and 3 in the Manchuria Group, relating to the ownership of land for trade, manufacture, and agricultural enterprises, as well as for the right of settlement in the interior of South Manchuria, the Chinese Government, after discussion at several conferences, agreed to them in principle, but desired to introduce certain amendments concerning the control and protection of the Japanese subjects who might avail themselves of these

rights. The course of the negotiations in connection with these amendments will be referred to subsequently.

In the Matter of Those Demands to Which China Could Not Agree

Of the twenty-one original demands there were six, as previously mentioned, to which China could not agree on the ground that they were not proper subjects for international negotiation, conflicting as they did with the sovereign rights of China, the treaty rights of other Powers, and the principle of equal opportunity.

Thus, for example, the second article of the Hanyehping question in the original Third Group in particular seriously affected the principle of equal commercial opportunity.

The proposal that there should be joint administration by China and Japan of the police in China was clearly an interference with the Republic's domestic affairs, and consequently an infringement of her sovereignty. For that reason the Chinese Government could not take the demand into consideration. But when it was explained by the Japanese Minister that this referred only to South Manchuria, and he suggested that his Government would be satisfied if China agreed to engage Japanese as police advisers for that territory, the Chinese Government accepted the suggestion.

The two articles relating to the acquisition of land for schools, hospitals, and temples, as well as to the right of missionary propaganda, would, in the opinion of the Chinese Government, have presented grave obstacles to the consolidation of the friendly feeling subsisting between the two people. The religions of the two countries are identical and, therefore, the need for a missionary propaganda to be carried on in China by Japanese does not exist. The natural rivalry between Chinese and Japanese followers of the same faith would tend to create incessant disputes and friction. Whereas Western missionaries live apart from the Chinese communities among which they labor, Japanese monks would live with the Chinese; and the similarity of their physical characteristics, their religious garb, and their habits of life would render it impossible to distinguish them for purposes of affording the protection which the Japanese Government would require should be extended to them under the system of extraterritoriality now obtaining in China. Moreover, a general apprehension exists among the Chinese people that these peculiar conditions favoring conspiracies for political purposes might be taken advantage of by some unscrupulous Chinese.

The demand for railway concessions in the Yangtze Valley conflicted with the Shanghai-Hangchow-Ningpo Railway Agreement

of March 6, 1908, the Nanking-Changsha Railway Agreement of March 31, 1914, and the engagement of August, 24, 1914, giving preference to British firms for the projected line from Nanchang to Chaochowfu. For this reason the Chinese Government found themselves unable to consider the demand, though the Japanese Minister, while informed of China's engagements with Great Britain, repeatedly pressed for its acceptance.

In respect to the demand for the appointment of influential Japanese to be advisers and instructors in political, financial and military affairs, the policy of the Chinese Government in regard to the appointment of advisers has been similar to that which has presumably guided the Japanese Government in like selection of the best qualified men irrespective of their nationality. As an indication of their desire to avail themselves of the services of eminent Japanese, one of the earliest appointments made to an advisership was that of Dr. Ariga, while later on Dr. Hirai and Mr. Nakayami were appointed to the Ministry of Communications.

It was considered that the demand that Japanese should be appointed in the three most important administrative departments, as well as the demand for the joint control of China's police, and the demand for an engagement to purchase a fixed amount of arms and ammunition from Japan or to establish joint arsenals in China, so clearly involved the sovereignty of the Republic that the Chinese Government were unable even to consider them.

For these reasons the Chinese Government, at the very outset of the negotiations, declared that they were unable to negotiate on the demands; but, in deference to the wishes of the Japanese Minister, the Chinese delegates consented to give the reasons for declining to enter into a discussion of them.

In the Matter of the Questions of Dispute Involved in Some of the Foregoing Demands

The demand by Japan for the right of her subjects in South Manchuria to lease or own land, and to reside and travel, and to engage in business or manufacture of any kind whatever, was deemed by the Chinese Government to obtain for Japanese subjects in this region a privileged status beyond the terms of the treaties existing between the two nations, and to give them a freedom of action which would be a restriction of China's sovereignty and a serious infringement of her administrative rights. Should Japanese subjects be granted the right of owning land, it would mean that all the landed property in the region might fall into their hands, thereby endangering China's territorial integrity. Moreover, residence in the interior was incompatible with the ex-

istence of extraterritoriality, the relinquishment of which is necessary to the actual enjoyment of the privilege of inland residence, as evidenced in the practice of other nations.

Japan's unconditional demand for the privilege of inland residence accompanied with a desire to extend extraterritoriality into the interior of China and to enable Japanese subjects to monopolize all the interests in South Manchuria, was also palpably irreconcilable with the principle of equal opportunity. For this reason the Chinese Government were, in the first instance, unable to accept this demand as a basis of negotiation. Their profound regard for the friendly relations of the two countries, however, persuaded them to exert their utmost efforts, in spite of all the inherent difficulties, to seek a solution of a question which was practically impossible to solve. Knowing that the proposal made by Japan was incompatible with treaties, they nevertheless sought to meet her wishes within the limits of treaties. Accordingly, they submitted a counter-proposal to open more places in South Manchuria to international trade and to establish Sino-Japanese joint reclamation companies.

This suggestion was made in the belief that the places to which Japanese subjects would desire to resort for purposes of trade, could not be other than important localities; if all these localities were opened to commerce, then they could reside, trade, and lease land there for joint reclamation. Thus Japanese subjects might enjoy the essence of the privilege of inland residence and would still be able to reconcile their position with China's treaties and the principle of equal opportunity.

After the Japanese Government declined to accept this suggestion, China withdrew it and replaced it with an amendment to the original articles. It was proposed in this amendment to grant to Japanese subjects the extra-treaty privilege of inland residence with the provisos that Japanese subjects in places outside of trade marts should observe Chinese police regulations and pay taxes in the same manner as Chinese; and that civil and criminal cases involving such Japanese subjects should be adjudicated by Chinese Authorities, the Japanese Consul attending merely to watch the proceedings. This suggestion was not an innovation; it was based upon the *modus operandi* now in force as regards the Korean settlers in inland districts in Chientao. But the Japanese Government again declined to accept it.

The Chinese Government thereupon made a third proposal along the line of what constitutes the present practice in Turkey, making a distinction, however, in favor of Japanese subjects, in the exercise of jurisdiction over civil and criminal cases. This was once more objected to by the Japanese Government.

Then the Chinese Government proposed to concede still another step—the fourth endeavor to meet Japan's wishes. They proposed to agree to the full text of Articles 2 and 3 relative to the question of inland residence, except that "the right of owning land" was changed into "the right of leasing land" and to the phrase "cultivating land" was added this clause: "the regulations for which shall be determined separately"; and, further, to add a supplementary article which embodied a *modus operandi* which the Chinese Government had constrained themselves to make, out of a desire to come to a settlement over this question. The view advanced in this supplementary article was based upon the Japanese Minister's declaration made on March 6, 1915, that a separate article embodying some compromise might be added to the original articles 2 and 3 for the purpose of avoiding any conflict with China's sovereignty or the system established by treaties. These suggestions made by the Chinese Government were not accepted by Japan.

As regards Eastern Inner Mongolia, not only have no treaties been entered into with Japan concerning this region, but also the people are so unaccustomed to foreign trade, that the Chinese Government invariably feel much anxiety about the safety of foreigners who elect to travel there. The Chinese Government, therefore, considered that it would not be in the interest of foreigners to open the whole territory to them for residence and commerce, and on these grounds based their original refusal to place Eastern Inner Mongolia on the same footing as South Manchuria. Still, their desire to meet the wishes of the Japanese Government eventually prompted them to offer to open a number of places in the region to foreign trade.

In the Matter of Japan's Revised Demands

The foregoing is an outline of the negotiations up to April 17. It was hoped by the Chinese Government that the Japanese Government, in view of the great concessions made by China at the conferences held up to this time, would see a way of effecting an amicable settlement by modifying their position on certain points. In regard to these it had, by this time, become manifest that China would encounter almost insuperable difficulties in making further concessions.

The Japanese Government, however, suspended the negotiations until April 26 when they surprised the Chinese Government by presenting a new list of twenty-four demands (which is hereto appended), and requested the Chinese Government to accord their acceptance without delay, adding that this was their final pro-

posal. At the same time the Japanese Minister stated that the Japanese Government would restore the leased territory of Kiaochow to China at an opportune time in the future and under proper conditions, if the Chinese Government would agree to the new list of twenty-four demands without modification.

In this new list, although the term "special position" in the preamble of the Manchuria Group was changed to "economic relations," and although the character of the articles in the original Fifth Group was altered from Demands to a recital of alleged statements by the Chinese Foreign Minister, four new demands were introduced concerning Eastern Inner Mongolia. In deference to the wishes of the Japanese Government, the Chinese Government gave the revised list the most careful consideration; and being sincerely desirous of an early settlement offered new concessions in their reply presented to the Japanese Minister on May 1. (Annexed.)

In this reply the Chinese Government reinserted the proposal in reference to the retrocession of Kiaochow, which they advanced at the first conference on February 2, and which was postponed at the request of the Japanese Minister. This, therefore, was in no sense a new proposal.

The Chinese Government also proposed to agree to three of the four articles relating to Eastern Inner Mongolia. There was some difficulty in determining a definition of the boundaries of Eastern Inner Mongolia—this being a new expression in Chinese geographical terminology—but the Chinese Government, acting upon a statement made at a previous conference by the Japanese Minister that the Japanese Government meant the region under Chinese administrative jurisdiction, and taking note, in the list presented by the Japanese Minister, of the names of places in Eastern Inner Mongolia to be opened to trade, inferred that the so-called Eastern Inner Mongolia is that part of Inner Mongolia which is under the jurisdiction of South Manchuria and the Jehol Intendency; and refrained from placing any limitations upon the definition of this term.

The Chinese Government also withdrew their supplementary proposal reserving the right of making regulations for agricultural enterprises to be undertaken by Japanese settlers in South Manchuria.

In respect of the trial of cases involving land disputes between Japanese only, or between Japanese and Chinese, the Chinese Government accorded to the Japanese Consul the right of deputing an officer to watch the proceedings.

The Chinese Government also agreed to accept the suggestion of the Japanese Government to modify the term "police law and

ordinances" into "police rules and regulations," thereby limiting the extent of control which the Chinese would have over Japanese subjects.

As regards the Hanyehping demand, the Chinese Government accepted the draft made by the Japanese Government, embodying an engagement by the Chinese Government not to convert the Company into a State-owned concern, nor to confiscate it, nor to force it to borrow foreign capital other than Japanese.

In respect of the Fukien question the Chinese Government also agreed to give an assurance in the amplified form suggested by the Japanese Government that the Chinese Government had not given their consent to any foreign nations to construct a dockyard, or a coaling station, or a naval base, or any other military establishment along the coast of Fukien Province; nor did they contemplate borrowing foreign capital for the foregoing purposes.

Having made these concessions which practically brought the views of China into line with those of Japan, and having explained in a note accompanying the reply the difficulty for China to make further concessions, the Chinese Government hoped that the Japanese Government would accept their reply of May 1, and thus bring the negotiations to an amicable conclusion.

The Japanese Government, however, expressed themselves as being dissatisfied with China's reply, and withdrew the conditional offer to restore Kiaochow to China made on April 26. It was further intimated that if the Chinese Government did not give their full compliance with the list of twenty-four demands, Japan would have recourse to drastic measures.

Upon receiving this intimation the Chinese Government, inspired by the conciliatory spirit which had been predominant from the very beginning of the negotiations and desirous of avoiding any possible rupture in the relations of the two countries, made a supreme effort to meet the situation, and represented to the Japanese Government that they would reconsider their position and make another attempt to find a solution that would be more satisfactory to Japan, in respect to those articles which China had declared could not be taken up for consideration, but to which Japan attached great importance. Even in the evening of May 6, after the Japanese Minister had notified the Chinese Government that the Ultimatum had arrived in Peking, the Chinese Government in the interests of peace still exerted efforts to save the situation by offering to meet Japan's wishes.

These overtures were again rejected, and thus exhausted the means at the disposal of the Chinese Government to prevent an *impasse*.

It is plain that the Chinese Government proceeded to the fullest extent of possible concessions in view of the strong national sentiment manifested by the people throughout the whole period of negotiations. All that the Chinese Government strove to maintain was China's plenary sovereignty, the treaty rights of foreign Powers in China and the principle of equal opportunity.

To the profound regret of the Chinese Government, however, the tremendous sacrifices which they had shown themselves ready to make proved unavailing, and an Ultimatum (the text of which is appended) was duly delivered to them by the Japanese Minister at three o'clock on the afternoon of May 7.

As to the allegations made in the Ultimatum against China, the Chinese Government hope that the foregoing outline of the history of the negotiations constitutes a clear, dispassionate, and complete reply.

In considering the nature of the course they should take with reference to the Ultimatum the Chinese Government was influenced by a desire to preserve the Chinese people, as well as the large number of foreign residents in China, from unnecessary suffering, and also to prevent the interests of friendly Powers from being imperiled. For these reasons the Chinese Government were constrained to comply in full with the terms of the Ultimatum (the reply being hereto appended), but in complying the Chinese disclaim any desire to associate themselves with any revision, which may thus be effected, of the various conventions and agreements concluded between other Powers in respect of the maintenance of China's territorial independence and integrity, the preservation of the *status quo*, and the principle of equal opportunity for the commerce and industry of all nations in China.

THE DOCUMENTS IN THE SINO-JAPANESE NEGOTIATIONS

JAPAN'S TWENTY-ONE DEMANDS

Translation of Document Handed to the President, Yuan Shih-k'ai by Mr. Hioki, the Japanese Minister, on January 18th, 1915

I

The Japanese Government and the Chinese Government being desirous of maintaining the general peace in Eastern Asia and further strengthening the friendly relations and good neighborhood existing between the two nations agree to the following articles:

Article 1. The Chinese Government engages to give full assent to all matters upon which the Japanese Government may hereafter agree with the German Government relating to the disposition of all rights, interests and concessions, which Germany by virtue of treaties or otherwise, possesses in relation to the Province of Shantung.

Article 2. The Chinese Government engages that within the Province of Shantung and along its coast, no territory or island will be ceded or leased to a third Power under any pretext.

Article 3. The Chinese Government consents to Japan's building a railway from Chefoo or Lungkow to join the Kiaochow-Tsinanfu Railway.

Article 4. The Chinese Government engages, in the interest of trade and for the residence of foreigners, to open by herself as soon as possible certain important cities and towns in the

Province of Shantung as Commercial Ports. What places shall be opened are to be jointly decided upon in a separate agreement.

II

The Japanese Government and the Chinese Government, since the Chinese Government has always acknowledged the special position enjoyed by Japan in South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia, agree to the following articles:

Article 1. The two Contracting Parties mutually agree that the term of lease of Port Arthur and Dalny and the term of lease of the South Manchuria Railway and the Antung-Mukden Railway shall be extended to the period of 99 years.

Article 2. Japanese subjects in South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia shall have the right to lease or own land required either for erecting suitable buildings for trade and manufacture or for farming.

Article 3. Japanese subjects shall be free to reside and travel in South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia and to engage in business and in manufacture of any kind whatsoever.

Article 4. The Chinese Government agrees to grant to Japanese subjects the right of opening the mines in South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia. As regards what mines are to be opened, they shall be decided upon jointly.

Article 5. The Chinese Government agrees that in respect of the (two) cases mentioned herein below the Japanese Government's consent shall be first obtained before action is taken:

(*a*) Whenever permission is granted to the subject of a third Power to build a railway or to make a loan with a third Power for the purpose of building a railway in South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia.

(*b*) Whenever a loan is to be made with a third Power pledging the local taxes of South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia as security.

Article 6. The Chinese Government agrees that if the Chinese Government employs political, financial or military advisers or instructors in South Manchuria or Eastern Inner Mongolia, the Japanese Government shall first be consulted.

Article 7. The Chinese Government agrees that the control and management of the Kirin-Changchun Railway shall be handed

over to the Japanese Government for a term of 99 years dating from the signing of this Agreement.

III

The Japanese Government and the Chinese Government, seeing that Japanese financiers and the Hanyehping Co. have close relations with each other at present and desiring that the common interests of the two nations shall be advanced, agree to the following articles:

Article 1. The two Contracting Parties mutually agree that when the opportune moment arrives the Hanyehping Company shall be made a joint concern of the two nations; and they further agree that without the previous consent of Japan, China shall not by her own act dispose of the rights and property of whatsoever nature of the said Company nor cause the said Company to dispose freely of the same.

Article 2. The Chinese Government agrees that all mines in the neighborhood of those owned by the Hanyehping Company shall not be permitted, without the consent of the said Company, to be worked by other persons outside of the said Company; and further agrees that if it is desired to carry out any undertaking which, it is apprehended, may directly or indirectly affect the interests of the said Company, the consent of the said Company shall first be obtained.

IV

The Japanese Government and the Chinese Government with the object of effectively preserving the territorial integrity of China agree to the following special article:

The Chinese Government engages not to cede or lease to a third Power any harbor or bay or island along the coast of China.

V

Article 1. The Chinese Central Government shall employ influential Japanese as advisers in political, financial and military affairs.

Article 2. Japanese hospitals, churches and schools in the interior of China shall be granted the right of owning land.

Article 3. Inasmuch as the Japanese Government and the Chinese Government have had many cases of dispute between

Japanese and Chinese police which caused no little misunderstanding, it is for this reason necessary that the police departments of important places (in China) shall be jointly administered by Japanese and Chinese or that the police departments of these places shall employ numerous Japanese, so that they may at the same time help to plan for the improvement of the Chinese Police Service.

Article 4. China shall purchase from Japan a fixed amount of munitions of war (say 50 per cent or more of what is needed by the Chinese Government) or that there shall be established in China a Sino-Japanese jointly worked arsenal. Japanese technical experts are to be employed and Japanese material to be purchased.

Article 5. China agrees to grant to Japan the right of constructing a railway connecting Wuchang with Kiukiang and Nanchang, another line between Nanchang and Hangchow, and another between Nanchang and Chaochow.

Article 6. If China needs foreign capital to work mines, build railways and construct harbor-works (including dock-yards) in the Province of Fukien, Japan shall be first consulted.

Article 7. China agrees that Japanese subjects shall have the right of missionary propaganda in China.

JAPAN'S REVISED DEMANDS

Japan's Revised Demands on China, Twenty-four in All, Presented April 26, 1915

The revised list of articles is a Chinese translation of the Japanese text. It is hereby declared that when a final decision is reached, there shall be a revision of the wording of the text.

Group I

The Japanese Government and the Chinese Government, being desirous of maintaining the general peace in Eastern Asia and further strengthening the friendly relations and good neighborhood existing between the two nations, agree to the following articles:

Article 1. The Chinese Government engages to give full assent to all matters upon which the Japanese Government may hereafter agree with the German Government, relating to the disposition of all rights, interests and concessions, which Germany, by virtue of treaties or otherwise, possesses in relation to the Province of Shantung.

Article 2. (Changed into an exchange of notes.) The Chinese Government declares that within the Province of Shantung and along its coast no territory or island will be ceded or leased to any Power under any pretext.

Article 3. The Chinese Government consents that as regards the railway to be built by China herself from Chefoo or Lungkow, to connect with the Kiaochow-Tsinanfu Railway, if Germany is willing to abandon the privilege of financing the Chefoo-Weihsien line, China will approach Japanese capitalists to negotiate for a loan.

Article 4. The Chinese Government engages, in the interest of trade and for the residence of foreigners, to open by China

herself as soon as possible certain suitable places in the Province of Shantung as Commercial Ports.

(Supplementary Exchange of Notes.)

The places which ought to be opened are to be chosen, and the regulations are to be drafted, by the Chinese Government, but the Japanese Minister must be consulted before making a decision.

Group II

The Japanese Government and the Chinese Government, with a view to developing their economic relations in South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia, agree to the following articles:

Article 1. The two Contracting Powers mutually agree that the term of lease of Port Arthur and Dalny and the term of the South Manchuria Railway and the Antung-Mukden Railway, shall be extended to 99 years.

(Supplementary exchange of notes.)

The term of lease of Port Arthur and Dalny shall expire in the 86th year of the Republic or 1997. The date for restoring the South Manchuria Railway to China shall fall due in the 91st year of the Republic or 2002. Article 12 in the original South Manchuria Railway Agreement that it may be redeemed by China after 36 years after the traffic is opened is hereby cancelled. The term of the Antung-Mukden Railway shall expire in the 96th year of the Republic or 2007.

Article 2. Japanese subjects in South Manchuria may lease or purchase the necessary land for erecting suitable buildings for trade and manufacture or for prosecuting agricultural enterprises.

Article 3. Japanese subjects shall be free to reside and travel in South Manchuria and to engage in business and manufacture of any kind whatsoever.

Article 3a. The Japanese subjects referred to in the preceding two articles, besides being required to register with the local authorities passports which they must procure under the existing regulations, shall also submit to police laws and ordinances and tax regulations, which are approved by the Japanese Consul. Civil and criminal cases in which the defendants are Japanese shall be tried and adjudicated by the Japanese Consul; those in which the defendants are Chinese shall be tried and adjudicated by Chinese Authorities. In either case an officer can be deputed

to the court to attend the proceedings. But mixed civil cases between Chinese and Japanese relating to land shall be tried and adjudicated by delegates of both nations conjointly, in accordance with Chinese law and local usage. When the judicial system in the said region is completely reformed, all civil and criminal cases concerning Japanese subjects shall be tried entirely by Chinese law courts.

Article 4. (Changed to an exchange of notes.)

The Chinese Government agrees that Japanese subjects shall be permitted forthwith to investigate, select, and then prospect for and open mines at the following places in South Manchuria, apart from those mining areas in which mines are being prospected for or worked; until the Mining Ordinance is definitely settled, methods at present in force shall be followed:

Province of Feng-tien

LOCALITY	DISTRICT	MINERAL
Niu Hsin T'ai	Pen-hsi	Coal
Tien Shih Fu Kou	Pen-hsi	do
Sha Sung Kang	Hai-lung	do
T'ieh Ch'ang	T'ung-hua	do
Nuan Ti T'ang	Chin	do
An Shan Chan region	From Liao-yang to Pen-hsi	Iron

Province of Kirin (Southern Portion)

LOCALITY	DISTRICT	MINERAL
Sha Sung Kang	Ho-lung	C. & I.
Kang Yao	Chi-lin (Kirin)	Coal
Chia P'i Kou	Hua-tien	Gold

Article 5. (Changed to an exchange of notes.)

The Chinese Government declares that China will hereafter provide funds for building railways in South Manchuria; if foreign capital is required the Chinese Government agrees to negotiate for a loan with Japanese capitalists first.

Article 5a. (Changed to an exchange of notes.)

The Chinese Government agrees that hereafter, when a foreign loan is to be made on the security of the taxes of South Manchuria (not including customs and salt revenue on the security

of which loans have already been made by the Central Government), it will negotiate for the loan with Japanese capitalists first.

Article 6. (Changed to an exchange of notes.)

The Chinese Government declares that hereafter if foreign advisers or instructors on political, financial, military or police matters are to be employed in South Manchuria, Japanese will be employed first.

Article 7. The Chinese Government agrees speedily to make a fundamental revision of the Kirin-Changchun Railway Loan Agreement, taking as a standard the provisions in railway loan agreements made heretofore between China and foreign financiers. If, in future, more advantageous terms than those in existing railway loan agreements are granted to foreign financiers, in connection with railway loans, the above agreement shall again be revised in accordance with Japan's wishes.

Chinese Counter-Proposal to Article 7

All existing treaties between China and Japan relating to Manchuria shall, except where otherwise provided for by this Convention, remain in force.

Matters Relating to Eastern Inner Mongolia

1. The Chinese Government agrees that hereafter when a foreign loan is to be made on the security of the taxes of Eastern Inner Mongolia, China must negotiate with the Japanese Government first.

2. The Chinese Government agrees that China will herself provide funds for building the railways in Eastern Inner Mongolia; if foreign capital is required, she must negotiate with the Japanese Government first.

3. The Chinese Government agrees, in the interest of trade and for the residence of foreigners, to open by China herself, as soon as possible, certain places suitable in Eastern Inner Mongolia as Commercial Ports. The places which ought to be opened are to be chosen, and the regulations are to be drafted, by the Chinese Government, but the Japanese Minister must be consulted before making a decision.

4. In the event of Japanese and Chinese desiring jointly to undertake agricultural enterprises and industries incidental thereto, the Chinese Government shall give its permission.

Group III

The relations between Japan and the Hanyehping Company being very intimate, if the interested party of the said Company

comes to an agreement with the Japanese capitalists for coöperation, the Chinese Government shall forthwith give its consent thereto. The Chinese Government further agrees that, without the consent of the Japanese capitalists, China will not convert the Company into a State enterprise, nor confiscate it, nor cause it to borrow and use foreign capital other than Japanese.

Article IV

China to give a pronouncement by herself in accordance with the following principle:

No bay, harbor, or island along the coast of China may be ceded or leased to any Power.

Notes to be Exchanged

A.

As regards the right of financing a railway from Wuchang to connect with the Kiukiang-Nanchang line, the Nanchang-Hangchow railway, and the Nanchang-Chaochow railway, if it is clearly ascertained that other Powers have no objection, China shall grant the said right to Japan.

B.

As regards the right of financing a railway from Wuchang to connect with the Kiukiang-Nanchang railway, a railway from Nanchang to Hangchow and another from Nanchang to Chaochow, the Chinese Government shall not *grant* the said right to any *foreign Power* before Japan comes to an understanding with the other Power which is heretofore *interested* therein.

Notes to be Exchanged

The Chinese Government agrees that no nation whatever is to be permitted to construct, on the coast of Fukien Province, a dockyard, a coaling station for military use, or a naval base; nor to be authorized to set up any other military establishment. The Chinese Government further agrees not to use foreign capital for setting up the above-mentioned construction or establishment.

Mr. Lu, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, stated as follows:

1. The Chinese Government shall, whenever, in future, it considers this step necessary, engage numerous Japanese advisers.

2. Whenever, in future, Japanese subjects desire to lease or purchase land in the interior of China for establishing schools or hospitals, the Chinese Government shall forthwith give its consent thereto.

3. When a suitable opportunity arises in future, the Chinese Government will send military officers to Japan to negotiate with Japanese military authorities the matter of purchasing arms or that of establishing a joint arsenal.

Mr. Hioki, the Japanese Minister, stated as follows:

As relates to the question of the right of missionary propaganda, the same shall be taken up again for negotiation in future.

CHINA'S MEMORANDUM TO THE JAPANESE MINISTER

Memorandum Read by the Minister of Foreign Affairs to Mr. Hioki, the Japanese Minister, at a Conference Held at Wai-chiao Pu, May 1, 1915

The list of demands which the Japanese Government first presented to the Chinese Government consists of five Groups, the first relating to Shantung, the second relating to South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia, the third relating to the Hanyehping Company, the fourth asking for non-alienation of the coast of the country, and the fifth relating to the questions of national advisers, national police, national arms, missionary propaganda, Yangtse Valley railways, and Fukien Province. Out of profound regard for the intentions entertained by Japan, the Chinese Government took these momentous demands into grave and careful consideration and decided to negotiate with the Japanese Government frankly and sincerely what were possible to negotiate. This is a manifestation to Japan of the most profound regard which the Chinese Government entertains for the relations between the two nations.

Ever since the opening of the negotiations China has been doing her best to hasten their progress, holding as many as three conferences a week. As regards the articles in the second group, the Chinese Government, being disposed to allow the Japanese Government to develop the economic relations of the two countries in South Manchuria, realizing that the Japanese Government attaches importance to its interests in that region, and wishing to meet the hopes of Japan, *made a painful effort, without hesitation, to agree to the extension of the 25-year lease of Port Arthur and Dalny, the 36-year period of the South Manchuria railway and the 15-year period of the Antung-Mukden railway, all to 99 years; and to abandon its own cherished hopes to regain control of these places and properties at the expiration of their respective original*

terms of lease. It cannot but oe aamitted that this is a most genuine proof of China's friendship for Japan. As to the rights of opening mines in South Manchuria, the Chinese Government has already agreed to permit Japanese to work mines within the mining areas designated by Japan. China has further agreed to give Japan a right of preference in the event of borrowing foreign capital for building railways or of making a loan on the security of the local taxes in South Manchuria. The question of revising the arrangement for the Kirin-Changchun railway has been settled in accordance with the proposal made by Japan. The Chinese Government has further agreed to employ Japanese first in the event of employing foreign advisers on political militarv financial and police matters.

Furthermore, the provision about tne repurchase period in tne South Manchuria railway was not mentioned in Japan's original proposal. Subsequently, the Japanese Government alleging that its meaning was not clear, asked China to cancel the provision altogether. Again, Japan at first demanded the right of Japanese to carry on farming in South Manchuria, but subsequently she considered the word "farming" was not broad enough and asked to replace it with the phrase "agricultural enterprises." To these requests the Chinese Government, though well aware that the proposed changes could only benefit Japan, still acceded without delay. This, too, is a proof of China's frankness and sincerity toward Japan.

As regards matters relating to Shantung, the Chinese Government has agreed to a majority of the demands.

The question of inland residence in South Manchuria is, in the opinion of the Chinese Government, incompatible with the treaties China has entered into with Japan and other Powers; still the Chinese Government did its best to consider how it was possible to avoid that incompatability. At first, China suggested that the Chinese Authorities should have full rights of jurisdiction over Japanese settlers. Japan declined to agree to it. Thereupon China reconsidered the question and revised her counter-proposal five or six times, each time making some definite concession, and went so far as to agree that all civil and criminal cases between Chinese and Japanese should be arranged according to existing treaties. Only cases relating to land or lease contracts were reserved to be adjudicated by Chinese Courts, as a mark of China's sovereignty over the region. This is another proof of China's readiness to concede as much as possible.

Eastern Inner Mongolia is not an enlightened region as yet and the conditions existing there are entirely different from those prevailing in South Manchuria. The two places, therefore, cannot

be considered in the same light. Accordingly, China agreed to open commercial marts first, in the interests of foreign trade.

The Hanyehping Company mentioned in the third group is entirely a private company, and the Chinese Government is precluded from interfering with it and negotiating with another government to make any disposal of the same as the Government likes, but having regard for the interests of the Japanese capitalists, the Chinese Government agreed that whenever, in future, the said company and the Japanese capitalists should arrive at a satisfactory arrangement for coöperation, China will give her assent thereto. Thus the interests of the Japanese capitalists are amply safeguarded.

Although the demand in the fourth group asking for a declaration not to alienate China's coast is an infringement of her sovereign rights, yet the Chinese Government offered to make a voluntary pronouncement so far as it comports with China's sovereign rights. Thus, it is seen that the Chinese Government, in deference to the wishes of Japan, gave a most serious consideration even to those demands which gravely affect the sovereignty and territorial rights of China as well as the principle of equal opportunity and the treaties with foreign Powers. All this was a painful effort on the part of the Chinese Government to meet the situation—a fact of which the Japanese Government must be aware.

As regards the demands in the fifth group, they all infringe China's sovereignty, the treaty rights of other Powers or the principle of equal opportunity. Although Japan did not indicate any difference between this group and the preceding four in the list which she presented to China in respect of their character, the Chinese Government, in view of their palpably objectionable features, persuaded itself that these could not have been intended by Japan as anything other than Japan's mere advice to China. Accordingly, China has declared from the very beginning that while she entertains the most profound regard for Japan's wishes, she was unable to admit that any of these matters could be made the subject of an understanding with Japan. Much as she desired to pay regard to Japan's wishes, China cannot but respect her own sovereign rights and the existing treaties with other Powers. In order to be rid of the seed for future misunderstanding and to strengthen the basis of friendship, China was constrained to iterate the reasons for refusing to negotiate on any of the articles in the fifth group; yet in view of Japan's wishes China has expressed her readiness to state that no foreign money was borrowed to construct harbor works in Fukien Province. Thus it is clear that China went so far as to seek a solution for Japan

of a question that really did not admit of negotiation. Was there, then, evasion on the part of China?

Now, since the Japanese Government has presented a revised list of demands and declared at the same time that it will restore the leased territory of Kiaochow, the Chinese Government reconsiders the whole question and herewith submits a new reply to the friendly Japanese Government.

In this reply the unsettled articles in the first group are stated again for discussion. As regards the second group, those articles which have already been initialed are omitted. In connection with the question of inland residence the police regulation clause has been revised in a more restrictive sense. As for the trial of cases relating to land and lease contracts the Chinese Government now permits the Japanese Consul to send an officer to attend the proceedings. Of the four demands in connection with that part of Eastern Inner Mongolia which is within the jurisdiction of South Manchuria and the Jehol Intendency, China agrees to three. China, also, agrees to the article relating to the Hanyehping Company as revised by Japan.

It is hoped that the Japanese Government will appreciate the conciliatory spirit of the Chinese Government in making this final concession and forthwith give her assent thereto.

There is one more point. At the beginning of the present negotiations it was mutually agreed to observe secrecy, but unfortunately a few days after the presentation of the demands by Japan an Osaka newspaper published an "Extra" giving the text of the demands. The foreign and the Chinese press has since been paying considerable attention to this question and frequently publishing pro-Chinese or pro-Japanese comments in order to call forth the world's conjecture, a matter which the Chinese Government deeply regrets. The Chinese Government has never carried on any newspaper campaign and the Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs has repeatedly declared it to the Japanese Minister.

In conclusion, the Chinese Government wishes to express its hope that the negotiations now pending between the two countries will soon come to an end and whatever misgivings foreign countries entertain toward the present situation may be quickly dispelled.

CHINA'S REPLY TO JAPAN'S REVISED DEMANDS

China's Reply of May 1, 1915, to the Japanese Revised Demands of April 26, 1915

Group I

The Chinese Government and the Japanese Government, being desirous of maintaining the general peace in Eastern Asia and further strengthening the friendly relations and good neighborhood existing between the two nations, agree to the following articles:

Article 1 The Chinese Government declare that they will give full assent to all matters upon which the Japanese and German Governments may hereafter mutually agree, relating to the disposition of all interests which Germany, by virtue of treaties or recorded cases, possesses in relation to the Province of Shantung.

The Japanese Government declare that when the Chinese Government give their assent to the disposition of interests above referred to, Japan will restore the leased territory of Kiaochow to China; and further recognize the right of the Chinese Government to participate in the negotiations referred to above between Japan and Germany.

Article 2. The Japanese Government consent to be responsible for the indemnification of all losses occasioned by Japan's military operation around the leased territory of Kiaochow. The customs, telegraphs and post-offices within the leased territory of Kiaochow shall, prior to the restoration of the said leased territory to China, be administered as heretofore, for the time being. The railways and telegraph lines erected by Japan for military purposes are to be removed forthwith. The Japanese troops now stationed outside the original leased territory of Kiaochow are now to be withdrawn first; those within the original leased territory are to be withdrawn on the restoration of the said leased territory to China.

Article 3. (Changed into an exchange of notes.)
The Chinese Government declare that within the Province of Shantung and along its coast no territory or island will be ceded or leased to any Power under any pretext.

Article 4. The Chinese Government consent that as regards the railway to be built by China herself from Chefoo or Lungkow to connect with the Kiaochow-Tsinanfu railway, if Germany is willing to abandon the privilege of financing the Chefoo-Weihsien line, China will approach Japanese capitalists for a loan.

Article 5. The Chinese Government engage, in the interest of trade and for the residence of foreigners, to open by herself as soon as possible certain suitable places in the Province of Shantung as Commercial Ports.
(Supplementary Exchange of Notes.)
The places which ought to be opened are to be chosen and the regulations are to be drafted, by the Chinese Government, but the Japanese Minister must be consulted before making a decision.

Article 6. If the Japanese and German Governments are not able to come to a definite agreement in future in their negotiations respecting transfer, etc., this provisional agreement contained in the foregoing articles shall be void.

Group II*

The Chinese Government and the Japanese Government, with a view to developing their economic relations in South Manchuria, agree to the following articles:

Article 2. Japanese subjects in South Manchuria may, by arrangement with the owners, lease land required for erecting suitable buildings for trade and manufacture or for agricultural enterprises.

Article 3. Japanese subjects shall be free to reside and travel in South Manchuria and to engage in business and manufacture of any kind whatsoever.

Article 3a. The Japanese subjects referred to in the preceding two articles, besides being required to register with the local authorities passports, which they must procure under the existing regulations, shall also observe police rules and regulations and

* The six articles which are found in Japan's Revised Demands of April 26, 1915, but omitted herein, are those already initialed by the Chinese Foreign Minister and the Japanese Minister.

pay taxes in the same manner as Chinese. Civil and criminal cases shall be tried and adjudicated by the authorities of the defendant's nationality and an officer can be deputed to attend the proceedings. But all cases purely between Japanese subjects, and mixed cases between Japanese and Chinese, relating to land or disputes arising from lease contracts, shall be tried and adjudicated by Chinese Authorities and the Japanese Consul may also depute an officer to attend the proceedings. When the judicial system in the said Province is completely reformed, all the civil and criminal cases concerning Japanese subjects shall be tried entirely by Chinese law courts.

Relating to Eastern Inner Mongolia

(To be Exchanged by Notes.)

Article 1. The Chinese Government declare that China will not in future pledge the taxes, other than customs and salt revenue, of that part of Eastern Inner Mongolia under the jurisdiction of South Manchuria and Jehol Intendency as security for raising loans.

Article 2. The Chinese Government declare that China will herself provide funds for building the railways in that part of Eastern Inner Mongolia under the jurisdiction of South Manchuria and the Jehol Intendency; if foreign capital is required, China will negotiate with Japanese capitalists first, provided this does not conflict with agreements already concluded with other Powers.

Article 3. The Chinese Government agree, in the interest of trade and for the residence of foreigners, to open by China herself certain suitable places in that part of Eastern Inner Mongolia under the jurisdiction of South Manchuria and the Jehol Intendency, as Commercial Marts.

The regulations for the said Commercial Marts will be made in accordance with those of other Commercial Marts opened by China herself.

Group III

The relations between Japan and the Hanyehping Company being very intimate, if the said Company comes to an agreement with the Japanese capitalists for coöperation, the Chinese Government shall forthwith give their consent thereto. The Chinese Government further declare that China will not convert the Company into a State enterprise, nor confiscate it nor cause it to borrow and use foreign capital other than Japanese.

Letter to be Addressed by the Japanese Minister to the Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs

Excellency:

I have the honor to state that a report has reached me that the Chinese Government have given permission to foreign nations to construct on the coast of Fukien Province dock-yards, coaling stations for military use, naval bases and other establishments for military purposes and further that the Chinese Government are borrowing foreign capital for putting up the above-mentioned constructions or establishments. I shall be much obliged if the Chinese Government will inform me whether or not these reports are well founded in fact.

Reply to be Addressed by the Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs to the Japanese Minister

Excellency:

I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your Excellency's Note of ————————. In reply I beg to state that the Chinese Government have not given permission to foreign Powers to construct, on the coast of Fukien Province, dock-yards, coaling stations for military use, naval bases or other establishments for military purposes; nor do they contemplate borrowing foreign capital for putting up such constructions or establishments.

JAPAN'S ULTIMATUM

Ultimatum Delivered by Japanese Minister to Minister of Foreign Affairs at 3 o'clock p. m. on May 7th, 1915

The reason why the Imperial Government opened the present negotiations with the Chinese Government is first to endeavor to dispose of the complications arising out of the war between Japan and Germany, and secondly, to attempt to solve various questions which are detrimental to the intimate relations of China and Japan with a view to solidifying the foundation of cordial friendship subsisting between the two countries to the end that the peace of the Far East may be effectually and permanently preserved. With this object in view, definite proposals were presented to the Chinese Government in January of this year, and up to to-day as many as twenty-five conferences were held with the Chinese Government in perfect sincerity and frankness.

In the course of the negotiations the Imperial Government has consistently explained the aims and objects of the proposals in a conciliatory spirit, while on the other hand the proposals of the Chinese Government, whether important or unimportant, have been attended to without any reserve.

It may be stated with confidence that no effort has been spared to arrive at a satisfactory and amicable settlement of those questions.

The discussion of the entire corpus of the proposals was practically at an end at the twenty-fourth conference; that is, on 17th of the last month. The Imperial Government, taking a broad view of the negotiations and in consideration of the points raised by the Chinese Government, modified the original proposals with considerable concessions and presented to the Chinese Government on the 26th of the same month the revised proposals for agreement, and at the same time it was offered that, on the acceptance of the revised proposals, the Imperial Government would, at a suitable opportunity, restore with fair and proper conditions, to the Chinese Government the Kiaochow territory, in the acquisition of which the Imperial Government had made a great sacrifice.

On the 1st of May, the Chinese Government delivered the reply to the revised proposals of the Japanese Government, which is contrary to the expectations of the Imperial Government. The

Chinese Government not only did not give a careful consideration to the revised proposals, but even with regard to the offer of the Japanese Government, to restore Kiaochow to the Chinese Government, the latter did not manifest the least appreciation of Japan's good will and difficulties.

From the commercial and military points of view Kiaochow is an important place, in the acquisition of which the Japanese Empire sacrificed much blood and money, and, after the acquisition, the Empire incurs no obligation to restore it to China. But with the object of increasing the future friendly relations of the two countries, she went to the extent of proposing its restoration, yet to her great regret, the Chinese Government did not take into consideration the good intention of Japan and manifest appreciation of her difficulties. Furthermore, the Chinese Government not only ignored the friendly feelings of the Imperial Government offering the restoration of Kiaochow Bay, but also in replying to the revised proposals they even demanded its unconditional restoration; and again China demanded that Japan should bear the responsibility of paying indemnity for all the unavoidable losses and damages resulting from Japan's military operations at Kiaochow; and still further in connection with the territory of Kiaochow China advanced other demands and declared that she has the right of participation at the future peace conference to be held between Japan and Germany. Although China is fully aware that the unconditional restoration of Kiaochow and Japan's responsibility of indemnification for the unavoidable losses and damages can never be tolerated by Japan, yet she purposely advanced these demands and declared that this reply was final and decisive.

Since Japan could not tolerate such demands, the settlement of the other question, however compromising it may be, would not be to her interest. The consequence is that the present reply of the Chinese Government is, on the whole, vague and meaningless.

Furthermore, in the reply of the Chinese Government to the other proposals in the revised list of the Imperial Government, such as South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia, where Japan particularly has geographical, political, commercial, industrial and strategic relations, as recognized by all the nations, and made more remarkable in consequence of the two wars in which Japan was engaged, the Chinese Government overlooks these facts and does not respect Japan's position in that place. The Chinese Government even freely altered those articles which the Imperial Government, in a compromising spirit, have formulated in accordance with the statement of the Chinese Representatives, thereby

making the statements of the Representatives an empty talk; for on seeing them conceding with the one hand and withholding with the other, it is very difficult to attribute faithfulness and sincerity to the Chinese Authorities.

As regards the articles relating to the employment of advisers, the establishment of schools and hospitals, the supply of arms and ammunition and the establishment of arsenals, and railway concessions in South China in the revised proposals, they are either proposed with the proviso that the consent of the Power concerned must first be obtained, or they are merely to be recorded in the minutes in accordance with the statement of the Chinese delegates, and thus they are not in the least in conflict either with Chinese sovereignty or her treaties with the Foreign Powers. *Yet the Chinese Government in their reply to the proposals, alleging that these proposals are incompatible with their sovereign rights and the Treaties with the Foreign Powers, defeat the expectations of the Imperial Government.* In spite of such attitude of the Chinese Government, the Imperial Government, though regretting to see that there is no room for further negotiation, yet warmly attached to the preservation of the peace of the Far East, is still hoping for a satisfactory settlement in order to avoid the disturbance of the relations.

So in spite of the circumstances which admitted no patience, they have reconsidered the feelings of the Government of their neighboring country and with the exception of the article relating to Fukien, which is to be the subject of an exchange of notes as has already been agreed upon by the Representatives of both nations, will undertake to detach the Group V from the present negotiations and discuss it separately in the future. Therefore the Chinese Government should appreciate the friendly feelings of the Imperial Government by immediately accepting without any alteration all the articles of Groups I, II, III and IV and the exchange of notes in connection with Fukien Province in Group V, as contained in the revised proposals presented on the 26th of April.

The Imperial Government hereby again offer their advice and hope that the Chinese Government upon this advice will give a satisfactory reply by 6 o'clock p. m. on the 9th day of May. It is hereby declared that if no satisfactory reply is received before or at the designated time, the Imperial Government will take steps they may deem necessary.

JAPAN'S EXPLANATORY NOTE

Explanatory Note Accompanying Ultimatum Delivered to the Minister of Foreign Affairs by the Japanese Minister on the Seventh Day of May, 1915

1. With the exception of the question of Fukien to be arranged by an exchange of notes, *the five articles postponed for later negotiation* refer to (a) the employment of advisers, (b) the establishment of schools and hospitals, (c) the railway concessions in South China, (d) the supply of arms and ammunition and the establishment of arsenals, (e) the propagation of Buddhism.

2. The acceptance by the Chinese Government of the article relating to Fukien may be either in the form as proposed by the Minister of Japan on the 26th of April or in that contained in the Reply of the Chinese Government of May 1st. Although the Ultimatum calls for the immediate acceptance by China of the modified proposals presented on April 26th, without alteration, yet it should be noted that it merely states the principle and does not apply to this article and articles 4 and 5 of this note.

3. If the Chinese Government accept all the articles as demanded in the Ultimatum the offer of the Japanese Government to restore Kiaochow to China, made on the 26th of April, will still hold good.

4. Article 2 of Group II relating to the lease or purchase of land, the terms "lease" and "purchase" may be replaced by these terms, "temporary lease" and "perpetual lease" or "lease on consultation," which means a long-term lease with its unconditional renewal.

Article 4 of Group II relating to the approval of laws and ordinances and local taxes by the Japanese Consul may form the subject of a secret agreement.

5. The phrase "to consult with the Japanese Government" in connection with questions of pledging the local taxes for raising loans and the loans for construction of railways, in Eastern Inner Mongolia, which is similar to the agreement in Manchuria relating

to the matters of the same kind, may be replaced by the phrase "to consult with the Japanese capitalists."

The article relating to the opening of trade marts in Eastern Inner Mongolia in respect to location and regulations, may, following the precedent set in Shantung, be the subject of an exchange of notes.

6. From the phrase "those interested in the Company" in Group III of the revised list of demands, the words "those interested in" may be deleted.

7. The Japanese version of the Formal Agreement and its annexes shall be the official text or both the Chinese and Japanese shall be official texts.

CHINA'S REPLY TO THE ULTIMATUM

The Reply of the Chinese Government to the Ultimatum of the Japanese Government, Delivered to the Japanese Minister on the 8th of May, 1915

On the 7th of this month, at three o'clock p. m., the Chinese Government received an Ultimatum from the Japanese Government together with an Explanatory Note of seven articles. The Ultimatum concluded with the hope that the Chinese Government up to 6 o'clock p. m. on the 9th of May, will give a satisfactory reply, and "it is hereby declared that if no satisfactory reply is received before or at the designated time, the Japanese Government will take steps they may deem necessary."

The Chinese Government with a view to preserving the peace of the Far East, hereby accepts, with the exception of those five articles of Group V postponed for later negotiation, all the articles of Groups I, II, III and IV, and the exchange of Notes in connection with Fukien Province in Group V, as contained in the revised proposals presented on the 26th of April and in accordance with the Explanatory Note of seven articles accompanying the Ultimatum of the Japanese Government, with the hope that thereby all outstanding questions are settled, so that the cordial relationship between the two countries may be further consolidated. The Japanese Minister is hereby requested to appoint a day to call at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to make the literary improvement of the text and sign the Agreement as soon as possible.

NEW TREATIES AND NOTES

BETWEEN

CHINA AND JAPAN

(Signed at Peking, May 25, 1915; ratifications exchanged at Tokyo, June 8, 1915)

(A) TREATY RESPECTING THE PROVINCE OF SHANTUNG

Article 1. The Chinese Government agrees to give full assent to all matters upon which the Japanese Government may hereafter agree with the German Government relating to the disposition of all rights, interests and concessions which Germany, by virtue of treaties or otherwise, possesses in relation to the Province of Shantung.

Article 2. The Chinese Government agrees that as regards the railway to be built by China herself from Chefoo or Lungkow to connect with the Kiaochow-Tsinanfu Railway, if Germany abandons the privilege of financing the Chefoo-Weihsien line, China will approach Japanese capitalists to negotiate for a loan.

Article 3. The Chinese Government agrees in the interest of trade and for the residence of foreigners, to open by China herself, as soon as possible, certain suitable places in the Province of Shantung as Commercial Ports.

Article 4. The present treaty shall come into force on the day of its signature.

The present treaty shall be ratified by His Excellency the President of the Republic of China and His Majesty the Emperor of Japan, and the ratifications thereof shall be exchanged at Tokyo as soon as possible.

In witness whereof the respective Plenipotentiaries of the High Contracting Parties have signed and sealed the present Treaty, two copies in the Chinese language and two in Japanese.

(Signed) Lou Tseng-tsiang (*Minister of Foreign Affairs*)
Hioki Eki (*Japanese Minister*)

EXCHANGE OF NOTES

(I) Respecting Shantung

(From M. Lou to Dr. Hioki)

Monsieur le Ministre,

In the name of the Chinese Government I have the honor to make the following declaration to your Government:—"Within the Province of Shantung or along its coast no territory or island will be leased or ceded to any foreign Power under any pretext." [1]

(II) Respecting the Opening of Ports

(From M. Lou to Dr. Hioki)

I have the honor to state that the places which ought to be opened as Commercial Ports by China herself, as provided in Article 3 of the Treaty respecting the Province of Shantung signed this day, will be selected and the regulations therefor will be drawn up, by the Chinese Government itself, a decision concerning which will be made after consulting the Minister of Japan.

(III) Respecting the Restoration of Kiaochow Bay

(From Dr. Hioki to M. Lou)

Excellency,

In the name of my Government I have the honor to make the following declaration to the Chinese Government:

When, after the termination of the present war, the leased territory of Kiaochow Bay is completely left to the free disposal of Japan, the Japanese Government will restore the said leased territory to China under the following conditions:

1. The whole of Kiaochow Bay to be opened as a Commercial Port.

[1] The replies to the first notes being merely repetitions, they are here omitted from the text.

2. A concession under the exclusive jurisdiction of Japan to be established at a place designated by the Japanese Government.

3. If the foreign Powers desire it, an international concession may be established.

4. As regards the disposal to be made of the buildings and properties of Germany and the conditions and procedure relating thereto, the Japanese Government and the Chinese Government shall arrange the matter by mutual agreement before the restoration.

(B) TREATY RESPECTING SOUTH MANCHURIA AND EASTERN INNER MONGOLIA

Article 1. The two High Contracting Parties agree that the term of lease of Port Arthur and Dalny and the terms of the South Manchuria Railway and the Antung-Mukden Railway, shall be extended to 99 years.

Article 2. Japanese subjects in South Manchuria may, by negotiation, lease land necessary for erecting suitable buildings for trade and manufacture or for prosecuting agricultural enterprises.

Article 3. Japanese subjects shall be free to reside and travel in South Manchuria and to engage in business and manufacture of any kind whatsoever.

Article 4. In the event of Japanese and Chinese desiring jointly to undertake agricultural enterprises and industries incidental thereto, the Chinese Government may give its permission.

Article 5. The Japanese subjects referred to in the preceding three articles, besides being required to register with the local Authorities passports which they must procure under the existing regulations, shall also submit to the police laws and ordinances and taxation of China.

Civil and criminal cases in which the defendants are Japanese shall be tried and adjudicated by the Japanese Consul; those in which the defendants are Chinese shall be tried and adjudicated by Chinese Authorities. In either case an officer may be deputed to the court to attend the proceedings. But mixed civil cases between Chinese and Japanese relating to land shall be tried and adjudicated by delegates of both nations conjointly in accordance with Chinese law and local usage.

When, in future, the judicial system in the said region is completely reformed, all civil and criminal cases concerning Japanese

subjects shall be tried and adjudicated entirely by Chinese law courts.

Article 6. The Chinese Government agrees, in the interest of trade and for the residence of foreigners, to open by China herself, as soon as possible, certain suitable places in Eastern Inner Mongolia as Commercial Ports.

Article 7. The Chinese Government agrees speedily to make a fundamental revision of the Kirin-Changchun Railway Loan Agreement, taking as a standard the provisions in railway agreements made heretofore between China and foreign financiers.

When, in future, more advantageous terms than those in existing railway loan agreements are granted to foreign financiers in connection with railway loans, the above agreement shall again be revised in accordance with Japan's wishes.

Article 8. All existing treaties between China and Japan relating to Manchuria shall, except where otherwise provided for by this Treaty, remain in force.

Article 9. The present Treaty shall come into force on the date of its signature. The present Treaty shall be ratified, etc.

In witness whereof, etc.

(Signed)

EXCHANGE OF NOTES

(I) Respecting the Lease of Port Arthur, Etc.

(From M. Lou to Dr. Hioki)

I have the honor to state that, respecting the provisions contained in Article 1 of the Treaty relating to South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia, signed this day, the term of lease of Port Arthur and Dalny shall expire in the 86th year of the Republic or 1997. The date for restoring the South Manchuria Railway to China shall fall due in the 91st year of the Republic or 2002. Article 21 in the original South Manchuria Railway Agreement, providing that it may be redeemed by China after 36 years from the day on which the traffic is opened, is hereby cancelled. The term of the Antung-Mukden Railway shall expire in the 96th year of the Republic or 2007.

(II) Respecting the Opening of Ports

(From M. Lou to Dr. Hioki)

I have the honor to state that the places which ought to be opened as Commercial Ports by China herself, as provided in Article 6 of the Treaty respecting South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia signed this day, will be selected, and the regulations therefor will be drawn up, by the Chinese Government itself, a decision concerning which will be made after consulting the Minister of Japan.

(III) Respecting Mining Areas

(From M. Lou to Dr. Hioki)

I have the honor to state that Japanese subjects shall, as soon as possible, investigate and select mines in the mining areas in South Manchuria specified hereinunder, except those being prospected for or worked, and the Chinese Government will then permit them to prospect or work the same; but before the Mining

regulations are definitely settled, the practice at present in force shall be followed.

Fengtien.

LOCALITY	DISTRICT	MINERAL
Niu Hsin T'ai	Pen-hsi	Coal
Tien Shih Fu Kou	"	"
Sha Sung Kang	Hai-lung	"
T'ieh Ch'ang	Tung-hua	"
Nuan Ti T'ang	Chin	"
An Shan Chan region	From Liaoyang to Pen-hsi	Iron
Kirin (Southern portion)		
Sha Sung Kang	Ho-lung	Coal & Iron
Kang Yao	Chi-lin (Kirin)	Coal
Chia P'i Kou	Hua-tien	Gold

(IV) Respecting Railways and Taxes

(From M. Lou to Dr. Hioki)

In the name of my Government,

I have the honor to make the following declaration to your Government:

China will hereafter provide funds for building necessary railways in South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia; if foreign capital is required China may negotiate for a loan with Japanese capitalists first; and further, the Chinese Government, when making a loan in future on the security of the taxes in the abovementioned places (excluding the salt and customs revenues which have already been pledged by the Chinese Central Government) may negotiate for it with Japanese capitalists first.

(V) Respecting the Employment of Advisers

(From M. Lou to Dr. Hioki)

In the name of the Chinese Government I have the honor to make the following declaration to your Government:

Hereafter, if foreign advisers or instructors on political, financial, military or police matters are to be employed in South Manchuria, Japanese may be employed first.

(VI) Respecting "Lease by Negotiation"

(*From Dr. Hioki to M. Lou*)

Excellency,

I have the honor to state that the term *"lease by negotiation,"* contained in Article 2 of the Treaty respecting South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia signed this day, shall be understood to imply a long-term lease of *not more than thirty years and also the possibility of its unconditional renewal.*

(VII) Respecting Police Laws and Ordinances and Taxation

(*From M. Lou to Dr. Hioki*)

I have the honor to state that the Chinese Authorities will notify the Japanese Consul of the police laws and ordinances and the taxation to which Japanese subjects shall submit, according to Article 5 of the Treaty respecting South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia signed this day, so as to come to an understanding with him before their enforcement.

(VIII) Respecting the Postponement of Articles 2, 3, 4 & 5

(*From M. Lou to Dr. Hioki*)

I have the honor to state that, inasmuch as preparations have to be made regarding Articles 2, 3, 4 and 5 of the Treaty respecting South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia signed this day, the Chinese Government proposes that the operation of the said Articles be postponed for a period of three months beginning from the date of the signing of the said Treaty.

I hope your Government will agree to this proposal.

(IX) Respecting the Hanyehping Company

(*From M. Lou to Dr. Hioki*)

I have the honor to state that if in future the Hanyehping Company and the Japanese capitalists agree upon coöperation, the Chinese Government, in view of the intimate relations subsisting between the Japanese capitalists and the said Company, will forthwith give its permission. The Chinese Government further agrees not to confiscate the said Company, nor without the consent of the

Japanese capitalists to convert it into a State enterprise, nor cause it to borrow and use foreign capital other than Japanese.

(X) Respecting the Fukien Question

(From M. Lou to Dr. Hioki)

I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your Excellency's note of this day's date, which I have noted.

In reply I beg to inform you that the Chinese Government hereby declares that it has given no permission to foreign nations to construct, on the coast of Fukien Province, dock-yards, coaling stations for military use, naval bases, or to set up other military establishments; nor does it entertain an intention of borrowing foreign capital for the purpose of setting up the above-mentioned establishments.

APPENDIX B

THE CLAIM OF CHINA FOR DIRECT RESTITUTION TO HERSELF OF THE LEASED TERRITORY OF KIAO-CHOW, THE TSINGTAU-TSINAN RAILWAY AND OTHER GERMAN RIGHTS IN RESPECT OF SHANTUNG PROVINCE

Submitted by the Chinese Delegation to the Preliminary Peace Conference at Paris, February, 1919

A.—Origin and Extent of Germany's Leasehold and Other Rights Respecting Shantung

1. The German Asiatic squadron, in search of a suitable naval base and maritime harbor in the Far East, had made laborious cruises along the Chinese coast and an official German Commission had recommended the Bay of Kiaochow as the most desirable spot, when the killing of two German missionaries in November, 1897, in the interior of Shantung Province, in circumstances beyond the control of the local authorities, afforded the German Government the long-sought pretext for resorting to force in order to attain their object. Four German men-of-war, by order of the Kaiser, landed an expeditionary force on the coast of Kiaochow Bay and forthwith announced their occupation of the territory. In the face of imminent danger from the presence of German troops on Chinese territory, the Chinese Government was constrained to conclude with Germany the Convention of March 6, 1898.

2. It was under this Convention that China set aside a zone of 50 kilometers around the Bay of Kiaochow at high water for the passage of German troops therein at any time, while reserving to herself all rights of sovereignty; and granted to Germany a lease for ninety-nine years of both sides of the entrance to the Bay of Kiaochow with a certain number of islands.

3. Germany obtained under the same Convention the concession to construct two lines of railway in Shantung and to develop mining properties for a distance of 15 kilometers from each side of

these railways. Both the railways and mining enterprises were to be undertaken by Sino-German Companies to be organized for the purpose, and Chinese and German merchants alike might subscribe to their share of stock and appoint directors for their management. Besides, the Chinese Government was made to engage that in all cases where foreign assistance, in personnel, capital or material, might be needed for any purpose whatever within the Province of Shantung, an offer should be made in the first instance to German manufacturers and merchants.

The Tsingtau-Tsinan Railway and branch, 434 kilometers in all, was one of the two lines authorized, financed and constructed by the Schantung Eisenbahn Gesellschaft, founded June 14, 1899, under a charter from the German Government, granted June 1, 1899; and which had made an agreement with the Governor of Shantung, March 21, 1900, covering the detailed regulations relative to the construction and working of this line. It was opened to traffic in June, 1904.

The concession to develop the mining properties as granted by the Convention of March 6, 1898, was taken up by the Schantung Bergbau Gesellschaft, a company which was formed October 10, 1899. The properties developed or in process of development by this company were the Fangtze and Hungshan Collieries and the iron mines near the Ching-lin-chen.

By an agreement of February 5, 1913, the Schantung Bergbau Gesellschaft transferred all its rights and liabilities to the Schantung Eisenbahn Gesellschaft, which thereupon became the owner of the mining properties under consideration as well as the railway.

4. The right of protection of the Tsingtau-Tsinan Railway belonged to China. Article 16 of the Railway Regulations made by the agreement of March 21, 1900, provided:

"If troops are needed, outside the 100 *li* (50 kilometer) zone, they shall be despatched by the Governor of the Province of Shantung. No foreign troops may be employed for this purpose."

Article 26 of the same agreement provided:

"Should the Railway Company apply for soldiers to protect the preparatory work, the construction or the traffic of the railway, the Governor of the Province of Shantung shall at once consider the circumstances and comply with such application."

As regards the protection of the mining properties belonging to the Shantung Mining Company, Article 10 of the Mining Regulations made by the agreement of March 21, 1900, provided:

"If the Company, in the course of prospecting or operating mines, or in course of building mining plants, should request the Governor of Shantung to despatch troops for protection outside the 100 *li* (50 kilometer) zone, he shall, on the receipt of such a

petition and after considering the circumstances, forthwith comply with the request, and despatch an adequate body of troops for the purpose. As regards the amount of contribution which the Company shall pay to these guards, the matter shall be subsequently negotiated. But the Company shall not apply for foreign troops."

In 1900 German troops were sent to and remained in Kaomi and Kiaochow, which are inside the 50 kilometer zone, but outside of the leased territory. Pursuant to a convention concluded November 28, 1905, between the Chinese Governor of Shantung Province and the German Governor of Tsingtau, Germany, however, withdrew the troops to Tsingtau and recognized China's right of policing that section of the railway which lay within the 50 kilometer zone as well as the remaining portion of the line westward and enforcing therein the Chinese police regulations in force in other parts of Shantung Province. A Chinese police station was forthwith established at Kiaochow and the policing of the section within the zone was duly taken over by China.

5. Besides, Germany possessed certain railway loan options in respect of Shantung Province. By an exchange of notes of December 31, 1913, China granted Germany an option to finance and construct and supply materials for two lines of railway, one from Kaomi to a point on the Tientsin-Pukow line, tentatively fixed at Hanchuan, and the other from Tsinan to a point on the Peking-Hankow line between Shunteh and Sinhsiang; while Germany, on her part, relinquished her options in respect of Tehchow-Chenting line and the Yenchow-Kaifeng line, as well as the concession granted in the Convention of March 6, 1898, to build a line through the southern part of Shantung Province; and also agreed to ratify the Mining Areas Delimitation Agreement of July 24, 1911, concluded between the Governor of Shantung Province and the Mining Company. Subsequently by an exchange of notes of June 10, 1914, Germany obtained a loan option on any westward extension of the Tsinan-Shunteh line, on the Chefoo-Weihsien line, and the Tsining-Kaifeng line.

Under the Mining Areas Delimitation Agreement of July 24, 1911, mentioned above, Germany's mining rights in Shantung Province which, according to the Convention of March 6, 1898, extended 15 kilometers or 10 miles on each side of the railways then to be built in the Province, were greatly curtailed. The Shantung Mining Company relinquished under this agreement, all its mining rights except the Tzechuan and Fangtze Collieries and the Ching-lin-chen iron mine. The areas of these three mining properties retained were surveyed and defined with an option for German subjects to supply capital, engineers, materials and machinery, if needed for mining operations within the areas relinquished.

B.—Origin and Extent of Japan's Military Occupation of Shantung

1. Soon after the outbreak of the European War, China proclaimed her neutrality by a Presidential Mandate of August 6, 1914. Two weeks later the Japanese Minister informed the Chinese Government that Japan had delivered an ultimatum to Germany on August 15, advising the immediate withdrawal of German men-of-war and armed vessels of all kinds from Chinese and Japanese waters and the delivery at a date not later than September 15 of the entire leased territory of Kiaochow to the Japanese authorities, with a view to the eventual restoration of the same to China; and asking for an unconditional acceptance of the advice by noon on August 23, 1914. The purpose of this step, as stated in the preamble of the ultimatum, was "to see that causes of disturbance of peace in the Far East are removed and to take steps to protect the general interests of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance." Though not previously consulted, the Chinese Government intimated their desire to join in the contemplated course of action in regard to the leased territory of Kiaochow, and ceased to urge it only when they found it was not favorably entertained. Japan, failing to receive a reply to her ultimatum, declared war on Germany, August 23, 1914.

2. The first contingent of Japanese troops, 20,000 strong, despatched to attack Tsingtau, unexpectedly selected for the purpose of disembarkation the port of Lungkow, which is situated on the northern coast of Shantung Province, 150 miles north of Tsingtau. They landed on September 3. In proceeding across the entire breadth of the peninsula to the destination, Kiaochow, which their advance guards reached on September 14, they deemed it necessary to occupy cities and towns *en route,* to seize the Chinese postal and telegraph offices, and to subject the populace to suffering and hardships, including requisitions of labor and supplies. The British force which coöperated with the Japanese troops in the attack, was landed on the other hand at Laoshan Bay, inside the German leased territory, on September 23; and owing to the fact that the distance which separated Laoshan Bay from Tsingtau was much shorter and the natural obstacles fewer than what the Japanese troops had to encounter in their preliminary advances, it arrived on the scene in time to participate in the first engagement with the Germans.

3. In order to better safeguard the neutrality of her territory, China, when confronted with the presence of Japanese troops in Lungkow, was constrained to declare, on September 3, that the Chinese Government, following the precedent established in the Russo-Japanese War, would not accept responsibility for the passing of belligerent troops or any war operations at Lungkow,

Laichow, and the adjacent districts of Kiaochow Bay, and reconfirmed the strict neutrality of the other parts of China. The Governments of the Powers were informed of this declaration by a note of the same date. At the same time an understanding was reached with the Japanese Government that the special military zone so declared extended from the sea to a point on the railway east of the Weihsien railway station, approximately 100 miles west of Tsingtau, and that the Japanese troops should observe the limits and not encroach westward.

4. Nevertheless, on September 26, a contingent of 400 Japanese troops proceeded to Weihsien and occupied the railway station. On October 3, they compelled the withdrawal of Chinese troops from the vicinity of the railway; and three days later, on October 6, they, notwithstanding the protests of the Chinese Government, went to Tsinan and occupied all the three stations in the city, thereby possessing themselves of the entire line of the railway from Tsingtau to Tsinan. Japanese troops were distributed along the entire line and its employees were gradually replaced by Japanese subjects. The mining properties along the railway were seized in the same period and their exploitation resumed.

Meanwhile the military campaign to invest and capture Tsingtau proceeded until November 7, when the Germans surrendered the city of Tsingtau to the Allied expeditionary force of British and Japanese troops who entered on November 16. The port was opened to trade on January 1, 1915.

5. Seeing that with the complete surrender of the Germans at Tsingtau, hostilities had terminated and the military measures of both belligerents had been abandoned, the Chinese Government requested the withdrawal of Japanese troops from the interior of Shantung to Tsingtau, the removal of the light railway from Lungkow to Chantien, and the taking down of the special telegraph wires attached to the Chinese telegraph poles. Unable to persuade the Japanese Government to accede to their request, but seeing that the exigencies which had compelled them to declare the special military zone had already ceased to exist, the Chinese Government revoked their previous declaration and duly notified the British and Japanese Ministers on January 7, 1915, of the act of revocation. To this communication the Japanese Minister replied in a note of January 9, 1915, stating under instructions from his Government that the act of revocation was "improper, arbitrary, betraying, in fact, want of confidence in international good faith and regardless of friendly relations," and that the Japanese Government would not permit the movements and actions of the Japanese troops in Shantung to be in any way affected by the action of the Chinese Government.

6. After the occupation of Tsingtau and the Bay of Kiaochow, Japan demanded the right to appoint about forty Japanese subjects to the staff of the Chinese Maritime Customs which China had established under the Sino-German agreement of April 17, 1899, as amended December 1, 1905. The Chinese Government did not feel justified in acceding to the proposal, as they had reason to apprehend that its acceptance might disorganize the Customs administration and as, when the Germans were in control, appointments to the staff of the Chinese Customs in Tsingtau had always been made by China. When negotiations were thus pending, General Kamio, under instructions, took possession of the Customs office and seized the archives and other property of the Chinese Customs.

7. The Province of Shantung was in this situation when the Japanese Minister in Peking, to the dismay of China, presented to the President of China on January 18, 1915, the now celebrated Twenty-one Demands, divided into five groups. The first group dealt with the question of Shantung. Negotiations extended into May, when on the 7th of that month the Japanese Government sent an ultimatum to China demanding a satisfactory reply within forty-eight hours. At the same time reports reached Peking of the increase of the Japanese garrisons in Manchuria and Shantung. In the face of these circumstances the Chinese Government had no other course to follow than to yield to the wishes of Japan. China was constrained to sign on May 25, 1915, among other things, a treaty in respect of Shantung Province, accompanied by three sets of notes. The Chinese Government felt compelled to give their consent, however unwillingly, only in order to maintain the peace of the Far East, to spare the Chinese people unnecessary suffering, and to prevent the interests of friendly Powers in China from being imperilled at a time when they were already engaged in an unprecedented struggle against the Central Powers for the vindication of right, liberty, and justice; and because she felt confident, moreover, that the final settlement of this question, as of the other questions dealt with in the agreement made in consequence of the Twenty-one Demands, could be effected only at the Peace Conference.

8. Under an Imperial Ordinance, No. 175, of October 1, 1917, the Japanese Government established a Civil Administration at Tsingtau with branches at Fangtze, Changtien, and Tsinan, all of which three cities are situated along the Railway outside of the leased territory and the 50 kilometer zone. Fangtze, the nearest of the three above-mentioned cities to Tsingtau, is separated from it approximately by a distance of ninety miles. The Fangtze branch of the Japanese Civil Administration has even asserted

jurisdiction in lawsuits between Chinese and has levied taxes on them. The Kiaochow-Tsinan Railway and the mines were also placed under the control of a railways department of the Civil Administration.

9. Public opinion in China, especially in Shantung, became alarmed at the continued presence of the Japanese troops along the railway, extending as it does into the heart of Shantung, and at the establishment of these Japanese bureaux of Civil Administration aiming, in the view of the Chinese people, at the permanent occupation of that Province—one to which their hearts are profoundly attached. They brought such pressure to bear upon the Chinese Government that the latter deemed it advisable to find some means of appeasing their minds until the War was terminated, and until the Peace Conference has met to settle all questions affecting the future peace of the world. Negotiations were opened with the Japanese Government and a preliminary agreement was concluded with them on September 24, 1918, making a loan for the construction of two railways to connect the Tsingtau-Tsinan Railway with the Tientsin-Pukow-Nanking-Shanghai line at Hsuchow and the Peking-Hankow line. In consideration thereof, the Japanese Government, in an exchange of notes, also dated September 24, 1918, agreed, among other things, to withdraw the Japanese troops along the Tsingtau-Tsinan Railway to Tsingtau, except a contingent of them to be stationed at Tsinan, and to abolish the existing Japanese Civil Administration bureaux in Shantung. An advance of twenty million Yen was made, but the final agreement has not to date been signed.

C.—Why China Claims Restitution

1. The leased territory of Kiaochow, including the bay and islands therein, is and has always been an integral part of Chinese territory. The nationality has never been in question. On the contrary, the sovereignty of China over the territory is reserved in the Lease Convention. Besides, the lease to Germany in 1898 originated in an act of aggression on her part, and was granted by China only under coercion in circumstances already described in Part A of this memorandum. The railway and mining rights which Germany possessed in Shantung Province before the War were part of the same grant. Restitution to China of these rights and the leased territory would, therefore, be a mere act of justice to her in consonance with the accepted principle of territorial integrity and of nationality, while return of the same to Germany, or their transfer to any third Power, would be to deny justice to China.

2. The Province of Shantung, of which the leased territory of Kiaochow is a part, and in which the German-built railway, now in Japanese occupation, stretches from Tsingtau to the interior over a distance of 254 miles, contains a population of thirty-eight million inhabitants, who are proud and intensely patriotic. They are part and parcel of the homogeneous Chinese race. They speak and write the same Chinese language, and believe in the same Confucian religion as the Chinese people in the other Provinces of China. They meet every requirement of the principle of nationality; they are indeed the very embodiment of the principle itself. Nor is there any doubt of their earnest desire to free their own Province from the menace of Germany, or of any other Power.

3. Historically, Shantung is the birthplace of China's two greatest sages, Confucius and Mencius, and the cradle of Chinese civilization. It is, in fact, the Holy Land for the Chinese people. Every year thousands of Chinese scholars, pilgrims of Confucianism, travel to Chufou, in the heart of the Province, to do homage to the revered memory of the illustrious sages. The eyes of the entire Chinese people are focussed on this Province which has always played and still plays a very important part in the development of China.

4. The dense population in Shantung Province creates a keen economic competition. To earn a livelihood is a difficult thing for 38,347,000 inhabitants limited to the resources of agriculture in a Province of 35,976 square miles. The population is almost equal to that of France, with a territory, however, only one-quarter as large. It is evident, therefore, that there is no room for the inflow of the surplus population of any foreign Power. The creation of a special sphere of influence or of special interests therein could lead only to the unjustified exploitation of the Chinese inhabitants.

5. Besides, Shantung Province possesses all the elements for the economic domination of North China. Its large population provides a growing market for foreign merchandise, while its rich mineral resources and abundance of raw materials are conducive to the development of industries. More important than these, however, is the fact that the Bay of Kiaochow is destined to be at once the chief outlet for the products of North China and the principal port of entrance for foreign goods destined for the same regions. Kiaochow has indeed been the principal port of Shantung for many centuries. Thither the products of the Province were brought down in a canal built in the year A.D. 1200 and connected with Weihsien, the most important market of the interior. Though Kiaochow itself has ceased to be a maritime town after

the torrents which emptied into the bay had gradually filled the northern part, yet Shantung now possesses the port of Tsingtau which occupied a point on the coast corresponding to the port of Kiaochow. Reinforced by new arteries of trade, including the Tsingtau-Kiaochow-Weihsien-Tsinan Railway, which is connected at the last-mentioned city with the Peking-Tientsin-Nanking-Shanghai system of railways, and being situated on the brink of the Kiaochow Bay which, unlike the Peiho of Tientsin, never freezes, but is well sheltered from the winter winds, the new emporium is in a position to tap the trade of the whole of North China. Nowhere, therefore, is the building up of a foreign sphere of influence more dangerous to international trade and industries: nowhere can the open door policy be upheld with greater advantage to the common interests of all foreign Powers, than in the Province of Shantung; and no country is in a better position to uphold it than China herself.

6. Strategically, the Bay of Kiaochow commands one of the gateways of North China. By the existence of the Tsingtau-Tsinan Railway, which is connected at the latter-mentioned terminal with the railway of Tientsin and Peking, it controls, too, one of the quickest approaches from the sea to the capital of the Chinese Republic, one other being the line of railway commencing from Port Arthur and Dalny to Mukden and thence to Peking. In the interests of her national defense and security, no less on other grounds, the Chinese Government have wished to terminate the German occupation of Tsingtau and Kiaochow Bay, and now that, thanks to the Anglo-Japanese Allied force, Germany has been expelled therefrom, China earnestly desires to retain these strategically vital points in her own hands.

7. Examined from various points of view, the question of the leased territory of Kiaochow with its appurtenant rights is susceptible of only one satisfactory solution. By restoring it to China, together with the railway and other rights, the Peace Conference would be not only redressing a wrong which has been wantonly committed by Germany, but also serving the common interests of all nations in the Far East. The people of Shantung Province are a sensitive people: they resent any foreign penetration looking to political or economic domination of their Province, and they do not always hesitate to manifest their resentment. They resented bitterly the German occupation of Kiaochow Bay and the German penetration into the Province of Shantung. They resent even the present temporary occupation of the leased territory and the railway by a friendly associate and partner in the War, as evidenced by the protests of the Provincial Legislature, of the gentry and of the Chamber of Commerce. And their feeling

is shared by the people in the other Provinces of China. The difficulty with which the Chinese Government have restrained them from manifesting their opposition in a more energetic way than making protests is indicative of their profound feelings on the question. It is felt that non-restitution might give cause to friction not only between China and any foreign Power which was to hold the leased territory, the railway and other rights of Germans, but more particularly between the people of Shantung and the nationals of such a Power. It would be difficult to reconcile it with the declared purpose of the attack on Tsingtau, which was "to secure a firm and enduring peace in Eastern Asia"; nor would it be consonant with the objects of the alliance between Japan and Great Britain, one of which was stated to be "the preservation of the common interests of all Powers in China by insuring the independence and integrity of the Chinese Empire, and the principle of equal opportunities for the commerce and industry of all nations in China."

D.—Why Restitution Should be Direct

In dwelling upon the ground justifying complete restitution to China of the leased territory of Kiaochow, the Tsingtau-Tsinan Railway and other appurtenant rights, the Chinese Government is far from suggesting, still less from apprehending, that Japan, in claiming from Germany the unconditional surrender of the leasehold and the railway rights, would not return the same to China after she had obtained them. On the contrary, China has every confidence in Japan's assurances to her. If emphasis has been laid on the point of complete restoration to China, it has been done only for the purpose of focussing attention on the fundamental justice of such a step.

1. But of this restoration there are two possible modes,—direct restitution to China, and indirect restitution through Japan,—and of the two, the Chinese Government prefers the first course, because, among other reasons, it is a simpler procedure and less likely to give rise to complications. It is preferable to take one step than two, if it leads to the same point of destination. Moreover, the fact that China, participating in the glorious victory of the Allies and Associates, receives direct from Germany the restitution of Tsingtau and other rights of Shantung, will comport to her national dignity and serve to illustrate further the principle of right and justice for which the Allies and Associates have fought the common enemy.

2. In asking for direct restitution the Chinese Government is not unaware of the sacrifices which Japan has made in dislodging

Germany from Tsingtau, nor of the losses she has sustained in life and treasure. For this act of neighborly service so nobly performed by her brave army and navy, the Government and people of China feel sincerely grateful. They feel indebted also to Great Britain for having coöperated in this task at a time of great peril to herself in Europe. Nor are they forgetful of their indebtedness to the troops of the other Allied and Associated Powers who held in check an enemy who might otherwise have easily sent reinforcements to the Far East, thereby prolonging hostilities there. China appreciates these services all the more keenly because her own people in Shantung have suffered and been obliged to undergo sacrifices in connection with the military operations of the allied forces for the capture of Tsingtau. But grateful as China is, she does not feel justified in admitting that her territorial rights could be affected *ipso facto* by a war between other Powers, she not having then entered the War. Furthermore, the sacrifices of Japan could receive no greater or more substantial compensation than in the full attainment of her declared object in the War, namely, the elimination of German menace to the peace of the Far East.

3. Nor are the Chinese Government oblivious of the fact that Japan has been for four years a military occupant of the leased territory, the railway and other rights. But military occupation pending the termination of a war, it is submitted, does not of itself give title to the territory or property occupied. It is in any case only temporary and subject to confirmation or termination at the Peace Conference, where the general interests of all the Allied and Associated Powers in the War are to be considered. In the present case, Japan's military occupation of the leased territory and the railway has, from the day of China's Declaration of War on Germany and Austria-Hungary, been against the rights of China as Associate and partner in the War, and, in the case of the railway, has been against her protests from the very beginning.

4. It is true that on May 25, 1915, China concluded with Japan a treaty in relation to the Shantung Province, the first article of which reads:

"The Chinese Government agrees to give full assent to all matters upon which the Japanese Government may hereafter agree with the German Government relating to the disposition of all rights, interests and concessions which Germany, by virtue of treaties or otherwise, possesses in relation to the Province of Shantung."

It is to be recalled, however, that this treaty, together with another in relation to Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia

and a number of exchanges of notes, was the outcome of the Twenty-one Demands imposed on China by Japan on January 18, 1915, without the least provocation. China reluctantly agreed to it only after having received an ultimatum from Japan calling for a satisfactory reply within forty-eight hours.

Apart from the circumstances under which the treaty was made —circumstances which were most painful to China—it was in the view of the Chinese Government at best merely a temporary arrangement subject to final revision by the Peace Conference, because it dealt primarily with a question which had arisen from the War and which, therefore, could not be satisfactorily settled except at the final Peace Conference. The same view applies to the agreement made more recently in respect of the Kiaochow-Tsinan Railway and other railway concessions formerly granted to Germany.

Moreover, careful examination of the article above-mentioned will reveal the fact that it does not confer on Japan any claim to the leased territory, the railway or the other German rights in Shantung; it merely gives her an assurance of China's assent to all matters relating to the disposition of Germany's rights, interests and concessions which may eventually be agreed on between Japan and Germany. This assurance was clearly subject, however, to the implied condition that China remained neutral throughout the War and, therefore, would be unable to participate in the final Peace Conference. Any other interpretation of this article would have to attribute to Japan an intention which she could not have entertained consistently with her express declaration, as for instance, in her treaty of alliance with Great Britain, of her desire to insure, among other things, the independence of China. For to have denied China the right to declare war, to sit in the Peace Conference and defend her own rights and interests would have meant the denial to her of an essential right accruing from her political independence. China's entry into the War so vitally changed the situation contemplated in the treaty that, on the principle of *rebus sic stantibus,* it ceased to be applicable.

5. Furthermore, since China had expressly stated in her Declaration of War that all treaties, agreements and conventions, heretofore concluded between China and Germany, were abrogated by the existence of the state of war between them, the Lease Convention of March 6, 1898, under which Germany had held the leased territory, the railway and other rights, was necessarily included in the act of abrogation; and all the leasehold rights of Germany might be therefore considered to have reverted in law to the territorial sovereign and original lessor state. In other words, Germany has lost her leasehold rights and now possesses

no rights in relation to Shantung which she can surrender to another Power. If it be contended that the War had not conclusively abrogated the Lease Convention, then Germany, because of an express prohibition in the Convention would be no more competent to transfer the leased territory to a third Power. As regards the railway, the right is expressly reserved to China in the Railway Agreement of March 21, 1900, to buy the line back, implying a prohibition against transfer to a third Power.

In view of the foregoing considerations, the Chinese Government earnestly trust that the Peace Conference will find their claim for direct restitution to China of the leased territory of Kiaochow, the Tsingtau-Tsinan Railway, and other German rights in relation to Shantung Province, as one well founded in law and justice. Full recognition of this claim, they believe, will cause the Government and people of China to feel deeply indebted to the Powers, especially to Japan, for their sense of justice and their spirit of altruism. It will serve at once to strengthen the political independence and territorial integrity of China which, the Chinese Government believe, Japan and other friendly Powers are sincerely desirous of upholding, and to secure, by a new guarantee, the permanent peace of the Far East.

Convention Between China and Germany Respecting the Lease of Kiaochow to Germany, March, 6, 1898

The incidents connected with the Mission in the Prefecture of Tsaochowfu, in Shantung, being now closed, the Imperial Chinese Government consider it advisable to give a special proof of their grateful appreciation of the assistance rendered to them by Germany. The Imperial German and the Imperial Chinese Governments, therefore, inspired by the equal and mutual wish to strengthen the bonds of friendship which unite the two countries, and to develop the commercial relations between the subjects of the two States, have concluded the following separate Convention:

Section I

Lease of Kiaochow

Article 1. His Majesty the Emperor of China, guided by the intention to strengthen the friendly relations between China and Germany, and at the same time to increase the military readiness of the Chinese Empire, engages, while reserving to himself all rights of sovereignty in a zone of 50 kilom. (100 Chinese *li*) surrounding the Bay of Kiaochow at high water, to permit the free

passage of German troops within this zone at any time, also in taking any measures, or issuing any ordinances therein, to previously consult and secure the agreement of the German Government, and especially to place no obstacle in the way of any regulation of the water-courses which may prove to be necessary. His Majesty the Emperor of China, at the same time, reserves to himself the right to station troops within this zone, in agreement with the German Government, and to take other military measures.

Article 2. With the intention of meeting the legitimate desire of His Majesty the German Emperor, that Germany like other Powers should hold a place on the Chinese coast for the repair and equipment of her ships, for the storage of materials and provisions for the same, and for other arrangements connected therewith, His Majesty the Emperor of China leases to Germany, provisionally for ninety-nine years, both sides of the entrance to the Bay of Kiaochow. Germany engages to construct, at a suitable moment, on the territory thus leased fortifications for the protection of the buildings to be constructed there and of the entrance to the harbor.

Article 3. In order to avoid the possibility of conflicts, the Imperial Chinese Government will not exercise rights of administration in the leased territory during the term of the lease, but grants the exercise of the same to Germany, within the following limits:

1. On the northern side of the entrance to the Bay:

The Peninsula bounded to the northeast by a line drawn from the northeastern corner of Potato Island to Laoshan Harbor.

2. On the southern side of the entrance to the Bay:

The Peninsula bounded to the south-west by a line drawn from the south-westernmost point of the Bay lying to the south-west of Chi-po-shan Island in the direction of the To-lo-shan Island.

3. The Island of Chi-po-shan and Potato Island.

4. The whole water area of the Bay up to the highest water-mark at present known.

5. All islands lying seaward from Kiaochow Bay, which may be of importance for its defense, such as To-lo-shan, Cha-lien-chow, etc.

The High Contracting Parties reserve to themselves to delimit more accurately, in accordance with local traditions, the boundaries of the territory leased to Germany and of the 50 kilom. zone round the Bay, by means of Commissioners to be appointed on both sides.

Chinese ships of war and merchant vessels shall enjoy the same privileges in the Bay of Kiaochow as the ships of other nations on friendly terms with Germany; and the entrance, departure

and sojourn of Chinese ships in the Bay shall not be subject to any restrictions other than those which the Imperial German Government, in virtue of the rights of administration over the whole of the water area of the Bay transferred to Germany, may at any time find it necessary to impose with regard to the ships of other nations.

Article 4. Germany engages to construct the necessary navigation signs on the islands and shallows at the entrance of the Bay.

No dues shall be demanded from Chinese ships of war and merchant vessels in the Bay of Kiaochow except those which may be levied upon other vessels for the purpose of maintaining the necessary harbor arrangements and quays.

Article 5. Should Germany at some future time express the wish to return Kiaochow Bay to China before the expiration of the lease, China engages to refund to Germany the expenditure she has incurred at Kiaochow and convey to Germany a more suitable place.

Germany engages at no time to sublet the territory leased from China to another Power.

The Chinese population dwelling in the leased territory shall at all times enjoy the protection of the German Government provided that they behave in conformity to law and order; unless their land is required for other purposes, they may remain there.

If land belonging to Chinese owners is required for any other purpose, the owner will receive compensation.

As regards the reëstablishment of Chinese customs stations which formerly existed outside the leased territory but within the 50 kilom. zone, the Imperial German Government intends to come to an agreement with the Chinese Government for the definite regulations of the customs frontier, and the mode of collecting customs duties in a manner which will safeguard all the interests of China, and proposes to enter into further negotiations on the subject.

Section II

Railways and Mines

Article 1. The Chinese Government sanctions the construction by Germany of two lines of railway in Shantung. The first will run from Kiaochow to Tsinan and the boundary of Shantung Province *via* Weihsien, Tsingchow, Poshan, Tzechuan and Tsowping. The second line will connect Kiaochow with Ichow, whence an extension will be constructed to Tsinan through Lai-wu-hsien. The construction of the line from Tsinan to the boundary of Shantung Province shall not be begun till after the completion of the construc-

tion of the line to Tsinan, so that a further arrangement may be made with a view to effecting a connection with China's own railway system. What places the line from Tsinan to the provincial boundary shall take in *en route* shall be specified in the regulations to be made separately.

Article 2. In order to carry out the above-mentioned railway work a Sino-German Railway Company shall be formed with branches in one or more places, and in this Company both German and Chinese merchants shall be at liberty to raise the capital and appoint directors for the management of the undertaking.

Article 3. All arrangements for the above purposes shall be determined in an additional agreement to be concluded by the High Contracting Parties as soon as possible. China and Germany will settle this matter by themselves, but the Chinese Government will accord favorable treatment to the said Sino-German Railway Company in constructing and operating the above-mentioned lines and extend to them other privileges enjoyed by Sino-Foreign Companies established in other parts of China.

The above article is conceived only in the interests of commerce: it has no other design. Positively no land or territory in the Province of Shantung may be annexed in the construction of the above-mentioned railways.

Article 4. In the vicinity of the railways to be built, within 30 *li* of them, as, for instance, in Weihsien and Po-shan-hsien on the Northern line from Kiaochow to Tsinan and as in Ichowfu and Lai-wu-hsien on the Southern line from Kiaochow *via* Ichow to Tsinan, German merchants are permitted to excavate coal, etc. The necessary work may be undertaken by Chinese and German merchants combining the capital. The mining regulations shall also be subsequently negotiated with care. The Chinese Government will, according to what has been stipulated for in the provision concerning the construction of railways, also accord favorable treatment to the German merchants and workmen, and extend to them other privileges enjoyed by Sino-Foreign Companies established in other parts of China.

This article is also conceived only in the interests of commerce, and has no other design.

Section III

Affairs in the Whole Province of Shantung

If within the Province of Shantung any matters are undertaken for which foreign assistance, whether in personnel, or in capital, or in material, is invited, China agrees that German merchants

concerned shall first be asked whether they wish to undertake the work and provide the materials.

In case the German merchants do not wish to undertake the said work and provide the materials, then as a matter of fairness China will be free to make such other arrangement as suits her convenience.

Ratifications

The above agreement shall be ratified by the Sovereigns of both Contracting States, and the ratifications exchanged in such manner that, after the receipt in Berlin of the Treaty ratified by China, the copy ratified by Germany shall be handed to the Chinese Minister in Berlin.

The foregoing Treaty has been drawn up in four copies, two in German and two in Chinese, and was signed by the Representatives of the two Contracting Parties on the 6th of March, 1898, equal to the 14th day of the 2nd month in the 24th year Kuang-hsu.

(Great Seal of the Tsung-li Ya-men)

LI HUNG-CHANG.

(In Chinese) Imperial Chinese Grand Secretary, Minister of the Tsung-li Ya-men, etc.

BARON VON HEYKING,
Imperial German Minister.

WENG TUNG-HO.

(In Chinese) Grand Secretary, Member of the Council of State, Minister of the Tsung-li Ya-men, etc., etc.

AGREEMENT BETWEEN CHINA AND GERMANY RESPECTING THE KIAO-CHOW-TSINAN RAILWAY REGULATIONS

(March 21, 1900)

His Excellency the Governor of the Province of Shantung, Yuan Shih-k'ai, and His Excellency the Lieutenant-General Yin Chang, upon petition of the Governor of Shantung, especially delegated by Imperial decree to these negotiations, on the one side, and the Managing Board of the Shantung Railway Company at Tsingtau, represented by Mr. H. Hildebrand, a Royal Inspector of Prussian Railways, on the other side, have, in order to prevent agitation and disturbances of any kind in Shantung during the period of building the railway and to maintain friendly relations between the population of the province and the Company, agreed upon the following Railway Regulations with regard to the line of railway between the boundaries of the German leased territory and Tsinanfu, subject to the approval of the Board of Directors of the

Shantung Railway Company in Berlin, and reduced to writing in Chinese and German texts of like tenor.

Article 1. In accordance with Article 4, section 2, of the aforesaid Kiaochow Convention a German-Chinese Railway Company shall be formed, issuing shares to German and Chinese subjects. This company shall for the present be under German management. It shall half-yearly notify the Chiao She Ch'u, at Tsinanfu, of the number of shares purchased by Chinese. As soon as the amount of such shares reached Taels 100,000, the Governor of the Province of Shantung shall delegate a Chinese official for coöperation at the seat of the Company.

Article 2. Should in future branches of the Administration of the Company be established in Shantung, one Chinese official shall be delegated to each one of them.

Article 3. Officials or respectable citizens shall be consulted upon the location of the railway, in order to take as far as possible into consideration the interests of the population. To avoid difficulties in negotiations, these shall be conducted on the Chinese side by Chinese officials delegated by the Governor of Shantung. The technical determination of the location of line shall be left to the Company's engineers. A sketch plan of the line's location, done in a scale of 1:25,000 shall be submitted to the Governor of Shantung for information and only thereafter land may be purchased. The construction of the railway cannot be begun before the land has actually been purchased.

The purchase of land shall be done peacefully and quickly as hitherto, so that the construction of the railway be not delayed by purchasing land or by difficulties arising from disputes with individual owners. To avoid all such difficulties the above-mentioned Chinese officials shall act as mediators when land is purchased and shall settle all disputes eventually arising. The land shall be purchased in an honest way according to the locally customary ruling price.

The Company shall not be allowed to buy more land than necessary for the railway enterprise, and future extension thereof.

Meanwhile the following minima may be purchased:

For stopping points a plot of land 630 m. long and 70 m. wide.

For country stations a plot of land 730 m. long and 100 m. wide.

For small town stations a plot of land 850 m. long and 130 m. wide.

For stations of larger towns the plots of land have to be larger, corresponding to actual importance of the place in question. The land necessary for the supply of earth to construct embankments is not included in the foregoing areas. 1 m. is equal to 2 feet 9.6 inches; 1 foot is equal to 0.338 m.

Article 4. Wherever water courses are met, sufficient flow has to be provided for by building bridges and culverts so that agriculture may suffer no damage.

Article 5. The road is to be located in such a way as not to damage or cut through city walls, fortifications, public edifices and important places.

Article 6. Houses, farmsteads and villages, temples, graves and, above all, high class graveyards belonging to the gentry which are fenced in and planted with trees, shall be avoided by the railway as far as possible. So far as this is impossible the local authorities shall give notice to the owners two months beforehand and settle with them a compensation of an amount enabling them to erect graveyards, etc., of the same condition at another place without sustaining any loss of money.

Article 7. In surveying the land to be purchased the *kung* shall be used as unit. One *kung* is equal to 5 official feet; one foot is equal to 0.338 m. One *mou* is counted to be 360 *kung* or equal to 9,000 square feet.

As to the land tax to be paid by the Shantung Railway Company, the same regulations shall be applied as in force for the most-favored Railway Company in any other place of China.

Article 8. Injuries done to crops during preparatory or construction work are to be made good by the Company according to prices to be settled with the local authorities.

Article 9. The salaries of the assistants placed by the local authorities at the disposition of the Railway at its wish shall be paid by the latter. These salaries shall not be included in the price of the land purchased.

The money for the land is to be paid into the hands of the District-Magistrate, who is responsible for the proper payment to the different owners entitled to receive the money.

The District-Magistrate also has to hand over the title deeds to the Railway Company.

Article 10. The Railway Administration intending to rent houses for offices and residences near the work places shall apply to the District-Magistrate who will make the necessary arrangements with the owners and will on its behalf conclude the contracts.

Article 11. The purchase of material necessary for the construction of the railway shall be transacted in a fair manner and the usual market price shall be paid for the same. If necessary, the intervention of the District-Magistrate shall be applied for.

Article 12. The exchange of different kinds of money shall always be done at the rate ruling on the day.

Article 13. The Railway Company is not permitted to construct without special permission of the Governor of Shantung other

railroads than those mentioned in the Kiaochow Convention, including the branch line to Po-shan-hsien.

Branch lines connecting coal and other mines and places where building or ballasting materials are to be taken, connecting with the main line, may be built without special authorization. It is, however, understood that previous notice of the construction of such lines has to be given to the Governor of Shantung.

Article 14. Foreigners, traveling or doing business in the interior of the Province of Shantung, in order to enjoy better protection, must be provided with passports duly sealed by the proper Chinese and German authorities. Chinese local authorities cannot assume responsibility if such a passport is not produced.

Article 15. German and Chinese employees of the Railway Company are to be provided with certificates attested by the seals of the Railway Administration and of the Local Authorities, in order, when necessary, to prove their official capacity.

The engineers, when surveying, shall be accompanied by an official, delegated by the District-Magistrate. This official shall, if necessary by police-force, render assistance in protecting the property of the Railway Company and the survey poles.

Persons fraudulently pretending to be employees of the Railway Company shall be arrested and punished by the Local Authorities.

Article 16. If troops are needed, outside of the 100 *li* (50 kilometer) zone, they shall be despatched by the Governor of the Province of Shantung. No foreign troops may be employed for this purpose.

The Governor of the Province of Shantung binds himself to take effective measures during the period of surveying, as well as when the railway is under construction or opened for traffic, to prevent any damage being done to it by the mob or by rebels.

Article 17. This railway, having for sole purpose the development of commerce, shall not outside of the 100 *li* zone, be permitted to transport foreign troops and war materials employed by them. In case there should be war between China and a foreign Power and the railway should at the time still be managed by the said Company, then the Company must continue to observe the provision aforementioned. In case certain sections are occupied by the enemy and the Company should lose its power of management, then the provincial authorities will not be responsible for the protection (of the railway).

Article 18. Freightage for foodstuffs and clothing to be distributed amongst the distressed during famines and floods, shall be reduced according to the rules adopted by the railways of Germany, and when troops are despatched to suppress rebellions the

same is to be applied to the fares for soldiers and to the freightage for their war materials.

Article 19. At railway stations, where custom-houses are established, the Railway Administration shall make such arrangements as to assist the Imperial Chinese Customs in collecting the legal dues.

The expenses for the necessary buildings, to be erected upon application of the Customs Administration, are to be refunded by the latter to the Railway Administration according to agreements always to be made beforehand.

Article 20. The natives of towns and villages near the railway shall be as far as possible engaged as workmen and as contractors for the supply of materials.

Article 21. Chinese subjects employed outside the leased territory by the Railway Company in case of contravention of Chinese law are subject to the jurisdiction of the competent District-Magistrate.

The competent District-Magistrate having officially notified the necessity of legal steps against such employees, the Railway Company shall not do anything by which they may evade justice.

Complaints against foreigners are to be dealt with according to the proper laws. In such cases the Railway Company on its part shall make an investigation and take disciplinary proceedings against the offender.

Article 22. The natives of districts where the railway passes through, shall as far as possible be employed at the work and shall be paid for as customary there.

If fights should occur between railway-men and natives, the local official will have the right to arrest and punish the guilty.

The workmen of the railway are absolutely prohibited unwarrantably to enter houses of natives. In case of contravention they will be severely punished.

Article 23. The construction of the railway being completed, foremen and workmen necessary for maintenance and safekeeping of the line are as far as possible to be engaged from amongst the inhabitants of villages and towns near the line in conformity with suggestions made by the elders of these places. These elders will be responsible for the good behavior of those engaged and will furnish them with certificates issued by the District-Magistrate.

Article 24. The railway being open to public traffic, its Administration assumes the responsibility for any loss of life or goods caused by accidents and is liable to pay compensation to wounded or killed persons according to the local custom, and to cover any loss of goods according to detailed regulations to be drawn up and published by the Company.

Likewise the Railway will be held responsible for damage to persons and property by construction trains through its neglect.

Article 25. The safety of the line being endangered by floods, slips of embankments or breakage of bridges, etc., public traffic shall not be reopened before all these difficulties have been removed.

Article 26. Should the Railway Company apply for soldiers to protect the preparatory work, the construction or traffic of the railway, the Governor of the Province of Shantung shall at once consider the circumstances and comply with such application. The amount to be contributed by the Company for the troops despatched shall be the subject of a further understanding.

Article 27. In the German leased territory the rights of sovereignty are safeguarded by the Governor of Tsingtau. In the districts of the remaining part of the Province of Shantung through which the railway is running, the rights of sovereignty are safeguarded by the Governor of the Province of Shantung.

Article 28. It shall be the subject of further agreements when and under what conditions the Chinese Government may in future take over the railway.

The foregoing regulations after being approved shall be notified to the Authorities of Shantung Province and to the officials of the railway. Thereupon they shall be duly observed.

Should it in future be deemed necessary to have alterations made of some of the above regulations or to have drawn up supplementary rules, this can only be done by mutual agreement between the then Governor of the Province of Shantung and the Shantung Railway Company.

This agreement is executed in two exemplars each of which contains a Chinese as well as a German version of like tenor. Each of the contracting parties has received one exemplar.

Tsinanfu, the 21st of March, 1900.

The Governor of the Province of Shantung.
(Seal and Signature) YUAN SHIH-K'AI.

H. I. M.'s Special Delegate, Lieutenant-General.
(Signed) YIN CHANG.

Die Betriebsdirection der Schantung-Eisenbahn-Gesellschaft.
(Signed) H. HILDEBRAND.

CONVENTION BETWEEN CHINA AND GERMANY RESPECTING THE WITHDRAWAL OF GERMAN TROOPS FROM KIAOCHOW AND KAOMI

(November 28th, 1905)

The Emperor of China has appointed Yang Shih-hsiang, Civil and Military Governor of Shantung, and the German Emperor,

Van Semmern, Civil and Military Governor of Kiaochow, who after communicating full powers and finding them in due form have agreed upon the following articles.

Whereas the German Emperor has for the purpose of promoting friendly relations, agreed to withdraw the troops stationed at Kiaochow and Kaomi, the following articles are hereby concluded.

Article 1. The German troops at Kiaochow shall withdraw immediately after this Convention has been signed.

Article 2. One-fourth of the German troops stationed at Kaomi shall withdraw immediately after the signing of this Convention, and another fourth within two months therefrom. The remaining troops shall withdraw within the next two months, during which period barracks and stables shall be so speedily built in Tsingtau that the said troops may withdraw altogether within this said time-limit. But in case the said work cannot be finished within two months, a complete withdrawal shall nevertheless be effected—there shall be no further extension of time.

Article 3. From the date of the signing of this Convention, no matter whether the German troops at Kiaochow and Kaomi have completely withdrawn or not, the railways within the surrounding zone shall completely be under the supervision and protection of the Chinese local authorities and police officers. The police officers shall despatch so many policemen as they deem fit but not more than two hundred and forty, to be evenly stationed at various sections; all matters relating thereto shall be conducted according to the police regulations prevailing beyond the surrounding zone. At some place near the city of Kaomi there shall be established a police office with a police force of not more than 100 men who shall, by turn, attend to their duty in the protection of the railway and in the suppression of disturbances which may arise. But if China should station troops in the said place, all matters relating thereto shall be governed by the Kiaochow Lease Convention.

Article 4. All the works which Germany has constructed in Kiaochow and Kaomi, such as barracks, stables, drill grounds, roads, waterworks, and the like, together with the foundations thereof, houses and the fixtures attached thereto, cost, calculated at their original prices, $496,388.48. From this amount are to be subtracted $5,000 as rent paid by the German Government to the Chinese Government, $21,388.48 expended for annual repairs and considered as representing the annual diminution of the value of the properties, and $70,000 as extra reduction; the net price will then be $400,000, at which the said properties will be purchased by and reverted to China under a separate agreement. The price of the buildings shall be paid off in four instalments within two

years from the day when the barracks at Kiaochow and Kaomi are handed over. After their purchase or reversion, all the buildings shall be reserved for educational and other public uses.

Article 5. In case Germany should, in accordance with the Treaties, require passage for her troops through Kiaochow and Kaomi, and stay there for a few days, a week's notice will be necessary, in order that a vacant place may be assigned for their temporary stay, free of charge.

Of this Convention there shall be made four copies in Chinese and four in German, identical in sense; and after they have been signed, two copies each of the Chinese and German texts shall be filed at the office of the Governor of Shantung, and the other two copies, each of the said two languages, at the office of the Civil and Military Governor of Kiaochow, for reference, transmission and observance.

Thirty-first year of Kuang-hsu, eleventh month, second day, corresponding to the 28th of November, 1905.

(Signed) YANG SHIH-HSIANG.
VAN SEMMERN.

AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE PROVINCIAL AUTHORITIES OF SHANTUNG AND THE SINO-GERMAN MINING COMPANY FOR DELIMITING MINING AREAS IN THE PROVINCE OF SHANTUNG

(July 24, 1911)

For the purpose of defining the mining rights of the Sino-German Company along the railways in Shantung Province and concluding a working arrangement, the Provincial Authorities of Shantung and the Mining Company have mutually agreed upon the following Articles:

Article 1.—1. The Shantung Mining Company reserves for its exclusive exploitation the Fangtze and Tzechuan mining areas and the mining district from Ching-lin-chen along the Kiaochow-Tsinan Railway in a northerly direction for a distance of 30 *li* to Changtien.

2. The Company is to prepare maps showing the boundaries of the mining areas it designates for exclusive development. These maps are to form an important part of this Agreement. All mining properties within the specified areas are to be exclusively exploited by the Company and no Chinese undertakings are permitted therein.

3. With the exception of the delimited areas set aside herein for exclusive development by the Mining Company, all mining rights hitherto granted by China to the Company within 30 *li* (15

kilom.) on both sides of Kiaochow-Tsinan Railroad now in operation, the Tientsin-Pukow Railroad now under construction, and the Kiaochow-Ichow Railroad recently surveyed, are hereby cancelled.

4. Tze-chuan-hsien and Po-shan-hsien being within the 30 *li* zone of mining rights, the Company originally intended to exploit it by itself. Now as an act of special friendship, the Company hereby relinquishes its claim to Poshan mines. The Tzechuan mining area beginning in the south at Ta Kwei Shan, passing Lung-kow-chen in a north-westerly direction and reaching the eastern boundary of Tzechuan, is hereby likewise relinquished to the Chinese for their free exploitation. The remaining areas in this region shall, in accordance with Article 1, belong to the mining areas of the Company.

5. The 30 *li* zone of the Fangtze mining area in Weihsien touches the boundaries of Changlo and Ankiu Hsiens and includes parts thereof. The Company surrenders voluntarily, as a further evidence of good-will, its claim to the north-western district of Ankiu Hsien. It retains, however, its title to Chin-shan-wa mining area in Changlo Hsien to the extent of 10 *li* from Fangtze mine in a straight line.

6. For the purpose of delimiting mining areas the Provincial Authorities of Shantung and the Mining Company have jointly drawn up the following maps:

1. Tzechuan mining area and the mining area from Ching-lin-chen to Changtien.
2. The southern section of the Tzechuan mining area.
3. Mining areas in Weihsien and Changlo Hsien.
4. General map showing all mining areas delimited by this Agreement.

Article 2.—1. Within the mining areas relinquished by the Mining Company in three Hsiens of Changkiu, Tzechuan and Poshan, along the Kiaochow-Tsinan Railway, Chinese are not permitted to undertake the development of the biggest mine therein before the year 1920, but they shall be at liberty to do so after that year.

2. In the mining areas reserved by the Company all Chinese mining shafts that are now in a working condition shall be stopped within one month from the date of formal exchange of the texts of this Agreement duly approved by the Chinese and German Governments.

3. The Chinese Government is still to accord protection to the works of the Company in accordance with the provisions of the Mining Agreement concluded in the 26th year of Kuang-hsu, corresponding to the year 1900 A.D.

4. Should the Chinese Government and merchants be short of capital for the exploitation of mines in the districts relinquished to China by this Agreement, they shall approach German capitalists for loans. If foreign materials and machinery are needed, they shall purchase them from Germany. If foreign engineers are to be employed, they shall engage German engineers.

Article 3. To meet the expenditures hitherto incurred by the Company for prospecting mines, fixing boundaries and purchasing lands, the Chinese Government agrees to pay to the Company $210,000 Mex., the said sum being payable within one year from the date of this Agreement in two instalments. After the signing of this Agreement, the Company shall immediately turn over to the Chinese Government all maps and papers relating to the prospecting of these mines and all lands purchased by the Company.

Article 4. Ching-lin-chen iron mine is to be exploited according to the Mining Regulations of the 26th year of Kuang-hsu (1900). If China desires to establish iron smelting works near the mine a joint-stock company may be formed, with a capital of something like 500,000 taels. Regulations therefor are to be drawn up separately at the proper time.

This Agreement is executed in quadruplicate copies in the Chinese and German languages, found identical in sense, together with four sets of maps of the mines, to be held by the contracting parties.

Third year of Hsuan-tung, 6th month, 29th day, corresponding to the 24th day of July, 1911.

Delimination Commissioners of the Imperial Chinese Government, namely,

(Signed) Su, *Commissioner for the Promotion of Industrial Affairs at Mukden.*

Yu, *Expectant Taotai of Shantung.*

Managing Director of the Sino-German Mining Company.

German Consul-General at Tsinanfu, Shantung.

THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS TO THE DIPLOMATIC REPRESENTATIVES AT PEKING RESPECTING DECLARATION OF WAR ZONE

Peking, September 3rd, 1914.

Your Excellency,

As all the belligerents engaged in the present European War maintain friendly relations with our country, our Government has decided to declare neutrality and maintain the same with all efforts. Reports from the local authorities in the Province of Shantung have repeatedly stated that German troops have been engaged in

military preparations in and near Kiaochow Bay, and that the Japanese and British Allied troops have begun also military operations in Lungkow and in places near Kiaochow Bay and Laichow. It is very unfortunate that Germany, Japan and Great Britain, friends of our country, have committed such altogether unexpected acts within our territory, creating an extraordinary situation analogous to the Russo-Japanese acts of hostility in Liaotung Peninsula in the year of 1904. The only way open to us is to follow that precedent, to declare that so far as concerning Lungkow, Laichow and places adjacent to Kiaochow Bay, within the narrowest possible limits absolutely necessary for military operations of the belligerent troops, our Government will not be wholly responsible as a neutral state; while in all other places within our territory, the Law of Neutrality which has already been promulgated shall remain in full force. However, within the districts as designated above, the administration as well as territorial jurisdiction, the safety of the inhabitants and the functionaries, public and private properties shall be fully respected by the belligerent states.

While the above is communicated to all other belligerent States, I request Your Excellency to have the goodness of transmitting the same to your Government.

(Signed) Sun Pao-chi.

Note from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the Japanese Minister at Peking Protesting Against Violation of Neutrality

Peking, September 27, 1914.

Your Excellency,

A telegram received from the local authorities in the Province of Shantung states that over four hundred Japanese soldiers have arrived at Weihsien and taken possession of the railway station.

When the Japanese and British Allied Troops needed a military passage in order to attack Kiaochow our country was obliged to prescribe a war zone and also declared that Japan and Great Britain should at the same time observe strictly China's neutrality outside the zone. On the 7th of September, a despatch received from your Government stated that your Government understood, with some difficulty, what our Government meant in that declaration. This Ministry further declared that the railroad from Weihsien to Tsinan should be under Chinese protection, and through Your Excellency we requested your Government to issue an order prohibiting your troops from advancing to Weihsien, or to any place west of Weihsien. But now the troops of your country have

forced their way into Weihsien and taken possession of the railway. Considering that the railroad belongs to a Sino-German Corporation, that all the railway stations have also been under Chinese protection, and in none of them has there ever been any German troops, and that Weihsien is in the purely neutral territory, the acts committed by the troops of your country are manifestly contrary to the declaration and in violation of China's neutrality.

Therefore, we request Your Excellency to transmit this note to your Government, and ask your Government to order by telegraph the withdrawal of the troops, and the restoration of the railway stations. Such acts should never be allowed to be repeated again, in order that international good faith, as well as the law of neutrality, be observed.

We wish that you will favor us with a reply.

(Signed) Sun Pao-chi.

First Note from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the Japanese Minister at Peking Protesting Against the Occupation of the Kiaochow-Tsinan Railway

Peking, September 29, 1914.

Your Excellency,

Regarding the occupation of Weihsien by Japanese troops and the violation of China's neutrality, a despatch was sent to your Government, together with a memorandum on the 27th instant. On the 28th, the next day, Your Excellency came to the Ministry and stated that the troops of your country would soon take possession of Kiaochow-Tsinan Railway, whereupon we immediately and emphatically replied that we could not accept the reasons you advanced therefor. As it is a matter of grave importance, I hereby specially make a formal protest.

The Kiaochow-Tsinan Railway has been constructed and operated jointly by Chinese and German capitalists, and this is clearly provided in Section II of the Kiaochow Convention and Article I of the Kiaochow-Tsinan Railway Regulations. It thus becomes clear that the railway is not only the private property of the German merchants, but also partly owned by the Chinese capitalists. To regard this line as the public property of the German Government is, therefore, a fundamental mistake. It is a settled principle that even the public property of a belligerent, while on a neutral territory, cannot be attacked, or taken possession of by the other belligerent, much more so in the present case when the property in question is jointly owned by Chinese and German

capitalists. How can your Government have the least pretext for taking possession of it? It has been a long while since the troops of your country have begun to attack Tsingtau, and the German troops in Tsingtau have been isolated, rendered helpless, and entirely and long ago cut off from communication through the Kiaochow Railway. Not only our Government will never allow the Germans to make use of the line, but it is actually beyond their power to make use of it. Therefore, the contemplated action of your country is decidedly not a case of military necessity.

When the Japanese and British troops directed a joint attack upon Kiaochow Bay, our Government was obliged to prescribe a special zone. But outside of the zone we are determined to maintain strict neutrality, which should be respected by all the belligerents. This has been declared by our Government, and accepted by your Government. As to the protection by our Government of the railway from Weihsien to Tsinanfu, the Ministry also made a special declaration, which was accepted by Your Excellency. Now greatly to our surprise, the troops of your country have, without any justification, occupied the station in Weihsien, and intimated their intention to advance westward, and Your Excellency has even informed the Ministry that they will occupy the whole railway. Our Government is obliged to regard both the contemplated and accomplished acts as contrary to our previous understanding, as a violation of China's neutrality, and as a breach of international law.

Therefore, we make this formal and solemn protest and request, through Your Excellency, your Government for the sake of maintaining international relations to order the troops outside the prescribed area to be withdrawn as soon as possible.

We wish that Your Excellency will favor us with an immediate reply.

(Signed) Sun Pao-chi.

Reply from the Japanese Minister

Peking, October 2, 1914.

Your Excellency,

I have the honor to say that I have duly received your despatches of September 27th and September 29th in which your honorable Ministry made protests regarding the occupation of the Weihsien railway station by the troops of our country. These communications along with the request for your approval, which I made, under instructions from my Government to your honorable Minister in person on September 28th, for the transfer of that part

of the railway between Weihsien and Tsinan to the control and management of my country, were telegraphically sent to my Government. Instructions have now been received from my Government this day, and I have the honor to reproduce the same for your perusal, as follows:

In pursuance of the policy of the Imperial Government to definitely uphold the peace of the entire Far East, and for the purpose of weakening the fundamental influence of Germany in the said region, the Japanese-German War was declared. The War now declared has for its aim not only the attack on the men-of-war and forts of the enemy in the leased territory of the Kiaochow Bay, but also the elimination of the base of German activities in the Far East, which aim has been repeatedly communicated to the Government of China, and we hope, has been clearly understood.

Regarding the Shantung Railway, it was the outcome of the Treaty of lease of the Kiaochow Bay between Germany and China in the year 1898. It was in consequence of this Treaty that Germany secured the right of building this railway, the Company of which is entirely under the control of the German Government, and its nature is public and in no way different from a purely German Company. It is of the same character as the leased territory. This fact is beyond dispute, in view of its origin, the special charter given by the German Government and the way in which the Company draws its funds.

Moreover, a railway from its very nature positively can not be treated one part separately from the other. Although one part of this German-owned railway is situated west of Weihsien, it cannot be held as having changed its character on the ground that a part remains in neutral territory. Besides, the aim of the Imperial Government is not only to overthrow the base possessed by the enemy, but also to cause the control and administration of this indivisible railway to fall into our possession. In view of the War this does not seem to be beyond propriety. It is, therefore, not necessary to secure the approval of the Chinese Government as to the execution of this principle. But in order to avoid misunderstanding, we have made friendly request for approval regardless of the urgency of the situation. It is surprisingly beyond the comprehension of the Imperial Government for the Chinese Government to be suspicious of Japan's every movement. We regret for such a condition.

Regarding the points misunderstood by the Chinese Government as shown in the two documents, we point out as follows:

1. Whether the Shantung Railway is a German railway or a joint-interest railway can be determined substantially by the special permit given by Germany. As to the governmental nature

of the said railway, there can be no doubt in view of what has been said above.

2. If the Shantung Railway cannot be held as being the property of a neutral, how can it be said of our violating neutrality if it is transferred to our control? Now, China in consequence of the delimitation of the war zone, suggests to change simultaneously the nature of the Shantung Railway. The Imperial Government cannot see the reason why China should do so. Furthermore, the question of delimiting the war zone and the question of the nature of the Shantung Railway, as well as its control and administration, are clearly separate questions which cannot be amalgamated into one.

3. Although the Chinese Government holds that under the present condition the Shantung Railway cannot be utilized by the German troops in view of its severance with Tsinan, yet from the attacking troops' point of view, the Railway being immediately behind Tsingtau, and in view of the present situation, it is a serious danger to the military operations to leave a railway owned by the enemy perfectly free. We are, therefore, compelled to secure the railway by all means. Moreover, the Chinese Government has often failed to stop the assistance of the enemy on this railway, of which there are many examples.

4. In the documents the Chinese Government emphatically declared its readiness to protect the railway between Weihsien and Tsinan, which declaration is said to have been agreed to by our Government. The Imperial Government likes to be informed as to what this refers to.

(Signed) Hioki Eki.

Second Note from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the Japanese Minister at Peking Protesting Against the Occupation of the Kiaochow-Tsinan Railway

Peking, October 9th, 1914.

Your Excellency,

I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your despatch dated the 2nd instant, of which I have taken notice. But our Government cannot concur in the explanation made by your Government of the occupation of the Kiaochow-Tsinan Railway.

1. That the Kiaochow-Tsinan Railway is private property is beyond any doubt. In Article 2, Section II, of the Kiaochow Convention, there is the express provision that "in order to carry out the above-mentioned railway construction a Sino-German Company shall be formed"; and in Article 1 of the Regulations made in

1899 respecting the joint construction and maintenance of the Kiaochow-Tsinan Railway, it is stated that the construction and maintenance of the Railway shall be undertaken by a Sino-German Company. All these stipulations show very clearly that the railway is a joint-stock enterprise of Chinese and German merchants. In our despatch to Your Excellency on September 29th, we mentioned the above two points, to which we call Your Excellency's attention; but in your reply we fail to see why no reply was made to these two points. If you wish to ascertain the real and definite nature of that railway—whether it is public or private property—those two points are essential to the solution of the question; and yet they have apparently been disregarded. We really fail to discover any reason for such a disregard.

2. The protection by our Government of the railway from Weihsien to Tsinan is at the same time a matter of our right and duty. The concurrence of your Government on this matter is, strictly speaking, quite unnecessary. It was simply out of extra caution that more than once we made oral declarations to that effect before Your Excellency, and instructed by telegraph our Minister at Tokyo, Mr. Lu Tsung-yu, to make the same declaration to your Government. Since your Government did not express any objection thereto, we have certainly the right to conclude that your Government have tacitly and justly recognized our rights and duty.

3. During the present unfortunate war our Government has acted in accordance with international law and maintained strict neutrality, particularly we have paid special attention to Shantung affairs. Your Government in the above-mentioned reply alleged that our Government was unable to prevent acts contributing to strengthen the position of your enemy from being done on the railway. From such an allegation we strongly dissent; and, as there is no evidence produced, we do not know to what your Government referred.

4. Tsingtau has been isolated and rendered helpless; the Kiaochow-Tsinan Railway has been guarded by our troops and police in the section of 400 *li* west of Weihsien, and by the troops of your country in the other section of 300 *li* east of Weihsien; and, in fact, Tsingtau is so surrounded by besieging troops that no possible assistance can be expected from outside. And yet your Government said that the situation would be extremely dangerous, unless that portion of 400 *li* west of Weihsien was occupied by the troops of your country. In fact, we fail to see where lies the danger.

5. Your country has announced that its declaration of war

against Germany was for the purpose of preserving peace in the Far East. Therefore, only the disarmament of German war-vessels and the restoration of Kiaochow have been proclaimed. We have never heard of the so-called elimination of the base of German activities in the East. But the action sought to be justified in such vague terms has resulted in the violating of China's neutrality, and in the occupation of property within the territory of a friendly nation—property partly owned by neutral merchants. This is entirely inconsistent with the previous declaration of your Government.

Finding the situation extremely regrettable, we are obliged hereby again to make a strong protest in the hope that your Government will, in compliance with our request made in the note of September 29th, withdraw all the troops outside the prescribed area, in conformity with the declared principle and observance of the law of neutrality.

(Signed) Sun Pao-chi.

First Note from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the British and Japanese Ministers at Peking, Notifying the Cancellation of the War Zone

Peking, January 7th, 1915.

Your Excellency,

On September 3rd, 1914, it was communicated to Your Excellency that, as Great Britain, Japan and Germany were making military preparations in and near Kiaochow, Lungkow and Laichow, and as all the belligerents are friends to China, our Government was obliged to follow the precedent established during the Russo-Japanese War, of delimiting a minimum area absolutely necessary for military actions of the troops of both parties to the war, and that so far as the delimited area was concerned, we would not hold ourselves wholly responsible as a neutral State.

Now, as the hostilities have ceased, and all military preparations have been entirely withdrawn, it is clear that there will be no more occasion to use Lungkow or the places near Kiaochow for military actions. It is, therefore, hereby declared that all the previous communications relating to the delimitation of the war zone shall be cancelled, and that the original status of the said area be restored.

Wherefore I request, through you, Your Excellency, that your Government, in order to respect the neutrality of China, withdraw all the troops, if there are still any, from the said area.

(Signed) Sun Pao-chi.

Note from the Japanese Minister at Peking to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Refusing to Recognize the Cancellation of the War Zone

Peking, January 9th, 1915.

Your Excellency,

I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your note of January 7th stating: that as Great Britain, Japan and Germany were making military operations in Kiaochow, Lungkow and Laichow the Chinese Government, acting upon the precedent set during the Russo-Japanese War, has delimited a minimum area necessary for the movement of troops and for the use of the troops of the belligerent States, and that as the hostilities have ceased and the military measures will naturally be all withdrawn, it is clear that there will be no more necessity of using the said area, and therefore all the previous communications relating to delimiting the exceptional area be cancelled, its original status be restored, and the Japanese troops be all withdrawn.

The contents of the above note were immediately reported to our Government, from which a telegraphic instruction has now been received which states:

When your Government brought up the matter in question for diplomatic discussion, the Imperial Government declared that a reply would be given sooner or later, and also courteously gave the reason why the reply was delayed; but your Government has ignored all the diplomatic negotiations in the past and now of a sudden performs an act, improper, arbitrary, betraying, in fact, want of confidence in international good faith and regardless of friendly relations. We cannot acquiesce therein under any circumstance.

The Imperial Government deems it necessary to declare that even if your Government actually cancels the communications concerning the creation of a war zone, the Imperial Government would not permit the movement and actions of their troops within a necessary period to be affected or restricted by such act of cancellation.

The above are my instructions which I have the honor to communicate to Your Excellency's Government.

(Signed) Hioki Eki.

Second Note from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the Japanese Minister at Peking Respecting the Cancellation of the War Zone

Peking, January 16th, 1915.

Your Excellency,

In reply to your note of the 9th of January, I regret to say that there exists much misunderstanding.

When Japan, Great Britain and Germany, friends of China, were making military preparations within Chinese territory, our Government, in view of the extraordinary situation, declared Laichow, Lungkow and places near Kiaochow, within the narrowest possible limits, and absolutely necessary for the operations of the troops of the belligerent States, to be temporarily a special area within which we shall not be responsible as a neutral State. This step was taken with a view to maintaining international friendship on the one hand, and meeting the necessity of the international situation on the other. We made that special declaration because we considered it necessary, and not because we had any agreement to that effect with the belligerent States. As our declaration was an independent act, so now we cancel it in an equally independent way—there being no necessity at all to secure the concurrence of any party. It is really difficult to see how you can consider our declaration to cancel the special area arbitrary or inappropriate. Two months have elapsed since the capture of Tsingtau: the base of German military preparations has been destroyed, the troops of Great Britain have already been, and those of your country gradually, withdrawn. This shows clearly that there is no more military action in the special area, and that the said area ought to be cancelled admits of no doubt. It is just because of our due regard for international confidence and friendship that our Government postponed a formal declaration to cancel what ought to have been cancelled already long ago. Furthermore, within the last two months, we have repeatedly reminded your Government of the desirability of an early withdrawal of your troops so as to effect a restoration of order. Notwithstanding all this, the matter still remains unsettled to-day. The molestation in these localities and the sufferings of the inhabitants, coupled with the fact that the port of Tsingtau has already been opened without any more hindrance, have led our Government to think that time is opportune for cancellation, and to wait any longer would be simply unreasonable; and after careful deliberation, we finally decided to make a declaration to cancel the said prescribed area. So far as international confidence and friendship is concerned, we have nothing to regret on our part. Moreover, at the outbreak of the hostilities, your Government declared the preservation of peace in the Far East to be their object. Now, our declaration to cancel the prescribed zone has also been made out of our sincere belief in and respect for the principle which your Government has been cherishing. That such a declaration should be deemed as tending to impair international confidence and friendship, is really beyond our comprehension.

In short, we prescribed a special area simply because there

existed a special situation created by the acts of the belligerent States. Now, as there is no longer any such special situation, the *raison d'être* for the prescribed area ceases to exist. As efforts have always been made to effect an amicable settlement of affairs between your country and ours, it is our earnest hope that your Government will act upon the principle of preserving peace in the Far East, and of maintaining international confidence and friendship which is really an appropriate and well-meant act—so that there shall be no further misunderstanding and that a state of complete neutrality in the said area should be restored.

We shall be much obliged, if you will be so good as to transmit this reply to your Government.

(Signed) Sun Pao-chi.

China's Declaration of War on Germany and Austria-Hungary

(August 14, 1917)

See text on pp. 300-302, supra, Chapter XVII, on China's Entry into the War.[1]

[1] The Claim, as presented to the Peace Conference, incorporated just before the above Declaration of War, the following documents of Appendix A, *supra*:—Japan's Twenty-one Demands, January 18, 1915; Japan's Ultimatum to China and Explanatory Note; China's Reply to the Ultimatum; Treaties and Exchanges of Notes, May 25, 1915.

Exchange of Notes Between the Chinese Minister at Tokyo and the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs Respecting the Construction of Tsinan-Shunteh and Kaomi-Hsuchow Railways

(From Mr. Chang Tsung-hsiang to Baron Goto)

Tokyo, September 24, 1918.

Monsieur le Ministre,

The Chinese Government have decided to obtain loans from Japanese capitalists for the purpose of constructing as soon as possible the railways connecting points as below set forth. Having received an authorization from my Government, I have the honor to communicate the same to your Government.

1. Between Tsinan and Shunteh;

2. Between Kaomi and Hsuchow.

However, in case the above-mentioned two lines are deemed to be disadvantageous from the point of view of railway enterprise, other suitable lines will be decided upon by consultation.

Should there be no objection to the above propositions it is requested that your Government will proceed forthwith to take the necessary steps to cause Japanese capitalists to agree to enter into negotiations for loans on the same.

A reply to the above communication will be appreciated.

(Signed) Chang Tsung-hsiang.

His Excellency Baron Shimpei Goto, etc.

(*From Baron Goto to Mr. Chang*)

Tokyo, September 24, 1918.

Monsieur le Ministre,

I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of Your Excellency's note of this day's date in which you state that your Government have decided to obtain loans from Japanese capitalists for the purpose of constructing as soon as possible the railways connecting points as below set forth.

1. Between Tsinan and Shunteh;
2. Between Kaomi and Hsuchow.

The Imperial Government acknowledge with pleasure the communication of the Chinese Government, and beg to state in reply that they will proceed forthwith to take the necessary steps to cause Japanese capitalists to agree to enter into negotiations for loans on the same.

(Signed) Shimpei Goto.

His Excellency Chang Tsung-nsiang, etc.

Preliminary Contract Between China and Japan Respecting the Tsinan-Shunteh and Kaomi-Hsuchow Railways

(September 24, 1918)

The full text of the preliminary contract for the Tsinan-Shunteh and Kaomi-Hsuchow railways construction loan is as follows:

For the construction of two railways—one from Tsinan, in the Province of Shantung, to Shunteh, in the Province of Chihli, the other from Kaomi, in the Province of Shantung, to Hsuchow, in the Province of Kiangsu (hereafter called the Two Railways)—the Government of the Republic of China (hereafter called the Government) of the first part, and the Japanese Industrial Bank representing the three banks, the Japanese Industrial Bank, the Taiwan Bank, and the Chosen Bank (hereafter called the Banks) of the second part, hereby make the following preliminary contract as a basis for the conclusion of a formal contract.

Article 1. The Government agrees that to meet all the expenses necessary for the construction of the railway from Tsinan, in the Province of Shantung, to Shunteh, in the Province of Chihli, and that from Kaomi, in the Province of Shantung, to Hsuchow, in the Province of Kiangsu, the Banks shall issue Chinese Government Tsinan-Shunteh Railway Gold Bonds and Kaomi-Hsuchow Railway Gold Bonds (hereafter called bonds of the two railways). But to assure the success of the Tsinan-Shunteh and Kaomi-

Hsuchow lines, if as a railway enterprise the location of the lines should be found to be not advantageous, the Government may arrange with the Banks to change the location of the lines.

Article 2. The Government will soon determine the amount required for the construction and of all other necessary expenses, and secure concurrence of the Banks therefor.

Article 3. The bonds of the two railways shall expire at the end of forty years dating from the day of issue. Repayment shall begin from the eleventh year and be made in accordance with a plan of amortization.

Article 4. As soon as the formal contract shall have been made, the construction work shall begin so that the railroads may be completed in a short time.

Article 5. The Government pledges the following as security for the repayment of the principal and interest on the bonds of the two railways: all properties now belonging or will in the future belong to the Tsinan-Shunteh and Kaomi-Hsuchow railways.

Without the consent of the Banks, the Government shall not pledge away to any other party as security or guarantee any part of the property or its income which at present belongs, or will, in future, belong to Tsinan-Shunteh and Kaomi-Hsuchow railways.

Article 6. The price of issue of the railway bonds, the interest thereon, and the actual amount to be received by the Government shall be agreed upon according to the circumstances at the time of issue, always, however, with a view to the best interests of the Government.

Article 7. Conditions which have not been provided for in the preceding articles shall be decided between the Government and the Banks in common accord.

Article 8. A formal contract for the Tsinan-Shunteh and Kaomi-Hsuchow railway loan shall be based on this preliminary contract, and be made within four months from the date of this contract.

Article 9. On the conclusion of this preliminary contract, the Banks will advance to the Government 20,000,000 Yen in the full amount without any discount whatsoever.

Article 10. The rate of interest on the said advance shall be eight per cent per annum, that is to say, every one hundred Yen shall bear a yearly interest of eight Yen.

Article 11. The said advance shall be paid against the delivery of national treasury notes issued by the Government, according to their actual value.

Article 12. The national treasury notes referred to in the preceding article shall be renewed every six months, and upon each

renewal, the interest thereon for the six months shall be paid to the Banks.

Article 13. After a formal contract for the Tsinan-Shunteh and Kaomi-Hsuchow Railway loan has been made, the Government shall appropriate the proceeds realized from the sale of the above said bonds in payment, by priority, and without delay, of the above advance.

Article 14. The payment of the said advance and of the interest thereon, its repayment, and all other transaction connected therewith, shall be made at Tokyo, Japan.

This preliminary contract is made in two Japanese copies and two Chinese copies; the Government and Banks shall each keep one copy of each language. In case of doubt in interpretation, the Japanese text shall prevail.

The 24th day, 9th month, 7th year of the Republic of China.

(Signed) CHANG TSUNG-HSIANG,
Chinese Minister.
A. ONO,
Vice-President of the Japanese Industrial Bank.

EXCHANGE OF NOTES BETWEEN THE CHINESE MINISTER AT TOKYO AND THE JAPANESE MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS RESPECTING ADJUSTMENT OF QUESTIONS CONCERNING SHANTUNG

(*From Baron Goto to Mr. Chang Tsung-hsiang*)

Tokyo, September 24, 1918.

Monsieur le Ministre,

The Japanese Government, mindful of the amicable relations between our two countries and out of a spirit of friendly coöperation, propose to adjust all the questions relating to Shantung in accordance with the following Articles:

1. Japanese troops along the Kiaochow-Tsinan Railway, except a contingent of them to be stationed at Tsinanfu, shall be withdrawn to Tsing-tau.

2. The Chinese Government may organize a police force to undertake the policing of the Kiaochow-Tsinan Railway.

3. The Kiaochow-Tsinan Railway is to provide a reasonable amount to defray the expenses for the maintenance of the above-mentioned police force.

4. Japanese are to be employed at the headquarters of the above-mentioned police force, at the principal railway stations and at the police training school.

5. Chinese citizens shall be employed by the Kiaochow-Tsinan Railway Administration as part of its staff.

6. The Kiaochow-Tsinan Railway, after its ownership is definitely determined, is to be made a Sino-Japanese joint enterprise.

7. The Civil Administration established by Japan and existing now is to be abolished.

The Japanese Government desire to be advised of the attitude of your Government regarding the above-mentioned proposals.

(Signed) Shimpei Goto.

His Excellency Chang Tsung-hsiang, etc.

(*Reply from Mr. Chang*)

Tokyo, September 24, 1918.

Monsieur le Ministre,

I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of Your Excellency's note stating:

The Japanese Government, mindful of the amicable relations between our two countries and out of a spirit of friendly coöperation, propose to adjust all the questions relating to Shantung in accordance with the following Articles:

(*Quotes Items 1-7 as above.*)

In reply, I have the honor to state that the Chinese Government are pleased to agree to the above-mentioned Articles proposed by the Japanese Government.

(Signed) Chang Tsung-hsiang.

His Excellency Baron Shimpei Goto, etc.

Exchange of Notes Between the Chinese Minister at Tokyo and the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs for Building Four Railroads in Manchuria and Mongolia

(*From Mr. Chang Tsung-hsiang to Baron Goto*)

Tokyo, September 24, 1918.

Monsieur le Ministre,

The Chinese Government have decided to obtain loans from Japanese capitalists for the purpose of building as soon as possible the railways connecting the points as below set forth. Having received an authorization from my Government, I have the honor to communicate the same to your Government.

1. Between Kaiyuan, Hailung and Kirin.
2. Between Changchun and Taonan.
3. Between Taonan and Dalny(?).
4. From a point between Taonan and Jehol to some seaport (this line to be determined in future after an investigation).

Should there be no objection to the above propositions it is requested that your Government will proceed forthwith to take

the necessary steps to cause Japanese capitalists to agree to enter into negotiations for loans on the same.

A reply to the above communication will be appreciated.

(Signed) Chang Tsung-hsiang.

His Excellency Baron Shimpei Goto, etc.

(*Reply from Baron Goto*)

Tokyo, September 24, 1918.

Monsieur le Ministre,

I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of Your Excellency's note in which you state that your Government have decided to obtain loans from Japanese capitalists for the purpose of constructing as soon as possible the railways connecting points as below set forth.

(*Quotes Items 1-4 as above.*)

The Imperial Government acknowledge with pleasure the communication of the Chinese Government, and beg to state in reply that they will promptly take the necessary steps to cause Japanese capitalists to agree to enter into negotiations for loans on the same.

(Signed) Shimpei Goto.

His Excellency Chang Tsung-hsiang, etc.

Preliminary Contract for Loans to Build Four Railroads in Manchuria and Mongolia

The Chinese Government, hereafter called the Government, for the purpose of building four railroads:

1. From Jehol to Taonan.
2. From Changchun to Taonan.
3. From Kirin *via* Hailung to Kaiyuan.
4. From a point between Jehol and Taonan to some point on the sea coast (the said four roads to be hereafter mentioned as the four roads in Manchuria and Mongolia), and as a preparatory measure for a formal contract, hereby concludes with the syndicate represented by the Japanese Industrial Bank and composed of:

1. The Japanese Industrial Bank,
2. The Taiwan Bank,
3. The Chosen Bank,

(hereafter mentioned as the Banks) the following Preliminary Contract.

Article 1. The Government authorizes the afore-mentioned Japanese Banking Syndicate to issue:

1. Chinese Government Jehol-Taonan R. R. Gold Bonds.

2. Chinese Government Changchun-Taonan R. R. Gold Bonds.
3. Chinese Government Kirin-Kaiyuan R. R. Gold Bonds.
4. Chinese Government (name to be determined) R. R. Gold Bonds, (hereafter to be designated as Manchuria-Mongolia Four Railway Bonds) to cover the constructing expenses of the above-mentioned four R. R.

The Government and the Banks shall conjointly determine the point on the Jehol-Taonan R. R. to be connected to some seaport and the route to be taken by the R. R. connecting said point with said seaport.

Article 2. The Government shall determine as soon as possible the constructing and other expenses needed by the Four R. R. and shall obtain the agreement of the Banks in respect thereof.

Article 3. The Gold Bonds of the Four R. R. shall expire at the end of forty years, counting from the date of issue of said bonds.

Beginning with the eleventh year from the date of issue, the repayment of the said bonds shall commence in accordance with a system of amortization.

Article 4. When the Formal Contract for the loan to build the Four R. R. is concluded, the Chinese Government shall conjointly with the Banks decide on an engineering program of construction, and construction shall begin with a view to the speedy completion of the said R. R.

Article 5. As guarantee for the capital and interest of the Gold Bonds, the Government shall pledge to the Banks the present and future property and income of the Four R. R.

Unless with the consent of the Banks the Government shall not pledge the above-mentioned property and income as guarantee or security to any other party.

Article 6. The price of issue, the rate of interest and the actual amount to be received by the Government in respect of the Gold Bonds shall be determined in accordance with the conditions at the time of issue of said bonds, always, however, to the best interests of the Government.

Article 7. The Government and the Banks shall conjointly decide on matters not covered by the above articles.

Article 8. The present Preliminary Contract shall form the basis for a Formal Contract which shall be concluded within four months from the conclusion of the present Preliminary Contract.

Article 9. The Banks, after the conclusion of the Preliminary Contract, shall advance to the Government 20,000,000 Yen to be paid in full and without discount.

Article 10. The interest of the above-mentioned advance shall

be eight per cent per annum, to wit, for every one hundred Yen there shall be eight Yen as annual interest.

Article 11. The above-mentioned advance shall be paid against the delivery of the national treasury notes issued by the Government at their actual value.

Article 12. The said national treasury notes shall be renewed every six months, each time with the payment of six months interest.

Article 13. When the Formal Contract for loans to build the Four R. R. is concluded, the advance shall have priority of repayment from the proceeds of the Gold Bonds.

Article 14. The payment of both the interest and the advance and other transactions connected therewith shall take place in Tokyo.

Copies of this Preliminary Contract shall be prepared in both the Chinese and Japanese languages, two copies in each language. The Government and the Banks shall each be furnished with two copies, one in each language.

In case of disagreement in the interpretation of the Preliminary Contract the Japanese language shall prevail.

Done this Twenty-eighth day of the Ninth Month of the Seventh Year of the Republic of China.

This Twenty-eighth day of the Ninth Month of the Seventh Year of the Reign of Taisho of the Imperial Government of Japan.

(Signed) CHANG TSUNG-HSIANG.
Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of the Republic of China to Japan.

A. ONO,
Vice-President of the Japanese Industrial Bank.

APPENDIX C

QUESTIONS FOR READJUSTMENT SUBMITTED BY CHINA TO THE PEACE CONFERENCE AT PARIS, APRIL, 1919

Introductory

Since the beginning of the present century, and especially since the Revolution of 1911 which resulted in establishing a Republican Régime in place of the old imperial autocracy, China has made remarkable progress in the political as well as in the administrative and economic fields.

Her free development has, however, been greatly retarded by a number of hindrances of international nature. Of these hindrances, some are the legacies of the past, due to circumstances which do not exist now, while others arise from recent abuses which are not justifiable in equity or in law. Their maintenance would perpetuate the causes of difficulties, frictions and discords. As the Peace Conference seeks to base the structure of a new world upon the principles of justice, equality and respect for the sovereignty of nations, as embodied in President Wilson's Fourteen Points and accepted by all the Allied and Associated Powers, its work would remain incomplete if it should allow the germs of future conflicts to subsist in the Far East.

The Chinese Delegation have, therefore, the honor to submit the present memorandum dealing with questions which require readjustment so that all hindrances to China's free development be removed in conformity with the principles of territorial integrity, political independence and economic autonomy which appertain to every sovereign State.

I. Renunciation of the Spheres of Influence or Interest

The Chinese Government, in their desire to expedite China's economic development, have sought to extend to all nations alike the opportunities for trade and investment which China offers by reason of her large population and rich resources. In this effort

they have encountered obstacles in the so-called spheres of influence or interest claimed by certain Powers having interests in China. The idea underlying the claims seems to be that within the sphere of influence or interest the Powers claiming it should be entitled to enjoy reserved territorial advantages or preferential or exclusive rights and privileges of trade and investment.

It was Germany who first claimed a sphere of influence or interest over the Province of Shantung, and later other Powers, apparently out of a desire to maintain the balance of power in the Far East, advanced similar claims in regard to other parts of the territory of China.

The claims of foreign Powers for spheres of influence or interest in China are either based upon agreements between themselves to which China is not a party, such as the Agreement of September 2, 1898, relating to railway construction, concluded between British and German banking groups and sanctioned by their respective Governments, and the Anglo-Russian Convention of April 28, 1899, concerning their respective railway interests in China; or based upon treaties or agreements made with China under circumstances precluding the free exercise of her will, such as the so-called non-alienation agreements made during the period known as that of the "Battle of Concessions," the Convention with Germany for the lease of Kiaochow of March 6, 1898, and the Treaties and Notes of May 25, 1915, made with Japan in consequence of the latter's Twenty-one Demands on China.

The policy of claiming spheres of influence or interest in China appears unjustifiable for several reasons. In the first place, it hampers rather than helps China's economic development. It appears to be conceived to serve the interests of none but those of the Power in whose favor the claim is advanced. It looks upon a particular province or provinces of China as a preserve for exclusive exploitation by its own citizens or subjects without regard to the economic needs of the Chinese people. It restricts the natural flow of surplus capital, denies the freedom of selection in the purchase of materials and in the employment of technical experts, and seeks to check the operation of the principle of supply and demand. There have been several instances of one nation or another who was unable itself to supply the necessary capital or the proper men for a particular enterprise in a region it claims for its sphere of influence or interest and yet who refused to allow the enterprise either financed or carried out by other nations who could supply both the money and the men.

In the second place, it prejudices the common interests of other nations, vitiating the principle of equal opportunity for the commerce and industry of all nations. Instead of sharing the advan-

tages and opportunities with other Powers on a footing of equality, that Power which claims a sphere of influence or interest over a given region and enjoys exclusive or preferential rights and privileges therein, whether for building railroads, opening mines or financing other industrial enterprises, usually gains ascendency and gradually gathers in its hands all the elements for economic domination over that region.

But a graver objection to the claims for spheres of influence or interest lies in the fact that the claim of one nation always leads to similar claims by other nations over other parts of China's territory. Insistence on the claims for spheres of influence or interest in China can only lead, in the ultimate result, not to a unified and coördinated process of economic development of whole China, but rather to the building-up within her domain of a number of rival economic areas, threatening her territorial integrity and political independence, as well as giving rise to international jealousy and friction and thereby jeopardizing the peace of the Far East. The true interests of the world as well as the national welfare of China appear to call for the renunciation by the Powers concerned of their claims for spheres of influence or interest in China, spheres which constitute veritable "economic barriers" to the application of the generally accepted principle of equal opportunity for the commerce and industry of all nations, and which tend to foster "economic antagonisms" most susceptible to transformation into elements of serious international discord.

In view of the foregoing considerations, the Chinese Government hope that the interested Powers will, out of their sincere regard for the sovereign rights of China and the common interests of all nations having trade relations with her, make a declaration, each for itself, to the effect that they have not any sphere of influence or interest in the Republic of China, nor intend to claim any; and that they are prepared to undertake a revision of such treaties, agreements, notes or contracts previously concluded with her as have conferred, or may be construed to have conferred, on them, respectively, reserved territorial advantages or preferential rights or privileges to create spheres of influence or interest impairing the sovereign rights of China.

II. Withdrawal of Foreign Troops and Police

The presence of foreign troops and police in Chinese territory other than those in the leased territories and in the foreign settlements and concessions, which have been dealt with in the memorandum on these two subjects, has been a matter of increasing concern to the Chinese Government. To present the situation clearly, it is desirable to discuss the question under two separate headings.

(I) *Foreign Troops in China*

A. Origin of their Presence

They are of two classes: (1) those who remain in China under the sanction of treaty and (2) those whose presence is unwarranted.

(1) In their note of December 22, 1900, communicating to the Chinese Government the peace terms consequent on the Boxer Uprising, the foreign Powers demanded, among other things, "the right of each Power to maintain a permanent guard in the quarter for the defense of its Legation." This right was granted in China's reply of January 16, 1901, and confirmed in the final protocol of September 7, 1901. In the same instrument there was granted to the Powers, signatories thereof, "the right of occupying certain points to be determined by agreement between them for keeping the communication free between the Capital and the sea." For this purpose a number of points along the Peking-Mukden Railway were specified for occupation by foreign troops. All the foreign Powers, signatories of the Protocol of 1901, except Spain, have stationed troops at one or more of these points, these Powers being Austria-Hungary, Belgium, France, Germany, Great Britain, Holland, Italy, Japan, Russia and the United States. The total number of these foreign troops fluctuated before the War around 9,000. While the troops of some of the Powers were withdrawn after the outbreak of the War in 1914, and while the German and Austrian troops were interned by China on the rupture of diplomatic relations with the Central Powers, those of the other Powers still remain.

(2) Foreign troops are present also in several other places in China, and these, unlike the Legation guards and the troops stationed along the Peking-Mukden Railway, remain on Chinese soil, not by sanction of treaty, but against the repeated protests of the Chinese Government.

(a) In Manchuria there are stationed Japanese and Russian troops. While the Chinese Eastern Railway Agreement of 1896 between China and the Russo-Chinese Bank provided in Article V that the Chinese Government "will take measures for the protection of the line and the men employed thereon," the Russian Government, in its subsequent charter to the Chinese Eastern Railway Company, stated that "the preservation of law and order on the lands assigned to the railway and its appurtenances shall be confided to police agents appointed by the Company," and that "the Company shall for this purpose draw up and establish police regulations." Under these provisions, railway guards were maintained by the Company. In the course of constructing the line, however, Russia despatched troops to Manchuria, on the pretext of pro-

tecting the railway. The outbreak of Boxers in Northern China gave her occasion to increase her military forces in Manchuria. Her troops occupied Newchuang, Mukden and all the important points along the Chinese Eastern Railway. Although by her agreement of April 8, 1902, with China, Russia undertook to effect a complete withdrawal of all her troops within a stipulated period, she refused to carry out her undertaking fully. Instead she merely moved her troops into the territory occupied by the Railway Company and, in addition, occupied ports at the mouth of the Liao River and the towns of Feng-hwang-cheng and Antung. Then followed the fruitless Russo-Japanese War, which was fought on the soil of Manchuria.

By the Treaty of Portsmouth concluding the war, Russia transferred to Japan the railway from Port Arthur to Changchun. Although in Article III of the Treaty Japan and Russia mutually engaged to evacuate Manchuria completely and simultaneously except the leased territory of Liaotung Peninsula, the contracting parties, in an additional article, reserved "to themselves the right to maintain guards to protect their respective railway lines in Manchuria," the number of such guards not to "exceed fifteen per kilometer, and within that maximum number the commanders of the Japanese and Russian Armies" to fix, by common accord, "the number of such guards to be employed as small as possible while having in view the actual requirements." Thus the Japanese troops and guards came to be stationed along the now called South Manchurian Railway.

While China, by the Agreement of December 22, 1905, with Japan, agreed to the transfer from Russia to Japan of the leasehold rights, railway privileges and mining concessions which Russia had enjoyed before the Russo-Japanese War, the provisions of the said additional article relating to the stationing of railway guards, were not assented to by China.

On the contrary, in Article II of the Agreement China expressed an earnest desire "to have the Japanese and Russian troops and railway guards in Manchuria withdrawn as soon as possible," and the Japanese Government, "in the event of Russia agreeing to the withdrawal of her railway guards, or in case other proper measures are agreed to between China and Russia, consent to take similar steps accordingly." These railway guards have not been withdrawn. While the Chinese troops have, since the outbreak of political disturbance in Russia, taken the place of the Russian guards in the protection of the Chinese Eastern Railway and the line from Harbin to Changchun, the Japanese railway guards along the South Manchurian Railway and the railway from Mukden to Antung still remain.

(b) Since 1909 the Japanese Government have stationed some troops at their Consulates in such places as Liu-tow-kow, in the Province of Fengtien, and Yenki, in the Province of Kirin, and beginning with 1911 the Russians, following the Japanese precedent, also put military guards at their Consulates at such places as Kirin and Yenki.

(c) On the outbreak of the Revolution in China in the autumn of 1911, Japan despatched a battalion of about 600 men to Hankow, 800 miles up the Yangtze River, on the ground of protecting Japanese residents in that city. These have been stationed quite outside of the treaty-port limits and have at times numbered as many as 1,500. Notwithstanding the repeated requests of the Chinese Government for their withdrawal, these troops still remain. They are equipped with a company of machine guns and now quartered in barracks specially built since, capable of holding 2,500 men and provided with a wireless station.

(d) There are also Japanese troops at Liaoyuan, on the border of Inner Mongolia. These were first sent there in 1914. In August of that year a party of Chinese police were engaged in a fight against the bandits in Changtu, far away in the interior of Manchuria. A company of Japanese troops came to pass by the place, and mistaking the Chinese police to be firing against them, opened fire, killing three policemen and a Chinese passer-by, besides wounding ten others. Two Japanese were also wounded, but it could not be ascertained whether the wounds were inflicted by the police or by the bandits. On being apprised of this incident, the Japanese Consul despatched troops to Liaoyuan. Although the incident was considered closed by China granting redress which included the punishment of the policemen, reprimand of the police officers and an indemnity of $12,000, the Japanese troops have not yet been withdrawn.

(e) After the outbreak of the War in Europe in 1914, Japan declared war on Germany and proceeded to attack Tsingtau. For this purpose she landed troops at Lungkow, 150 miles north of their destination. These Japanese forces, on the pretext of military necessity, seized the entire railway from Tsingtau to Tsinan in the heart of the Province, occupied all the important stations on the line, and compelled Chinese troops to withdraw from its vicinity. Although the military operations entirely ceased in November, 1914, and Tsingtau was reopened to trade on January 1, 1915, the Japanese troops have remained in the Province against the protests of the Chinese Government. About 2,200 Japanese troops are stationed along the railway.

(f) At Kashgar in the Province of Sinkiang, formerly known as Chinese Turkestan, Great Britain in the year 1896 established a

postal agency with several messengers for carrying despatches between this place and India. Five years later the Russians also established a postal agency in the same place protected by over ten mounted guards. Since 1900 the number of Russian troops was raised to 150. In 1918 Great Britain despatched 30 Indian soldiers to this city, stating that they were intended for the protection of the British Consulate there.

B. Reasons for Withdrawal

1. (a) With reference to the foreign troops stationed in China by sanction of the Protocol of 1901, the Chinese Government believe that the necessity of their presence has ceased to exist. That Protocol was a sequel to the Boxer outbreak, and the provisions for the stationing of troops were inspired by the conditions which had then lately prevailed in Northern China. Those conditions have disappeared. The respect of the Chinese for foreign lives and property in recent years has been striking and beyond criticism, even in time of internal disturbance.

(b) The presence of the Legation guards and foreign troops between the Capital and the sea also does violence to the sense of pride of the Chinese people, in that they are a standing derogation of China's sovereignty. In the same light must be viewed the existence of the special quarters occupied by the foreign Legations, which "shall be considered as one specially reserved for their use and placed under their exclusive control, in which the Chinese shall not have the right to reside and which may be made defensible." Such an area finds no parallel in other capitals of the world.

(c) The stationing of these international garrisons gives rise to incidents disturbing the peace and order of the localities in which they are stationed. Not infrequently troops of one Power quarrel with those of another. Such incidents, while not always grave in nature, have often given cause for anxiety on the part of the Chinese authorities.

2. While the foregoing observations apply equally to the foreign troops who are present in Chinese territory without legal justification, there are additional reasons for urging the withdrawal of these troops:

(a) The presence of foreign troops in Chinese territory jeopardizes the amicable relations among foreign Powers themselves. It will be recalled, as an illustration, that the presence and the continual massing of Russian troops on the Mongolian frontier and in Manchuria in 1900 rapidly estranged Japan from Russia, and it was the latter's refusal to withdraw her troops from Manchuria which brought on the Russo-Japanese War.

(b) It also disturbs the friendly relations between China and the Power stationing troops in her territory. That such is the case can be seen from a number of unfortunate incidents which have occurred between the Japanese troops in China and the Chinese people, but of which perhaps only a few need be cited here.

(1) The case in 1913 of Colonel Nesimori of the Japanese troops stationed at Hankow, who attempted to force his way into the headquarters of the second division of the Chinese Army stationed in the same city and who, when asked by the sentinel to leave, seriously wounded the latter by stabbing him with the sword, caused no little feeling among Chinese military circles.

(2) A more serious case took place in September, 1913, in Changli in the Province of Chihli, wherein a contingent of forty Japanese troops under one officer attacked the Chinese police station, in order to arrest the policeman who had tried to stop certain Japanese soldiers from stealing pears from a Chinese peddler. The officer stabbed the Chinese police captain and his forty men fired three volleys killing four Chinese policemen. The case aroused so much feeling among the Chinese people that the Chinese Government felt obliged to take precautionary measures to prevent the people from taking the law into their own hands.

(3) In September, 1913, in Changchun in the Province of Kirin, a contingent of more than 100 Japanese soldiers proceeded to the headquarters of the third and fourth police districts to search for and arrest the Chinese policemen on the ground that the Chinese police had interfered with a Japanese subject attacking a Chinese peddler.

(4) In August, 1916, a fracas took place between Chinese and Japanese troops in Cheng-chia-tun, in Eastern Inner Mongolia, in which four Chinese and twelve Japanese soldiers were killed and others wounded. This incident was taken by Japan as the occasion for presenting to the Chinese Government a series of demands, some of which were highly prejudicial to China's sovereign rights and jeopardized for five months the amicable relations between China and Japan.

(5) Again, the stationing of Japanese troops in the interior of Shantung Province has given rise to frequent conflicts with the Chinese people thereof and caused no little ill-feeling on their part. In fact it was their unlawful presence in the Province which led to the protest of the Chinese Government, and this was, in turn, seized upon by the Japanese Government as the occasion for presenting the now celebrated Twenty-one Demands in January, 1915, to the detriment of the friendly feelings of the two countries.

In view of the foregoing reasons, the Chinese Government earnestly request (1) that all foreign troops now present in Chinese

territory without legal justification be immediately withdrawn; and (2) that Articles VII and IX of the Protocol of September 7, 1901, be declared cancelled, and that the Legation guards and foreign troops stationed by virtue of these provisions be completely withdrawn within a period of one year from the date when a declaration to this effect is made by the Peace Conference.

(II) *Foreign Police*

Since 1905 the Japanese Government have established and gradually extended police agencies in Manchuria, notwithstanding the repeated protests of the Chinese authorities. The number of such agencies, as reported in 1917 by the local authorities of Fengtien and Kirin Provinces, has reached twenty-seven.

It will be recalled that while foreign police has been established in certain foreign Settlements and Concessions in China under the sanction of treaty or of "land regulations" approved by the Chinese Government, no such privilege has been granted to any foreign Power in other parts of Chinese territory. The establishment of Japanese police agencies in Manchuria has no justification.

The Japanese Government have sought on several occasions to obtain from the Chinese Government the privilege of stationing Japanese police officers in South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia, especially in connection with the Cheng-chia-tun affair in August, 1916. In order to settle this case they demanded, among other things, that China should "agree to the stationing of Japanese police officers in places in South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia where their presence was considered necessary for the protection of Japanese subjects"; and that she should also "agree to the engagement by the officials of South Manchuria of Japanese police officers." This demand was later explained by the Japanese Government on the ground that they considered it necessary to station Japanese police officers in these regions for the control and protection of their own subjects; that a number of Japanese police officers had already been stationed in the interior of South Manchuria and had been recognized by the local officials of the localities concerned, since intercourse had been conducted between them; and that such a privilege was "but a corollary of the right of extraterritoriality."

In reply to this, the Chinese Government stated that as there were already treaty provisions concerning the protection and control of Japanese subjects, there was no necessity to station Japanese police officers; that the question of police could not be associated with extraterritoriality and they could not recognize it as a corol-

lary thereof; that since the conclusion of extraterritoriality treaties, no such claim had ever been heard; and that in regard to the Japanese police stations already established, they and the local authorities had repeatedly lodged their protests, and wished again to protest and ask for their removal.

The Chinese Government now continue to hold the above view as regards the Japanese police agencies in Manchuria and desire again to urge their immediate withdrawal, along with the foreign troops and military guards now stationed in China without legal justification.

III. Withdrawal of Foreign Post Offices and Agencies for Wireless and Telegraphic Communications

Foreign Post Offices began to open branches and agencies in the principal Treaty Ports of China in the early sixties of last century. The opening of these offices was not based on any treaty provision or concession. Their existence and gradual increase since has merely been tolerated by the Chinese Government.

About the same time a regular service for the carriage of mails was established on Western lines in connection with the Customs, operating chiefly between the numerous Ports on the coast of China and those far up the Yangtze River. The service continued to work and improve its machinery year by year till at last, in 1896, it was established by an Imperial Decree as a separate Government Department, with a full staff of Commissioners and subordinates devoting their whole time to the work and entirely distinct from the Customs staff.

This connection of the Postal Service with the Customs continued till 1911, when it was entirely detached and placed under the direct control of the Ministry of Communications.

Though China had been formally invited to join the Universal Postal Union as early as 1878, she hesitated to do so until she could feel that her organization was complete for the work, and it was not till 1914 that the final step was taken. Since September of that year the Chinese Postal Department has functioned successfully as a member of the Universal Postal Union, having been placed in the first class and contributing as much towards the general expenses as any other member.

When the Postal Department was transferred from the Customs to the Ministry of Communications in 1911, it had already spread its nets widely over the whole of China, well into the regions of Mongolia, as far as Kashgar and the frontiers of Russia. In that year the number of offices and agencies that had been established amounted to 6,201, and in 1917, the number had increased to 9,103.

The mail lines over which the service was carried on (including a small percentage in which railway, steamer, and river boat facilities were availed of) amounted at the end of 1917 to over 520,000 *li* (equal to, say, 173,000 miles), the aggregate distance having increased some 34,000 *li* since 1914.

The work done has advanced with equal strides. In 1917 the articles or pieces of mail matter dealt with amounted to a gross total of 965,748,371 pieces, as compared with 692,182,200 in 1914 and 421,000,000 odd in 1911.

In addition a parcel post has been established which is freely availed of. In 1917, 11,465,061 parcels were handled, the declared value of which was $136,137,200 and the weight 39,797,271 kilos, say approximately 40,000 tons.

A Registration Section has also been established with a system of insuring letters and parcels. Parcels are also now received on which money has to be collected at the place of delivery, that is, parcels with "trade charges" attached or "cash-on-delivery" parcels.

A Money Order Section which is largely availed of has also been in working for some years. Orders to the number of 1,030,000, and of the aggregate value of $21,523,000, were issued in 1917. Especially to be noted is the use made of this money order service by the British and French Governments as the channel for the payment of monthly allotments to families of tens of thousands of laborers who have gone abroad to serve in Labor Corps in France and Flanders. The amount issued to the British Emigration Bureau of Wei-hai-wei alone totalled over $1,000,000 for the last nine months of 1917. In the handling of these money orders which were sent to over 25,000 families mostly residing in remote places in Chihli and Shantung, it is a significant fact that not one order was lost in transmission.

In the beginning the service was unavoidably run at a loss, but within the last few years the Postal Service has become more than self-supporting as the following approximate figures for 1917 show:

Revenue—$8,546,000 Expenses—$7,124,000

giving a surplus of $1,422,000 available for improvements and developments.

It is to be noted also that there was very little interruption of the Postal Service in China during the Revolution, even in the remotest parts of the country.

To carry on an establishment so extensive as described necessarily requires a large staff. At the end of December, 1917, the Foreign Staff, which had been reduced owing to the War, amounted to over a hundred—Commissioners, Deputy Commissioners, Assist-

ants and Postal officers—of various friendly nationalities. On the same date the total Chinese staff of all ranks amounted to 25,867. It may be added that it is not the intention of the Chinese Government to dispense with the services of foreigners in their Postal Department as long as their assistance is considered necessary or desirable.

From the foregoing outline of the growth of the Chinese Postal Service, from its modest beginnings over fifty years ago, it will be seen how the institution has gradually developed to its present dimensions, becoming complete in all its branches and discharging its functions with thorough efficiency and having already for over five years taken its place as a fully equipped member of the Universal Postal Union.

Having thus proved itself fully competent to carry on satisfactorily all the functions of a post office the Chinese Government are of opinion that the time has now come when their own postal service should become the sole establishment of the kind carrying on postal work within the limits of the Chinese territory, as is the rule in every other independent country. They, therefore, giving the said offices ample time to wind up their affairs, submit to the Conference that all foreign post offices be withdrawn from China on or before January 1st, 1921.

Furthermore, in connection with the withdrawal of foreign post offices, the Chinese Government must demand that no foreign wireless or telegraphic installations of any kind shall be set up on Chinese territory and that all such installations as may have already been set up on Chinese territory shall be handed over forthwith to the Chinese Government upon due compensation being given.

IV. Abolition of the Consular Jurisdiction

It is hardly necessary to dwell on the incompatibility of consular jurisdiction with the exercise of the right of territorial sovereignty. Suffice it to say that the consular jurisdiction in China is not and was not based upon any principle of International Law, but was merely created by the Treaties. Among the treaty stipulations which brought consular jurisdiction into existence, we may mention Art. XIII of the Sino-British Treaty of 1843 which was abrogated by and substantially incorporated into the Sino-British Treaty of Tientsin in Arts. I, XV, XVI and XVII; Arts. XXI and XXV of the Sino-American Treaty of 1844; and Arts. XXV, XXVII and XXVIII of the Sino-French Treaty of the same year. The reasons assigned to justify the introduction of the system into China were the then fundamental difference between the Chinese and the

foreign laws and the imperfection of the Chinese judicial machinery.

That this system is admittedly a makeshift to be eventually abandoned, is clearly shown by the Art. XII of the Sino-British Treaty of 1902 which provides: "China having expressed a strong desire to reform her judicial system and bring it into accord with that of Western nations, Great Britain agrees to give every assistance to such reforms, and she will also be prepared to relinquish her extraterritorial rights when she is satisfied that the state of Chinese laws, the arrangements for their administration, and other considerations warrant her in so doing." Similar provisions are found in Art. XV of the Sino-American Commercial Treaty of 1903, and in Art. XI of the Sino-Japanese Commercial Treaty of the same year.

The several friendly Powers having thus given their formal and explicit promise, the primary question to be answered is, therefore, whether the state of Chinese laws and the arrangements for their administration have attained a point to satisfy these and other treaty Powers and warrant them in relinquishing their extraterritorial rights. While we do not claim that the Chinese laws and their administration have now reached such a state as has been attained by the most advanced nations, we do feel confident to assert that China has made very considerable progress in the administration of justice and in all matters pertaining thereto since the signing of the above-mentioned Commercial Treaties. Let us enumerate a few instances:

1. China has adopted a National Constitution prescribing, among others, the separation of governmental powers, assuring to the people their inviolable fundamental rights of life and property, and guaranteeing the complete independence and ample protection of judicial officers and their entire freedom from interference on the part of the executive or legislative powers.

2. She has prepared five Codes, namely, the Criminal, Civil and Commercial Codes, and the two Codes of Procedure in civil and criminal cases. Some of them are provisionally in force, as the Provisional Criminal Code and some chapters of the Codes of Procedure; others are duly promulgated, as the Law for the Organization of the Judiciary, the Provisional Regulations of the High Courts and their Subordinate Courts, the Ordinance for Commercial Matters, and so on. These different codes and laws have been carefully adopted from those of the most advanced nations and made adaptable to the situations in China.

3. Three grades of new courts have been established, namely: District Courts, High Courts or Courts of Appeal, and the Ta-li-yuan or the Supreme Court in Peking. Side by side there has been

established also the system of procuratorates with three corresponding grades.

4. Among the improvements in legal proceedings, we may mention the complete separation between civil and criminal cases, the publicity of all trials and judgments rendered; and in criminal cases weight is laid on circumstantial evidence and personal testimony, the employment of corporal punishment to coerce confessions having long been abolished. The system of legal counsel is also in vogue, but no one is allowed to practice the profession unless he has passed regular examinations or met certain equivalent requirements.

5. The judicial officers of all the courts, high and low, have received regular legal training, and a large number of them have studied in universities abroad..

6. The prison and police systems have been reformed and improved, and the success of these reforms is evident to all.

In view of the satisfactory results China has already obtained and the progress she has been making from day to day in the domain of legislative and judicial reforms, the reasons for the introduction of consular jurisdiction into China have ceased to exist, and the day when the conditions provided in the Treaties of 1902-1903 will be fulfilled is not far distant. Furthermore, the maintenance of this system will appear to be still less justifiable if we look at the serious defects in its working:

Firstly, we find defect due to the diversity of laws to be applied. The prevailing rule by which the consular jurisdiction is determined is that of defendant's nationality: claims against Englishmen must be made in English Courts, against Frenchmen in French Courts, against Americans in American Courts, and so forth. What constitutes an offense or cause of action in one consular court may not be treated as such in another. It is for this reason that different decisions are given, while the facts are exactly the same, and this inequality of treatment hurts the sentiment of equity and justice.

The second defect is the lack of effective control over witnesses or plaintiffs of another nationality. Where the testimony of a foreign witness of a nationality different from that of the defendant is required, the court is dependent upon his voluntary action, and if, after he has voluntarily appeared, he should decline to answer questions, he could not be fined or committed for contempt of court, nor could he be punished by that court if he should commit perjury. So also a foreign plaintiff cannot be punished by that court for perjury or contempt of court. From the same want of control over a foreign plaintiff arises another grave flaw in the system of consular jurisdiction. If the defendant has no defense

against the plaintiff but has a counter-claim, the court cannot entertain the counter-claim, however obvious the validity of that counter-claim may be.

The third defect is the difficulty of obtaining evidence where a foreigner commits a crime in the interior. By the treaty, if a foreigner while traveling in the interior, commits any offense against the law, "he shall be handed over to the nearest Consul for punishment, but he must not be subjected to any ill-usage in excess of necessary restraints." "This, rendered into plain language," said the American Minister, Mr. Reed, "means that the foreigner who commits a rape or murder a thousand miles from the seaboard is to be gently restrained, and remitted to a Consul for trial, necessarily at a remote point, where testimony could hardly be obtained or ruled on."

The fourth defect lies in the conflict of consular and judicial functions. The first duty of a Consul is to look after the interests of his nationals. It is, therefore, scarcely consistent to add to that duty the task of administering justice. When a complaint is brought against his nationals, the duty of protection of a class and the administration of impartial justice between that class and others cannot but clash. Such a practice is obviously contrary to the modern principle of the separation of administrative and judicial functions.

Not to mention many other grounds, the inherent defects in the working of the artificial system are in themselves sufficient grounds for its abolition. It has, therefore, manifested a marked tendency to disappear everywhere sooner or later. It was totally abolished in Japan in 1899, by the treaties concluded successively with the several Powers as a consequence of the codification of the Civil, Commercial and Criminal Laws, and the promulgation of the Law of Judicial Organization. In Siam, the reorganization of local courts brought Great Britain, France and other Powers to consent to a partial surrender of the right of jurisdiction to the territorial authorities and to a future extension of their competence after the accomplishment of certain determined reforms.

China, therefore, asks that the system will also disappear in China at the expiration of a definite period and upon the fulfillment of the following conditions:

1. The promulgation of a Criminal, a Civil, and a Commercial Code, a Code of Civil Procedure and a Code of Criminal Procedure.

2. The establishment of new courts in all the districts which once formed the chief districts of the old prefectural divisions, that is to say, in fact, in all the localities where foreigners reside.

China undertakes that by the end of 1924, the above-mentioned conditions shall be fulfilled. On the other hand, she requests the

Treaty Powers to give their promise that upon the fulfillment of the conditions they will at once relinquish their consular jurisdiction and the jurisdiction of their special courts (if they have any) in China.

Before, however, the actual abolition of consular jurisdiction, China asks furthermore the Powers to give immediately their consent to:

a. That every mixed case, civil or criminal, where the defendant or accused is a Chinese be tried and adjudicated by Chinese Courts without the presence or interference of any consular officer or representative in the procedure or judgment.

b. That the warrants issued or judgments delivered by Chinese Courts may be executed within the concessions or within the precincts of any building belonging to a foreigner, without preliminary examination by any consular or foreign judicial officer.

In conclusion, it may be added that not China alone will be benefited by the abolition of consular jurisdiction.

From the technical point of view, the Treaty Powers themselves, too, will see in the system of a single jurisdiction the disappearance of the inconveniences which reveal themselves in controversies among the foreigners of different nationalities—inconveniences of the same nature as those which present themselves in cases between the Chinese and foreigners.

Furthermore, the whole Chinese people will appreciate the goodwill of the Powers who give a satisfaction to their ardent desire to see the disappearance of all inequalities in judicial matters, which exist on the Chinese soil between the nationals and foreigners. As a result of the more general application of the laws of the country by the national courts, the administration will become more efficient, and the people themselves will urge the Government to open the whole country to the trade and residence of foreigners.

The abolition of consular jurisdiction will from that time bring about, as a consequence, the development of international commerce which will be beneficial both to China and the foreign Powers.

V. Relinquishment of the Leased Territories

The existence of leased territories in China, which jeopardizes the territorial integrity of China, is due, in the original instance, to the aggressions of Germany whose forcible occupation of Shantung Province constrained the Chinese Government to grant a lease for ninety-nine years of the Bay of Kiaochow in Shantung Province, the finest harbor on the coast of China.

In November, 1897, two German missionaries were murdered in

the interior of Shantung. A German squadron at once occupied Kiaochow and demanded reparation. The murderers were executed, certain Chinese officials were punished for lax conduct, an indemnity was paid, and two expiatory chapels erected. Measured by even an exacting standard, the satisfaction accorded to Germany appeared ample and definitive.

But the incident was not allowed to end with China's grant of full redress. No sooner had the case been settled than the German Minister in Peking, Baron von Heyking, approached the Chinese Government with the proposal that Kiaochow Bay should be *leased* to Germany. To give moral support to his proposal, a German squadron under the command of the Emperor's brother Prince Henry of Prussia was despatched to Chinese waters, the Prince being enjoined by the Emperor at a farewell banquet to be prepared to "strike with his mailed fist." In view of the international situation with which she was confronted, China was constrained to accept the proposal and on March 6, 1898, signed a convention setting aside a zone of 50 kilometers (33 miles) around the Bay of Kiaochow at high water for the passage of German troops therein at any time, and agreeing to a lease for ninety-nine years of both sides of the entrance to the Bay of Kiaochow, including a certain number of islands, with the right to construct fortifications. In the same convention, Germany obtained the right to build certain railways traversing the Province and to prospect for and work mines within ten miles along the railways, as well as a preference for German subjects, German materials and German capital in case foreign assistance was needed in the Province, which is larger than England and Wales.

Germany having obtained a fortified outpost on the coast of China, Russia, invoking the doctrine of balance of power, presented to the Chinese Government on the day the Lease Convention of Kiaochow was concluded a demand to which a time limit was given for a favorable reply that Port Arthur and Ta-lien-wan and the adjacent waters should be leased to her in order that the Russian fleet might have a "secure base," and that she should be given, among other things, the right to build a railway to be guarded by Russian soldiers traversing the Manchurian Provinces from Port Arthur and Ta-lien-wan to join the trans-Manchurian Russian railway at Harbin, the concession to construct which had been granted to Russia two years earlier.

Yielding again to the pressure Russia was able to bring, the Chinese Government consented on March 27, 1898, to lease Port Arthur and Ta-lien-wan to Russia for a period of twenty-five years, and at the same time granted her other demands.

It may be stated that by the Treaty of Portsmouth, of Septem-

ber 5, 1905, which terminated the war between Japan and Russia, the latter agreed to transfer to Japan the lease of the two ports and adjacent territories and waters together with the rights and privileges belonging to the lease, "with the consent of the Government of China." This consent was accorded by China on December 22, 1905.

Following the lease of Kiaochow Bay to Germany and that of Port Arthur and Ta-lien-wan to Russia, France obtained from China on April 22, 1898, the lease of Kwang-chou-wan on the coast of Kwangtung Province for ninety-nine years and Great Britain the lease, also for ninety-nine years, of an extension of Kowloon and the adjoining territory and waters close to Hongkong on June 9, 1898, and the lease "for so long a period as Port Arthur should remain in the occupation of Russia" of the port of Wei-hai-wei on the coast of Shantung on July 1, 1898. Both Great Britain and France based their claims for the leases on the ground of the necessity of preserving the balance of power in the Far East.

While the measures and extent of control by the lessee Powers over the leased territories vary in the different cases, the leases themselves are all limited, as is seen above, to a fixed term of years. Expressly or impliedly they are not transferable to a third Power without the consent of China. Though the exercise of administrative rights over the territories leased is relinquished by China to the lessee Powers, during the period of the lease, the sovereignty of China over them is reserved in all cases. Moreover, in most of the lease conventions, it is provided that Chinese vessels of war should enjoy the equal right with the lessee Powers of using the leased ports as naval bases (though in the Lease Convention of Kwang-chow-wan this right was conditioned on China remaining in the state of neutrality).

From the foregoing account it appears clear that the leased territories remain part of Chinese territory, though encumbered with certain restrictions in regard to the exercise of administrative rights therein by the territorial sovereign. They are creatures of compact different from cessions in fact and in law.

These territorial leases do not, therefore, appear to have adequate reason for continuance. Not only were they granted by China under pressure, real or potential, but they were demanded by the Powers in the main avowedly to create balance of power, not as between China and another country, but as between rival foreign aspirants to power and advantage, at a time when the territorial integrity of China under the misrule of the Manchu Dynasty appeared to be in imminent grave danger. Twenty years have elapsed since then, and conditions have entirely altered. With the

elimination of German menace in particular, an important disturbing factor to the peace of the Far East has been removed, while the approaching formation of a League of Nations to prevent wars of aggression seems to provide an added reason for dispensing with the necessity of maintaining a balance of power in the Far East, which was the principal ground of their original claims, and therefore a new ground for the interested Powers to relinquish their control over the territories leased to them.

The Chinese Government feel, moreover, that the existence of these leased territories has greatly prejudiced China's interests. Situated, as they all are, at strategic points of the Chinese territory, these foreign leaseholds have not only hampered her work of national defense and, constituting in China a virtual *imperium in imperio,* have been a menace to the integrity of her territory, but because of the shifting conflict of interests of the different lessee Powers, they have involved China more than once in complications and controversies of their own, especially in the cases of actual hostilities between them.

Furthermore, some of these territories are utilized, with a view to economic domination over the vast adjoining regions, as *points d'appui* for developing spheres of interest, to the detriment of the principle of equal opportunity for the commerce and industries of all nations in China.

As the prolongation of the foreign control over the leased territories constitutes a continued hardship, whose injurious effects tend from day to day to increase, the Chinese Government feel in duty bound to ask for the restitution of these territories, with the assurance that, in making this proposal, they are conscious of, and are prepared to undertake, such obligations as the relinquishment of control may equitably entail on them as regards the protection of the rights of property-owners therein and the administration of the territories thus restored to the complete control of China.

VI. Restoration of Foreign Concessions and Settlements

The right of foreigners to reside and trade in China was definitely provided, for the first time, in the Sino-British Treaty of August 29, 1842, the second article of which allowed British subjects "to reside for the purpose of carrying on their mercantile pursuits, without molestation or restraint at the Cities and Towns of Canton, Amoy, Foochow, Ningpo, and Shanghai." To facilitate the enjoyment of this right, the Supplementary Treaty of October 8, 1843, provided, in Article 7, that "the ground and houses . . . shall be set apart by the local officers in communication with the Consul." Accordingly, land was set apart in the

five ports for the use of British subjects, arrangements having been made by the local authorities in communication with the British Consuls.

The citizens or subjects of several other Powers acquired, by treaty with China, rights similar to those conferred on British subjects, and in some cases similar arrangements were made.

Since 1842 many new ports have been added to the list of localities already opened to foreign trade and residence; and in a number of these new places, too, special quarters have been designated for the use of foreign citizens or subjects for purposes of residence and trade.

These special areas in the open ports are generally known as "Concessions" or "Settlements." As these Concessions were granted individually to various treaty Powers, a number of them may be found in one and the same port, for example, at Tientsin or Hankow. In Shanghai, the British and American Concessions were amalgamated in 1854 into one Concession which is now called the International Settlement. The French Concession there still exists as a separate entity.

These Concessions, which remain Chinese territory and in which foreign property-holders are under obligation to pay a land tax to the Chinese Government as the Chinese do, are governed either by the Consul of the State in whose favor the Concession has been granted, or by a Municipal Council elected by foreign taxpayers residing therein. The Council or the Consul, as the case may be, administers the interests of the Concession, issues ordinances and regulations binding on all residents for the maintenance of public order, levies taxes for municipal purposes, erects public buildings, makes roads, and maintains a police force.

Although Chinese citizens constitute the bulk of the population in most of the Concessions and contribute by far the largest share of the revenue of these municipalities, they are not represented in the Municipal Councils, with the exception of the Ku-lang-soo International Settlement, the Municipal Council of which always has a Chinese member appointed by the Chinese local authority. In the Shanghai International Settlement Chinese residents, who compose over ninety-five per cent of its population, are allowed to have only an Advisory Committee of three delegates elected annually by the various Chinese commercial bodies.

These Concessions and Settlements are busy commercial centers in China which have played an important part in the development of her foreign trade and which have contributed, in no small measure, to the prosperity of the Chinese people. But they have at the same time brought into existence certain practices and claims on the part of the foreign authorities of the Concessions for power

and jurisdiction which have at once impaired the sovereignty of China and hampered her work of administration.

For one thing, China has been denied her right of plenary jurisdiction over her own citizens residing within the Concessions. For example, Chinese residents therein cannot be arrested by Chinese authorities except with the approval of the Consul of the State in whose favor the Concession has been granted, or if in the International Settlement at Shanghai, of the Senior Consul; and if the particular Chinese is in some way connected with a foreign firm or family, then the consent of the Consul of the State to which such firm or family belongs must also be obtained. If in the International Settlement at Shanghai a Chinese commits a crime on another Chinese or is sued by another Chinese, he, even though the case involves no foreigner or foreign interests, must be tried before a Mixed Court, wherein a foreign assessor not only watches the proceedings but virtually tries and decides the case. If Chinese fugitives from justice take shelter within the Concession, they cannot be reached by the Chinese authorities, except when the warrants are approved by the foreign authorities of the Concession.

Besides, Chinese troops are denied the right of passage through these Concessions, though they are part of Chinese territory. Thus China's right of eminent domain is not given due recognition by the foreign authorities of the Concessions.

The assertion of exclusive authority and power has made each concession virtually *"un petit état dans l'état,"* to the impairment of China's rights as a territorial sovereign. Such a development was hardly within the contemplation or intention of those who helped organize them. In his instructions to Sir Frederick Bruce, British Minister at Peking, April, 8, 1863, Earl Russell, British Secretary for Foreign Affairs, stated:

"The lands situated within the limits of the British Settlement are without doubt Chinese territory, and it cannot reasonably be held that the mere fact of a residence within those limits exempts Chinese subjects from fulfilling their natural obligations."

Later in the same year, the foreign representatives at Peking met in conference and agreed upon certain principles upon which the reorganization of the foreign Settlement in Shanghai should be, and was until recently, based. These are:

"1. That whatever territorial authority is established shall be derived directly from the Imperial Government through our Ministers.

"2. That such shall not extend beyond simple municipal matters, roads, police and taxes for municipal objects.

"3. That the Chinese not actually in foreign employ, shall be wholly under the control of Chinese officers, as much as in the Chinese City.

"4. That each Consul shall have the government and control of his own people, as now: the municipal authority simply arresting offenders against the public peace, handing them over, and prosecuting them before their respective authorities, Chinese and others as the case may be.

"5. That there shall be a Chinese element in the municipal system, to whom reference shall be made and assent obtained to any measure affecting the Chinese residents."

The existence of the foreign Concessions has also given rise to the ever-recurring problem of extensions. As the population of the Concessions grows in size and more room is needed for expansion, demands are made upon the Chinese Government to grant extensions of territory. In view of the claim and actual appropriation of broad powers of sovereignty by the foreign Consuls or Municipal Councils on the one hand, it is not unnatural that the Chinese Government should often manifest hesitation to comply with these applications. Such delay or refusal, however, is seldom sympathetically viewed and, more often than not, it is considered as just cause for making acrimonious representations.

Besides tending thus to mar the friendly relations between China and the Power making the application, the question of Settlement extensions often gives rise to controversies among the foreign Powers. For the application of one Power for extension not infrequently leads another to make a similar application, and where the interests of the two applicants conflict, as has occurred in more than one instance, the friendly feelings between these Powers are not a little affected.

It is, moreover, to be noted that while in the more recent Concessions the exercise of these powers of municipal government is provided for in treaties, it was not so authorized in the case of the earlier grants of land for foreign trade and residence. There it was originally based on certain regulations known as the Land Regulations agreed upon by the Chinese authorities and the foreign Consuls.

In both cases, however, the necessity for the maintenance of such independent municipalities seems to have ceased to exist. When the country was first opened to foreign intercourse, the people were unaccustomed to associate with foreign nationals, and it was therefore deemed expedient to assign separate districts for the use of foreign merchants; and as these districts were undeveloped sections of the Chinese cities, it was desirable to organize some system of local government for the maintenance of public order and morals within the foreign communities. By such arrangement the Chinese authorities were able to prevent friction between Chinese and foreign subjects, while the Consuls found themselves in a better

position to exercise over their nationals the protection and control provided by the treaties.

That whatever necessity there was for separate residence has entirely ceased to prevail, appears clear from the fact that in such treaty ports as Nanking and Changsha, where no foreign Concessions exist, Chinese and foreigners live together in peace and friendship. This is true even of the existing Concessions themselves, wherein large numbers of Chinese and foreigners reside together without friction.

Besides, China has in recent years made great progress in municipal government and believes herself prepared to assume the responsibilities for effective administration which will necessarily be implied in the desired restoration of the foreign Concessions and Settlements. Not only the administration of such large cities as Peking has been modernized and conducted to the satisfaction of Chinese and foreign residents alike, but also in the German and Austro-Hungarian Concessions at Tientsin and Hankow, of which the Chinese Government assumed charge on their Declaration of War on these Powers in 1917, no serious criticism has been heard of the Chinese administration.

Nor does the maintenance of these arrangements appear now as an essential arrangement for the enjoyment of the right to trade. In the last two decades China has steadily been pursuing a policy of encouraging foreign trade and commerce. She has not only consented by treaty to add a number of places to the list of treaty ports, but she has opened on her own initiative many places in the interior to foreign trade. In the places voluntarily opened by China, such as Tsinan for example, foreigners who are required to observe the Chinese municipal and police regulations on the same footing as Chinese, have found no discouragement in that requirement. They are steadily moving into these places which, though only recently opened to foreign trade, are rapidly becoming prosperous business centers.

In view of the foregoing considerations the Chinese Government entertain a most earnest desire to have all the foreign Concessions and Settlements returned to China and request the Governments of those Powers which now hold one or more Concessions in China, to agree to such restoration. China is ready to enter into negotiations for the purpose, and make such arrangements as may be necessary for effecting the restoration and for securing and safeguarding the right of leasing land in the treaty ports generally.

Realizing that there are considerable foreign vested interests in the Concessions and Settlements and desiring to avoid giving them any cause for concern, the Chinese Government are also prepared to consent that such arrangement, when agreed to by

the interested Powers, shall take effect at the end of five years from the date of such agreement.

Pending the final restoration, the Chinese Government are desirous, however, to introduce certain modifications in the existing regulations of the foreign Concessions, mainly for the purpose of securing a more just treatment for Chinese residents therein and of preparing the way for the final restoration to China. These modifications, which would in no way affect any of the privileges enjoyed by the citizens or subjects of treaty Powers, are:

1. That Chinese citizens shall have the right to own land in all the Concessions and Settlements under the same conditions as foreigners.

2. That Chinese citizens residing in the Concessions shall have the right to vote in the election of members of the municipal councils and to be elected thereto.

3. That warrants issued and judgments delivered by competent Chinese Courts outside the Concessions shall be executed in the Concessions, without being subject to any revision whatsoever by the foreign authorities.

4. That in no foreign Concession shall a foreign assessor be allowed to take part in the trial or decision of cases wherein Chinese citizens alone are concerned.

VII. Tariff Autonomy

The existing tariff arrangement dates back to the Treaty of Nanking signed in 1842 with the representatives of Great Britain. The duties to be collected upon imported goods were fixed in the Supplementary Treaty of 1843, and consisted of specific levies calculated mostly on the basis of five per cent *ad valorem* of the values then current, but in some cases the duty was as high as ten per cent. This tariff was subsequently adopted by the other Powers when they entered into treaty relations with China. In the several treaties which China concluded in 1858 with Great Britain, France and other countries a revision took place when the rate of five per cent *ad valorem* was for the first time universally applied. These treaties contained provisions for periodical revision which were adopted in all the commercial treaties subsequently concluded with other Powers, but for one reason or another there have been only two revisions since 1858, namely, in 1902 and in 1918. In both cases, however, only the values of goods were revised, the uniform five per cent *ad valorem* rate remaining unchanged.

This tariff is not only unfair but also unscientific in so far as articles of prime necessity are charged duties at the same rate

as articles of luxury, with results seriously detrimental to Chinese finance and trade. The reasons are briefly as follows:

1. *No Reciprocity.* By these treaties and by the most-favored-nation clause China has given to all the Powers a conventional tariff. By the latter clause any one Power is entitled to claim whatever rights or privileges which are granted to another Power, but in return China receives no reciprocal treatment. Thus every treaty Power enjoys the benefit of China's five per cent tariff, but her goods entering the ports of those countries are not entitled to the corresponding benefit. This non-reciprocity is contrary to international usage according to which tariff concessions are always on a mutual and compensatory basis.

2. *No Differentiation.* Since the abandonment of the principle of differentiation in 1858 all goods, from luxuries to necessaries, including raw materials, are taxed at exactly the same rate. How far this is at variance with the common practice in other countries can be easily seen from the following tables:

IMPORT DUTY ON LUXURIES COLLECTED BY DIFFERENT COUNTRIES IN 1913

	Tobacco		Spirits	
	£ s d		£ s d	
England	8 6	per lb.	15 2	per gallon
United States	18 9	" " & 25%	10 10	" "
France	1 7 2½	" "	2 6½	" "
Japan	355%		10 2	" "
China	5%		4½	" "

The figures shown in the above table speak for themselves.

Owing to the extremely low rate, consequently insufficient revenue, many articles which ought to be free of duty are also taxed for revenue purposes. This can be shown by a comparison of the percentage of value of articles imported free of duty into China with that of other countries in 1913. (The figures of this year are quoted because it was just before the war during which conditions became normal.)

China	6.5%
Japan	49.5%
France	50.0%
United States	54.5%
England	90.7%

How far this uniform tariff is unfitted to the present conditions can be illustrated by the following comparison:

NUMBER OF ARTICLES ENUMERATED IN THE REVISED TARIFFS	VALUE OF IMPORT IN THE CORRESPONDING PERIODS (EXCLUDING OPIUM)
In the year 1858 ..... 138 articles	About 30 million taels
" " " 1902 ..... 332 "	" 545 " "
" " " 1918 ..... 598 "	" 280 " "

Thus it will be seen that during the last sixty years, although the number of articles enumerated increased more than four times, and the volume of trade eighteen times, the principle of a uniform five per cent tariff has remained absolutely unchanged. In 1858 China consented to such a uniform rate because foreign trade was then comparatively unimportant, but since then foreign trade has grown considerably. She now finds not only the distribution of the burden exceedingly unfair, but her national economy is seriously affected by the lack of encouragement of the import of raw materials and machinery and by the abnormal increase in the import of luxuries.

3. *Insufficiency of Revenue.* The treaty tariff of five per cent *ad valorem* is obviously much lower than that which exists in other countries, but even that rate is only nominal, for the periodical revision provided for by the treaties has never been carried out in due time, and when it has been effected, the basis of valuation adopted is always lower than the actual value at the time: for example, in 1902 the average prices of 1897-1899 were taken and in 1918, those of 1912-1916. Thus owing to the steady increase in the value of commodities imported, the actual duties paid at any given time are always lower than current prices would demand. Moreover, the import duty forms a very small percentage of the annual state revenue. Take for instance, in 1914, the total ordinary revenue was 280 million taels, while the import duty only yielded 18 million taels, thus forming less than seven per cent. The Chinese Government are, therefore, forced to raise money by some other means, and many taxes, admittedly bad, have to be retained: for example, the inland taxation, known as *li-kin* and similar taxes, which is universally condemned both by Chinese and foreigners, but as it gives the Government a revenue of forty million taels, it has to be tolerated.

The evils of *li-kin* taxation have long been recognized by the Powers themselves. Thus in the commercial treaties with Great Britain, the United States and Japan in 1902-1903, it was agreed, *inter alia,* to increase the tariff from five per cent to twelve and one-half per cent, if China would abolish *li-kin,* but this could only be effected if *all* the treaty Powers "have signified their acceptance of these engagements." The last condition has made the treaty stipulation practically a dead letter, as unanimity among so many Powers has been impossible of attainment. It is clear, therefore, that in the matter of tariff China does not enjoy the same right as is granted practically to all other nations.

4. *No Real Revision.* It is to be observed that the five per cent tariff was fixed in 1858, and there has never been any real revision of it since, as the so-called revisions in 1902 and in 1918

were merely re-estimates of prices which were the bases on which the specific duties were calculated and levied. Thus for more than half a century China's tariff has undergone no modification in the rate of levy.

To conform to the aim and object of the League of Nations it is urgently desired that the right of China to revise the existing tariff conventions should be recognized and agreed to by the friendly Powers. The Chinese Government regard the Peace Conference as a unique opportunity because such revision requires the consent of all the treaty Powers which is practically impossible to obtain under ordinary conditions.

What the Chinese Government desires to be agreed to by the Conference in principle is that the present tariff should be superseded two years henceforth by the general tariff which is applied to the trade of non-treaty Powers, but in the meantime China is willing to negotiate with the treaty Powers with a view to arranging the new conventional rates for those articles in which they are specially interested, under the following conditions:

1. Any favorable treatment thus arranged must be reciprocal.
2. A differential scale must be established so that luxuries should pay more and raw materials less than necessaries.
3. The basis of the new conventional tariff rate for necessaries must not be less than twelve and one-half per cent in order to cover the loss of revenue resulting from the abolition of *li-kin* as provided for in the commercial treaties of 1902-1903.
4. At the end of a definite period to be fixed by new treaties China must be at liberty not only to revise the basis of valuation, but also the duty rate itself.

In return for such concessions China is willing to abolish the undesirable tax of *li-kin,* so that anything that tends to hinder the development of trade may be removed once for all.

The Chinese Government do not intend to adopt a system of protective tariff nor to overtax trade, but simply demand the revision of the present tariff because it is unfair, unscientific, out of date and does not meet China's economic needs. The prolonged unfavorable balance of trade and the constant increase of national debt have created a serious financial and economic stress which can only be relieved by consolidating the system of taxation and encouraging the export trade which will in turn benefit the importers by increasing the people's purchasing power. This reform has long been overdue, and in placing China's case before the Peace Conference the Chinese Government have behind them the voice of the whole country. It is to be hoped that the friendly Powers will restore to China the same fiscal right as is enjoyed by all independent nations so that the Chinese people may develop their

natural resources, become better consumers of the world's commodities, and contribute their share to the progress and civilization of mankind.

Conclusion

In submitting the present memorandum to the Peace Conference, the Chinese Delegation are not unaware that the questions herein dealt with did not primarily arise out of this World War—a war which has brought sufferings to mankind to such a degree and extent as are unknown in history. They are, however, fully conscious of the purpose of the Peace Conference which seeks, in addition to concluding peace with the enemy, to establish a new world order upon the foundation of the principles of justice, equality and respect for the sovereignty of nations. It finds an eloquent expression in the Covenant of the League of Nations. These questions demand readjustment by the Peace Conference because, if left unattended to, they contain germs of future conflicts capable of disturbing the world peace again.

The Chinese Delegation, therefore, request that they be taken into consideration by the Peace Conference and be disposed of in the following ways:

1. *With reference to the Spheres of Influence or Interest,* that the various interested Powers will, each for itself, make a declaration that they do not have or claim any sphere of influence or interest in China and that they are prepared to undertake a revision of such treaties, agreements, notes or contracts previously concluded with her as have conferred, or may be construed to have conferred, on them, respectively, reserved territorial advantages or preferential rights or privileges to create spheres of influence or interest, which impair the sovereign rights of China.

2. *With reference to Foreign Troops and Police,* that all foreign troops and foreign police agencies now present on Chinese territory without legal justification be immediately withdrawn; that Articles VII and IX of the Protocol of September 7, 1901, be declared cancelled; and that the Legation guards and foreign troops stationed by virtue of these provisions be completely withdrawn within a period of one year from the date when a declaration to this effect is made by the Peace Conference.

3. *With reference to Foreign Post Offices and Agencies for Wireless and Telegraphic Communications,* that all foreign post offices be withdrawn from China on or before January 1, 1921; that no foreign wireless or telegraphic installations be set up on Chinese territory without the express permission of the Chinese Government; and that all such installations as may have already

been set up on Chinese territory shall be handed over forthwith to the Chinese Government upon due compensation being given.

4. *With reference to the Consular Jurisdiction,* that upon China's fulfillment of her undertaking by the end of 1924, firstly, to promulgate the Five Codes and, secondly, to establish new courts in all the districts which once formed the chief districts of the prefectural divisions, all the treaty Powers promise to relinquish their consular jurisdiction and the jurisdiction of their special courts, if any, in China; and that before the actual abolition of Consular Jurisdiction, the Powers agree:

a. That every mixed case, civil or criminal, where the defendant or accused is a Chinese citizen, be tried and adjudicated by Chinese courts without the presence or interference of any consular officer or representative in the procedure or judgment.

b. That the warrants issued or judgments delivered by Chinese courts may be executed within the Concessions or within the precincts of any building belonging to a foreigner, without preliminary examination by any consular or foreign judicial officer.*

5. *With reference to the Leased Territories,* that they be restored to China upon her undertaking such obligations as the relinquishment of control may equitably entail on her as regards the protection of the rights of property-owners therein and the administration of the territories thus restored.

6. *With reference to Foreign Concessions and Settlements,* that the Powers concerned consent to have the Concessions or Settlements held by them restored to China by the end of 1924. China also undertakes the obligations to safeguard the rights of the property-owners therein. Pending the final restoration certain modifications in the existing regulations of the foreign Concessions are desired.

* The memorandum is accompanied by sixteen appendices which are omitted here. They deal with the question of consular jurisdiction by quoting treaty provisions conferring such extraterritorial rights, and reinforce the plea for their abolition by quoting the clauses of the Provisional Constitution of March, 1912, defining the legal rights of Chinese citizens and the separation of administrative from judicial functions, as well as giving a list of places where modern courts, modern procuratorates and modern prisons have already been established in the Republic. As communicated to the Peace Conference, the appendices also include in the form of separate annexes the following: the Provisional Criminal Code, the Law of the Organisation of the Judiciary, the Ordinance for Commercial Associations, the Provisional Regulations of the High Courts and their Subordinate Courts, the Regulations for the Court of Arbitration in Commercial Matters, the Rules for the Government and Administration of Prisons, the Provisional Regulations for Detention Houses, Facts Concerning the First Model Prison of Peking, Photographs of the First Model Prison of Peking, and Photographs of thirteen Modern Prisons in China.

7. *With reference to Tariff Autonomy,* that it be declared that at the end of a definite period to be fixed by mutual agreement, China is free to regulate, of her own accord, her customs tariff, and that during the said period China is free to negotiate with the various Powers tariff conventions which shall be reciprocal in treatment, shall differentiate luxuries from necessaries and shall have as the basis of the new conventional rate for necessaries not less than twelve and one-half per cent. Pending the conclusion of such conventions, the present tariff shall be superseded by the end of 1921 by the general tariff which is applied to the trade of non-treaty Powers. China, on her part, promises to abolish *li-kin* as soon as new conventions are concluded.

CHRONICLE OF IMPORTANT EVENTS

1689 —China's first treaty with an European Power (Russia).
1842 —Treaty of Nanking between China and Great Britain.
1858 —Treaties of Tientsin.
1872 —First Chinese Educational Mission to U. S. A.
1894-5—War between China and Japan.
1898 —*Coup d'état* of "Old Buddha" Empress Dowager.
" —Leases of Kiaochow, Port Arthur, Weihaiwei, Kwangchow-wan, etc.
1900 —Boxer Outbreak in North China.
1901 —International "Boxer" Protocol.
1902-3—Promises of Great Britain, U. S. A. and Japan to surrender extraterritoriality.
1904-5—War between Japan and Russia.
1905 —Abolition of old Literary examinations.
1906 —Special constitutional investigation mission to the West.
1907 —Agreement between China and Great Britain to discontinue Opium traffic.
1911, October —Outbreak of the Chinese Revolution.
1912, February —Abdication of the Manchus and establishment of the Chinese Republic.
1912, March —Promulgation of Provisional Constitution.
1913, October —Recognition of the Chinese Republic by the Powers.
1914, August —Japan's ultimatum to Germany.
1915, January —Japan presents Twenty-one Demands to China.
1916, June —Death of Yuan Shih-k'ai and succession of General Li Yuan-hung as President.
1917, February —China's protest to Germany.
" March —China's rupture with Germany.
" June —Dissolution of Parliament by President Li.
" July —Manchu Restoration fiasco of Chang Hsun.
" August —China declares war against Germany and Austria-Hungary.
" September—Convocation of old Parliament in Canton and beginning of hostilities between North and South.
1918, October —Inauguration of Hsu Shih-ch'ang as President.
1919, May —Beginning of the Student Movement.

1919, June —Signature of German Peace Treaty at Versailles.
" September—Signature of Austrian Peace Treaty at St. Germain.
" November—Signature of Bulgarian Peace Treaty at Neuilly.
1920, May —China refuses to negotiate directly with Japan concerning restoration of Kiaochow.
" June —Signature of Hungarian Peace Treaty at Trianon.
1921, July —Ratification of Sino-German preliminary peace treaty.
" " —China accepts President Harding's invitation to participate in Washington Conferenee.

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